De Gaulle's Foreign Policy

[Theobald]

De Gaulle' Foreign Policy : Politics of grandeur, 1962-1968

With the Algerian conflict behind him, in 1962 de Gaulle was able to achieve his two main objectives: to reform and develop the French economy, and then to promote an independent foreign policy and a strong stance on the international stage. This was the "politics of grandeur" (politique de grandeur).

In the context of a population boom unseen in France since the 18th century, the government under Prime Minister Georges Pompidou oversaw a rapid transformation and expansion of the French economy. With dirigisme - a unique combination of capitalism and state-directed economy - the government intervened heavily in the economy, using indicative five-year plans as its main tool.

With these projects, the French economy recorded growth rates unrivalled since the 19th century. In 1963, de Gaulle vetoed Britain's entry into the EEC for the first of two times. In 1964, for the first time in 200 years, France's GDP overtook that of the United Kingdom, a position it held until the 1990s.

This strong economic foundation enabled de Gaulle to implement his independent foreign policy. In 1960, France became the fourth state to acquire a nuclear arsenal, detonating an atomic bomb in the Algerian desert. In 1968, at the insistence of de Gaulle, French scientists finally succeeded in detonating a hydrogen bomb without American assistance. In what was regarded as a snub to Britain, de Gaulle declared France to be the third big independent nuclear power, as Britain's nuclear force was closely coordinated with that of the United States.

While grandeur was surely an essential motive in these nuclear developments, another was the concern that the U.S., involved in an unpopular and costly war in Vietnam, would hesitate to intervene in Europe should the Soviet Union decide to invade. An additional effect was that the French military, which had been demoralised and close to rebellion after the loss of Algeria, was kept busy. In 1965, France launched its first satellite into orbit, being the third country in the world to build a complete delivery system, after the Soviet Union and the United States.

De Gaulle was convinced that a strong and independent France could act as a balancing force between the United States and the Soviet Union, a policy seen as little more than posturing and opportunism by his critics, particularly in Britain and the United States, to which France was formally allied. In January 1964, he officially recognized the People's Republic of China, despite U.S. opposition. Eight years later, U.S. President Richard Nixon would begin to normalize relations with the PRC.

Indeed, Nixon's first foreign visit after his election was to de Gaulle in 1969. They both shared the same non-Wilsonian approach to world affairs, believing in nations and their relative strengths, rather than in ideologies, international organizations, or multilateral agreements. De Gaulle is famously known for calling the United Nations le Machin ("the thing").

In February 1966, France withdrew from the common NATO military command, but remained within the organization. De Gaulle, haunted by the memories of 1940, wanted France to remain the master of the decisions affecting it, unlike in the 1930s, when France had to follow in step with her British ally.

In September 1966, in a famous speech in Phnom Penh (Cambodia), he expressed France's disapproval of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam as the only way to ensure peace. As the Vietnam War had its roots in French colonialism in South-East Asia, this speech did little to endear de Gaulle to the Americans, even if they later drew the same conclusion.

During the establishment of the European Community, de Gaulle helped precipitate one of the greatest crises in the history of the EC, the Empty Chair Crisis. It involved the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, but almost more importantly the use of qualified majority voting in the EC (as opposed to unanimity). In June 1965, after France and the other five members could not agree, de Gaulle withdrew France's representatives from the EC. Their absence left the organization essentially unable to run its affairs until the Luxembourg compromise was reached in January 1966. De Gaulle managed to make QMV essentially meaningless for years to come, and halted more federalist plans for the EC, which he opposed.

Having vetoed Britain's entry into the EEC a second time, in June 1967, he condemned the Israelis for their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza following the Six-Day War. This was a major change in French policy. Until then, France had been a staunch ally, helping Israel militarily and jointly planning the Suez Campaign in 1956.

Under de Gaulle, following the independence of Algeria, France embarked on foreign policies more favourable to the Arab side, still a distinct aspect of French foreign policy today. Israel's leadership, stung by what it considered its capricious abandonment, turned towards the United States for military support.

However, de Gaulle supported the principle of a just settlement for both the Arab and Jewish refugees of the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations. This was stated upon the adoption of UN Resolution 242, in his press conference of November 27, 1967 and contained in his letter to David Ben-Gurion dated January 9, 1968.

During Nigeria's civil war of 1967-1970, de Gaulle's government supported the Republic of Biafra in its struggle to gain independence from Nigeria. Despite lack of official recognition, de Gaulle provided covert military assistance through France's former African colonies. The United Kingdom opposed de Gaulle's stance, but he viewed the political position of the Igbo in Nigeria as analogous to that of the French Québécois living in Canada.

In July 1967, de Gaulle visited Canada, which was celebrating its centennial with a world's fair, Expo 67. On 24 July, speaking to a large crowd from a balcony at Montreal's city hall, de Gaulle uttered Vive le Québec ! (Long live Quebec!) then added, Vive le Québec libre ! (Long live free Québec!). The Canadian media harshly criticized the statement, and the Prime Minister of Canada, Lester B. Pearson, a soldier who had fought in World War I and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, stated that "Canadians do not need to be liberated." De Gaulle left Canada of his own accord the next day without proceeding to Ottawa as scheduled. He never returned to Canada. The speech caused outrage in English Canada; it led to a serious diplomatic rift between the two countries. However, the event was seen as a watershed moment by the Quebec sovereignty movement.

In December 1967, claiming continental European solidarity, he again rejected British entry into the European Economic Community.

Source

[Theobald]

More :

- De Gaulle & NATO

General de Gaulle's attitude to NATO, progressing from overt mistrust even before 1958 to his decision in 1966 to withdraw French forces from the integrated military structure, was part of his plan to provide France with an independent defence policy...

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- De Gaulle & Quebec

After his trip to North America in 1960, General de Gaulle foresaw the possibility of a special status for Quebec within Canada, as "a state with French roots, alongside another with British roots". (...) Demands for independence multiplied and a Maison Québécoise opened in Paris in 1961, acting as an official overseas delegation. (...) The General went further, insisting in 1963 on the idea that "French Canada will become a state", thereby deeming the Canadian state to be a fact. (...) The Great Exhibition held in Montreal in 1967 would provide the occasion for de Gaulle to make his position public. "Vive le Québec libre ! (Long live free Quebec !)" is one of the General's phrases that everyone knows. (...)
Closer relations were forged between France and Quebec in education, culture and science.

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- De Gaulle & Wallonia

Charles de Gaulle knew Belgium well, and Wallonia in particular. (...) De Gaulle has made his position very clear, in a private interview : " I had received a delegation from the Walloons, determined to prepare for attachment to France. The delegation explained that the Flemish were becoming increasingly arrogant and would probably end by themselves seceding. That may be how it will all end.
Wallonia exists, but there is no Walloon nation, the Walloons have never sought to become a state. Their request is to be included in the French Republic, to which they already once belonged. It is quite different from seeking emancipation, as do the people of Quebec, from Anglo-Saxon domination.
Many Walloons believe they would receive better treatment from France than from Flanders. That is probably the case. As part of France, they would rediscover the pride of belonging to a great nation, pride in their language and culture, a taste for taking part in the great affairs of the world and for fighting in the name of the great human causes.
All these things they have lost through their unnatural association, imposed by the English, with the Flemish who dislike them and whom they dislike. In the interests of the unity of Belgium, the differences between them have been smoothed over. They are frustrated by this."

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- De Gaulle & the Third World

From 1962, following the resolution of the Algerian question, support for Third World development became one of the main issues in de Gaulle's foreign policy. The emergence of the Third World, organised as an institution since the creation of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations at the Bandoeng Conference in 1955, was a useful tool in implementing his strategy of denouncing American imperialism and calling for action against the hardening of the two great power blocs.
(...)
His visits to Latin America in 1964 showed that there was nowhere on earth beneath his consideration so long as France had any interests, cultural and linguistic in particular, that could counterbalance American influence in the region. It sent a powerful signal of support for those struggling against US domination.

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- De Gaulle & Europe

On 11 November 1942, de Gaulle invited Europeans to "join together in a practical and lasting fashion". In his view, however, Europe should be something more than the institutional construction known successively as the EEC, Common Market and then European Union. The phrase "from the Atlantic to the Urals" clearly expressed his view of the geographic and historic extent of the concept of Europe : there would not be time, however, for him to make this project a reality.
(...)
After 1945 de Gaulle, like others, rapidly realised that the time for antagonism within Europe was over as it was in ruins and feeling the pressure of the new superpowers. Yet slogans like "a United States of Europe" (immortalised by Victor Hugo in 1851) held little appeal in his eyes. Steeped in history, strongly attached to the values of mediaeval Christianity and to the "concert of nations", a key 19th concept, he believed that Europe, should it ever take shape, should be based on realities and constructed in stages, first and foremost in the economic and technical fields in order to create a "de facto solidarity" without undermining national sovereignties. He also believed that such a Europe could not exist unless preceded by a firm and lasting reconciliation between France and Germany, along with a deep understanding between the two peoples which would constitute its foundation and core, while allowing France to play a decisive role.

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- De Gaulle & his visits abroad

Setting aside any of his pre-1940 postings abroad, General de Gaulle made many visits abroad both in and out of office. Their purpose was to consolidate or strengthen France's "rank" : for him, France was "never so great as when she spoke to the world".
(...)
Even so, all de Gaulle's overseas visits contributed significantly to demonstrating France's position in the world, and making the General's personality more widely known. He spoke in the language of the host country, which won him extraordinary enthusiasm and consideration. He sought to show by this that the idea of the nation takes precedence over any other consideration, and he was acclaimed for this recognition of peoples. His other motivation, of course, was to make it clear that France was an independent and sovereign power.

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[Theobald]

And that dirty Atlantist buffoon dares to claim de Gaulle's legacy...

[Franze]

In aglosaxon countries De Gaulle is criticised, I knew some questions but now I know more.

[ewald steiner]

De Gaulle filled a historical vacuum in France's chequered political history. His tenure had a temporary effect, he was toppled by the rabble rousing hooligans ( vipers nesting in the buxom of France) of 1968. In spite of his politics of grandeur, De Gaulle overlooked the demographic sanctity of France; leaving the door open to unrestrained inmigration from the ex colonies. Having left the scene, those who followed him were mere functionaires, thanks to those myopic international policies France finds herself in a historical cul de sac, from which to extricate herself seems a non attainable goal. Anyone , any political clown that is , claiming to carry the Gaullist mantle is expediently playing to an audience. Since there is no other historical reference point of departure for today's clownesque demagogues , they resort to using De Gaulle's name and his non-applicable policies in contemporary France.

The circus of political electioneering with bankrupt slogans and ,abstract high flouting , nonsensical policies is the only legacy from which to kickstart a re-evaluation of values, keeping in conformity with traditional cultural rigeur and core nationhood.

France is a hotbed babel of centrifugal forces. Was De Gaulle to rise from his grave and see his nation today, no doubt he would re-interred himself forthwith.