Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society)

[Nerthus]

Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society)


Ian Hughes


A major contribution to the discussion of community was made in the 1920's by Ferdinand Tonnies, who used the German words Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) with special meanings which have entered the language of social science.

Gemeinschaft, normally translated as 'community', refers to the closeness of holistic social relationships said to be found in pre-industrial communities, and imputed to the community as moral worth. For Tonnies, Gemeinschaft exists by the subjective will of the members: "the very existence of Gemeinschaft rests in the consciousness of belonging together and the affirmation of the condition of mutual dependence" (Tonnies 1925: 69).

Gesellschaft refers to the more instrumental, purposeful types of relationship typical of industrial society. This objective society or association (Gesellschaft), where "reference is only to the objective fact of a unity based on common traits and activities and other external phenomena" (Tonnies 1925: 67) stands in contrast to community defined by shared feeling. Tonnies considers entities based on objective common interest such as "ethnic community, community of speech, community of work" (Tonnies 1925: 67) to be Gesellschaft (society), not Gemeinschaft (community), because they lack the element of shared feeling which is essential to Gemeinschaft. Gemeinschaft type relationships may be found in modern industrial society, but they do not typify the dominant type of relationship of that society.

For Tonnies, Gemeinschaft exists by the subjective will of the members: "the very existence of Gemeinschaft rests in the consciousness of belonging together and the affirmation of the condition of mutual dependence" (Tonnies 1925: 69). Contrasted to this community defined by shared feeling, is Tonnies's concept of the objective society or association (Gesellschaft), where "reference is only to the objective fact of a unity based on common traits and activities and other external phenomena" (Tonnies 1925: 67). Tonnies considers entities such as "ethnic community, community of speech, community of work" (Tonnies 1925: 67) to be Gesellschaft (society), not Gemeinschaft (community), because they lack the element of shared feeling which is essential to Gemeinschaft.

This distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) is important for any student trying to come to grips with the complex confusion of ideas around community studies. Although it is not always referred to directly, this distinction underlies almost all sociological debate in this field.

Tonnies himself drew on previous ideas of evolutionary development constructed in the Nineteenth century. Theories of evolution led to several varieties of "social Darwinism", in which social systems were seen as analogous to biological systems. Early theories led to a concept of a broad social evolution, progressing from small close-knit rural communities to large urban societies characterised by specialisation, role differentiation and alienation.


References

Tonnies F (1925) "The Concept of Gemeinschaft", in Cahnman W J & Heberle R (Eds) Ferdinand Tonnies on Sociology: Pure, applied and empirical. Selected writings, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp62-72.

Source

[Siegmund]

It would seem reasonable to hypothesize that ethnocultural nations were bound together closely by Gemeinschaft, and that their disintegration coincided with the replacement of this bond by Gesellschaft.

Similarly, it would be interesting to find out if these notions have been picked up any modern day nationalists, German or otherwise.

[Nerthus]

Some additional information:

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are sociological categories introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies for two normal types of human association. (A normal type as coined by Tönnies is a purely conceptual tool to be built up logically, wheras an ideal type, as coined by Max Weber, is a concept formed by accentuating main elements of a historic/social change.) Tönnies' concepts of both Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, conceptionally strictly to be separated from each other, are fully discussed in his work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887, seven more German editions). Only the 2nd edition of 1912 turned out to be a success, and the juxtaposition of these two terms belonged to the general stock of concepts German pre-1933 intellectuals were quite familiar with and quite often misunderstood.

Gemeinschaft

Gemeinschaft (often translated as community) is an association in which individuals are oriented to the large association as much if not more than to their own self interest. Furthermore, individuals in Gemeinschaft are regulated by common mores, or beliefs about the appropriate behaviour and responsibility of members of the association, to each other and to the association at large; associations marked by "unity of will" (Tönnies, 22). Tönnies saw the family as the most perfect expression of Gemeinschaft; however, he expected that Gemeinschaft could be based on shared place and shared belief as well as kinship, and he included globally dispersed religious communities as possible examples of Gemeinschaft.

Gemeinschafts are broadly characterized by a moderate division of labour, strong personal relationships, strong families, and relatively simple social institutions. In such societies there is seldom a need to enforce social control externally, due to a collective sense of loyalty individuals feel for society. Historically, Gemeinschaft societies were racially and ethnically homogeneous.

Gesellschaft

Gesellschaft (often translated as society or civil society), in contrast, describes associations in which, for the individual, the larger association never takes on more importance than individual self interest, and lack the same level of shared mores. Gesellschaft is maintained through individuals acting in their own self interest. A modern business is a good example of Gesellschaft, the workers, managers, and owners may have very little in terms of shared orientations or beliefs, they may not care deeply for the product they are making, but it is in all their self interest to come to work to make money, and thus the business continues.

Unlike Gemeinschafts, Gesellschafts emphasize secondary relationships rather than familial or community ties, and there is generally less individual loyalty to society. Social cohesion in Gesellschafts typically derives from a more elaborate division of labor. Such societies are considered more susceptible to class conflict as well as racial and ethnic conflicts.

Since, for Tönnies, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are normal types, he considered them a matter of Pure Sociology, whereas in Applied Sociology, on doing empirical research, he expected to find nothing else than a mix of them. Nevertheless, following Tönnies, without normal types one might not be able to analyze this mix.

References

* Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society ed. Jose Harris, (Cambridge: 2001)
* (Ferdinand Tönnies), Ferdinand Tönnies Gesamtausgabe {TG}, critical edition, 24 vols., ed. Lars Clausen et al., (Berlin/New York (de Gruyter): 1998- )

Source

[Nerthus]

Toennies' "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft" (Community and Society)

Actions are directed either toward the preservation or the destruction of life and will. Positive Actions are those which tend to preserve life or will. Negative Actions are those which tend to destroy life or will.

1. Theory of "Gemeinshchaft" The theory of Gemeinschaft assumes that all human wills are united and that this is their natural condition. These wills are related either by blood or by marriage, through three strong types of relationships: man-wife, mother-child, and between children of the same mother.

a. The man-woman relationship is not always long and lasting, and it is based on the sexual instinct. Usually at the beginning of the relationship, it is one-sided because the man is the dominant party and the woman is passive. Later on, when they have children, the bond between man and woman becomes stronger.

b. The mother-child relationship is the most important because it is a very deep one. Nature gives the mother a helpless baby who depends on her for food, clothing, and general care. Consequently, the mother loves the child very much and this is an instinctive feeling. The child, on the other hand, returns the mother's affection and is also grateful to her for all that she gave him. Both mother and child are bound together with memories of their common past.

c. The father-child relationship resembles the relationship between brothers and sisters, only it is less intense. The father assumes authority over his children and delegates his powers to his first son in the case of primogeniture (this means that the first son inherits his father's possessions and his title). In cases where all the children inherit equally, they receive their rights directly through the father and not through the elder brother.

d. The brother-sister relationship is not based on instinct. In the old times, marriage between brothers and sisters were allowed, but it is now prohibited. The children of the same mother have memories of experiences which they had shared in the past while they were growing up together. They also are more alike, since they have a common biological heritage. Consequently we can say that the brother-sister relationship is the most "human" of man's characteristics.

There are three types of Gemeinschaft: the kinship group, the neighborhood, and friendship.

a. The kinship group live in the same house in close proximity to each other; they eat together; they have common enemies; they must protect the family honor; and they share common ancestors. This type of life fosters affection and love among the members and results in a very closely-knit group.

b. The neighborhood consists of several dwellings in close proximity to one another and the inhabitants share belief in the common deities of the village. They also share common rituals, beliefs, and customs. Therefore, there is give-and-take in the neighborhood.

c. Friendship is a mutual feeling of affection between two individuals. It is created by choice; therefore no instinct is involved. Usually the parties in a friendship situation have common likes and dislikes, and often they have similar occupations.

Gemeinschaft is maintained through two kinds of will: authority and common will.

a. Authority is created when one person's will is increased while at the same time, somebody else's will is decreased or curbed. Authority involves both rights and duties. However, as far as the authority of the Gemeinschaft type is concerned, the difference in wills cannot be great, otherwise there will not be common will.

b. Common will is the binding force which keeps a number of individuals together in the Gemeinschaft. It is based on the fact that these individuals share the same beliefs, values, and ways of behaving. The common will is expressed through language (words and gestures), because only through language we can let others know what we think, what we fear, and what we like. Only through language can we communicate and understand one another. The mother also uses language--to admonish or to praise her child, as well as to instill in him certain values and beliefs which he will have to use in order to share in the common will.

There are consequently three basic laws of Gemeinschaft. They are the following:

a. Blood relatives and married couples, neighbors and friends feel affection for each other and have common beliefs and customs.

b. This affection and similarity in beliefs and values creates "understanding."

c. By virtue of this love and understanding the members of the group tend to stay together and the result is the Gemeinschaft type of relationship.

2. Theory of the Gesellschaft. In the Gesellschaft type of relationship, a large number of individuals live in close proximity without exhibiting any of the characteristics of Gemeinschaft. There is no common will. Everyone looks after his own personal interests and does not wish to contribute anything to the community. Any expression of interest in others is regarded with suspicion. Personal property is separate and distinct, and there is no common property. Everything in the Gesellschaft type of relationship is compared, weighed, and measured, so that when a person gives something away, he is sure to receive something else which he considers of equal value and/or worth.

a. Value is the quality which an object possess in being better than another object. Who determines value? In the Gesellschaft, a thing is of value if it is possessed by one individual and not by all; those who do not possess the object in question desire to possess it. Therefore, this gives the object value. An object does not have to be practically useful in order to be considered of value.

b. The worth of an object is estimated by the amount of labor which is required for its production.

The result is that every individual in the Gesellschaft works and produces certain objects or services which he offers to other individuals in exchange for their products. At first glance, they all seem to work for each other and for the welfare of the Gesellschaft in general. At closer scrutiny, this reveals itself to be an illusion. In reality everyone looks after himself only.

Source

[Perun]

Alain de Benoist did an interesting commentary on this topic as well.

The Slavophiles upheld a similar concept to gemeinschaft known as sobornost.

[Nerthus]

Originally Posted by Perun

Alain de Benoist did an interesting commentary on this topic as well.

Yes, that's right. That is also a good source.

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: A sociological view of the decay of modern society.

Based on an original essay by Alain de Benoist, translated and interpreted by Tomislav Sunic, Juniata College Alain de Benoist is a French philosopher and the editor of the Quarterly Krisis. He is the author of several books, including Comment peut-on etrepaien Tomislav Sunic is a professor of political science who is currently affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Croatia, and is the author of The European New Right (New York, Peter Lang, 1990). Vol. 34, Mankind Quarterly,
04-01-1994, pp 263.

Peaceful modern societies which respect the individual evolved from age-old familistic ties. The transition from band-type societies, through clan and tribal organizations, into nation-states was peaceful only when accomplished without disruption of the basic ties which link the individual to the larger society by a sense of a common history, culture and kinship. The sense of "belonging" to a nation by virtue of such shared ties promotes cooperation, altruism and respect for other members. In modern times, traditional ties have been weakened by the rise of mass societies and rapid global communication, factors which bring with them rapid social change and new philosophies which deny the significance of the sense of nationhood, and emphasize individualism and individualistic goals. The cohesion of societies has consequently been threatened, and replaced by multicultural and multi-ethnic societies and the overwhelming sense of lost identity in the mass global society in which Western man, at least, has come to conceive himself as belonging.
Sociologically, the first theorist to identify this change was the Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), who emphasized the tendency for mass urban societies to break down when the social solidarity characteristic of tribal and national societies disappeared. Ibn Khaldun saw dramatically the contrast between the morality of the nationalistic and ethnically unified Berbers of North Africa and the motley collation of peoples who called themselves Arabs under Arabic leadership, but did not possess the unity and sense of identity that had made the relatively small population of true Arabs who had built a widespread and Arabic-speaking Empire. Later it was Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) who introduced this thought to modern sociology. He did so in his theory of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, 1887). This theory revealed how early tribal or national (gemeinschaft) societies achieved harmonious collaboration and cooperation more or less automatically due to the common culture and sense of common genetic and cultural identity in which all members were raised. This avoided major conflicts concerning basic values since all shared a common set of mores and a common sense of destiny. However, as history progressed, larger multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies began to develop, and these Tonnies described as being united by gesellschaft ties. These were not united by any common set of values or historical identity, and collaboration was only maintained due to the need to exchange goods and services. In short, their existence came to depend on economic relations, and as a result of the diversity of cultural values, the lack of any "family feeling," and the emphasis on economic exchange and economic wealth, conflict over wealth and basic values was likely to disrupt the harmony of such societies at any time. In political terms, liberalism developed to eulogize the freedom of individuals from claims to national loyalty and support for national destiny, while Marxism grew out of the dissatisfaction felt by those who were less successful in achieving wealth and power, which now came to represent the primary goals of the individuals who were left at the mercy of the modern mass gesellschaft society. Nationalism and any sense of loyalty to the nation as a distinct ethnic, kinship unit came to be anathomized by both liberals and Marxists.
"A specter is haunting Europe - a specter of communism" wrote Marx in the preface of The Manifesto. A century later this specter became a mere phantom, with liberalism the dominant force. Over the last several decades, liberalism used communism as a scarecrow to legitimize itself. Today, however, with the bankruptcy of communism, this mode of "negative legitimation" is no longer convincing. At last, liberalism, in the sense of the emphasis on the individual above and even against that of the nation, actually endangers the individual by undermining the stability of the society which gives him identity, values, purpose and meaning, the social, cultural and biological nexus to which he owes his very being.
Fundamentally, classical liberalism was a doctrine which, out of an abstract individual, created the pivot of its survival. In its mildest form it merely emphasized individual freedom of action, and condemned excessive bureaucratic involvement by government. But praiseworthy though its defense of individual freedom was, its claim that the ideal system is that in which there is the least possible emphasis on nationhood leads to situations which in fact endanger the freedom of the individual. In its extreme form, classical liberalism has developed into universal libertarianism, and at this point it comes close to advocating anarchy.
From the sociological standpoint, in its extreme form, modern internationalist liberalism defines itself totally in terms of the gesellschaft society of Tonnies. It denies the historical concept of the nation state by rejecting the notion of any common interest between individuals who traditionally shared a common heritage. In the place of nationhood it proposes to generate a new international social pattern centered on the individual's quest for optimal personal and economic interest. Within the context of extreme liberalism, only the interplay of individual interests creates a functional society - a society in which the whole is viewed only as a chance aggregate of anonymous particles. The essence of modern liberal thought is that order is believed to be able to consolidate itself by means of all-out economic competition, that is, through the battle of all against all, requiring governments to do no more than set certain essential ground rules and provide certain services which the individual alone cannot adequately provide. Indeed, modern liberalism has gone so far along this path that it is today directly opposed to thee goals of classical liberalism and libertarianism in that it denies the individual any inalienable right to property, but still shares with modern liberalism and with libertarianism an antagonism toward the idea of nationhood. Shorn of the protection of a society which identifies with its members because of a shared national history and destiny, the individual is left to grasp struggle for his own survival, without the protective sense of community which his forebears enjoyed since the earliest of human history.
Decadence in modern mass multi-cultural societies begins at a moment when there is no longer any discernable meaning within society. Meaning is destroyed by raising individualism above all other values because rampant individualism encourages the anarchical proliferation of egotism at the expense of the values that were once part of the national heritage, values that give form to the concept of nationhood and the nation state, to a state which is more than just a political entity, and which corresponds to a particular people who are conscious of sharing a common heritage for the survival of which they are prepared to make personal sacrifices.
Man evolved in cooperating groups united by common cultural and genetic ties, and it is only in such a setting that the individual can feel truly free, and truly protected. Men cannot live happily alone and without values or any sense of identity: such a situation leads to nihilism, drug abuse, criminality and worse. With the spread of purely egotistic goals at the expense of the altruistic regard for family and nation, the individual begins to talk of his rights rather than his duties, for he no longer feels any sense of destiny, of belonging to and being a part of a greater and more enduring entity. He no longer rejoices in the secure belief that he shares in a heritage which it is part of his common duty to protect - he no longer feels that he has anything in common with those around him. In short, he feels lonely and oppressed. Since all values have become strictly personal, everything is now equal to everything; e.g., nothing equals nothing.
"A society without strong beliefs," declared Regis Debray in his interview with J.P. Enthoven in Le Nouvel Observateur, (October 10, 1981), " is a society about to die." Modern liberalism is particularly critical of nationalism. Hence, the question needs to be raised: Can modern liberal society provide strong unifying communal beliefs in view of the fact that on the one hand it views communal life as nonessential, while on the other, it remains impotent to envision any belief - unless this belief is reducible to economic conduct?
Moreover there seems to be an obvious relationship between the negation and the eclipse of the meaning and the destruction of the historical dimension of the social corpus. Modern liberals encourage "narcissism;" they live in the perpetual now. In liberal society, the individual is unable to put himself in perspective, because putting himself in perspective requires a clear and a collectively perceived consciousness of common heritage and common adherence. As Regis Debray remarks, "In the capacity of isolated subjects men can never become the subjects of action and acquire the capability of making history." (Critique de la raison politique, op. cit. p. 207). In liberal societies, the suppression of the sense of meaning and identity embedded in national values leads to the dissolution of social cohesion as well as to the dissolution of group consciousness. This dissolution, in turn, culminates in the end of history.
Being the most typical representative of the ideology of equalitarianism, modern liberalism, in both its libertarian and socialist variants, appears to be the main factor in this dissolution of the ideal of nationhood. When the concept of society, from the sociological standpoint, suggests a system of simple 'horizontal interactions,' then this notion inevitably excludes social form. As a manifestation of solidarity, society can only be conceived in terms of shared identity - that is, in terms of historical values and cultural traditions (cf., Edgar Morin: "The communal myth gives society its national cohesion.") By contrast, liberalism undoes nations and systematically destroys their sense of history, tradition, loyalty and value. Instead of helping man to elevate himself to the sphere of the superhuman, it divorces him from all 'grand projects' by declaring these projects 'dangerous' from the point of view of equality. No wonder, therefore, that the management of man's individual well-being becomes his sole preoccupation. In the attempt to free man from all constraints, liberalism brings man under the yoke of other constraints

• which now downgrade him to the lowest level. Liberalism does not defend liberty; it destroys the independence of the individual. By eroding historical memories, liberalism extricates man from history. It proposes to ensure his means of existence, but robs him of his reason to live and deprives him of the possibility of having a destiny.

There are two ways of conceiving of man and society. The fundamental value may be placed on the individual, and when this is done the whole of mankind is conceived as the sum total of all individuals - a vast faceless proletariat - instead of as a rich fabric of diverse nations, cultures and races. It is this conception that is inherent in liberal and socialist thought. The other view, which appears to be more compatible with man's evolutionary and socio-biological character, is when the individual is seen as enjoying a specific biological and culture legacy - a notion which recognizes the importance of kinship and nationhood. In the first instance, mankind, as a sum total of individuals, appears to be "contained" in each individual human being; that is, one becomes first a "human being," and only then, as by accident, a member of a specific culture or a people. In the second instance, mankind comprises a complex phylogenetic and historic network, whereby the freedom of the individual is guaranteed by the protection of family by his nation, which provide him with a sense of identity and with a meaningful orientation to the entire world population. It is by virtue of their organic adherence to the society of which they are a part that men build their humanity.
As exponents of the first concept we encounter Descartes, the Encyclopaedists, and the emphasis on "rights"; nationality and society emanate from the individual, by elective choice, and are revokable at any time. As proponents of the second concept we find J.G. Herder and G.W. Leibniz, who stress the reality of cultures and ethnicity. Nationality and society are rooted in biological, cultural and historical heritage. The difference between these two concepts becomes particularly obvious when one compares how they visualize history and the structure of the real. Nationalists are proponents of holism. Nationalists see the individual as a kinsman, sustained by the people and community. which nurtures and protects him, and with which he is proud to identify. The individual's actions represent an act of participation in the life of his people, and freedom of action is very real because, sharing in the values of his associates, the individual will seldom seek to threaten the basic values of the community with which he identifies. Societies which lack this basic sense of national unity are inherently prone to suffer from repeated situations wherein the opposing values of its egotistical members conflict with each other.
Furthermore, proponents of nationhood contend that a society or a people can survive only when: a) they remain aware of their cultural and historical origins; b) when they can assemble around a mediator, be it individual, or symbolic, who is capable of reassembling their energies and catalyzing their will to have a destiny; c) when they can retain the courage to designate their enemy. None of these conditions have been realized in societies that put economic gain above all other values, and which consequently: a) dissolve historical memories; b) extinguish the sublime and eliminate subliminal ideals; c) assume that it is possible not to have enemies.
The results of the rapid change from national or tribal-oriented societies to the modern, anti-national individualism prevalent in contemporary "advanced" societies have been very well described by Cornelius Castoriadis: "Western societies are in absolute decomposition. There is no longer a vision of the whole that could permit them to determine and apply any political action . . . Western societies have practically ceased to be [nation] states . . . Simply put, they have become agglomerations of lobbies which, in a myopic manner, tear the society apart; where nobody can propose a coherent policy, and where everybody is capable of blocking an action deemed hostile to his own interests." (Liberation, 16 and 21 December, 1981).
Modern liberalism has suppressed patriotic nationhood into a situation in which politics has been reduced to a "delivery service" decisionmaking process resembling the economic "command post," statesmen have been reduced to serving as tools for special interest groups, and nations have become little more than markets. The heads of modern liberal states have no options but to watch their citizenry being somatized by civilizational ills such as violence, delinquency, and drugs.
Ernst Junger once remarked that the act of veiled violence is more terrible than open violence. (Journal IV, September 6, 1945). And he also noted: "Slavery can be substantially aggravated when it assumes the appearance of liberty." The tyranny of modern liberalism creates the illusion inherent in its own principles. It proclaims itself for liberty and cries out to defend "human rights" at the moment when it oppresses the most. The dictatorship of the media and the "spiral of silence" appear to be almost as effective in depriving the citizenry of its freedom by imprisonment. In the West, there is no need to kill: suffice it to cut someone's microphone. To kill somebody by silence is a very elegant kind of murder, which in practice yields the same dividends as a real assassination - an assassination which, in addition, leaves the assassin with good conscience. Moreover, one should not forget the importance of such a type of assassination. Rare are those who silence their opponents for fun.
Patriotic nationhood does not target the notion of "formal liberties, " as some rigorous Marxists do. Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate that "collective liberty," i.e., the liberty of peoples to be themselves and to continue to enjoy the privilege of having a destiny, does not result from the simple addition of individual liberties. Proponents of nationhood instead contend that the "liberties" granted to individuals by liberal societies are frequently nonexistent; they represent simulacra of what real liberties should be. It does not suffice to be free to do something. Rather, what is needed is one's ability to participate in determining the course of historical events. Societies dominated by modern liberal traditions are "permissive" only in so far as their general macrostability strips the populace of any real participation in the actual decision-making process. As the sphere in which the citizenry is permitted to "do everything" becomes larger, the sense of nationhood becomes paralyzed and loses its direction.
Liberty cannot be reduced to the sentiment that one has about it. For that matter, both the slave and the robot could equally well perceive themselves as free. The meaning of liberty is inseparable from the founding anthropology of man, an individual sharing a common history and common culture in a common community. Decadence vaporizes peoples, frequently in the gentlest of manners. This is the reason why individuals acting as individuals can only hope to flee tyranny, but cooperating actively as a nation they can often defeat tyranny.

Source

[Perun]

William S. Lind also does a good job explaining the difference between the two concepts within the context of the Iraq war in his piece "Why they[the Iraqis] fight". It's very good.


http://www.military.com/NewContent/0...102403,00.html

[Siegmund]

Originally Posted by Perun

William S. Lind also does a good job explaining the difference between the two concepts within the context of the Iraq war in his piece "Why they[the Iraqis] fight". It's very good.

Yes indeed, and worth a few comments:

The article, by Craig Gordon and Knut Royce, was titled "Iraqi Business Ties Raise Questions." It quotes a partner in a Washington firm called New Bridge Strategies, which it says "was created by a group of influential Republicans with close ties to the Bush family," as stating:

Baghdad has "not one single recognizable brand name, not one single oasis of quality, no brass, glass and steel office building, or a retail store you're familiar with... One well-stocked 7-Eleven would put 30 Iraqi shops out of business."

That statement is true, within the definitions established by Brave New World. It is also why the forces of Fourth Generation war are determined to stop Brave New World, whatever the cost.

The Baghdad at which the unnamed member of the Washington Establishment sneers represents much of the world, not only today but throughout history. It also represents Gemeinschaft, or community. In that world, relationships among people are not merely functional (you hand him a dime, he hands you a newspaper). They are multifaceted, deep and sustaining. Gemeinschaft is human nature's antidote to the isolation, anomie and cultural pessimism Brave New World engenders, and which it seeks to counter through materialism, consumerism, hedonism and solipsism. It is probably true that one well-stocked 7-Eleven would put 30 Iraqi shops out of business. But in doing so, it would tear apart the lives of hundreds of Iraqis, not just the store owners and their families, but the families who have shopped in those stores, sometimes for generations, and who know the store owners and their families as neighbors and friends.

Brave New World cannot understand these complaints. Nor can it understand why Iraqis, and other people, however poor, who continue to live in Gemeinschaft affirm life far more powerfully than the inhabitants of Brave New World's rich but empty Gesellschaft (which translates, poorly, as "society"). Nothing shows the difference better than birth rates. It is safe to say that the Iraqi birth rate is considerably higher than that of the partners in New Bridge Strategies.

While Brave New World cannot understand Gemeinschaft and the Fourth Generation forces fighting to defend it, those Fourth Generation forces understand Brave New World very well. They look at its MTV, listen to its rap music, see its clothes and manners, and know its love for this world and contempt for the next, and they understand what they are looking at: Hell.

Now Hell is something worth fighting against, just as Gemeinschaft is worth fighting for. Not only fighting, but also killing, dying and breeding, in large numbers. Fourth Generation forces do all those things enthusiastically, while the militaries of Brave New World are reluctant to do any of them. Hell, it seems, has a problem with motivation.

Here, in distilled form, is a succinct summary of why the US is doomed to lose the Iraq war - just as and for the same reason it lost the "hearts and minds" war in Vietnam. Yes, the Iraq war is about values, as Bush repeated ad nauseam in his pathetic and self-serving tv homily yesterday, but whose values? Community, however poor, vs. American commodity fetishism perhaps?

I remember years ago, when I worked overseas a bit, strolling down a street in Sri Lanka. TV had just been introduced into the country. It was the strangest experience: crowds of impoverished people in front of the windows of the shiny new stores, gazing into the luxe of the First World for the first time. Looking at their faces, I knew I was witnessing the very beginnings of the end of a part of their humanity - and I wondered what had become of a part of my own, without ever noticing.

[Marcus Marulus]

From Marcello Truzzi, Sociology: The Classic Statements. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 145-154.



FERDINAND TONNIES

On Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft




Reprinted from Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft by Ferdinand Tonnies, translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis, pp. 223-231. Copyright 1957, The Michigan State University Press.




The German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) was a major contributor to theory and field studies in sociology. [1] He is best remembered for his distinction between two basic types of social groups. [2] Tonnies argued that there are two basic forms of human will: the essential will, which is the underlying, organic, or instinctive driving force; and arbitrary will, which is deliberative, purposive, and future (goal) oriented. Groups that form around essential will, in which membership is self-fulfilling, Tonnies called Gemeinschaft (often translated as community). Groups in which membership was sustained by some instrumental goal or definite end he termed Gesellschaft (often translated as society). Gemeinschaft was exemplified by the family or neighborhood; Gesellschaft, by the city or the state. [3]



Bibliographical Notes




1. Tonnies' major work, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (first published in 1887), is available in English translation (edited and translated by Charles P. Loomis) as Community and Society (1957). It is also available in an earlier edition, which also contained some of Tonnies' later essays, as Fundamental Concepts of Sociology (1940). Tonnies ten other books, of which the major work dealing with sociology is his 1931 Einfuhrung in die Soziologie (An Introduction to Sociology), plus most of his essays, still await English translations. A full bibliography of Tonnies' work can be found in: American Journal of Sociology, 42 ( 1937), 100-101.

2. Brief critiques of Tonnies' works include: Louis Wirth, "The Sociology of Ferdinand Tonnies," American Journal of Sociology, 32 (1927), 412-422; and Rudolf Heberle, "The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tonnies: 'Community' and 'Society'," in Harry Elmer Barnes (ed.), An Introduction to the History of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp.227-248.

3. Modern applications of Tonnies' typology can be found in: Linton C. Freeman and Robert F. Winch, "Societal Complexity: An Empirical Test of a Typology of Societies," American Journal of Sociology 62 (1957), 461-466; and Charles P. Loomis and Cohn C. McKinney "Systematic Differences between Latin-American Communities of Family Farms and Large Estates," American Journal of Sociology, 61 (1956), 404-412.


______________________________________________________________

1. Order--Law--Mores

There is a contrast between a social order which--being based upon consensus of wills--rests on harmony and is developed and ennobled by folkways, mores, and religion, and an order which--being based upon a union of rational wills--rests on convention and agreement, is safeguarded by political legislation, and finds its ideological justification in public opinion.

There is, further, in the first instance a common and binding system of positive law, of enforcible norms regulating the interrelation of wills. It has its roots in family life and is based on land ownership. Its forms are in the main determined by the code of the folkways and mores. Religion consecrates and glorifies these forms of the divine will, i.e., as interpreted by the will of wise and ruling men. This system of norms is in direct contrast to a similar positive law which upholds the separate identity of the individual rational wills in all their interrelations and entanglements. The latter derives from the conventional order of trade and similar relations but attains validity and binding force only through the sovereign will and power of the state. Thus, it becomes one of the most important instruments of policy; it sustains, impedes, or furthers social trends; it is defended or contested publicly by doctrines and opinions and thus is changed, becoming more strict or more lenient.

There is, further, the dual concept of morality as a purely ideal or mental system of norms for community life. In the first case, it is mainly an expression and organ of religious beliefs and forces, by necessity intertwined with the conditions and realities of family spirit and the folkways and mores. In the second case, it is entirely a product and instrument of public opinion, which encompasses all relations arising out of contractual sociableness, contacts, and political intentions.

Order is natural law, law as such = positive law, mores = ideal law. Law as the meaning of what may or ought to be, of what is ordained or permitted, constitutes an object of social will. Even the natural law, in order to attain validity and reality, has to be recognized as positive and binding. But it is positive in a more general or less definite way. It is general in comparison with special laws. It is simple compared to complex and developed law.


2. Dissolution


The substance of the body social and the social will consists of concord, folkways, mores, and religion, the manifold forms of which develop under favorable conditions during its lifetime. Thus, each individual receives his share from this common center, which is manifest in his own sphere, i.e., in his sentiment, in his mind and heart, and in his conscience as well as in his environment, his possessions, and his activities. This is also true of each group. It is in this center that the individual's strength is rooted, and his rights derive, in the last instance, from the one original law which, in its divine and natural character, encompasses and sustains him, just as it made him and will carry him away. But under certain conditions and in some relationships, man appears as a free agent (person) in his self-determined activities and has to be conceived of as an independent person. The substance of the common spirit has become so weak or the link connecting him with the others worn so thin that it has to be excluded from consideration. In contrast to the family and co-operative relationship, this is true of all relations among separate individuals where there is no common understanding, and no time-honored custom or belief creates a common bond. This means war and the unrestricted freedom of all to destroy and subjugate one another, or, being aware of possible greater advantage, to conclude agreements and foster new ties. To the extent that such a relationship exists between closed groups or communities or between their individuals or between members and nonmembers of a community, it does not come within the scope of this study. In this connection we see a community organization and social conditions in which the individuals remain in isolation and veiled hostility toward each other so that only fear of clever retaliation restrains them from attacking one another, and, therefore, even peaceful and neighborly relations are in reality based upon a warlike situation. This is, according to our concepts, the condition of Gesellschaft-like civilization, in which peace and commerce are maintained through conventions and the underlying mutual fear. The state protects this civilization through legislation and politics. To a certain extent science and public opinion, attempting to conceive it as necessary and eternal, glorify it as progress toward perfection.

But it is in the organization and order of the Gemeinschaft that folk life and folk culture persist. The state, which represents and embodies Gesellschaft, is opposed to these in veiled hatred and contempt, the more so the further the state has moved away from and become estranged from these forms of community life. Thus, also in the social and historical life of mankind there is partly close interrelation, partly juxtaposition and opposition of natural and rational will.


3. The People (Volkstum) and the State (Staatstum)


In the same way as the individual natural will evolves into pure thinking and rational will, which tends to dissolve and subjugate its predecessors, the original collective forms of Gemeinschaft have developed into Gesellschaft and the rational will of the Gesellschaft. In the course of history, folk culture has given rise to the civilization of the state.
The main features of this process can be described in the following way. The anonymous mass of the people is the original and dominating power which creates the houses, the villages, and the towns of the country. From it, too, spring the powerful and self-determined individuals of many different kinds: princes, feudal lords, knights, as well as priests, artists, scholars. As long as their economic condition is determined by the people as a whole, all their social control is conditioned by the will and power of the people. Their union on a national scale, which alone could make them dominant as a group, is dependent on economic conditions. And their real and essential control is economic control, which before them and with them and partly against them the merchants attain by harnessing the labor force of the nation. Such economic control is achieved in many forms, the highest of which is planned capitalist production or large-scale industry. It is through the merchants that the technical conditions for the national union of independent individuals and for capitalistic production are created. This merchant class is by nature, and mostly also by origin, international as well as national and urban, i.e., it belongs to Gesellschaft, not Gemeinschaft. Later all social groups and dignitaries and, at least in tendency, the whole people acquire the characteristics of the Gesellschaft.

Men change their temperaments with the place and conditions of their daily life, which becomes hasty and changeable through restless striving. Simultaneously, along with this revolution in the social order, there takes place a gradual change of the law, in meaning as well as in form. The contract as such becomes the basis of the entire system, and rational will of Gesellschaft, formed by its interests, combines with authoritative will of the state to create, maintain and change the legal system. According to this conception, the law can and may completely change the Gesellschaft in line with its own discrimination and purpose; changes which, however, will be in the interest of the Gesellschaft, making for usefulness and efficiency. The state frees itself more and more from the traditions and customs of the past and the belief in their importance. Thus, the forms of law change from a product of the folkways and mores and the law of custom into a purely legalistic law, a product of policy. The state and its departments and the individuals are the only remaining agents, instead of numerous and manifold fellowships, communities, and commonwealths which have grown up organically. The characters of the people, which were influenced and determined by these previously existing institutions, undergo new changes in adaptation to new and arbitrary legal constructions. These earlier institutions lose the firm hold which folkways, mores, and the conviction of their infallibility gave to them.
Finally, as a consequence of these changes and in turn reacting upon them, a complete reversal of intellectual life takes place. While originally rooted entirely in the imagination, it now becomes dependent upon thinking. Previously, all was centered around the belief in invisible beings, spirits and gods; now it is focalized on the insight into visible nature. Religion, which is rooted in folk life or at least closely related to it, must cede supremacy to science, which derives from and corresponds to consciousness. Such consciousness is a product of leaning and culture and, therefore, remote from the people. Religion has an immediate contact and is moral in its nature because it is most deeply related to the physical-spiritual link which connects the generations of men. Science receives its moral meaning only from an observation of the laws of social life, which leads it to derive rules for an arbitrary and reasonable order of social organization. The intellectual attitude of the individual becomes gradually less and less influenced by religion and more and more influenced by science. Utilizing the research findings accumulated by the preceding industrious generation, we shall investigate the tremendous contrasts which the opposite poles of this dichotomy and these fluctuations entail. For this presentation, however, the following few remarks may suffice to outline the underlying principles.


4. Types of Real Community Life



The exterior forms of community life as represented by natural will and Gemeinschaft were distinguished as house, village, and town. These are the lasting types of real and historical life. In a developed Gesellschaft, as in the earlier and middle stages, people live together in these different ways. The town is the highest, viz., the most complex, form of social life. Its local character, in common with that of the village, contrasts with the family character of the house. Both village and town retain many characteristics of the family; the village retains more, the town less. Only when the town develops into the city are these characteristics almost entirely lost. Individuals or families are separate identities, and their common locale is only an accidental or deliberately chosen place in which to live. But as the town lives on within the city, elements of life in the Gemeinschaft, as the only real form of life, persist within the Gesellschaft, although lingering and decaying. On the other hand, the more general the condition of Gesellschaft becomes in the nation or a group of nations, the more this entire "country" or the entire "world" begins to resemble one large city. However, in the city and therefore where general conditions characteristic of the Gesellschaft prevail, only the upper strata, the rich and the cultured, are really active and alive. They set up the standards to which the lower strata have to conform. These lower classes conform partly to supersede the others, partly in imitation of them in order to attain for themselves social power and independence. The city consists, for both groups (just as in the case of the "nation" and the "world"), of free persons who stand in contact with each other, exchange with each other and cooperate without any Gemeinschaft or will thereto developing among them except as such might develop sporadically or as a leftover from former conditions. On the contrary, these numerous external contacts, contracts, and contractual relations only cover up as many inner hostilities and antagonistic interests. This is especially true of the antagonism between the rich or the so-called cultured class and the poor or the servant class, which try to obstruct and destroy each other. It is this contrast which, according to Plato, gives the "city" its dual character and makes it divide in itself. This itself, according to our concept, constitutes the city, but the same contrast is also manifest in every large-scale relationship between capital and labor. The common town life remains within the Gemeinschaft of family and rural life; it is devoted to some agricultural pursuits but concerns itself especially with art and handicraft which evolve from these natural needs and habits. City life, however, is sharply distinguished from that; these basis activities are used only as means and tools for the special purposes of the city.

The city is typical of Gesellschaft in general. It is essentially a commercial town and, in so far as commerce dominates its productive labor, a factory town. Its wealth is capital wealth which, in the form of trade, usury, or industrial capital, is used and multiplies. Capital is the means for the appropriation of products of labor or for the exploitation of workers. The city is also the center of science and culture, which always go hand in hand with commerce and industry. Here the arts must make a living; they are exploited in a capitalistic way. Thoughts spread and change with astonishing rapidity. Speeches and books through mass distribution become stimuli of far-reaching importance.

The city is to be distinguished from the national capital, which, as residence of the court or center of government, manifests the features of the city in many respects although its population and other conditions have not yet reached that level. In the synthesis of city and capital, the highest form of this kind is achieved: the metropolis. It is the essence not only of a national Gesellschaft, but contains representatives from a whole group of nations, i.e., of the world. In the metropolis, money and capital are unlimited and almighty. It is able to produce and supply goods and science for the entire earth as well as laws and public opinion for all nations. It represents the world market and world traffic; in it world industries are concentrated. Its newspapers are world papers, its people come from all corners of the earth, being curious and hungry for money and pleasure.


5. Counterpart of Gemeinschaft



Family life is the general basis of life in the Gemeinschaft. It subsists in village and town life. The village community and the town themselves can be considered as large families, the various clans and houses representing the elementary organisms of its body; guilds, corporations, and offices, the tissues and organs of the town. Here original kinship and inherited status remain an essential, or at least the most important, condition of participating fully in common property and other rights. Strangers may be accepted and protected as serving-members or guests either temporarily or permanently. Thus, they can belong to the Gemeinschaft as objects, but not easily as agents and representatives of the Gemeinschaft. Children are, during minority, dependent members of the family, but according to Roman custom they are called free because it is anticipated that under possible and normal conditions they will certainly be masters, their own heirs. This is true neither of guests nor of servants, eithe