German Elite Troops in Afghanistan Marred by Reports of Misconduct

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Beer, Brats Aand Bad Behaviour

German Elite Troops in Afghanistan Marred by Reports of Misconduct

As members of the German Bundestag prepare to decide whether to extend the German military's mission in Afghanistan, reports of alcoholism and irresponsible behavior by commanders of Germany's "Kommando Spezialkräfte" elite unit are coming to light.


The KSK in training: The behavior of this elite unit in Afghanistan has been far from exemplary.

They're athletic, in top physical condition and usually between 28 and 35 years old. While on a mission they often paint their faces black or disguise themselves with sunglasses and balaclavas. The soldiers call themselves "snipers." When they use their laser sights to take aim at the enemy with G-36 assault rifles, they call it "direct action." Their tough selection process lasts more than three months, an endless series of physical and psychological tests described by one commander as the most strenuous "you can ask of people in a democracy."
The Bundeswehr, or German military, Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK) is the country's most secretive military operations unit -- Germany's special forces. Intense self-discipline and team spirit are expected. Their home base is in Calw, a peaceful town in the Black Forest. Their barracks lie behind a well-secured double- fence topped with barbed wire. The KSK is the vanguard of the German military, which has been deployed on an increasing number of missions throughout the world in recent years. The military itself refers to the KSK as "the elite unit."
Members of the KSK have been deployed in Afghanistan repeatedly since December 2001, but their behavior there has not always been what one would expect of an elite unit.

Drunken superiors, life-threatening vehicle training on mined territory and a vigorous trading of beer for United States military intelligence -- these are part of a long list of accusations contained in eyewitness accounts and documents that have just surfaced. One colonel in Kandahar is said to have been so fond of alcohol that American officers were forced to complain about his presence at mission briefings, during which he was clearly intoxicated.

Veil of Secrecy
The politically backed veil of secrecy that has long covered the KSK has begun to be lifted somewhat since the end of last year. Several KSK soldiers are suspected of having abused Bremen-born Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz in Kandahar before he was sent to Guantanomo Bay. He has since been released, but as of January a parliamentary commission has been investigating whether these allegations are true -- and what else the KSK has been doing in Afghanistan.
The German Defense Ministry is not making the investigation any easier. It was forced to admit that a large number of files on KSK missions during the period in question have been "accidentally" destroyed, and it has been very slow to hand over the remaining files. German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) only informs the chairmen of the Committees for Defense and Foreign Policy about KSK missions -- and what he tells them is, of course, classified. The vast majority of parliament is left out of the loop.



Graphic: German Troops in Afghanistan

The Defense Ministry was similarly secretive last week. Questions about the current allegations posed by SPIEGEL remained unanswered. Some of the questions touch on "a thematic complex that continues to be the object of a parliamentary commission of inquiry," explained Jung's press spokesman, Thomas Raabe. Respect for parliament requires "only speaking before the appropriate parliamentary committees," he added.
That makes the new eyewitness accounts from sources close to the KSK and from US soldiers who spoke to SPIEGEL about the deployment of the KSK's 1st Contingent all the more illuminating. Security policy expert Winfried Nachtwei of the Green Party already said last spring that "current information indicates grave shortcomings in the planning and execution of the entire mission." Rainer Arnold, a military expert with Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), also believes that "reports that something was out of kilter on this mission were not looked into seriously enough" by the leadership at various levels.

Several KSK soldiers serving with the contingent spoke to SPIEGEL about their mission. A number of them quit the military because of their experiences with it in Afghanistan, where the Bundeswehr engaged in its first true ground deployment since the end of World War II. In at least one instance, a KSK soldier later contacted the Bundeswehr Operations Command back in Potsdam near Berlin and recommended informing the Defense Minister about "problem cases" in the unit. But this warning apparently never reached then Defense Minister, Peter Struck.
The information coming to light in a bug-proof conference room in Berlin's Reichstag building, where parliament meets, raises a series of questions: Were the goings-on in the KSK contingent just an ugly one-off? Is the Defense Ministry's sometimes bizarre secretiveness vis-à-vis parliament really only designed to ensure the safety of KSK soldiers, or is it also a way of covering up embarrassing behavior? And why are the members of parliament not allowed to learn exactly what went wrong even years after the end of an operation?
After all, the German parliament or Bundestag will soon vote on whether not Germany will extend its missions with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.

Unlimited Solidarity?
The KSK's first deployment in Afghanistan began during the closing days of 2001. The ruins of the World Trade Center were still smoking when US President George W. Bush announced the beginning of the "war on terror" -- and urged all US allies to participate. Then German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised "unlimited solidarity" and the Bundestag voted in favor -- by a small majority -- of sending German troops to participate in the OEF anti-terror mission just 10 weeks after the terrorist attacks. It was the first time German ground troops had been deployed since 1945.
For most KSK soldiers, the Afghanistan mission began in a camp next to the US military base on Masira, a small island off the coast of Oman. From mid-December to early January 2002, group after group of German soldiers in desert fatigues climbed aboard US transporter planes and took off for Afghanistan.
The planes carrying the German elite forces landed on a dusty runway in Afghanistan's hard-fought southwest. It was bitterly cold that winter -- in December alone 177 local residents froze to death. The KSK soldiers saw rotting Soviet weapons, car and airplane wrecks and all sorts of garbage on the fields along the runway. They had arrived at Forward Operating Base (FOB) -- their first base during the war on terror, right by the airport in Kandahar, or "Q-Town," as the soldiers had named it.
Even experienced KSK soldiers were pushed to their limits by what awaited them there. The camp the US military had allotted the small KSK advance guard was about half the size of a soccer field. Aided by 150 Afghans, the KSK soldiers set up their "military camp" under the open sky. It mainly consisted of two-man tents. Even those soldiers who found shelter indoors were not much better off. The rooms were damp and there was no reliable electricity supply or heat.

It was a "life on the garbage dump," one member of the KSK 1st Contingent noted in his mission diary in early January 2002: "The mood in the camp is very tense."
The poor accommodations and provisions quickly took their toll. Many KSK soldiers fell ill. "Two mission soldiers collapsed today during roll call," one soldier wrote. Other sources spoke of "vitamin deficiency with scurvy-like symptoms."
During this initial period the KSK troops were fighting less against terror and more for their own survival. Moreover, they lacked their own helicopters and airplanes, or even vehicles suitable for the desert. The Germans didn't exactly get the impression that the US troops in Kandahar had been waiting desperately for them to arrive.
The US troops, who were charged with giving the KSK soldiers their assignments, were guarding a strongly secured prison camp on the FOB and initially kept their distance from the Germans. The KSK troops "often had to beg to be given assignments," and even then were given only "low-level targets," one KSK soldier recalls. The German troops were really "just a burden" on the US forces, he adds.
Ed H., a US soldier stationed in Kandahar from December 2001 onward, confirms this impression. "Basically, the Germans were not allowed to do anything," he recalls. "They looked around for things to do. They were incredibly bored." He remembers one frustrated German soldier killing time by explaining to him all the finer details of the German pension system.
But then the Germans' reputation abruptly changed. A rumor spread among US troops that at least one thing was worthwhile in the German unit -- its supply of alcohol.

Part 2: "Beer Was Like a Currency"
For the US troops, Kandahar -- located in the midst of Muslim Afghanistan -- was a so-called "dry camp." Beer and wine were strictly prohibited. But in the German zone, an e-mail with the subject line "BEER DAY" had already been sent around as early as Jan. 12, 2002. The e-mail explained that the commanding officer had approved "the following beer days: Saturday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday."
The commanding officer allowed every soldier a maximum of two cans of beer on these days and added that he expected "modesty in times when the forces must renounce beer consumption due to preparations for deployment." Moreover, a stock of 120 cans was to be held back for the troops.
According to a "shipment expectation" dated Jan. 5, 2002, the soldiers could expect the arrival of 2,000 cans of beer, 48 bottles of red wine and 24 bottles of white wine -- in addition to 150 bottles of Desperados, a tequila-flavored beer.
Word about the arrival of the German beer spread quickly in Q-Town. And soon enough a veritable beer bazaar developed, with KSK soldiers trading their lager for warm socks, long underwear, T-shirts and US army paraphernalia.

"Beer was like a currency," says one US soldier, who stocked up on the beverages provided by the KSK troops. "To us, the German beer supplies were Big Rock Candy." And the German and US troops also bonded over their beers. The KSK troops were especially interested in socializing with US reconnaissance troops. By drinking with them, they obtained access to confidential situation reports, and even satellite photographs and intelligence reports. Sometimes they were able to make phone calls using US satellite facilities. Even helicopter flights and other transportation services were traded for beer. One source says the KSK used the alcohol trade to "creatively compensate for the material deficits of the German forces."
And so the frugal lifestyle of the German troops gradually improved. There were even parties. And the "expectations" of the Americans were high, one commander noted in his daily report, number 42/02, urging the Germans to help "materially with the allocation and provision of German specialties (beer, canned sausages, Black Forest ham, etc.)."
Sometimes the "coalition forces" partied together, and at others the KSK contingent's chaplain would organize barbeques and free beers after the Sunday sermon. By Tuesday, the alcohol was flowing again - in one instance prompting a soldier to note the following day that, "Following alcoholic excesses by the troops last night, highly restrictive rules for alcohol consumption were issued today." By that same evening, however, soldiers popped out the booze again for an "Intel party" to celebrate a change in intelligence personnel.
Indeed, the soldiers openly mocked the alcohol directive. As well, it was an open secret among the troops on location that the contingent commander himself was fond of drinking. "He was inebriated for long periods of time," one soldier recalls.

Chain of Command
A number of participants went even further in their description of the colonel, calling him an "alcoholic" whose drinking habits had already attracted attention even before he joined the KSK. The officer "often drank until he fell over," another soldier told SPIEGEL.
The company commander also had a "known alcohol problem," one KSK soldier recalls, although "it was not as acute and not as obvious as that of the contingent commander." According to eyewitness accounts, the company commander unintentionally fired his gun once -- apparently after hitting the bottle. "Normally you would be relieved of your command for something like that," one member of the unit alleges, "but nothing happened."
It's a serious charge, to be sure: Were the German military's elite forces being led by a man with a known alcohol problem?
The suspicion is all the more grave considering that it was during those days in early January 2002 that incidents occurred that are still being probed today by two state prosecutors and as many parliamentary investigative committees. Following his return from Guantanamo, Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen raised in Germany, went on the record saying he had been maltreated by two KSK soldiers stationed in Afghanistan -- an accusation that those questioned have vehemently denied. Some members of parliament are now questioning whether the alleged abuse might have been carried out by drunken soldiers.

Back in Germany, Operations Command in Potsdam reportedly also knew about the problems of the 1st Contingent in Kandahar. KSK Commander Reinhard Günzel traveled to Afghanistan to visit the troops in his supervisory role. Upon his return and in light of the incidents, the commander responsible for special operations, Manfred Gerhardus, asked him to take action. Günzel replied that he had not observed any alcohol problem that would necessitate action.
The inactivity of the responsible officers angered and frustrated some of the soldiers who had been deployed to Afghanistan, who by now were being given assignments by the American troops -- primarily reconnaissance tasks.
"The situation in Kandahar was very unpleasant on the whole," one soldier lamented, looking back on the experience. "I have never seen conditions like those in this unit anywhere in the German military," he says. "There were disagreements on all levels. The leadership failed."

In the Dark
Of course, it could be that the leadership never found out about what was happening. Then-Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping emphasized last week he was not familiar with the accounts of alcohol abuse in Kandahar "from reports (he received) at the time." Former Bundeswehr General Inspector Harald Kujat also stresses that, by his recollection, alcohol consumption within the KSK unit "was not an issue at the mission briefings I participated in."
For many KSK members though -- and the accounts provided by several sources to SPIEGEL were consistent -- the experiences in Kandahar were reason enough to look around for a new job following their return. "These experiences led me and and other members to leave the KSK as soon as possible," one soldier says.
Even those who remained faithful to the unit apparently haven't forgotten what happened, either. Years later, some were still worried the events could be made public -- causing further damage to the KSK's reputation. The elite force's image had already taken a major hit with Günzel's dismissal in 2003 and the allegations that emerged in the Kurnaz case.

When media reports about the unit's internal fears of being deployed in eastern Afghanistan were published in the summer of 2005, one member of the 1st Contingent apparently panicked, fearing that another "betrayal" could possibly yield more explosive details. The soldier sat down in front of his computer and wrote an urgent e-mail to Gerhardus at the Operations Command Potsdam on July 14.


KSK forces were first deployed in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002.

The e-mail's first item mentions the company commander's "alcohol abuse" and "all problems associated with it." It also states the commander's full name. The second item refers to the "constellation" made up by the contingent commander and the company commander and the "failure of everyone familiar with the problem to act." The third item is no less explosive: It alleges that the company commander ordered soldiers to participate in "vehicle training" in "mine-infested Afghanistan." The author of the e-mail also proved far-sighted in his remark about the "surveillance of detainees of the US forces," specifying that this would become a problem "when the 'Bremen Taliban' is set free, at the very latest."
The soldier was well aware of the explosive nature of his remarks, and he ended his missive with the words: "It may be advisable to make the DM aware of these developments" - "DM" being short for the Defense Minister. That office was held at the time by Peter Struck, who it seems was left in the dark about the incidents, too.

Inconsequential Action
The way their company commander was greeted when the 1st Contingent returned home to Germany, struck many of the unit's soldiers as downright farcical. The contingent commander received the honorary pin of the German military's Special Operations Division (DSO) and a time piece from the Bundeswehr's Chief of Army Staff -- the highest honorary award available from that office.
Chief of Army Staff Hans-Otto Budde, who at the time was also still the commander of the DSO and therefore the immediate superior of the KSK at the time, has refused to comment on allegations about the elite unit's drinking habits in Kandahar.
But he will not stand for criticism of the unit's activities either. "I am convinced the KSK soldiers did a good job and are still accomplishing their tasks superbly today," he says.
In fact, the unit did uncover a so-called safe house -- a site that served as a refuge for potential suicide bombers -- in Kabul in autumn 2006. And even Green Party politician Nachtwei praises the KSK's "valuable contributions" to the protection of the German ISAF troops in northern Afghanistan.

But the new allegations raise the question of whether the KSK needs to be supervised more closely by parliament -- a practice that has long been customary for Germany's intelligence agencies. So far, the government has resisted calls to establish a supervisory body analagous to that for the intelligence agencies, which meets regularly, for the KSK.

Rainer Arnold, a Social Democrat, is also part of the chorus in parliament that is reacting to the incidents by demanding more information about the activities of the secretive elite unit. Arnold says that the voluntary reports the Defense Ministry gives parliament about the KSK's activities should be made mandatory.
Still, drinking excesses within the KSK have at least become an issue within the Bundestag's Defense Committee. But only a few dozen of the 613 members of the Bundestag soon to decide on the possible extension of the German military's ISAF and OEF mandates -- and, by implication, on the KSK's future Afghanistan missions -- are getting much information about what happened inside the unit.
They will be forced to make their decision in parliament based on considerable faith but very little knowledge. In that sense, the current situation isn't much different than it was in November 2001, when the Bundestag voted to give the 1st Contingent its first mandate for a deployment in Afghanistan.

Beer, Brats and Bad Behavior: German Elite Troops in Afghanistan Marred by Reports of Misconduct - International - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News