Islam in Albania

[Ferran]

Islam in Albania

Albania: Freedom Unconsidered

H. Abiva

[The Albanians embraced Islam nearly as a whole, which is remarkable when seen in the light of Albanian history. Their ancient origin was from the Illyrian people who inhabited the Adriatic littoral of the Balkan peninsula. The rugged terrain of this region served as a natural barrier against outside invaders and greatly slowed the spread of foreign ideas, such as Christianity and linguistic borrowing. Before the outlawing of religion in 1967, Albania's population was 75% Muslim, 15% Orthodox Christian and 10% Roman Catholic. Eighty-five percent of Albanian Muslims followed Hanafi school of thought. The majority of urban dwellers were Muslim and most of central and northeast Albania was populated by Muslims.
As the Eastern Roman Empire began to crumble away in the Balkans, Albania was invaded by the expanding Serbian State and by the Kingdom of Naples. The Serbs managed to gain minor footholds throughout the country while Naples was able to capture and control all of the coastal towns. After the death of the Serbian king Dushan in the mid 14th century, the Albanian chief Gjergj Balsha managed to set up an independent principality centered around the northern city of Shkoder. In 1385, Ghergj Balsha perished in a battle with the Ottomans. Following their victory over a combined force of Hungarians, Serbs, Bosnians and Wallachians on the banks of the Maritza River, Ottoman troops expanded their hold over large portions of the south-central Balkans.
By 1479, the entire country, except for Durres, Dulcigno and Antivari, was under Ottoman suzerainty. The lenient terms of capitulation required by Islamic law gave Albanians the right to retain their religious beliefs. It was not until the early seventeenth century that Islam began to gain hold in Albania. This is proof in itself that the so-called theories that Islam was forced upon Albanians and other Balkan peoples hold no ground in historical fact. Islam gave them a way to God without the entanglements of intermediaries and without the complex theological doctrines that typified medieval Christianity. Islam also gave Albanians a voice in the administration of not only their own lands but of the whole Ottoman State. Prominent Vizirs and Pashas hailed from Albania, and were appointed to their posts long before the majority of Albanians professed Islam.
Albania proclaimed its independence on Nov. 28, 1912. Albania's territorial integrity was insured by the Great Powers, albeit not without a price. In return for foreign protection, a foreign Christian prince, William of Wied, was placed as monarch of Albania. In June 1924, the American-educated Orthodox Bishop Fan Noli was placed in power. Later, in 1928, Ahmet proclaimed himself king of Albania, who was known as King Zog. He set about to de-Islamize Albania on the model of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey.
Following the second world war, the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) began the total destruction of Islam. In 1945, all waqf properties were nationalized and hundreds of ulema were executed. No contact was allowed with Muslims in predominantly Muslim lands. Public religious instruction was made illegal. The final blow came on Feb. 6, 1967, when Albania was proclaimed the world's first atheistic state. All of the country's 530 mosques were locked up. Those that were allowed to remain open were turned into museums, gymnasiums and even artist's studios. Pig farms sprang up throughout the country and all were encouraged to eat pork products.
Although Christians make up only some 25% of Albania's population, they hold more than half of the membership of the Albanian politburo. The first Juma' prayer in over twenty years was held Nov. 23, 1990 in Tirana.]

During the recent great wave of change that has swept through the countries of Soviet dominated Eastern Europe, the U.S. and her allies have grown eager to encourage free elections and a general opening of society. This massive support, from both the treasuries and media of the West, has not been allocated to the two "maverick" communist states of the Balkans, Yugoslavia and Albania, both of which broke away from Moscow's clutch in the 1950s.
Nearly a year after the popular revolts freed much of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and Albania have begun to give in to internal cries for the end of the communist monopoly on the government. During the latter part of last year, free elections were held throughout the six republics that constitute Yugoslavia. The results of the election proved to be a mixed blessing, for although they gave the masses a popular say in government, they also unleashed the traditional hatreds between the various ethnic groups. Albania, the last vestige of Stalinism in Europe, has finally succumbed to the will of her people, but why Albania (and to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia) has been denied the sympathy of the West is a question that needs to be answered. Albania has long been noted in the West as the "Tibet of Europe." Travelers to the country during the pre-communist era noted its rugged mountains, the intensely independent and tribalist nature of its rural population, and to Western eyes, its complete backwardness. When the scramble for influence in the Balkans began in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Khalifate, the surrounding powers chose to ignore any major involvement in Albania rather than expend the tremendous amount of money and troops to subdue and develop the country. This, however, did not mean that the Western powers had allowed Albanians to chart their own course to self-determination. The Great Powers did manage to place the Protestant Prince William of Wied as monarch of Albania; and in the 1930s, Mussolini, in his bid to revive the Roman Empire, invaded Albania and annexed it to Italy. But the country remained an insignificant theater during both World wars and the subsequent cold war.

The confessional make-up of the Albanian people also served to gain Western contempt and disregard. Before the outlawing of religion in 1967, Albania's population was 75% Muslim, 15% Orthodox Christian and 10% Roman Catholic. The Muslim population was further divided between the 85% who followed the Hanafi school of the Ahli-Sunnah wal Jama' and the 15% who were affiliated with the highly syncretic Bektashi sect. The majority of urban dwellers were found to be Muslim and most of central and northeast Albania was populated solely by Muslims. Catholics were found primarily among the inhabitants of the extremely mountainous northwestern region around the city of Shkoder, and the Orthodox were scattered throughout the towns and villages near the present-day Greek-Albanian border.
The Albanians unique distinction of being the only European people to have embraced Islam nearly as a whole is remarkable when seen in the light of Albanian history. Their ancient origin was from the Illyrian people who inhabited the Adriatic littoral of the Balkan peninsula. The rugged terrain of this region served as a natural barrier against outside invaders and greatly slowed the spread of foreign ideas, such as Christianity and linguistic borrowings. By the fourth century C.E., however, Illyria began to succumb to the Christian religion, with the great coastal towns such as Durres and Vlore becoming bases for missionary activity in the inland mountains. When the schism between the Catholic Church of Rome and the Orthodox Church of Constantinople occurred in 1054, Albania was divided into spheres of influence by the two great churches, with the Shkumbi River as the dividing line. To the north of the river, the Catholic Church would have its hand on religious life as the Orthodox did in the south. This division exacerbated the dialectical differences between Northern Albanians, known as the Ghegs, and Southern Albanians, called Tosks. The literary language of Albania was Latin in the north and Greek in the south.

As the Eastern Roman Empire began to crumble away in the Balkans, Albania was invaded by the expanding Serbian State, which was situated to the northeast, and by the Kingdom of Naples. The Serbs managed to gain minor footholds throughout the country while Naples was able to capture and control all of the coastal towns. The interior was to remain under the control of tribal chiefs who paid nominal fealty to the two occupiers.
After the death of the Serbian king Dushan in the mid 14th century, the Albanian chief Gjergj Balsha managed to set up an independent principality centered around the northern city of Shkoder. Nearly all of the coastal cities were freed from Neapolitan control. This political independence was, however, to be short-lived. In 1385, Ghergj Balsha perished in a battle with a new invader: the Ottomans.
Following their victory over a combined force of Hungarians, Serbs, Bosnians and Wallachians on the banks of the Maritza River, Ottoman troops expanded their hold over large portions of the south-central Balkans. By the 1380s, the Muslim army, operating from bases along the Vardar River, began probing into the mountains of Albania. The city of Kroya was opened in 1415; Valona, Kanina and Berat in 1417; Gjirokaster in 1419; Ioannina in 1431; and Serres in 1433. In 1430, the captured area became Ottoman sanjak province and in 1440, one Iskander Bey was placed as the sanjak-bey or governor.
Iskander Bey (aka George Kastriotes), the son of an Albanian chief, had been reared as a hostage in the Ottoman court in Adrianople (Edirne). [Albanians prefer the spelling GJERGJ KASTRIOTI and Scanderbeg. Both American and German 'Atlas of World History' use the spelling George Kastriotis and Skanderberg]. With Kastriotes being an Albanian and an apparent convert to Islam, the Ottoman hierarchy saw him as an ideal governor of the newly acquired Albanian territories. However, three years after his placement he apostatized to Catholicism and led a 25 year revolt against the Ottomans.
After the death of Kastriotes in 1468, Albanian resistance withered. By 1479, the entire country, except for Durres, Dulcigno and Antivari (which were under the control of Venice), was under Ottoman suzerainty. Many of the highland tribes welcomed the Ottoman armies as liberators, due to their reluctance to form a united Albania under the leadership of Kastriotis' dan. The lenient terms of capitulation required by Islamic law gave Albanians the right to retain their religious beliefs.
It was not until the early seventeenth century that Islam began to gain hold in Albania. This is proof in itself that the so-called theories that Islam was forced upon Albanians land other Balkan peoples) hold no ground in historical fact. In his exhaustive study of the spread of Islam, T.W. Arnold stated that 'There can be little doubt of the influence exerted by the zealous activity and vigorous life of Islam in the face of the apathetic and ignorant clergy. If Islam in Albania had many such exponents as the Mullah, whose sincerity, courtesy and friendliness are praised by Marco Bizzi [a papal nuncio sent to Albania in the early 1600s], with whom he used to discuss religious questions, it may well have made its way (1979, The Preaching of Islam).
In the face of decay of the Christian Church and its clergy, Albanians sought a renewed spirituality in a faith that was well suited to their independent-minded nature. Islam gave them a way to God without the entanglements of intermediaries and without the complex theological doctrines that typified medieval Christianity. Islam also gave Albanians a voice in the administration of not only their own lands but of the whole Ottoman State. Prominent Vizirs and Pashas (the most notable were the Koprulu family) hailed from Albania, and were appointed to their posts long before the majority of Albanians professed Islam.

As the Christian armies of Austria and Russia began to conquer the lands of the Ottoman Balkans in the late seventeenth century, tens of thousands of Muslims chose to flee to the Anatolian heartland rather than remain under Christian occupation. The Sultan's Christian subjects repaid the tolerance and religious freedom given to them under four centuries of Muslim rule with rebellion and treason. In such areas as Bosnia, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, where Christians outnumbered Muslims, vengeful massacres carried out by Christians occurred, often under the watchful eyes of the invading European armies.
Amidst this sea of turmoil and collapse, Albania was to prove itself a bastion of Islam, successfully fending off any Christian invaders. When the Ottomans were forcefully ejected from all of Europe (except for eastern Thrace) as a result of the Balkan Wars (1912-13), Albanians were left to deal with the advancing armies of Serbia and Montenegro without assistance from the armies of the Khilafa. To prevent Albania's absorption by the neighboring states, its independence was proclaimed on Nov. 28, 1912 under the leadership of Ismail Kemal Bey. Albania's territorial integrity was insured by the Great Powers, albeit not without a price. In return for foreign protection, a foreign Christian prince, William of Wied, was placed as monarch of Albania. He was, however, driven out on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War and when the Muslim insurgents chased him and his entourage out of Durres, they raised the Ottoman flag and declared themselves for the Khilafa.
War would cut short any hope for a stable Albania governed on the principles of Islam. Secular opportunists such as Esad Pasa and Ahmet Bey Zogolli lined themselves up to make their bid for power. The country was occupied by the Serbs and Montenegrins who were then pushed out by the Austrians.
Following the war, the victorious allies occupied the country, with Italy given extensive holding of all the central provinces. A provisional government was set up by the Italians and when they evacuated the country a pro-Italian administration was left behind. In June 1924, the American-educated Orthodox Bishop Fan Noli was placed in power. Having a Christian clergyman ruling over a Muslim state was to prove too much for many. Six months later, Noli was thrown out by Ahmet Bey Zogolli. In 1928, Ahmet proclaimed himself king of Albania and became known simply as King Zog. He set about to de-Islamize Albania on the model of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. The Shari'ah was subordinated to the newly adopted Swiss Civil Code and all Muslim clergy were forced to carry out the directives of the State. These inter-war restrictions on the practice of Islam were to prove to be a foreshadowing of what was yet to come.

In the spring of 1939 Mussolini's Italian legions invaded Albania, threw Zog out of the country and annexed it to the "New Roman Empire." The Italian presence would drag Albania into the chaos of the Second World War. Resistance, which was almost second nature to the Albanians would soon arise.
The largest partisan armies were the Balli Kombetar, a conservative republican group; the Legaliteti, which sought the return of Zog; the Albanian Communist Party that held a Stalinist line; and the Trotskyite Zjarri (Fire) and Te Rinjte (Youth) factions. These mutually hostile groups would fail to form a united front against the Italians and their puppet Albanian troops.
When the Italians capitulated to the Allies in 1943, the German army quickly moved into Albania. The Communists, under the command of Enver Hoxha, began to exert pressure on other resistance groups to conform to communist ideology. This hostility caused the Balli Kombetar faction, under the leadership of Midhat Frasheri, and the Legaliteti, under Abas Kupi, to side with the Germans against the communists. But as the Germans faced collapse elsewhere, their Albanian garrison was slowly withdrawn to more important fronts. The communists, with massive support from the British and Tito's Yugoslav communist partisans, were able to eliminate their rivals. On Nov. 29, 1944, Albania was "liberated" from German and "feudal-bourgeois" forces.

The Albanian Communist Party (ACP) began its iron-fisted rule in the name of Marxism-Leninism. The main target of the ACP was the total destruction of Islam. In 1945, all waqf properties were nationalized and hundreds of ulema, accused of collaboration, were executed. No contact could be made with Muslims in predominantly Muslim lands. Public religious instruction was made illegal. The Sunni community was to be under guidance of four muftis and the Bektashis under a single deed. Religious life was governed by strict regulations. Muftis were to be appointed by the state, prayers were only to be said in Albanian, and only those mosques that were absolutely necessary for community use were to remain open.
The final blow came on Feb. 6, 1967, when Albania was proclaimed the world's first atheistic state. All of the country's 530 mosques (this is a pre-war count) were locked up. Those that were allowed to remain open were turned into museums, gymnasiums and even artist's studios. Pig farms sprang up throughout the country and all were encouraged to eat pork products. It is interesting to note that the communist regime to this day has retained cordial relations with most Muslim countries of the Middle East. The ACP's campaign against Islam was to proceed without so much as a protest from either East or West.
What managed to emerge from the ruins of Islam and Christianity in Albania is a potent mixture of Stalinism and Albanian nationalism. It is important to note that Sunni Muslims had little hand in the development of secular Albanian nationalism. The celebrated slogan of communist Albania, "The religion of the Albanian is Albanianism," was penned by the Christian poet Pashko Vasa Shkodrani (1825-1892). State heroes include Father Kristo Negovani (1875-1905) and Petro Nini Luarasi, who were both Christian clergymen. Christian Albanians have gained much from the secularization of Albania. Although Christians make up only some 25% of Albania's population, they hold more than half of the membership of the Albanian politburo.
Along with Christian elements in Albania, the Bektashi sect also gave a helping hand to the anti-Islamic nationalist movement. The two Frasheri brothers, whose poetry is much loved by Albanian nationalists, were among the attendants at the predominantly Christian sponsored "League of Prizren" which occurred in 1878 and saw the birth of Albanian nationalism. The Bektashis are a bizarre blend of Islam, Christianity and pagan elements. It was started by one Fadlullah Hurufi (d. 1401), who proclaimed that he was the incarnation of Allah. Their beliefs include the teaching that all religions are equal, the rejection of Islamic practices such as fasting in Ramadan and the five daily prayers, the taking of a ritual meal (similar to Christian communion) and the confession of sins to a "Baba," or head priest. Bektashism was viewed by many Albanian nationalists as an ideal vehicle for the achievement of their goals. Its view that all religions are equal and its sole use of the Albanian tongue was proof that it was an original Albanian faith (despite the fact that the sect's founder was from the notorious Qarmatiyyah sect of eastern Arabia) and one that surpassed the deep confessional differences that separated Muslim and Christian Albanians.
It is not surprising to note that more than 6,000 Bektashis fought in the communist bands during the Second World War. The ACP also found support among the Bektashi community. Faja Martaneshi and Fejzo Mallahkastra (both of whom were Babas) were members of the General Council of the Democratic Front and they were elected to the People's Assembly in 1945. Ironically, these two babas were assassinated by the head of the order, Hilmi Dede, in 1947 for collaboration with the communists.

After the great upheaval that rid East-ern Europe of Communism, it seemed that Albania would remain untouched by the wave of social change. Things were, however, far from hopeless, massive popular protest against the government began in spring of 1990. In July, hundreds of people seeking asylum crammed into the Italian and West German embassies. At least 10,000 demonstrators packed Skanderbeg (Iskander Bey) Square in Tirana, demanding that the government adopt major reforms. Stiff measures were taken by Ramiz Alia's regime (Enver Hoxha's successor), banning all unauthorized gatherings. Demonstrations have continued, however, and Enver Hoxha's domineering status in Tirana's Skanderberg Square was demolished by students during a protest in the last half of February of this year.
Alia was eventually forced to concede to demands to allow political plurality. In December, hoping that such a move would encourage economic aid from the West to Albania's weak economy, the government granted formal approval to the opposition Democratic Party. Early in January of this year, two more parties, the Ecological Party and the Republican Party, were formed. The opposition was able to force Alia to postpone the scheduled Feb. 10 elections to March 31, stating they were ill-prepared for the earlier date. When elections did come, the Democratic Party seized 75 seats out of the 250-seat single chamber assembly. The communist grip was weakened but not destroyed. The communists managed to sway the bulk of the rural population by playing upon rumors that the Democratic Party was anti-nationalist.
Following the election, several Albanian cities were wracked by anti-government riots, showing displeasure with the election results. On April 2, four Democratic Party members were mysteriously killed in the northern city of Shkodre, and virtually the entire city erupted in violent protest against the communist authorities.
During this last spring, thousands of Albanian citizens attempted to flee to neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. In Greece, those Albanians who were not of the Greek minority were turned back at the frontier. None were allowed into Yugoslavia due to that country's oppression of its own Albanian population.
The opposition has been given the right to publish its own daily publication, Rilindja Demokmtike (Democratic Revival). The paper features articles critical of communist rule and its first issue was so popular that all of its first print copies were sold out within two hours. There have also been concessions given to religious freedom. It is no longer a crime against the state to openly practice or discuss religion. The first Juma' prayer in over twenty years was held Nov. 23, 1990 in Tirana. A recent tour by a group of Tablighi Jama'at brothers (reported in depth in Crescent Inremational) late last fall had revealed that Islamic teachings were virtually unknown to the youth, and only a few elderly came forward to announce that they were Muslims. The jama'at brothers did note, however, that the youth showed great curiosity when the group made the Adhan and prayed.
It is apparent that it will take several decades to re-Islamize Albanian life. Although Islamic literature is now, for the most part, allowed, very few outside organizations have shown interest in having any sent to be distributed. The situation is grave, and Christian missionaries have begun to arrive in Albania to attempt to fill the religious void. While Muslim wealth was squandered on a senseless war, the West will do its best to see that Islam never rises again in Albania...

ALBANIA - GENERAL PROFILE
Area 28,748 sq km
Population 1988 3,147,000
Population Growth 1.91%
Population Density 109/sq km
ALBANIA - LANGUAGES, ETHNIC GROUPS & RELIGIONS
Languages: Albanian, Greek
Ethnic Groups:
Albanian 96%
Greek & Other 4%
Religions
Muslim 70%
Albanian Orthodox 20%
Catholic 10%
The original article contains more data on Albania.

By H. Abiva

The Message International, 1991

Source: http://members.tripod.com/worldupdat...world/id22.htm

[Lion of New York]

1. ISLAMIC HERITAGE
1.1. Religiosity and Indifference
Usually people speak of three religions in Albania: Muslim, Christian Orthodox, and Catholic. Sometimes a further distinction is made, between Sunnite Muslims, and the Bektashi. Foreign observers, and even some careless Albanian ones, with a quite superficial knowledge of the country, its history, and its culture, have no trouble in employing, heuristically, notions and categories like "the Muslim majority" (not to speak of those who, more or less inadvertently, confuse the Christian Orthodox with Greek minority). Other more careful observers have long since noticed that some Albanians are (or have become) indifferent to religion. They are often called "atheists", with all the negative connotation that this word is susceptible to carry. To my opinion, atheism implies a deliberate denial and/or rejection of God, religious practices, and usefulness of spiritual experiences. Religious indifference, in Albania, is instead related to the following factors:

• Most communists, and their families, gave up any kind of religious practice voluntarily, and viewed religion as an obsolete, if not hostile form of social experience (not to mention the total negation of its spiritual values)
• Entire generations, after the War, grew up in a social environment in which religion played no significant role at all, until it got definitely abolished, in 1967. These people had NO chance to come into contact with genuinely religious experiences (outside the family circle), hence their indifference.
• Even among older people, not necessarily connected to communism, religion had already lost most of its relevance, in a highly laicized context, and under the influence of Western European liberalism, relativism, and positivism.

How high is the percentage of the indifferent in today's Albania? It is hard to tell, insofar as no recent statistical data are available. It seems, however, that the indifferent are quite a lot, especially in urban areas, and among the learned.
Direct experience shows that too many people decline going to church or to the mosque, do not baptize their children, nor circumcize their little boys, etc. They have no problem with tolerating other people practice, however.
If asked, most of them will certainly say that they "believe in God". It is likewise probable that, in certain situations, they DO pray: when a child is sick, before an exam, when the plane takes off. They just refuse RELIGION as an organized social activity and experience, not as an inner reality.
Should we consider these people "atheist"? I think this term is too strong, and should be reserved for a few outstanding individuals, who reject God deliberately, and declare war to clergy and their role as a spiritual guide. Enver Hoxha's regime was an atheist one, but even under Enver Hoxha the number of REAL atheists was insignificant. This also for the simple reason that "atheist" has a strong correlative value: you can be an atheist if you are confronted with a believer. Otherwise you are simply a non-believer.
1.2. Decline of Islam
The major traditional religion in Albania, Islamism, even before WW2, ceased to be attractive to younger generations, especially in the south. Even though I have never heard about any Muslim family or community converting to Christianity in Albania after 1912 (except for some instrumental conversions that have taken place lately among immigrants in Greece), I have the impression that many Muslims simply stopped being religious, as soon as they realized that Islam, to them, meant first of all a frame of experience closely related to Ottoman Turkey, and Oriental style of life.
Islam has continued to lose ground, and today seems to be in crisis, at least in Albania, if not in other Albanian-populated areas. Both Catholicism and Orthodoxy are USED to survive surrounded by a hostile culture: they had almost 500 years to adapt to the new unfriendly environment. Therefore, Christianity in Albania is related to a culture of Survival. Islam instead didn't have time enough to develop this ability. I certainly believe that, when Islam arrived in Albania, some Albanians embraced the new faith because they found in it VERY HIGH spiritual values. But I AM in the right to think that some other Albanians became Muslim so that they could OPPORTUNISTICALLY profit from the new political and social reality in the area. The Muslim community in Albania has always been privileged: because of her being a majority; because of a political and military first exclusivity, and then tradition; because of Muslims being the richest and most powerful, and so on. They maybe know how to live, but they do MISS a culture of survival. Of course, history tells us that Orthodox faith in Southern Albania survived not simply because believers had this kind of culture, but also because of the survival of Byzantine Church within the Ottoman Empire. Something similar might be said about the Catholic. From this point of view, I don't see how Islam in Albania will be able to flourish, without the Islam world coming out of isolation and becoming a REAL actor in International arena in general, and in Europe in particular.
Religion can't exist outside a cultural background. Sometimes it is the religion that creates it, sometimes the contrary, but most often they feed each other with energy and ideas. If you have a look at the distribution of various religions in the world, you will see that it is closely related to geography. Religions spread geographically, and they are closely connected to anything else that spreads geographically. Islam came in Albania with Ottoman rule. Now Ottoman rule is gone, and Ottoman culture is gone too. On the contrary, the Orthodox world is there, and the Catholic world is there too. Further, Albania is today under a heavy bombardment of Western mass culture, which still maintains some evident links with Western traditions and Christianity. It is also evident that mass culture in Western Europe and in the U.S.A. tends to be anti-Islamic. So, this (often pseudo)cultural background is a serious obstacle for those striving to have Islam resurrected in Albania. Muslim Albanians might have the noblest of faiths, but they are culturally isolated. Enver Hoxha (who by the end of his long life underwent an Islamic-mystical crisis, starting with his infatuation with the Iranian revolution, and finishing with his "Reflections on Middle-East", with his encyclopaedic sketches of famous Arab mystics and scholars, as well as his open praising of the Coran's superiority to other religious texts), exploited this isolation for his political purposes. Of course, this doesn't mean that Islam is to be blamed because Hoxha was a cruel dictator. This simply means that, even though abolished by law, Islam continued to play a role in shaping Albania's post-War history.
There are many reasons for the Islam's downfall, and it might be interesting discussing about them.

• To the upper classes in pre-independent Albania, Islam was closely associated with power. After 1912, when an Albanian state was born, more or less conceived after the ideals of the Rilindja ideologues, Islam started a general retreat from social life in the country. The role of Islam in shaping independent Albania's history was almost nul, if not regressive. The Ataturk's anti-Islamic reforms in Turkey gave a further hard blow to its hopes for a healthier future. On the other hand, Albania's national myths, enhanced and cultivated by Rilindja, had an unquestionable anti-Islamic core.
• Islamic culture in Ottoman Albania was sharply dichotomic: there was a high culture restricted to an elite (Berat, Shkoder, Elbasan, Prizren, Diber), and a low culture, spread among the masses. Elements of this low culture survived easily the paradigmatic shift, by losing any past reference to their religious background: (cuisine, urban life, architecture, market practices, dress code, family life structure, rituals of wedding, elements of morality, etc.).
• This didn't happen to Christianity, which survived as a religion of resistence to conversion, in the sense that awareness of being a Christian used to be necessarily stronger than awareness of being a Muslim. After 1912, some Christian elites thought of independent Albania as a possibility for normalizing the social hierarchy between religions in the country.
• By the beginning of 20th century, both Christian religions could already be practiced in Albanian language and there were good Albanian versions of their basic texts. They were thus accessible to everyone, while Islam kept closely attached to Arab language and script, and the essence of its doctrine remained therefore beyond grasp for the average Albanian (and for a good part of the clergy, too).
• For most Albanian Muslims Islam was thus, first of all, a system of rituals to be respected, centered around a very simple set of religious assertions. This system was perceived as constitutive part of the life under Ottoman Turkey, in the sense that religious practices reproduced not only religiosity, but a power hierarchy as well.

The 70% number comes from an old census, and can't be so reliable today. The descendants of these 70% of Albanians in Albania are still clearly aware of their being of Muslim origin, though such an awareness may connote many things, from a superiority complex (we RULE), to feelings of guilt and inferiority (when confronted to a Christian Europe).
1.3. The rediscovered Spell of Catholicism
It is significant to constate that people in Albania display this little-understood tendency to connect religions with typical geographical areas or countries, as if religions, like people, had fatherlands too. Islam today is identified with the Arab world. Christian Orthodoxy goes usually with Greece, and Catholicism with Italy. And Italy has been Albania's door to the Western world for more than 80 years. Its prestige has progressively grown, in spite of two world wars, with Italian armies invading the country and killing Albanian innocent people.
The era of TV sanctioned Italy's role as a model country for Albanian popular culture, which represents a significant contribution to the raise of Catholicism's prestige in Albania.
Curiously enough, elements of an under-cover pro-Catholicism had already appeared under totalitarianism. The high-profile jubilation of Scanderbeg, his incoronation as the ultimate Albanian National Hero (in 1968), was an indirect way of admitting that Albania was bound to a slow, but resolute shift towards the Catholic Western World, as has cleverly been remarked by the German Albanologist Armin Hetzer.
Some years later, in the '80-ies, Albanian culture rediscovered (with much pomp) the Great Catholic Fathers of its literature: Buzuku, Budi, Bardhi, and Bogdani, all of them priests. The nationalist fever of those years brought afloat some other writers too, of Albanian origin, authors of works related to Scanderbeg: Marin Barleti was the most celebrated, but he was not the only one. These authors belonged, by affiliation, to Italian Renaissance, but a niche could be carved for them in the history of Albanian literature as well.
The most influential Albanian writer of that time, Ismail Kadare, would be very active in promoting this pro-Catholic wave: directly, by praising the pre-Turk Albania, and indirectly, through some of his fanta-historical novels. It is not suprising, therefore, that after 1990 he would openly assert his wish for a re-Catholicization of Albanians, as a way to go back to the very roots of Albanian nation.
In 1993, when Pope John Paul II visited Albania, a very large crowd gathered to greet him in Tirana's main square, most of whom non-Catholic. No Islamic, or Christian Orthodox authority could ever dream of such a triumphal reception in Albania.
If Catholicism gained ground because Europe became a central image in Albanian popular mythology, Islam lost terrain also because Arab countries and Islamic world in general were scarcely visible in the average Albanian's horizon of values (horizon shaped mainly through information received by TV). If Arab television, instead of the Italian one, were watched in Albania; if Albanian teen-agers had chosen their heroes from some Pakistani soap-opera; if Arab were the most studied foreign language in the country; and if Albanian Muslim political elites were overtly religious, then Islam could have had a bright future in Albania.
Otherwise, its debacle can't be stopped with building (overnight) hundreds of tiny mosques around the Rinas airport, nor with scholarship grants and humanitarian aid from Muslim foundations, or with distributing free copies of "Koran" to Albanian taxi drivers.
2. OLD RELIGIONS, OLD PROBLEMS
2.1. Crushed under Their Own Glory
Centered around the city of Shkoder, the Albanian Catholic community is the smallest of the three religious communities in the country, but the one whose cultural history is the most glorious.
Communism managed to give a hard blow to their cultural tradition. Due to well-known ideological reasons, Catholicism was the target of a cruel campaign of persecution by the communist regime. All those Catholic institutions, which had been preciously contributing to Albanian culture (schools, libraries, scholarly journals, museums, theaters, orchestras, etc.), along with other valuable traditions (like literature, painting, photograph, music, ethnology, folkloristics, textology, etc.) were mercilessly destroyed, while the Catholic cultural elite ended up their days in communist prisons.
Contrary to the hopes of many a Catholic, the restoration of religious institutions and practices could not bring back what was lost in 45 years of totalitarianism. As a matter of fact, the flowering of Catholic culture in Shkodra, until 1945, was the ultimate result of a very delicate network of carefully woven balances: regional, national, international, and inter-religious as well. It would be naive to hope that, with the nominal restoring of some religious and civil institutions, and with destroying some absurd barriers raised by communist idelogy, the old state of grace will be as by miracle recreated. Actually, it seems very hard to restore an interrupted continuity, and this task will certainly require not only help from Vatican, but also cooperation with the other religious communities in Albania.
One main problem of the Catholic community is that its self-organization is severely hindered by its traditional duality, corresponding to a sharp geo-cultural division between the urban Catholic community in the city of Shkoder, and the communities of the remote and backward rural areas. None of the other religious communities in Albania suffers from such a serious inner contradiction. To further complicate the situation, thousands and thousands of Catholic mountaineers have now settled in Shkoder, often disturbing the urban demographic and cohabitation balances.
There is, then, a further problem. Catholic community used to function properly (as a system for communication and transmission of collective memories) when the Catholics were well aware of their being the most "Westernized" of Albanians. Will they be able to reorganize culturally, and restart from scartch, now that the road from Tirana to Western Europe (and especially to Italy) doesn't have to pass necessarily through Shkoder? The cultural isolation made Shkoder narcissically think of itself as a CENTER. Now the city knows that its role as a center has been severely compromised, and that no new isolation will ever help to restore the former centrality.
With Europeanism dominating elites' mentality in post-communist Albania, Catholicism seemed to be in an ideal position to develop and blossom, in order to return to its past splendors. Paradoxically, right now the Catholic community is having trouble in (re)finding a cultural identity of their own, BEYOND the strictly religious domain. This because Europeanism, and Occidentalism in particular, are no more a Catholic prerogative, and the growing laicization of civil society in Europe is rapidly resizing the privileges that Catholics used enjoy in the past. The mechanism of instant categorization, which is always active in European mainstream mass psychology, gives ever less importance to religious identity, and is lagely based on ethnic (and national) identification. To the average European, whose mentality is shaped by the media, the difference between a Catholic and a Muslim Albanian counts far less than the difference between, say, an Albanian and a Czech.
While trying to revive their traditions, especially in culture, and in civil society institutions, the Catholic community risks being suffocated under the weight of its own rich history. Too much attention to and obsession with the past, Gjergj Fishta included, will certainly hinder their integration in modern Albanian society and culture. Otherwise, their traditional superiority complex, and their trust in a quite questionable assumption, according to which Europe will always protect them, and prefer them to other religious communities in Albania, might lead to some modern version of their typical isolation within the country.
2.2. The Church is Mine
The Christian Orthodox community is the second largest religious community in Albania, and if my assumpion about the social signifiance of religious indifference in the country is confirmed by polls or any kind of census, numerical differences between Muslim and Christian Orthodox should not be as pronounced as they currently seem.
Orthodox Albanians have preserved their faith from time immemorable, and managed not only to survive under 5 centuries of Ottoman rule, but also to organize and excel in a good many crafts and trades. With Albania gaining independence in 1912, they would fight for, and in the end achieve a supreme goal: having their own autocephalous church, thanks to the titanic efforts of Fan Noli, and other illuminated Orthodox Church members.
Unfortunately enough, the autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church died in 1967, together with other religious institutions, though it should be said that communists' hostility toward religion had already compromised its normal functioning. All this, in spite of the well known fact that the Orthodox community, as such, was the least persecuted of all the three religious communities, probably because their Church had shown no overt hostility toward communism.
In 1990, when religious practices were officially reintroduced, the Orthodox Church was the one having most trouble to resurrect itself. The appointing of the Greek bishop Janulatos as head of the Church, with the benediction of Albanian authorities, was a very serious setback, especially if one thinks of the history of Albanian Orthodoxy during the last two centuries. As a matter of fact, even the need for autocephaly was due exactly to Albanian Orthodox community's firm will to clearly differentiate themselves from their Greek counterpart, and have Greek ingerence in their inner affairs stop once for all.
The problem, as always, becomes more complex if its premises (often taken for granted) are carefully analyzed. Historically, the Orthodox Community in Albania have had trouble in keeping distinct from the neighbour Greeks. Of course, language and ethnicity were a firm basis for distinction, but Greek cultural policy, notoriously aggressive, and centered around the teaching of the Greek script in a strictly religious context, rendered the possibility of assimilation quite real. The Christian Orthodox Chams in Epirus got eventually assimilated, and the same is about to be completed with the Arvanites. If it weren't for the Albanian Rilindja, and the very active participation in it of Albanian Orthodox elites, the same kind of cultural and linguistic assimilation would have happened with other Albanian Orthodox communities in Lunxheri, Permet, Kolonje, Zagori, Breg and elsewhere (Myzeqe not excluded).
As a matter of fact, Orthodox communities in Albania, before the Albanian national Awakening, could not objectively distinguish between Christian Orthodox religion, and Grecity as a cultural trait. The same holds true for Greek people. The first armed insurrections by Greek communities against the Turkish-Ottoman yoke were not aimed at restoring independence to Greece, but to retake possession of the whole Ottoman empire, and restore THE OLD BYZANTIUM (with Konstantinople as its eternal capital). As Byzantium's inner unity was based on the common Christian Orthodox religion shared by its numerous peoples, it is hardly surprising that Albanian Christians took actively part in this liberatory movement, fighting for a common Christian ideal (I doubt that they simply went there to fight as Albanian nationals, to help their Greek brothers in need, as it is routinely heard).
Therefore, the efforts of those distinguished Orthodox men and women, during the 19th century, to open Albanian schools for Christian Orthodox children, provide textbooks and teachers for these schools, accept a Latin-based alphabet for Albanian language, and translate into this language the most important religious books, so that Albanian could hopefully gain one day the status of a liturgic language, -- all these efforts, for which some of them had to pay with their lives, are to be considered as among the NOBLEST gestures in Albanian history. The efforts would eventually pay off, and modern Albanian culture is, to a large extent, indebted to Albanian Orthodox elites.
History also shows that Christian Orthodox Albanians have given the best of themselves if placed in ethnically (and culturally) mixed environments. The blossoming of cultural life and civil society in some cities, like Korce, Berat, Manastir, Elbasan, etc., in which Orthodox communities used to live side by side, and in good neighborhood and often excellent cooperation, with Muslim communities, is a good example for this cultural enhancement. Contrariwise, where Orthodox communities have lived closed and isolated, some stagnation has occurred, with Himara as a significant example.
Another problem of the Christian Orthodox community in Albania has been the Aromanian (Vlach) component in it. Aromanians live in more or less distinct communities in south and in central Albania, with some of them preserving their language and identity, and some others having lost it, and embraced Albanian ones. It is objectively difficult to tell an Albanian from an Aromanian, though place of family origin often helps, even when language and memory are lost. On the other hand, if Albanian Christian Orthodox community, AS A WHOLE, has been and remains culturally superior to the other two rligious communities in the country, the Aromanian component in it represents, in general, its weakest point.
Some Aromanians were prominent figures in Albanian Rilindja (Nikolla Naco), whereas some others, especially those originated from Voskopoja and settled in Korce, were distinguished as pro-Greek. So far as I know, the Aromanian community has never objected to their having to patronize an Albanian church, but they doesn't seem either too much upset by the current presence of Bishop Janulatos in Albania.
What could be the future of Christian Orthodoxy in Albania? Well, almost everything depends on the future of autocephaly. If Greek bishops follow the track opened by the pioneer Janulatos, and monopolize the summit of the Albanian Orthodox Church, the Christian Orthodox faith will be viewed as a trait and/or instrument for Grecization. All those Orthodox Albanians who firmly oppose Grecization will wander away from the Church. At the same time, a growing Grecization of the Albanian Orthodox Church will necessarily relegate the institution to the margins of Albanian civil society, if not make of it a HOSTAGE of Greek and Albanian political contests and interests.
3. TV DREAMS
3.1. A need for spirituality
If religion is a necessary component of human life, then it is reasonable to think that it never disappears, but just changes shape. The history of communist Albania might be a valid proof for this. It has already been observed how Hoxha's cult, and the kind of relationship between him and the masses contained some elements of a religious experience. It has also been observed how communist parties, in Eastern block, to begin with the Party that Stalin built up in Soviet Union, were clearly shaped after the typical structure of a religious order. Analysts in Vatican have repeatedly accused these regimes of replacing traditional religions with the crude worship and adoration of the Dictatorial State and its Leaders.
On the other hand, not everything in people's daylife, at lest in Albania, was politicized. Between that Order of Fanatics that ruled the country, and the nuclei of those that had not abandoned the faith of their ancestors, there was a large mass of people who, having conveniently given up any kind of traditional religious experience, had not lost, nonetheless, the mental institution of Faith. Man has to believe in something, after all. If such a belief grows in importance to the extent that it starts shaping one's choices in life, including standards of behavior, ethics and lifestyle, it virtually (and functionally) becomes indistinguishable from religion.
This kind of unconventional religion is usually called a myth, though it is not easy to discern between the terms. Sometimes myth is considered as ONE of the many components of religion; in this case, myth consists of narrative(s) expressing the essence of a given religion, while religion itself includes ritual, religious ethics, doctrine(s), and institutions.
My thesis, which I will try to expose in the following paragraphs, is that a new religion developed (mostly) in (urban) Albania with the introduction of the TV set. Though I will start with using the term "religion" metaphorically, there are some elements that might allow to use it heuristically as well, though I do not intend discussing this topic right here.
It is generally admitted that Western TV programs introduced in the country the MYTH of Europe (what I call here "Europe" is a set of narratives and ideas regarding life in Western Europe and the USA). People watched TV, enjoyed the messages, and offered no resistance to its seductive power.
Due to the very nature of the TV medium, most of the messages coming from it are REDUNDANT, which roughly means that often different messages, or even different parts of the same message say more or less the same thing. With TV ads redundancy is put to work, so that repetition could create a NEED, or even a LOVE for the advertised object.
Ads transmitted by the Italian TV, however, were not intended for the Albanian public. The Italian viewer can go to the store and buy the advertised merchandise as soon as he starts feeling the need to have the advertised item. Afterwards the ad would maintain a mere comforting effect, and nothing more.
Nobody could have ever imagined the impact that these ads would have on people that could not complete the actions naturally triggered by the messages.
In fact, not only NONE of the advertised items could be found on the Albanian market, but the life they described was totally out of reach, as far as the average Albanian is concerned. It is often forgotten, by the way, that this extreme scarcity of merchandise on the market would become the Albania's definition of poverty.
On the other hand, the impossibility to HAVE the advertised object would set off, after some deep frustration, a series of unpredictable and aberrant responses. TV ads are structured in such a manner, that they should induce a real URGE to buy. They usually work in the subliminal level, while the viewer is distracted by superficial images and narratives. You feel you have to buy something, without having thought about the reasons that make you feel so.
3.2. The Upper Reality
What happens when you feel the need, enjoy the pleasure associated with the message, but can't satisfy it immediately? Well, you start to SUBLIMATE it, that is, to take it to an UPPER level of consciousness. Advertised items are usually beautiful, or at least associated with beautiful people and premises, for example, though this beauty is meant as a simple component in the general effect of inducing the NEED. If sublimated, this same beauty becomes a key opening the doors to THE BEAUTY, as a noble feeling of perception.
Step by step, the entire advertising message is extracted from its (pragmatic) context, and even de-constructed. The ultimate result is that ads are viewed as windows to an UPPER REALITY.
This is the reality where people, and things, and behaviors, and actions are light, colorful, beautiful. People are almost always good looking, clean, and well-dressed; they all smile and enjoy everything they do, and get extremely happy, even when confronted with a new tooth-brush.
To the average Albanian TV viewer, this was the modern variant of El Dorado, or paradise. A paradise ON Earth, close to Albanian shores, and still as impossible to reach as the conventional paradise, described in traditional religious myths.
These "sublime" images from an otherwise forbidden world should not be considered, nonetheless, as immediate and direct culprits for the outburst of material greed in the '90-s. Their role, between 1970 and 1990, was not dissimilar from the role of Biblical and Gospel narratives in the Christian tradition: offer a comfortable support to faith, and convey deep truth through articulated levels of meaning.
Part of the public's experience in front of the Italian TV (Yugoslav and Greek too, for that) was genuinely -- not metaphorically -- religious. Every night a spiritual communion with a transcendental world was achieved. Families were brought together, shared the same good feelings of uninterested pleasure, and spent hours under the spell of sublimation. Western Europe became Heaven.
The repeated contact with mirages of a reality BEYOND, not only created a diffuse DESIRE, but also kept it alive for a sufficiently long time, so that desire could lose its initial property of being a necessary impulse for action, and become a STATE OF MIND, similar to profuse, uninterested love. Nobody could permit the hope that, through the desire, one day it would be possible to obtain the desired object. Desire became thus a spiritual value, or category, in itself, and started shaping personalities, behavior, and lifestyle. Simple objects, originated in the Mythic Land, were often treated as sacred relics, displayed in living rooms, given as presents, and compulsively conserved: an empty Coke can, a page from a magazine, even a soap wrap paper.
Enhanced consciousness, as a permanent initiation to mysteries offered by the Europe BEYOND, was not necessarily related to the medium, in this case to TV. You could prove it if you were addicted to Western pop music, for example, and had your miserable collection of Beatles tapes, to share with your friends. You could also experience it if you were an International Soccer fan. The shock wave of some public events like, for example, a soccer match in Tirana between Albanian and West German national teams would trigger a genuine mass ecstasy. Also, when Italian pop singer Al Bano (and wife) visited the country in 1989 and performed in a stadium in Tirana, his mild romantic and mainstream melodies had a quasi psychedelic effect on the thrilled public, used to watching him, for more than 20 years, on TV. The social impact of these kind of events could be compared to the impact of religious miracles, like the so-called Marian apparitions (Fatima, etc.).
In both cases the effect is amplified by the persisting desire, and the transitory madness is due to the paradox of a desire refusing to be extinguished in perception.
This model of explanation might help to understand what exactly happened to the Albanians when both the country's borders and its market were wide-opened, in 1990. The sudden coming true of calcified desires probably led to a hypertrophy of the EGO, and to a consequent loosening of social constraints. Most people's lives were already simplified to the point that mere communion with objects of desire (for example, a luxury car, or living in Italy, or leaving FOR Italy) would suppress the need for a genuine social life. Social texture collapsed, and the refugees who crossed the Adriatic arrived in destination as people radically different from those same people who had been dreaming, for years and decades, about "the promised land". Desire had been so strong, and so persisting, that in the end it had lost touch with its object, and transformed people into relentless machines of perpetual GREED.
3.3. Was It Really a Religion?
Could we speak, then, of a new religion in Albania? If the question is not simply about terminology, it might be worth trying to find an answer. Some key elements of religion were certainly present: sublimation, high values, shared experience, beatitude, ritual, and supporting narratives.
Watching TV worked well as a consolation for everything gone wrong during the day. The life of the average Albanian, if confronted to Western standards, was clearly ASCETIC: in a social environment practically devoid of any possibility of luxury, people went through their days wearing the same clothes, eating the same poor meals, and with no opportunity for spending, because the market was literally empty. Asceticism, plus visions of a hyperreality, were a good terrain for religious experiences.
The barrier effect is also to be accounted for. Worship of Europe was unquestionably a serious political crime, and one could be persecuted simply because of his interest in foreign TV. For the same reason, TV antennas were constantly checked, and owners of suspicious ones invited to "reflect". Addiction of people to Italian TV was often accompanied by a sense of jeopardy, which could end up, eventually, in guilt, but usually would add energy to sublimation. The idea of doing something inherently dangerous and challenging to the regime would help creating the conviction that, for the very same reason, watching TV was a very serious and rewarding activity.
The basic tenet that the new religion shared with older traditional ones, especially with Christianity, was that true beatitude was somewhere BEYOND conventional reality, though believers were allowed glimpses of it, in both cases. A situation of great, almost unbearable distress, would be solved through the soothing effect of mythic opiates. Even the key myth of original sin was present, because whenever an Albanian would start to think of his/her own poverty and misery, it would tend to appear to him as a kind of expiation. Communism, more than a cause, would rather be thought of as an effect of something larger and deeper. Hence the "enigmatic" anti-nationalism of refugees in the '90-s. The cause of misery was to be found in the very essence of their being: Albania.
3.4. At Least We Had a Prophet
This new religion had also a Great Prophet: the writer Ismail Kadare. There was a time, in Albania, when his works were literally devoured by a very large public, a phenomenon this which cannot be explained within the conventional schema of a writer-reader relationship. Novel after novel, Kadare managed to build an ingenious mythical doctrine, according to which Albania was THE EDGE of European civilization, or the land where Europe itself, as a sublime idea, had continually fought against darkness, obscurantism, and despotism.
Most of Kadare's novels, though dealing with Albanian themes, and featuring Albanian events, contain a great deal of this "divine Europe", in the same way as Homer's "Iliad" is thoroughly with Gods and divinities. In both cases, the divine world observes, surveys and intercedes in favor of this or that part. In the typical narrative structure of Kadare's novel, these West-European characters constitute a level different from the one where Albanian characters move. They reflect, rather than act. Examples are numerous. In "Gjenerali i Ushtrise se Vdekur", and "Dosja H" we find the same couple of European males who never stop discussing about Albania's meaning and history. Political novels, like "Dimri i Madh", "Koncert ne Fund te Dimrit", "Viti i Mbrapshte" and "Nentori i nje Kryeqyteti" are rich of foreign correspondents, journalists, ambassadors, diplomats, etc. Even the last effort "S.P.I.R.I.T.U.S." features a European research group traveling in post-communist Albania, not to mention the entire story-line concerning the message secretly sent to France. Sometimes the role of "European Divinities" is trusted to initiated Albanians, like for example the Vorpsi couple in "Prilli i Thyer", or Kadare's alter ego Skender Bermema in Beijing. The general idea is that Europe is a place in transcendence, that could be shared in the geography of the soul, but not simply by crossing the Adriatic Sea.

[Menydh]

Typical Albanian propaganda on these boards. One grows tired of it. The point is 70% of Albanian population identify themselves as Moslem. Any further discussion on this is a futile attempt to mask it and justify it.

Accepting such population in Europe is just as suicidal as accepting Turkish.

[damjan]

its not propoganda. i know its hard for you to imagine a people who dont give a crap about religion.
there are 500,000-800,000 albs in greece. most have been there for 10-14 years, none has asked for mosque.

[Menydh]

500,000-800,000 Albanians in Greece?

Good grief! If we had half as many here you would be first in my list to kick out.

[Lion of New York]

Actually, his write it aint propaganda. It was published in italy in 97'.

Im sad to see you view things so religiously. Yes Albania is 70% muslim, however, aint it funny that a nation with 70% Albs can look so much to a Orthodox Greek Archbishop? Why would that be? Why would the entire nation gather up in the capitol of the city to see a Catholic Pope? Because both of those guys are/were great men. Not because of what their religion is.

Oh and who put 4% as greek minority? Check encyclopedia britannica. It was barely 90,000....

[Menydh]

You simply don't get it. I don't see things "so religiously". I see them in spiritual terms. It is about the spirituality and culture of the European Nations, conditio sine qua non for their preservation. And that spirituality and culture does not come in any case from centuries of Islamic teachings. Rather, if something, in opposition to it.

Do you see now where you don't fit in this scheme?

[Lion of New York]

What are you afraid of? if Europe is true to it's religion there is no need to fear Islam... The mosque will be next door...why would you see it as such a threat? The true europeans will always maintain their christianity, the only difference is youll see some dark people with funny hats as you go to the church. Not from Albs though, we look down on those clothes.. Just too plain racist to dress like arabs...