German Idealism

[Prussian]

This thread is intended to cover the Philosophical movement that represents the school of thought known as "German Idealism", in this we will cover various influences, leading thinkers & the general nature of this movement of principle, the principle of idealism from the German perspective.

The Movement Characterized. The term "German Idealism" refers to a phase of intellectual life that had its origin in the Enlightenment as modified by German conditions. English and French representatives of the Enlightenment, giving precedence to sensation, had become empiricists and skeptics. They viewed the world as a great machine, adopted hedonism as their ethics, and interpreted history from a subjective-critical point of view. The situation in Germany was just the reverse. There thought was given precedence over sensation, and, instead of empiricism, idealism was dominant. Ethics was based on norms of universal validity, instead of on individual whim. History was interpreted genetically as a rational process; and in place of the mechanical conception of the world, an organic or dynamic view was substituted. Nature was seen to be spiritual, as well as spatial, and was interpreted teleologically. In the hands of Jacobi and Kant, Hume's skepticism became the weapon that destroyed the influence of empiricism and thus paved the way for idealism. For the Germans, at least, Rousseau's radicalism brought into question the value of the culture-ideals of the Enlightenment, and impelled them to seek the basis of culture in the creative power of the mind. For the philosopher German idealism usually means the philosophy of Kant and his immediate followers, while for the historian of literature it may seem little more than the personality of Goethe; and it is not usual to characterize the literary aspect of the movement as neo-humanism. However, there is a unity in the movement that cannot be ignored. All its varied manifestations, whether in science, philosophy, literature, art, or social life, are properly treated under the title German Idealism


Leibniz and the Pietists. Several factors contributed to the peculiarly independent character of the Enlightenment in Germany. Most notable was the influence of Liebniz and that of the Pietists. Leibniz was an essentially religious personality, and in transplanting the spirit of the Enlightenment into Germany he gave it that distinctively ethical and religious flavor which became characteristic of German Idealism. It was he who was chiefly instrumental in substituting the mechanical view of nature with a teleological one. He transformed the atoms of the materialists into monads, or psychical entities, and substituted for natural law his theory of preestablished harmony. He asserted the absolute worth of the individual against the destructive monistic pantheism of Spinoza, and saw in the progress of history a movement of the monads towards some divine end. On the one hand, he made the development of materialism and skepticism impossible in Germany, and, on the other hand, he brought about the teleological explanation of the history of the universe as a whole. The teleological and idealistic tendencies of Leibniz were strengthened through Pietism; Klopstock, Herder, Jacobi, Goethe, and Jean Paul, all betray in their works the Pietistic influence.

Kant's Transcedentalism. The conceptual framework of German Idealism was provided by Immanuel Kant who was the first to reconcile the conflicting empirical and rationalistic elements of the prevailing dogmatic philosophy. With one stroke he secured for mind priority over nature, and yet without endangering the validity of the principles of scientific investigation. By giving the primacy to practical reason, he placed religion and ethics on a sure footing and broke the ban of rationalism. In the first instance Kant's work was purely epistemological. He made it particularly his problem to rescue natural science from the (epistemological) skepticism of Hume, and then to rescue religion from nationalism. Kant demolished the rationalistic arguments of Anselm, Descartes, and others, for the existence of God. Science is valid, but it has to do only with phenomena. This phenomenal world, however, is produced a priori by the activity of consciousness, reacting on that external reality whose eternal nature cannot be known. The constancy of experience is accounted for by the very fact that the world as we know it is only the sum total of phenomena. This becomes the basis of the universal validity of certain principles of explanation. Space and time, and the categories of the understanding are subjective and thus ideal. Taken together they form a mold in which we shape the impressions coming from the unknowable, transcendent reality. Thus, the principles of science and the laws of nature are universally valid because they are in the subject, not in the object. Knowledge of ultimate reality comes through the practical reason, particularly through the a priori moral law in us. Kant's idea of inner freedom became the inspiration of the creative genius. The phase of German Idealism manifested in the art and poetry of the period has been called aesthetic-ethical idealism. The leaders of this artistic movement, who really popularized idealism and made it a part of the life of the time, were not intent on solving the old philosophical problems. For conceptual thought they substituted the creative imagination.

Lessing, Herder, and Others. Klopstock and Wieland mark the turning-point toward idealsm. However, their contemporary, Lessing, was the first representative of the movement to liberate himself completely from conventional theology and all that was arbitrary and external in German culture and find in the inner aesthetic and ethical development of the mind the ideal to be followed. Idealism in the sense in which the word is here used became even more effective in the work of Herder. His break with the Enlightenment was complete. In his large application of the idealistic method to the interpretation of science, art, and history, he practically reformed all the intellectual sciences. He, too, proceeded from an analysis of the poetic and artistic impulse, and in the creative activity of the mind he found the key to ethics, aesthetics, and religion. From this subjective, or idealistic, view-point he saw the panorama of history as a spiritualistic development. If Lessing's great work was to introduce idealism into aesthetics, particularly the aesthetics of dramatic poetry, Herder's greatest service to the idealistic cause was his application of idealism, as a method, to the interpretation of history. What Wieland, Lessing, and others had done for poetic art, this Winckelmann did for plastic art. He too found in the conception of the free creative mind the basis of ethics, aesthetics, and religion.

Goethe, Schiller, and Others. The great representatives of the idealistic type mind in German poetry were Goethe, and Schiller. Against the exclusive claims of the aesthetic view of nature, and a morality essentially classical, Goethe emphasizes the moral and religious worth of the individual, thus approaching the ethical teachings of Kant. Schiller combined the epistemology of Kant with the pantheism of Goethe. With him aesthetic values were the chief types of intellectual norms. Thus, his ethics and religion might be regarded as a phase of aesthetics. However, the aesthetic harmony that he found in the universe had an impact on his ethical and religious nature; despite his aesthetic view-point, he must be classed with Kant and Fichte as one of the great moral teachers of Germany. Schiller's only consistent follower was Willhelm von Humboldt, who was instrumental in bringing about the Neo-Humanistic reform, on the basis of the new aesthetic-ethical culture. Jean Paul was a representative of the anti-classical type of idealism.

Early Views of Fichte and Schelling. The basis of the aesthetic-ethical movement was Kant transcendental idealism. But while Kant made the idealistic position secure, he had not accounted for the reality of the world of nature, with all that it means to the poet as the expression of some divine purpose. To get at the bottom of the matter, it was felt that human consciousness as a starting-point would have to be abandoned and an absolute consciousness posited. From this reality of absolute consciousness, then, individual consciousness could be deduced in a manner, analogous to that employed by Kant. The first to attempt such a comprehensive solution of the problem was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Starting from Kant's idealistic position he tried to overcome the dualism involved in Kant's doctrine of a (thing in itself) by bringing this mysterious reality into consciousness. To do this he dropped the Kantian distinction between practical and theoretical reason, and conceived of the absolute mind, or ego, as moral reason. In his view all existence is psychical, and the human mind is only a manifestation of the absolute ego. Thus, the last trace of an unknowable transcendent reality is obliterated. The absolute ego has divided itself into a large number of relative egos, and through these it is moving progressively toward its own destiny. The core of reality lies in human personality, in the finite mind, but this is caught up in an endless process of development; Hence, to transcend his own consciousness and explain the progress of history, with reference to the past and future, the philosopher must look at existence from the point of view of the absolute ego. In this way Fichte developed his subjective realism, bringing this scheme of idealistic evolution every phase of human experience. Under his treatment, ethics, sociology, aesthetics, and religion become a part of the history of the Absolute. He overcame the dualism between individual mind and nature by dissolving both individual nature and mind. Schelling, starting from the Kant-Fichte point of view, extended the conception of the Absolute to objective nature. His system may be characterized as a sort of spiritualized pantheism. The world is a continuous process from inorganic unconscious nature to organic conscious nature, and then from organic nature back to inorganic nature. While in humans the Absolute reaches consciousness, nature remains essentially objective, but not in a materialistic sense. Nature, for Schelling, is a system of spiritual forces similar to the monads of Leibniz. Schelling worked out his so - called Identitatsphilosophie by extending to absolute consciousness the view that in consciousness subject and object are identical. The sum total of existence then becomes the Absolute as perceived by itself. Naturally, all distinctions and qualities, which are created by a finite relational consciousness, disappear in a self-contemplation of the Absolute by itself, and existence becomes neutral. If Fichte had interpreted existence ethically, Schelling interprets it aesthetically. While with Fichte the Absolute distributes itself in finite minds in order to work out its own moral development, with Schelling the Absolute comes to consciousness in humans in order that we may enjoy the aesthetic contemplation of the unity of mind and nature, the identity of mind with its sensuous content.

Romanticism. The immediate result of the metaphysical systems of Fichte and Schelling was a revival of poetic production and criticism known as Romanticism, which sprang from the school of Goethe and Schiller. The union of poetry with the metaphysical or religious view of life became a recognized principle of art; and it was this combination that secured for idealism the final triumph over the narrow naturalism and rationalism of the Enlightenment. Romanticism brought to light the connection of poetry with Christianity. Just as Schiller had taken Kant's epistemology as a basis for the explanation of the relation of aesthetics to ethics, so now the Kantian position was used to explain the relation of religion to aesthetics. Thus, from Kant's idealism came a new analysis of religion, illuminating with a new light the problems of culture. Romanticism gave depth to the historical view and dissolved into thin air those time-worn conceptions of a "law of nature," "common sense," and innate norms of the reason; this was just as the Enlightenment had formerly disposed of the idea of a supernatural, ecclesiastical norm, which rested on these conceptions. The leading spirits in the romantic movement were the two Schlegels, though Fichte, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Schelling, Novalis, and many others took a part in it. Out of Romanticism sprang a new impulse for systematic thinking; and through the political catastrophes of the time and the moral earnestness of the intellectual leaders, idealistic speculation was forced to apply its norms to practical social problems.

Later Views of Fichte and Schelling. The first to feel the pressure of the realistic-historical problems were the founders of metaphysical idealism, Fichte and Schelling. Both betray the influence of Schleiermacher. Realizing the inadequacy of their philosophy to meet practical needs, they now sought an ethical and religious ideal which should unify the concrete content of spiritual life and at the same time be a necessary deduction from the metaphysical background of existence. Fichte retained his idea of the moral state as the consummation of the historical process. However, he no longer considered this state merely as a postulate of progressive freedom, but as a concrete civilized state, in which all members of society share in the blessings of religion, morality, and art. In this remodeled view of Fichte, religion is dominant; for he finds that only religious faith makes possible the realization of the moral idea, and thus the reality of the external world. The world is ethical. It is religious faith that gives an ultimate aim to ethical conduct, that makes possible a union of the empirical ego with its metaphysical basis, that is, God. His ethics is thus deprived of its formal character as an endless progress and given a definite aim. This ethical and religious view necessitates a modification of his metaphysics. The background of empirical consciousness is no longer an endless progression of the Absolute, but a fixed and unchanging divine being. In this being the empirical ego has its origin, and through ethical conduct it returns to its source. Similarly, in view of moral and aesthetic needs, Schelling was forced to change his views. In applying the principle of identity, he destroyed the variety of existence, and thus its reality. In describing the universe as a quality-less neutrum he had only caricatured the Absolute. His philosophy disagreed with every phase of experience. Just as Fichte, so Schelling sought in religion the key to the origin and destiny of humans. The phenomenal world takes its rise in the absolute, self-determined will of God. Because of its origin, the phenomenal world necessarily works its way back up to God again. This movement back to God is a religious process, through mythology, or natural religion, up to Christianity, at which stage the union of man with God takes place. Thus, Christianity, whose dogmas are interpreted evolutionistically by Schelling, becomes the end and purpose of history; and it is upon Christianity that ethics, politics, and aesthetics are to be based.

Hegel's System. If Fichte and Schelling tried to find the purpose of existence in some concrete content (such as the moral state or the Christian religion, deducing this concept from the conception of God), Hegel solved the problem by a systematic exploitation of the conception of evolution, which with him was both a constituent and a teleological principle. The conception had been variously and obscurely employed by Leibniz, Lessing, Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, and F. Schlegel. Then, on the basis of Kant's transcendental deduction, Fichte and Schelling interpreted the process of development in a purely idealistic manner as the unconscious opposition of the Absolute to itself; this further entailed the conscious and gradual removal of this opposition by self-absorption, the double process following necessarily from the very nature of mind. Hegel makes the impulse of the absolute mind a gradual and self-determined process, by which the Absolute lifts itself from mere possibility and actuality to conscious, free, and necessary possession. Viewed sub specie aeternitatis the whole process is timeless, and only to a finite mind does it appear as an endless procession in time and space. However, it is just in this finite view that the ethical, aesthetic and religious character of Hegel's philosophy manifests itself. In the finite consciousness there is a separation of the natural, the actual, and the empirical from the spiritual, the free, and the necessary. In the unity reached by overcoming this divorce of the finite from the infinite lies religious blessedness, perfect beauty, and moral freedom. Every phase and stage of this inner teleological development is necessary to the life of the Absolute, and all variety in finite experience is preserved in the higher unity. Nothing is lost. Instead of being an undifferentiated substance, or a qualityless neutrum, the Absolute is the living, vital reality that manifests itself in human experience. This reality is spiritual , and the guiding principle of its upward movement is the fulfillment of its own divine purpose, which is religious, ethical, aesthetic. Religion and ethics are thus a necessary product of the self-explication of the Absolute, or God.

Schleiermacher. The religious turn that idealistic metaphysics had taken was due to the influence of Schleiermacher, the most specifically religious of all the great philosophers. In his own system he made use of the religious consciousness in an original and striking manner to solve the practical and theoretical problems growing out of Kant's critical philosophy. In the field of ethics he was the most conspicuous exponent of German idealism. What Hegel had deduced from the Absolute by his application of the conception of development, Schleiermacher, following the critical method of Kant, sought to attain by an analysis of empirical consciousness. In its theoretical attitude toward being, consciousness is receptive and seeks to combine the data of sense into the highest possible conceptual unity; in its practical attitude consciousness is active and transfers the aim of reason from the world of sense to the world of conscious freedom. However, in both cases thought and being always remain separate for the finite understanding. On the other hand, that essential unity of reality which makes possible any relation of thought to being, such as volition to being, is present in religious feeling. While Hegel had employed a deductive, dialectical method to show that all being is in God, Schleiermacher reached this unity by an inductive process, which was guided by feeling, instead of by pure reason. Instead of starting with a timeless and spaceless Absolute, he started with the phenomenal world. His task was to analyze the reason that dominates the actual world of history, to bring to light its various purposes, combine them into a totality representing the absolute divine purpose of the universe, the summum bonum, and to show that the power to realize this ideal lies in religious consciousness. Schleiermacher's practical religious interests now took him into the field of theology.

Herbart. Herbart stuck even more closely to the Kantian view-point, but, like other followers of Kant, he sought to eliminate the conception of an unknowable reality, and press forward to the ultimate nature of things. He adopted Kant's analysis of consciousness, but in a psychological sense, and found that the transcendental reality consists of a plurality of simple substances. These he called "reals." They are psychical in nature and analogous to the monads of Leibniz. Through their relations to one another and to human consciousness the phenomenal world is brought into existence; and from their teleological cooperation Herbart deduces a divine, creative intelligence, analogous to the monad-monadum of Leibniz, thus opposing sharply current poetic naturalism and Spinozism. Herbart's practical and social philosophy, which is based on the judgments of the soul as to the relations of the "reals" to each other, particularly on judgments expressing like or dislike, also tends toward rationalism. On account of the method employed here, Herbart calls the result aesthetics, to which he subordinates ethics. In his view the ideal society would be one based on the insight and activity of the educated, and on the rational education of youth, and realizing in its organization the natural and fundamental ethical ideas. Herbart thus became not only a reformer of psychology, but of pedagogy as well.

Schopenhauer The last great representative of German Idealism in systematic philosophy was Schopenhauer. While with him the phenomenal world is idea (that is, existing only as a subject idea) its objective basis is not a "thing in itself" as Kant taught, but a universal will. This Schopenhauer interprets as a blind, illogical, aimless impulse, without any original ethical tendency whatsoever. Through the blind impulse of this world-will arises human intelligence and the phenomenal world. History loses all teleological significance and becomes an irrational and endless progression. Ethics, therefore, as the philosophy of the ultimate purpose of the world can only proclaim the aimlessness of the cosmic process and seek to put an end to it by stilling the will. This quietizing of the will is effected by recognizing the aimlessness of the process and resigning oneself to it completely. For these teachings, Schopenhauer found a support in Buddhism, which was then just becoming known in the West. He was bitter in his hatred of the theism of Judaism, which for him exhibited selfishness and sensuality, and was the root of all deceptive theism. The pure Christianity of Christ he regarded as a sort of mystical quietism. Though his metaphysical work, De Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, appeared as early as 1819, his teachings found no popular reception till after the wane of Hegel's influence in Germany. Idealism in the Positive Sciences. The effects of this idealistic development are apparent in the positive sciences no less than in metaphysics. In accord with the idea of the oneness of the world, the natural sciences have been given a subordinate position, or else reduced to natural philosophy. The new spirit is manifested even more clearly in the historical sciences, where the genetic method is everywhere employed and individual facts are treated in relation to the whole development. For instance, the historian of literature or art now seeks to bring the facts with which he is dealing into relation with other phases of life and thus grasp the life and ideals of a nation as a whole. Similarly, the philologist is no longer satisfied with the study of one language, but seeks to correlate it with kindred tongues and reconstruct the inner life of the people. Even in the field of jurisprudence the genetic method has been adopted and particular stress laid on the development of common law. The effect of this idealistic movement may also be observed in theology. Here deistic efforts to base Christianity on a general theory of religion have been replaced by a more penetrating psychological analysis, together with a genetic view of religious history. It should be added, though, that repeated and earnest attempts have been made to rescue the core of Christianity from the general flux of history and give to it a fixed character. Since it is in the universities, chiefly, that the sciences are cultivated, naturally the universities were reorganized in conformity to the changed ideals. It was in the University of Jena that German Idealism got its first foothold. From here the new educational ideal went to the newly established universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, Bonn, Breslau, and Munich, and into the secondary schools.

Source

[Prussian]

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

German philosopher, physicist, and mathematician whose mechanical studies included forces and weights. He believed in a deterministic universe which followed a "pre-established harmony." He extended the work of his mentor Huygens from kinematics to include dynamics. He was self-taught in mathematics, but nonetheless developed calculus independently of Newton. Although he published his results slightly after Newton, his notation was by far superior (including the integral sign and derivative notation), and is still in use today. It is unfortunate that continental and English mathematicians remained embroiled for decades in a heated and pointless priority dispute over the discovery of calculus.


Leibniz made many contributions to the study of differential equations, discovering the method of separation of variables, reduction of homogeneous equations to separable ones, and the procedure for solving first order linear equations. He used the idea of the determinant 50 years before Cramer, and did work on the multinomial theorem.

Leibniz combined the Scala Naturae with his plenum (continuous) view of nature, and called the result the Law of Continuity. He believed that it was not possible to put organisms into discrete categories, stating "Natura non facit saltus" (Nature does nothing in leaps).

Leibniz was a strong believer in the importance of the product of mass times velocity squared which had been originally investigated by Huygens and which Leibniz called vis viva, the living force. He believed the vis viva to be the real measure of force, as opposed to Descartes's force of motion (equivalent to mass times velocity, or momentum). It is not entirely clear why Leibniz should have chosen mv2 as this quantity rather than Descartes' mv, but he was apparently led to the conclusion that his quantity was the more fundamental by mechanical arguments. Leibniz's contention that vis visa, not Descartes's quantity, was the most fundamental conserved quantity comes extremely close to an early statement of the Law of Conservation of Energy in mechanics. Since, however, the conservation of quantity of motion had become one of the pillars of Cartesian natural philosophy, Leibniz's suggestion that the fundamental quantity of motion was different from the one Descartes had proposed was rejected out of hand by all good Cartesians. A great controversy ensued between the German school of physical thought, which naturally supported Leibniz, and the French and English schools, whose Cartesians and Newtonians opposed him. In identifying vis viva as the fundamental quantity of motion, Leibniz was searching for some active principle that was conserved and kept the universe from "running down." Leibniz believed that his vis viva, which described the "force" of a body in motion, would fit the bill. He further realized that this quantity could never increase, since this would produce perpetual motion, a notion which he summarily dismissed as "absurd." On the other hand, Leibniz also maintained that vis viva could never decrease, since this would contradict his belief that it was equivalent to the eternity of God's creation. In fact, Leibniz vigorously clung to his concept of universal conservation of living force, which had nothing but his metaphysical beliefs to support it, even though it appeared to be violated for inelastic collision and was bitterly opposed by a large segment of the scientific community. Thus, Leibniz serves as the first example of a scientist who vehemently argued the existence of a fundamental conservation quantity based not on experimental evidence, but rather from a belief in the order and continuity of the universe. Leibniz's dispute with the Cartesians eventually died down and was forgotten. However, nearly one and a half centuries passed before conservation laws and energy would once again dominate the realm of scientific inquiry and philosophical speculation.

Principle Works of Leibniz
~ De Arte Combinatoria (‘On the Art of Combination’)-1666
~ Hypothesis Physica Nova (‘New Physical Hypothesis’)-1671
~ Discours de métaphysique (‘Discourse on Metphysics’)-1686
~ unpublished manuscripts on the calculus of concepts-c. 1690
~ Nouveaux Essais sur L'entendement humaine (‘New Essays on Human Understanding’)-1705
~ Théodicée (‘Theodicy’)-1710
~ Monadologia (‘The Monadology’)-1714

Leibniz's Contributions To Philosophy:
Leibniz is known among philosophers for his wide range of thought about fundamental philosophical ideas and principles, including truth, necessary and contingent truths, possible worlds, the principle of sufficient reason (i.e., that nothing occurs without a reason), the principle of pre-established harmony (i.e., that God constructed the universe in such a way that corresponding mental and physical events occur simultaneously), and the principle of noncontradiction (i.e., that any proposition from which a contradiction can be derived is false). Leibniz had a lifelong interest in and pursuit of the idea that the principles of reasoning could be reduced to a formal symbolic system, an algebra or calculus of thought, in which controversy would be settled by calculations.

Resoures
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibnitiana
G.W.Leibniz-An Universal Philsopher
Island of Freedom-Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Leibnitz-1646-1716

[Prussian]

Immanuel Kant

Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), German philosopher, considered by many the most influential thinker of modern times.
Life

Born in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia), April 22, 1724, Kant received his education at the Collegium Fredericianum and the University of Königsberg. At the college he studied chiefly the classics, and at the university he studied physics and mathematics. After his father died, he was compelled to halt his university career and earn his living as a private tutor. In 1755, aided by a friend, he resumed his studies and obtained his doctorate. Thereafter, for 15 years he taught at the university, lecturing first on science and mathematics, but gradually enlarging his field of concentration to cover almost all branches of philosophy. Although Kant's lectures and works written during this period established his reputation as an original philosopher, he did not receive a chair at the university until 1770, when he was made professor of logic and metaphysics. For the next 27 years he continued to teach and attracted large numbers of students to Königsberg. Kant's unorthodox religious teachings, which were based on rationalism rather than revelation, brought him into conflict with the government of Prussia, and in 1792 he was forbidden by Frederick William II, king of Prussia, to teach or write on religious subjects. Kant obeyed this order for five years until the death of the king and then felt released from his obligation. In 1798, the year following his retirement from the university, he published a summary of his religious views. He died February 12, 1804.

Kant's Philosophy

The keystone of Kant's philosophy, sometimes called critical philosophy, is contained in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), in which he examined the bases of human knowledge and created an individual epistemology. Like earlier philosophers, Kant differentiated modes of thinking into analytic and synthetic propositions. An analytic proposition is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject, as in the statement “Black houses are houses.” The truth of this type of proposition is evident, because to state the reverse would be to make the proposition self-contradictory. Such propositions are called analytic because truth is discovered by the analysis of the concept itself. Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, are those that cannot be arrived at by pure analysis, as in the statement “The house is black.” All the common propositions that result from experience of the world are synthetic.

Propositions, according to Kant, can also be divided into two other types: empirical and a priori. Empirical propositions depend entirely on sense perception, but a priori propositions have a fundamental validity and are not based on such perception. The difference between these two types of proposition may be illustrated by the empirical “The house is black” and the a priori “Two plus two makes four.” Kant's thesis in the Critique is that it is possible to make synthetic a priori judgments. This philosophical position is usually known as transcendentalism. In describing how this type of judgment is possible Kant regarded the objects of the material world as fundamentally unknowable; from the point of view of reason, they serve merely as the raw material from which sensations are formed. Objects of themselves have no existence, and space and time exist only as part of the mind, as “intuitions” by which perceptions are measured and judged.

In addition to these intuitions, Kant stated that a number of a priori concepts, which he called categories, also exist. He divided the categories into four groups: those concerning quantity, which are unity, plurality, and totality; those concerning quality, which are reality, negation, and limitation; those concerning relation, which are substance-and-accident, cause-and-effect, and reciprocity; and those concerning modality, which are possibility, existence, and necessity. The intuitions and the categories can be applied to make judgments about experiences and perceptions, but cannot, according to Kant, be applied to abstract ideas such as freedom and existence without leading to inconsistencies in the form of pairs of contradictory propositions, or “antinomies,” in which both members of each pair can be proved true.

In the Metaphysics of Ethics (1797) Kant described his ethical system, which is based on a belief that the reason is the final authority for morality. Actions of any sort, he believed, must be undertaken from a sense of duty dictated by reason, and no action performed for expediency or solely in obedience to law or custom can be regarded as moral. Kant described two types of commands given by reason: the hypothetical imperative, which dictates a given course of action to reach a specific end; and the categorical imperative, which dictates a course of action that must be followed because of its rightness and necessity. The categorical imperative is the basis of morality and was stated by Kant in these words: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a general natural law.”

Kant's ethical ideas are a logical outcome of his belief in the fundamental freedom of the individual as stated in his Critique of Practical Reason (1788). This freedom he did not regard as the lawless freedom of anarchy, but rather as the freedom of self-government, the freedom to obey consciously the laws of the universe as revealed by reason. He believed that the welfare of each individual should properly be regarded as an end in itself and that the world was progressing toward an ideal society in which reason would “bind every law giver to make his laws in such a way that they could have sprung from the united will of an entire people, and to regard every subject, in so far as he wishes to be a citizen, on the basis of whether he has conformed to that will.” In his treatise Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant advocated the establishment of a world federation of republican states.

Kant had a greater influence than any other philosopher of modern times. Kantian philosophy, particularly as developed by the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, was the basis on which the structure of Marxism was built; the dialectical method, used by both Hegel and Karl Marx, was an outgrowth of the method of reasoning by “antinomies” that Kant used. The German philosopher Johann Fichte, Kant's pupil, rejected his teacher's division of the world into objective and subjective parts and developed an idealistic philosophy that also had great influence on 19th-century socialists. One of Kant's successors at the University of Königsberg, J.F. Herbart, incorporated some of Kant's ideas in his system of pedagogy.

Other Works

In addition to works on philosophy, Kant wrote a number of treatises on various scientific subjects, many in the field of physical geography. His most important scientific work was General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), in which he advanced the hypothesis of the formation of the universe from a spinning nebula, a hypothesis that later was developed independently by Pierre de Laplace. Among Kant's other writings are Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Metaphysical Rudiments of Natural Philosophy (1786), Critique of Judgment (1790), and Religion Within the Boundaries of Pure Reason (1793).

Principle works of Kant

~ Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces-1746
~On Fire [Doctoral Dissertation]-1755
~ A New Explanation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge
[Habilitation]-1755
~ General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens-1755
~ Physical Monadology-1756
~ New Theory of Motion and Rest-1758
~ Some Experimental Reflections about Optimism-1759
~The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures Demonstrated-1762
~ Enquiry into the Clarity of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality-1762-64
~ On the Only Possible Argument for Proving the Existence of God-1763
~ Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantitites into Philosophy-1763
~ Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime-1763
~ Dreams of a Visionary, Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics-1766
~The First Ground of the Distinction of Regions in Space-1768
~ On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World
[Inaugural Dissertation]-1770
~ Critique of Pure Reason-1770
~ Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics-1783
~ Idea for a Universal History-1784
~ What is Enlightenment?-1784
~ Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals-1785
~ Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science-1786
~ Conjectural Beginning of Human History-1786
~ Critique of Practical Reason-1788
~ Critique of Judgement-1790-93
~ Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone-1793-94
~ The End of All Things-1794
~ Perpetual Peace-1795-96
~ The Metaphysics of Morals-1797,1798-1803
~The Strife of the Faculties-1798
~ Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View-1798
~ Logic-1800

Resources
A Slice of Philosophy-Kant
Immanuel Kant 1724-1804
Island of Freedom-Immanuel Kant
Kantian Ethics
Kant-Metaphysics
Kant on the web

[Prussian]

The Proceedings of the Friesian School

[Prussian]

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)


Life

The Early Period:

Johann Fichte was born as a son of a very poor ribbon weaver in the village called Rammenau in Sachsen (Saxony in Eastern Germany). When he was a small child, he learned how to weave ribbon and watch geese and helped his family. Johann was a very unusual child and was able to retell the sermon as he very carefully listened to the preacher 's talk. One day, a wealthy farmer from the neighboring village was not able to be to attend the church service on time one Sunday. So someone told him that he should ask that child who attended the geese. As the wealthy farmer heard that child recite the sermon back to him exactly without any problem to him, he was so impressed with his potential that he sponsored this child's education.

Having graduated from the Gymnasium, Johann Fichte studied philosophy, classical literature and theology at Jena and Leipzig University. When his sponsor died and Fichte's parents could not provide Johann the financial support to continue his study, Johann Fichte went to Zurich and became a tutor for the children of a wealthy merchant. During his stay in Zurich, Johann Fichte had a chance to get acquainted with an extremely intelligent, strong-charactered young lady called Johanna Rahn and was deeply attracted by her. She later married Johann Fichte and helped him in various ways to further his philosophy throughout his life. Since the parents of the children he tutored were rather vulgar and uninteresting people, Johann Fichte left Zurich and went back to Leipzig in 1790. In order to make his living, he was commissioned to tutor a college student of the well-to-do family in Kant's philosophy, Johann Fichte for the first time himself studied Kant and his philosophy intensively for this purpose. This encounter of Fichte with Kant's publications made a decisive influence on Fichte and came to determine his entire life.

In his letter to his then fiancé and later his wife, Johanna Rahn, Fichte wrote, "I have finally acquired a most noble morality and instead of concerning myself with the external things, I am devoting myself to my own inner self. Thus I have been experiencing the peace of mind which I have never before experienced and am living a very happy life." To one of his friends, Johann Fichte also wrote, "...it is incredulous how profoundly Kant's philosophy, his moral philosophy in particular, has influenced the total system of one man's thinking and how decidedly Kant's philosophy has initiated a revolution in my total philosophical thought. Since I read the Critique of Practical Reason, I am living in a totally different world. The principles that I hitherto believed to be absolutely certain have been totally uprooted and destroyed. What I previously thought to be impossible to explain, for example, absolute Freedom and Moral Obligation are apodeictically demonstrated. An exhaustible joy fills me. It is incredible how great and overwhelming the admiration and the strength to humanity this system gives."

Next year, Fichte became acquainted with Kant in person in Königsberg in East Prussia (today's Karingrad). In the hope that his devotion to Kant's philosophy and his ability in philosophy be recognized by Kant himself, Johann Fichte wrote Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (A Attempt of the Critique of All Revelations) in 1792, in which Kant's philosophical thought was applied to religious philosophy. Since Kant had not yet published his book on religious philosophy (his Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft appeared in 1798), Kant read Fichte's work and appreciated his philosophical gift, so much so that Kant found a job tutoring in Danzig and helped Fichte's work to be published. In 1792 this opus was published anonymously, i.e., but without the author's name due to some unknown error. Because the position of the book was so close to Kant's philosophy, the academic world thought that the author of Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung was Kant. Once it was revealed that the book was written by Fichte instead, he became instantaneously famous.
Johann Fichte went back to Zurich to marry Johanna and also got acquainted with Pestalozzi, the famous Swiss pedagogist. During his stay in Zurich, Fichte wrote books on the French Revolution and on the freedom of the press. During his early period, Fichte was deeply involved in practical philosophy.

In 1794 Johann Fichte was appointed as the successor to Reinhold, as Reinhold moved to Kiel University. For five years, till 1799, Johann Fichte was at Jena University devoting himself to the development of his own philosophical system and also exercised a profound influence on his students. On first appearance his first opus looks to be a theoretical philosophy:

Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre in 1794.

Further, Fichte wanted to make his system more complete and more intelligible, thus he wrote:
Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre in 1797.

Fichte also wrote books on practical philosophy:
Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre in 1796.
Das System der Sittenlehre nach der Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre in 1798.

In 1799 the so-called Der Atheismusstreit (the controversy over atheism) took place in Jena whereby the bureaucrats accused Fichte of being an atheist.
Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung in 1798.

Johann Fichte argues that the moral order in the world is the most certain proof for the existence of God: The very moral order which is fully active and effective in us is no other than the proof that God exists. We need God solely as the universal moral order and need nothing else in our religion. Beyond and above this universal moral order, according to Fichte, there exists no basis to recognize a Special Being as the (mechanical, efficient) Cause of this universe. Anyone who tries to acknowledge and ascribe Him a certain "consciousness" and "person" in this special Being is to make God rather a finite being without being aware of what he is doing. The self that has consciousness is, according to Fichte, a finite, limited, individual ego.
Against Fichte's moral argument for God as the Ground for the moral order of this universe (which denies Him consciousness and person, too,), the Government of Kursachsen (Kursaxony), whose capital was Dresden, decided to confiscate Fichte's books and placed an official complaint to the Government of Weimar that Atheism was taught at the University in Jena, which was a territory of Weimar Republic. In stead of taking a consoling attitude to this political uproar, Fichte was being extremely outraged and wrote a second article with a more radical tone:
Appellation an ad Publikum in 1799
Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des Atheismus

The Government of Weimar wanted to settle this diplomatic friction rather quietly without both antagonizing the Government of Kursachsen and firing Fichte from the University. Nevertheless, Fichte's personality did not accept such a procedure (Wasn't he childish? Yes, Indeed he was.) and he wrote a radical complaint to the Government. Everyone concerned in the Government of Weimar got furious with Fichte and naturally fired him.
In Berlin Fichte wrote books and lectured as a private citizen (he could not get a teaching position due to that "scandal"). During the Berlin period, Fichte tended to be more religious and mystical in his philosophical thinking. The officials in Berlin were friendly to Fichte, people were enthusiastic, and Fichte enjoyed close friendships with such Romantic writers as the brothers Schlegel, Thiek and Schleiermacher.

Fichte wrote:
Die Bestimmung des Menschen
Der geschlossene Handelsstaat in 1800
Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre in 1801
Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters
Über das Wesen des Gelehrten
Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben oder die Religionslehre in 1806

In 1806 and 1807 Prussia fought against Napoleon and lost the war and Berlin was also occupied by the French army. Fichte gave a series of lectures appealing to Patriotism for the Germans:
Reden an die deutsche Nation in 1808

In 1810 a new university was founded in Berlin and Fichte became professor there.
In 1818 the so-called Freiheitskrieg (The War of Liberation) broke out, Paris was occupied in March and Napoleon was sent to St. Helena. Fichte became a victim of this war, for Johanna Fichte was working as a nurse at the military hospital and contracted an infectious disease from soldiers who were patients there. Fichte also became fatally infected.
Die Tatsachen des Bewußtseins
(his lectures at Berlin University in 1810) in 1817
This is a good introduction to Fichte's philosophy.
Works



Epistemology and Universal Ontology:

Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1694)
Grundriß der Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre (1795)
Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre
Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1797)
Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1800)
Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1801)
Die Tatsachen der Bewußtseins (1810/1817)

Ethics:

Zurückforderung der Denkfreiheit
Über die französische Revolution [1793]
Grundlage des Naturrechts [1796]
System der Sittenlehre [1798]
Der geschlossene Handelsstaat [1800]
Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters
Über das Wesen des Gelehrten [1806]
Reden an die deutsche nation [1808]
Vorlesungen über die Staatslehre [1818/1820]

The Religious Philosophy:

Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung [1792]
Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttlichen Wetregierung [1798]
Appellation an das Publikum Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des Atheismus [1799]
Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben oder die Religionslehre [1807]

Philosophy

1. Die Wissenschaftslehre (The doctrine of Science)

1. The Objectives
Unfisnished Business of Kant
Completion of Idealism
1.-i. The task unfulfilled by Kant's philosophy: Radicalization of Idealism:

According to Fichte, Kant's greatest merit was in his discovery and establishment of Transcendental Idealism (whereby the emphasis is on Idealism). Fichte contended that what Kant had accomplished by Transcendental Idealism was to reverse the philosophical "common sense" orientation such that our thought or understanding (reason) is the source of the universal and necessary validity of knowledge, and not the knowledge's relatedness to nature (the external world). In other words, Kant elucidated that the idea determines the object and not that the object determines the idea (unlike the assumption of the British Empiricism). Our knowledge does not derive from the external world, but no doubt being related to the external world, our knowledge possesses the universal and necessary validity (as the criterion of its truth) by means of our reason (our mind or consciousness).
In other words, Kant "divorced" the pursuit of knowledge (=philosophy) from its immersion in the external world (nature) and brought philosophy back to the inquiry into the Self itself or consciousness. This is in a senses a regression to philosophy of self and consciousness. Nevertheless, Fichte thought that most philosophers misunderstood the spirit of Kant's system and intention and adhered to the surface, namely the uses of the words. They were absolved in the thing in itself or the material elements and oversaw that Kant purported the opposite. Kant's interpreters intended to read their own prejudices into Kant's philosophy so that they took Kant's objections for Kant's thought. In other words, they merely made Kant's philosophy once again a dogmatism, while Kant had attempted to destroy dogmatism. For example, Reinhold's interpretation of Kant is a strange conjecture of a naive dogmatism and a decisive idealism. According to Fichte, however, that is inconceivable for the originator of such a great philosophy. Fichte thought that what Kant intended to accomplish in his philosophy was the unfinished business and Fichte's task was, so he conceived, to radicalize Kant's position and complete his intention by eliminating the dogmatic elements.

I.-ii. A systematic completion of idealism:

Fichte viewed that the biggest problem of Kant's philosophy consists in a "cleft" in his system, i.e., the "logical inconsistency" (according to Fichte) in Kant's philosophy. As Fichte saw it, Kant indeed established the transcendental philosophy to justify the objectivity of our knowledge of nature, and yet he failed to provide the philosophical foundation for Transcendental Idealism itself. What was left by Kant therefore, according to Fichte, was to establish the unity and integration of the system in the transcendental philosophy. The completion of Transcendental Idealism was to Fichte Die Wissenschaftslehre. According to Johann Fichte, in order to accomplish this, he must demonstrate that it is possible to logically deduce the entire system of philosophy from one and the only one principle. This was the subjectivity or "Self." In this sense, despite Fichte's contention, Fichte did not perfect Kant's philosophy as a mere epigonen (imitator and follower), but ended up with developing his own, considerably different philosophy.

2. The Details of Completing Transcendental Idealism:

What was the concrete shape and structure of the completion of Transcendental Idealism?
In the theoretical philosophy, Kant for example takes it for granted that the forms of thought may be applicable to the material elements (objectivity) of knowledge, and yet he did not work out and clarify the ground for its possibility, namely how our understanding which is totally different from its object can be applied to the object so that they would produce an a priori synthetic knowledge. For example, Kant attempted to deduce the category of substance or that of causality from the form of judgment, but according to Fichte, this actually means that the category of substance or the category of causality was not founded on the nature of intelligence, but was obtained from the experience to which Formal Logic applies. In order to authentically understand why reason must think in accordance with the categories, Fichte maintains, those Tathandlungen (the pure activities of the Self or I), i.e., the forms of our thought, must be demonstrated indeed to be the rules of our thinking. In other words, these categories are to be demonstrated as the condition of the possibility of self consciousness. Not only did Kant fail to do this, but he also failed to justify even space and time as forms of sensibility.

Even if Kant might have done this, so argues Fichte, then Kant was not able to provide the ground for and elucidate the origin of the material elements of our knowledge. Unless, before the eye of the philosophizing spirit, objectivity as a whole is "produced," so argues Fichte, dogmatism can not be completely eliminated. We cannot leave the thing in itself as something totally independent of our thought. According to Fichte, the thing in itself is nothing but that which the subjectivity has to justify and "produce!"

Just as the relation between form and matter of our knowledge has been "modified", the opposition and differentiation between understanding and senses are to be abolished and to be reduced to a common principle, namely subjectivity. Sensitivity is to be understood now also by the Spontaneity of subjectivity that the subjectivity determines itself.
In his practical philosophy (ethics), so insists Fichte, Kant left many questions unsolved. For example, according to Fichte, the so-called "categorical imperative" is not the ultimate. Therefore, the categorical imperative also to be philosophically justified. The categorical imperative is in itself the principle, but is to be deducible from the other, more fundamental principle. The authentic principle is the imperative of the absolute independence of reason (absolute Selbstständigkeit der Vernunft).
Furthermore, in order to obtain a substantial moral theory and not just a formal ethics, the relationship between moral consciousness and natural impulses must be well elaborated and elucidated.
Thirdly, the relationship between the theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy in Kant's thought is untouched by Kant and thus it remained obscure.

What Kant did was that he only distinguished them. This dualism must be overcome.

3. Choice of Philosophical Standpoint (Idealism or Dogmatism?)

Fichte has his own new innovative conception of Idealism apart from Kantian philosophy. According to Fichte, only two logically consistent systems of philosophy are possible, the one is dogmatism or realism and the other is idealism. Namely, the former (dogmatism) attempts to deduce ideas from things, while the former (idealism) endeavors to produce being from thought. Dogmatism is in error regarding its principle (because no one can produce thought from being!). If dogmatism were maintained consistently throughout, then it turns out to be like the system of Spinoza in the sense of materialism.

In this position they cannot escape from causal determinism (and there is no space for freedom of humanity). For everything is of nature or a product of nature and is governed by mechanistic causality. Therefore, dogmatism views spirit as an epiphenomenon of natural process and denies the human spirit the metaphysical and moral autonomy and its immateriality and thus the dogmatism fails to recognize freedom. In reality, thought cannot be produced or deduced from matter, therefore materialism or dogmatism must be erroneous in principle. In other words, being comes from the representation (the idea) while no representation comes from being.
However, Fichte maintains that being can be deduced from the representation, as consciousness (Bewußtsein) is also being (Sein) and yet consciousness is more than being. For consciousness (Bewußtsein) is ein bewußtes Sein (a conscious being). Thus it is obvious, according to Fichte, that consciousness (Bewußtsein) not only contains being but knowledge of being as its moments as well. Idealism can explain dogmatism, but the latter (dogmatism) can not explain the former (idealism). The greatest error of dogmatism is dealing with the empty concepts above and beyond consciousness or self. The concept is empty when it lacks intuitive givenness, but according to Kant, there cannot be intellectual intuition in epistemology (Kant talks about intellectual intuition in Critique of Judgement). Fichte went far beyond Kant's assertion and contended that there is intellectual intuition which Kant failed to recognize in the human mind. The most pregnant sense of intuition is intellectual intuition which is intuition of the existing self to immediately grasp its own self. (Intuition is a way of cognition in which the object (that which is to be known) is known to the subject (the knower) immediately, I.e., without any mediation.)
Philosophy may be able to abstract and must abstract what is given. Thus philosophy must always behold its object at a higher view-point. However, the correct abstraction is to separate those which appear as a synthesis in our experience. It analyses our experiential consciousness because we must re-construct our experiential consciousness out of its essential elements and it produces the experiential consciousness right "in front of our own eyes." In other words, the correct abstraction is no other than the actual history of our experiential consciousness. This abstraction with the aim of genetic observation of the self does not go beyond experience, but penetrates into the depth of experience. This analysis of abstraction of experience in philosophy is, therefore, not transcendent, but transcendental, precisely because of the above. Such an abstraction, maintaining the immediate connection with intuition, provides an actual philosophy (die wirkliche Philosophie) in contrast with various formal philosophical systems. By means of remaining within consciousness, i.e., within the self, the significance and advantage of idealism consists in being capable of the correct abstraction without being involved in those empty concepts. This is the theoretical strength of idealism.

The law of morality asserts, "Thou shall be independent." (Du sollst selbstständig sein!) In other words, independence may be understood as freedom and autonomy of the human-being. Therefore, "You ought to be free and autonomous." As Kant clearly pointed out, if we as humans ought to be independent, we must be capable of being independent. The ought (Sollen) of being independent presupposes its can (Können). However, if we are of matter or deducible from matter, we are not able to be independent. Therefore, idealism, seen from the practical point of view, is the only philosophical point of view which is consistent with the moral concept of "ought." From a different way of looking at this, we may say that one who adheres to realism has not yet elevated himself/herself to being free and autonomous, thus to the domain of morality. For in order to be able to know that you are free, you must first of all liberate yourself. Idealism can demonstrate that the idealist is free, and yet to be an idealist it is necessary to liberate oneself as an autonomous agent, to thereby be able to fulfill the moral obligation. "Those who fulfill the moral obligation, and who are free, are those who choose idealism for the sake of freedom. What kind of philosophical position one chooses depends upon what kind of human-being she/he is."

Was für eine Philosophie man wähle, hängt sonach davon ab, was man für ein Mensch ist: Denn ein philosophisches System ist nicht ein todter Hausrath, den man ablegn oder annehmen könnte, wie es uns beliebte, sondern es ist beseelt durch die Seele des Menschen, der es hat. ‹Die erste Einleitung zirr Wissenschaftslehre [What kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon what kind of human-being one is. For a philosophical system is not a "dead" utensil which one could reject or accept as if it were arbitrary. On the contrary, the philosophical system is enlivened by the human soul that one possesses.]

On the other hand, according to Fichte, it does not repudiate idealism even if the law of morality demands the reality of the external world and that of other spirits, for idealism does not deny realism, namely the reality of everyday life. Idealism explains realism not as the ultimate point of view, but as the necessary viewpoint for our mundane way of life. Contrary to idealism, dogmatism is an attempt to explain the philosophical viewpoint from the vulgar point of view. Idealism is related to the philosophical explanation while the mundane consciousness is to dogmatic realism.
Fichte contends idealism is the only defensible, satisfactory viewpoint both theoretically and practically. Just like the natural impulse and the moral volition in human action, both realism and idealism are rooted in Reason. Idealism is the ultimate philosophical position because idealism is able to explain realism, while dogmatism cannot explain idealism.



4. What is the Science of Knowledge or die Wissenschaftslehre?

What is the nature and aim of the Fichtean Wissenschaftslehre (the doctrine of science = Science of Knowledge)? Die Wissenschaftslehre is the authentically radicalized idealism and elevates Kant's philosophy to the level in which the science of knowledge becomes an evident and intuitive science as the philosophical basis for the transcendental philosophy. This evident science (Fichte's philosophy) seeks to eliminate the dualism of intuition and thinking on the one hand and dualism of knowledge and volition on the other so as to attain absolute monism. In other words, this evident science demonstrates both these dichotomies as deducible from one and the only one principle, namely the activity of the sole ego (die Tathandlung des einzigen Ichs).

Why this evident science is called die Wissenschaftslehre is because it adequately and ultimately answers the question,

How is knowledge (Wissen) possible?
and
How is experience possible?

This is not the science about "fact", but the science about "knowledge" (die Wissenschaft von Wissen). In Kant's terms, it is the transcendental philosophy. This "knowledge" does not include our everyday practical knowledge and common-sense knowledge, but exclusively deals with the knowledge of sciences. To Fichte, this knowledge (Wissen) includes not only common sense but the totality of all the scientific disciplines. Therefore, die Wissenschaftslehre is to intuitively elucidate the structure of our consciousness functioning both in our mundane life and in all the special sciences. Die Wissenschaftslehre deals with the necessary ideas or the necessary actions, while the other special sciences deal with arbitrary (willkürlich) ideas or action (=behavior). For example, we can arbitrarily represent the idea of triangle or circle, while the idea of space for instance is necessary and cannot be arbitrarily abstracted. Die Wissenschaftslehre intends to deal with those necessary ideas (=representations).

Why did intellect come to term with sensitivity?
Why did intellect come to intuitively know space and time?
Why did intellect create such specific categories as substance and causality?

Kant adequately described the activities of the intuitive spirit and the speculative spirit, but as answers to the above questions, these activities are to be demonstrated as necessary and to be deducted from the basis of all consciousness, i.e., from the Tathandlung des absoluten Ichs. Die Tathandlung is contrasted to die Tatsache. Die Tathandlung is also called pure activity. The self is according to Fichte nothing but this pure activity of the self or ego. Die Wissenschaftslehre deduces everything systematically from the self as the pure activity (Tathandlung). the highest pure activity of the self forms three principles.
The Tasks of The Wissenschaftslehre (Science of Knowledge)
(1) the Tasks Kant had left unsolved (viewed from Fichte's viewpoint)
a) Radicalization of idealism
B) Systematization of idealism
both of which is supposed to lead to the completion of idealism

(2) The Details for The Completion of Philosophy of Idealism
Theoretical Philosophy
Form and Matter
Form
The forms of thought (=Categories)
The forms of sensibility (Space and Time)
Matter
That which is affected through senses by Thing itself
`
Understanding and Sensibility

Practical Philosophy
The origin of the affirmative proposition
The relation between the Moral Consciousness and
the Natural Impulse

The Relationship Between theoretical and Practical Philosophy


(3) Choice of Philosophical Stand.
The Theoretical Justification
The Practical Justification

The Choice of either
Realism (Dogmatism)
or
Idealism


(4) Nature of Wissenschaftslehre

II. The Three Basic Principles (Die drei Grundsätze)
The highest forms of Tathandlung take three distinct Principles. They are led by the need for self reflection. In the case of thinking, What does the self necessarily do? It is the fact that in case of thinking (being conscious of) anything, the I inevitably thinks (is conscious) of one's own self and that we are not able to abstract this I or self from this activity at all.
That, I think, means either that the I affirms my self or that the I posits my self. Here it becomes obvious that thereby the affirming I and the affirmed I become apart, the positing I and the posited I, the thinking I and the I being thought of, distinguish themselves within the I or ego. This means further that the I or self is the subject and the object at the same time. The nature of self consciousness consists in the very identity of the representing and the represented. Such pure I or self is not a fact (Tatsache), but an activity (Tathandlung). this activity (Tathandlung) takes place unconsciously and it is by intellectual intuition that the self is aware of this unconscious pure activity. This is the meaning of the First principle. The First Principle says,


Das Ich setze ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Sein.‹Grundlage, p. 98
[The self primarily and directly posits its own being.]
That is, "the I or self (=ego) posits itself"(Das Ich setzt sich selbst. [p. 96]), or more simply, "I am", (Ich bin. [p. 96]). The nature of the self is no other than its activity that the I posits itself as my own being. The Cartesian "I think, therefore I am", as well as Kant's "synthesis" are this Tathandlung itself. Logically speaking, from this Tathandlung, the principle of identity ( A=A ) is deduced. In the categories, Kant's category of reality may be deduced from this.
This First Principle is that by which the I thinks of itself, and yet in the fact of our experiential consciousness, together with the I's positing itself, something other, "something opposite and foreign" comes to appear. Needless to say, what is something opposite is no other than opposite to the I itself (for nothing else does exist).
Thus The Second Principle states:



"Against the I the non-I posits itself".

From this Second Principle, the logical Principle of Contradiction is deduced and the Category of Negation is deducible.
The First Principle and The Second Principle are to be reconciled. Since both the I and the non-I are opposing each other within the (original) I itself, they are to be posited as mutually limiting. In other words, they are to be posited as mutually annulling its own portion, i.e., they are to be posited as being divisible (teilbar).
Thus The Third Principle states:

"Ich setze im Ich dem teilbaren Ich ein teilbares Nicht-Ich entgegen." [p. 110].

From this Third Principle the logical Principle of Reason (der Satz des Grundes), for that principle contains the reason for the synthesis and unity of the I and the non-I. The Category of Determination (die Kategorie der Bestimmung) is deducible from this.
Simply, the I (without its opposing non-I) as such and the non-I (without its opposing I) as such alone are indeterminate, infinite. By the Third Principle, they are now determined as the divisible I and the divisible non-I and being posited as opposite, they are now mutually determinant and in consequence determined, definite. This is what Kant called the Category of Limitation.
Those three Categories which are deducible from the three Principles belong to The Categories of Quality (Reality, Negation and Limitation).
The I that is the object of the intellectual intuition is the I which serves as the Ground of all beings, and is by no means an individual I.
It is the I-ness, the Spirituality as such (die Geistigkeit überhaupt), the Eternal Reason itself (die ewige Vernunft).
This I as the Eternal Reason is both common to and the one with every I that is. It appears in every thought and exists in it as its ground. To this absolute I an individual I is merely its accident (die Akzidenz), its means or its particular expression. this absolute I is pure activity and not a Substance. The pure I could not be conceived as an entity existing before this pure activity. Being is the accident and the result of this pure activity. The pure activity of the I is primary, the substance is secondary. In Goethe's Faust in Studienzimmer Szene (1224-1237), Faust opened with the beginning of the Gospel according to St. John in the New Testament, and wondered about the proper translation for the Greek word, "Logos" in the context of "In the beginning was the Word (Am Anfang war das Wort [Luther's translation]). Instead of "the Word", Faust tried, "Meaning" (Sinn), then "Power" (Kraft), then finally he settled on the word "Action" (Tat). According to Fichte, this Tat is no other than his Tathandlung, the pure activity of the absolute I.
The three activities expressed by the above Three Principles are isolated, mutually independent activities of the I. To the contrary, these three positings (Setzungen) are but one and encompassing, total activity. It is the beginning of the total system of the unconscious various activities and the inquiry into these various activities is the task of the Wissenschaftslehre.
In the Wissenschaftslehre the thesis (=the position of the I), the antithesis (=the position of the non-I), and the synthesis (=the position of the I and the non-I in mutual limitation) repeatedly appear to elucidate Fichte's thought and this is the very forerunner of Hegel's dialectic. This may trace back to what Kant called "eine artige Betrachtung", his Categories. If we may go further back, we may find it in Jacob Boehme.
Within The Third Principle, there are two propositions included:

1) Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich.
(The I posits itself as determined by the non-I.)
2) Das Ich setzt sich als bestimmend das Nicht-Ich.
(The I posits itself as determining the non-I.)

1) deals with the cognitive activity of the self, while 2) deals with the practical activity of the self.

III. The theoretical I (the I as cognitive faculty)

One of the two propositions,"the I posits itself as being determined by the non-I" which are
contained in the Third principle purports the cognitive act of the self. Furthermore, this proposition contains two more propositions:
1) "The non-I determines the I." In other words,, the I is "affected" by the other, namely "The I suffers(leidet=is acted upon) by the non-I".
2) "The I posits itself", i.e., "the I determines itself", that is, the I posits by itself its own determination. Namely,
"The I is active (=tätig)".



These two propositions are to be reconciled in such a way that a portion of the I is viewed as determining, while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined. Needless to say, this is based on the Third Principle that reveals that the I is divisible(=teilbar). This "being divisible" means "being capable of quantity." That one portion of the I is viewed as determining, while the other portion of the I is viewed as being determined is the same as the I posits in itself the negation in as much as posits in the non-I the reality, i.e., the same reality that is negated in the I is to be posited in the non-I. from here the Category of Quantity is derived. Quantitatively viewed, the being acted upon (=leiden) of the I is no other than the decrease of being active of the I. Being acted upon (=leiden) is a certain quantity of being active, i.e., that of the I. Unless the I is active, it is acted upon, or unless the I is active, the non-I is active. In short, the non-I is after all a portion of the I itself. Fichte tried to demonstrate this relationship of the I and the non-I by means of the analogy between the light (das Licht) and the darkness (das Finsternis), Reality, Negation and Limitation. Thus from the Limitation as one of the Categories - the Third Category of Quality, the Categories of Relation are to be derived.
In the propositions, "The I is acted upon by the non-I" and "The I is active", the relationship between the I and the non-I are carefully examined, then the Three Categories of Relation, namely, 1. Mutual Determination, 2. Causality, 3. Substance,

1. The Category of Mutual Determination (Wechselwirkung):
The Reality, once negated in the I, is posited with equal quantity.
As determinatio est negatio is said, between the I and the non-I the determination is mutually done by negation.
2. The Category of Causality:
The cause of the I's being-acted-upon is the non-I, and as its result,
the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is produced.
Thus the Category of Causality is derived.



3. The Category of Substance:
The being-acted upon (leiden=suffering) of the I is the limitation of the I upon itself.
Since the I's being-acted-upon (suffering=leiden) is viewed as an accident at its very portion, the activity of the I is fundamentally the substance. Thus from this the Category of Substance is derived. So subsist the necessary relationships among the three Categories of Relation which are derivable therefrom.

Furthermore, these categories represent three philosophical positions:

1) In view of Causality,
Dogmatic Realism, e.g., Spinoza's philosophy.
2) In view of Substance, Dogmatic Idealism, e.g., Berkeley's philosophy.


3) In view of Mutual Determination, Critical Idealism, Kant-Fichte's philosophical system.



That the I possesses Substantiality, while the non-I possesses Causality, can be viewed also as these two functions contained the (absolute) I, or this can further construed as the two, opposite directional powers. This power as a whole is the striving to infinity and it is also said to be the limitless productive power (Produktionsvermögen).
Compare with Kant's distinction of Imagination;

Die Einbildungskraft
die reproduktive Einbildungskraft = Synthesis by association in accordance with empirical rules.
die produktive Einbildungskraft = Spontaneität.
Its effects: Schemata
The Medium to mediate categories and perception between concepts and intuition



The effect of the productive imagination is the object as such. The totality of the (external) reality is produced by this imagination.

Ohne diese wunderbare Vermögen läßt sich gar nichts im menschlichen Geiste erklären, und auf welches dürfte sich gar leicht der ganze Mechanismus des menschlichen Geistes gründen [Grundlage, p. 208]).
The production of the productive imagination is prior to our conscious activities and unconscious activities. Therefore, we believe that objectivity (the external reality) appears to be discovered. The various representations are the various steps of the unconscious productivity. Thus, from the pure activity of the I, namely from the productive imagination, the fact of consciousness in general must be explained. This Fichte called "die Deduktion der Vorstellung".

The Deduction of Representations

1) Feeling (Gefühl) or sensation (Empfindung)
i.e., "In-sich Findung", to find in itself (the I itself). However, The I or self finds (this) as something other and yet finds in itself. In sensation no distinction between the being conscious and the being-conscious-of.
2) Intuition (die Anschauung).

When the I reflects upon its own sensation, and posits that which limits the I and looks at it, this act is Intuition (Anschauung), in which the non-I is intuited, and what is intuited appears as if it were the product of the non-I.
3) The reproductive imagination (= das Nach-bilden).

Taking into itself the intuition the I reproduces(nach-bilden) the intuition. its product is a "picture" (das Bild), i.e., das Nachbild to be exact. While this Nachbild is our representation, its original (das Vorbild) is the thing in itself. Here the thing in itself (das wirkende Ding) and the picture (das Bild) are distinguished. Thus the I reproduces (pictures) the Intuition (its own product as the non-I) in itself. In other words, the I consciously reproduces what the I unconsciously produced. Thus, while the productive imagination produces reality, the reproductive imagination produces representation.
4) Understanding (der Verstand):

According to Fichte what produces the Categories is also imagination. Understanding simply makes the categories applicable to the laws. Fichte even argues that Hume was right in maintaining that Causality is a product of imagination, although Hume erred in failing to recognize the objective validity of causality.

Kant viewed the Categories as the primary forms of thinking, i.e., that the Categories originate from Understanding, and he had to elaborate in the Schematism the Categories in conjunction with productive imagination in order to make the objective application of the Categories possible. In contrast, according to Fichte, Kant was right in the lawfulness of the Categories, and yet erred regarding the origin of the Categories. The Categories are not the products of Understanding, but they arise at the same time as objectivity, (external) reality and solely on the basis of the productive imagination.

Space and Time, too, according to Fichte, have their origin in imagination. While Kant discovered Space and Time as the a priori forms of intuition, Fichte attempts to deduce a priori Space and time. As a result, they are demonstrated as existing in the I.

Understanding solidifies the fluid intuition by means of concepts so that by understanding, the product of imagination becomes objectivity, the (external) reality.

5) Judgment (die Urtielskraft):

Judgment is the free ability (das freie Vermögen) of reflection. It is the ability whether or not to direct reflection to a certain object. It freely abstracts a certain object of understanding and it is an ability to, at will, connect or separate certain characteristics (Merkmale).
6) Reason (die Vernunft):

While understanding is the ability to abstract a certain objectivity, Reason is the ability to abstract objectivity itself as a whole. Reason is conscious of itself as the ability of abstraction which does not direct itself to a particular object. it is the I in its absolute, pure subjectivity. The significance and ability of Reason is Self-Consciousness. The freer Reason becomes from objectivity, the closer the empirical I comes to pure self consciousness.

IV. The Practical I (Das Praktische Ich)

The deduction of the various representations reveals the various steps of our cognition:
Sensation
The Sensory Intuition
Reproductive Imagination

Understanding
The Spiritual Judgment
Reason

In the section on theoretical philosophy, Fichte did not explain why the I, hindering itself from going to the infinity of its own self, goes back to its self. In order that the consciousness or cognition is formed, it was necessary to "give" or "produce" within itself the first limitation or hindrance (Anstoß). By so doing, Sensation was produced, and on that basis Understanding through reflections, the objective world was "built" or produced. Unless, therefore, the I limits its own infinite activity, there would be no representation, nor objectivity itself.
Why does consciousness, representation, or the world exist at all? "Where did the primordial non-I come from? Where did the hindrance (Anstoß) come from which hinders the I from going to infinity and has it return to the I itself?"

As long as we remain within the domain of the theoretical I, we are not able to answer these questions. For the theoretical I itself was born from encountering that hindrance. This hindrance (der Anstoß) has to be deduced, which is only possible in the domain of the practical I. The Primacy of the Practical Reason that Kant emphasized will be able to do so.
To become the theoretical I by limiting itself is, for the I, to become the practical I. There are the ability of representation and the world of representation in the theoretical world because we, as the practical Is, provide ourselves with the possibility of fulfilling the moral obligation. Why we are Intellect is because we may be able to be Will. We exist and, in consequence, recognize (the world), because we must act, and morally act. (To will and to act, it is necessary to have its object to "act upon.") To act means to give the form to its matter, to "process" and modify objectivity. The objective world is but the means to accomplish our moral end. Thus, "the objective world is the sensory matter for our moral obligation." It is not possible for the practical I to act, unless there is the objective world to act on. In other words, unless there is a hindrance, unless there is the non I, the practical I cannot act. Thus, the hindrance (der Anstoß) is deduced.

Moral obligation is the one and the only one in-itself (das An sich) in the phenomenal world (the moral ought is the form!). That is to say, genuine reality in the phenomenal world is this moral ought. "The so called Being in itself (das An sich) of the thing is precisely that which we produce (as its form) from that very thing. Objectivity exists in order to be gradually abandoned, because objectivity exists to be processed and modified so that the activity of the I may reveal itself.

By means of the same explanation as the necessity of the external world becomes clear, it becomes apparent that the infinite I diverges itself into many empirica