Eurasianism

[Arthur Gordon Pym]

In the 1920s, geopolitical thinking manifested itself undisguised among Russian nationalist-minded émigrés in the shape of Eurasianism. It was influenced partly by late Slavophilism of the 1870s and 1880s, partly by German geopolitics in the shape of Carl Schmitt, K. Haushofer, and Ernst Niekisch. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union geopolitics had no chance to be permitted as a separate doctrine as even national bolshevism could exist only behind the facade of Marxism-Leninism. Geopolitics became officially accepted as a political theory only in post-totalitarian Russia. Its rapidly growing popularity was, probably, due to. the new frustrating situation after the break-up of the Soviet empire. With 25 million Russians living beyond the frontiers of the Russian Federation, the idea of restoring the empire and the former Soviet Union's status of a superpower was harboured by considerably large quarters of society.

Geopolitics became the new ideological panacea for Russian-minded statist national patriots who quite often called themselves Eurasians (evraziitsy) or neo-Eurasians (neo-evraziitsy). As has been noted, this category of nationalists can be found within the Establishment in general, and within the army and other power structures in particular. Neo-Eurasianism includes aspects of both traditionalist and `modernist' thinking. Imperial thinking and orientation belong mainly to the first category, whereas the latter is characterised by urbanism and industrial, technological, and military-industrial projects.
Emerging in the early 1990s, Russia's new statist (imperial) nationalism represented several different currents of thought including different versions of anti-communist nationalism ( of the 'red-brown' ideology. At the same time, however, the neo-Eurasians showed certain common traits such as a very critical if not hostile attitude towards the West and its universalist ideas. This common ideological orientation was strengthened by the humiliating break-up of the Soviet empire in 1991. In post-Soviet Russia, hardliners among nationalists and nationalist-minded communists considered Yeltsin's government with its neoliberal reform policy to represent alien non-Russian interests.

Originally, the Eurasians were a movement among young Russian émigré intellectuals in the 1920s and early 1930s. The founder of their doctrine was Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938). The Eurasian manifesto entitled Exodus to the East (Iskhod k vostoku) was published in Prague in 1922.

Rejecting the possibility of a universal civilisation, the Eurasians pointed out the detrimental impact of the expanding European (Romano-Germanic) culture on other civilisations. This being the case, Nikolai Danilevsky's view of the contagious rotten Europe was more or lest revived. Russia's future was considered to be in the East. As a concept Eurasia was defined as a politically, historically and culturally indivisible territory which more or less coincided with that of imperial Russia. It constituted an organic and harmonic totality and needed protection from alien cultural influences. Thus, Russia should not copy European institutions but preserve its own traditions. In plain language, this implied a traditionalist policy. Spiritually, Russia should return to its pre-Petrine state - Muscovite Russia that had been an Orthodox theocracy.
However, besides being traditionalist Eurasianism included elements of modern nationalist thought. In particular, the new science of geopolitics was more or less adopted by the Eurasians. Moreover, even some germs of German racist thinking can be found, in particular in Trubetskoy's writings coloured by unsophisticated cultural anthropology. The attitude of the Eurasians towards Italian fascism was almost benevolent. Their view of the ideal, culturally autarchic and 'ideocratic' state was influenced by the principles of a corporative system of society. Soviet Russia, for its part, provoked contradictory feelings. Among the Eurasians, there were those who more or less sympathised with the Soviet regime. At the same time, they hoped that Bolshevism sooner or later would be replaced by Eurasianism. In their view, there were some positive features in the Soviet system such as a strong government with a clearly identifiable ruling group (the communist party) and the Soviets permitting ordinary people to participate in governing the country. Nikolai Alekseev, the leading political scientist in the Eurasian movement, advocated `a Russia with Soviets, but without communists. In a word, Russia should abandon Marxism, reject the communist party, and adopt Eurasianism as her new guiding doctrine.

In the 1920s, geopolitical thinking manifested itself undisguised among Russian nationalist-minded émigrés in the shape of Eurasianism. It was influenced partly by late Slavophilism of the 1870s and 1880s, partly by German geopolitics in the shape of Carl Schmitt, K. Haushofer, and Ernst Niekisch. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union geopolitics had no chance to be permitted as a separate doctrine as even national bolshevism could exist only behind the facade of Marxism-Leninism. Geopolitics became officially accepted as a political theory only in post-totalitarian Russia. Its rapidly growing popularity was, probably, due to. the new frustrating situation after the break-up of the Soviet empire. With 25 million Russians living beyond the frontiers of the Russian Federation, the idea of restoring the empire and the former Soviet Union's status of a superpower was harboured by considerably large quarters of society.

Geopolitics became the new ideological panacea for Russian-minded statist national patriots who quite often called themselves Eurasians (evraziitsy) or neo-Eurasians (neo-evraziitsy). As has been noted, this category of nationalists can be found within the Establishment in general, and within the army and other power structures in particular. Neo-Eurasianism includes aspects of both traditionalist and `modernist' thinking. Imperial thinking and orientation belong mainly to the first category, whereas the latter is characterised by urbanism and industrial, technological, and military-industrial projects .
In the early 1930s, the movement was split as the numerous anti-communist Eurasians withdrew and, in fact, moved towards the extreme right, i.e. the NTS or the Russian fascists and national socialists. In 1992, the ideas of Eurasianism became a fashionable umbrella ideology for numerous Russian nationalist movements and groupings. `Eurasia' became a codeword for Russia's lost imperial identity emphasising the differences between Russian and European civilisations. Concepts like the `Eurasian space' (evraziiskoe prostranstvo) implying the territory of the former Soviet empire, 'Eurasianism' or `Russia's geopolitical interest as a Eurasian power' became frequent in the national patriots' vocabulary. As time went on, the slogans of almost all political movements including those of Zyuganov's communists and Yeltsin's liberals became more or less coloured by Eurasianism. This thinking coincided with a renewed interest in the traditional strong Russian state. The idea was that the Russian state needed to be strong, powerful and centralised in order to be able to rule its vast territory. This being the case, Russia should not be too democratic, the argument went. In principle, this train of thought became a common denominator for the nationalists and communists in the opposition as well as for the liberals in power.

National bolshevism

The birth of the Soviet state was accompanied by a totally new ideological phenomenon in Russia, that of interaction between the extreme left, the ruling Bolsheviks, and part of the extreme right, the proponents of the Russian idea. As a result, a new red-white, or later even a red-white-brown, ideology called national bolshevism, came into being. This phenomenon, however, was not confined to Soviet Russia, but appeared in Europe as well, in particular in the Russian émigré community and in Germany. Thus, there was a continuous interaction of Bolshevik and rightist ideas not only in Soviet Russia but also in Europe, and above all in Germany. This process of reciprocal influences was especially fruitful in the 1920s.

Before the October revolution, Vladimir Lenin had pledged himself to work for the dissolution of the Russian empire. In his view, the granting of national self-determination to smaller nations would lead to a voluntary union between them and socialist Russia (unification through separation). The Leninist thesis about the nations' right to autonomy and secession from the Russian empire earned the party an influx of enthusiastic members from among the various national minorities, primarily among Jews, but also among Latvians and Georgians.

Yet, when the Bolsheviks had seized power, Lenin faced a new unexpected problem. His principle about the peoples' right to self-determination `no longer weakened the position of the Czar but, on the contrary, that of the Soviet government. The Azerbaijani, the Armenians and the Georgians declared their independence, and other countries - Ukraine, White Russia (Belarus), Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland - followed suit. In this new situation, the Bolsheviks realised that their political survival required all their efforts to save and restore the Russian empire. This being the case, they made a political volte face in turning down the idea of world revolution in favour of saving Russia. As the Bolshevik regime had a very narrow social base - many of the leaders of the party were Jews - finding a modus vivendi of sorts with anti-Western Russian nationalists was a conditio sine qua non.
The civil war of 1918-20 divided the rightist and nationalist forces. There were numerous proponents of the extreme right within the army, the security police and the Church, who sided with the Bolsheviks in the spirit of `red patriotism'. These antiliberal and anti-Western conservatives considered the Bolsheviks to be the only political force capable of restoring the Russian empire. In their view, the socialist and internationalist character of the Soviet regime was a transient phenomenon.
Large parts of the tsarist officer corps, including Aleksei Brusilov, the commander-in-chief, and Admiral Vasilii Altwater, joined the Red Army and greatly helped the Bolsheviks win the civil war. The White movement was considered to rather serve foreign interests including those of Great Britain. As a paradox, Russia's national interests were now defended by internationalist Vladimir Lenin who opposed a partition of the former empire. The Bolsheviks were promoting the imperial idea by re-establishing Russia's supremacy over White Russia (Belarus), Ukraine, and Transcaucasia.

In the wake of the civil war, the Bolsheviks were to deepen and extend their cooperation with the Russian national right. `The new Marxist-Leninist ideology, like the early Christianity, had to make its peace with the state. Revolutionary Bolshevism had to compromise with Russian state power' (Carter 1990, 46). Already during the civil war, there had been signs of a gradual merger of bolshevism with a traditional Russian concept of the state as the incarnation of the imperial idea. Lenin urged upon the Bolsheviks the necessity for intelligent compromise with their national conditions. Thus, the preconditions for the emergence of national bolshevism, the new shadow ideology, were created. Being formally radical and leftist, it actually represented conservatism and great power nationalism.

In the early 1920s, this new trend of thought was paralleled abroad by an émigré movement with the journal Smena vekh (Change of Landmarks) as its mouthpiece.
Emerging in the early 1990s, Russia's new statist (imperial) nationalism represented several different currents of thought including different versions of anti-communist nationalism ( of the 'red-brown' ideology of for example Alexander Dugin ( translated the occultist works of Julius Evola into Russian). At the same time, however, the neo-Eurasians showed certain common traits such as a very critical if not hostile attitude towards the West and its universalist ideas. This common ideological orientation was strengthened by the humiliating break-up of the Soviet empire in 1991. In post-Soviet Russia, hardliners among nationalists and nationalist-minded communists considered Yeltsin's government with its neoliberal reform policy to represent alien non-Russian interests.

Having deep historical roots, the aforementioned anti-Western attitude implies that Russia should not let herself be influenced by pernicious West has been accused of having tried to undermine Russia from within through communism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism as well as through alien religions, alien ideas and alien life-style.
In post-Soviet Russia, the neo-Eurasians' view of a Western cosmopolitan conspiracy is, in fact, quite secular. Theoretically, A. Dugin, the proponent of a `leftist' national socialism of sorts or `red-brown' philosophy, considers the eternal civilisational and geopolitical conflict between Atlanticism and Eurasianism to be the real reason behind all the Western conspiracies against Russia. In practical politics, the ongoing economic, political and cultural globalisation process in the world is interpreted as being administered by a small cosmopolitan elite. Russia's degradation from super power to a regional great power, along with its deep and protracted political and economic crisis, is explained as having been engineered by the cosmopolitan West and its `fifth column' (the democrats in general, and the Jews in particular ) within Russia.
During the years of perestroika and later, the leading reformers were labelled `agents of influence' (agenty vliianiia) by their ideological and political adversaries. Alexander- lakovlev, the architect of glasnost' and Mikhail Gorbachev's right hand, is a good case in point. He was de facto accused of having collaborated with Western intelligence services with the purpose to destabilise the Soviet Union. Yeltsin's cabinets headed by Yegor Gaidar and Viktor Chernomyrdin (1992-98), as well as by Sergei Kirienko in 1998, were nicknamed an `occupational government' by the 'red-brown' opposition. The regime was also called anti-Russian with the implication that it acts in collusion with the West at the expense of Russia's national interests.

As a geopolitical theory, neo-Eurasianism appears in several versions. Politically, Dugin's hard-line 'red-brown' doctrine seems to be the most important: It was gaining more and more devotees in Russia over the last years of the 1990s. It is a well-known fact that Alexander Dugin, as well as his former comrade-in-arms, Alexander Prokhanov, are the most prominent ideologists of neo-Eurasianism. This doctrine serves as an umbrella philosophy for other geopolitical theories including those of Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky.

Dugin's `red-brown' meta-ideology

In the late 1990s, A. Dugin had become very influential within the establishment, serving as an adviser to Gennadii Seleznëv, the communist speaker of the Russian Duma. Furthermore, his book The Basics of Geopolitics: Russia's Geopolitical Future (Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii) that appeared in 1997, and reappeared in an enlarged edition in 1999, was written with the help of Russian Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of RF.

There are at least three classical geopoliticians - Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt - who have influenced Dugin. In this chapter, however, we will mainly focus on the ideas of the first-mentioned as constituting the essential background to neo-Eurasianism.
The central idea of Mackinder's theory is geopolitical dualism, i.e. the eternal antagonism between the sphere of land and that of sea, between continental and maritime powers. In the twentieth century, the former were represented by Russia and Germany, the latter by the USA and Great Britain. Imperial Russia as well as the Soviet Union constituted the Eurasian `heartland' ; the repository for global landpower. Whoever controls the Eurasian land-mass will dominate the world, was Mackinder's conclusion. No wonder that Russian neo-Eurasians have found his theory attractive!

In Dugin's view, during the cold war the aforementioned geopolitical confrontation was disguised by ideological quarrels between liberalism and Marxism-Leninism, two Western anti-traditional theories. Dugin's conception as presented in Osnovy geopolitiki (The Basics of Geopolitics) takes this geopolitical antagonism further by asserting that the two sides are not just divided because of competing geostrategic interests, but are culturally incompatible. The Russian Eurasian thinker views the civilisational conflict between 'Atlanticism' and 'continentalism' (Eurasianism) as the main antagonism in the world.

Then, how does Dugin view this cultural confrontation? Two time-honoured opposite spheres of life - trade and warfare - are confronting each other. The Atlanticist civilisation of merchants is challenging the continental or Eurasianist civilisation of heroes. The former civilisation implies commercialisation of life, whereas its continental counterpart has manifested itself in militarisation of life - Dugin calls this civilisation military-authoritarian (voenno-avtoritarnaia tsivilizatsiia). Dugin traces this confrontation back to ancient history, to the Peloponnesian war between maritime Athens and land-based Sparta, as well as to the Punic wars between Carthage and Rome. Both Athens and Carthage continued the Phoenician tradition of seafaring, trading, and colonising coastal areas. During the twentieth century, Great Britain and the USA represented the maritime 'Atlanticist' civilisation that mphasised the primacy of economics. Dugin calls the USA the `new Carthage'.

On the other hand, Russia/the USSR ('the New Rome'), as well as Germany before its surrender in 1945, embodied the alternative continental military-authoritarian idea, Eurasianism . In these countries, economics were subordinated to politics. In such a culture, politics usually implies the use of force. As regards the Soviet Union, Dugin seems to accept it as representing incomplete Eurasianism. The struggle between 'Atlanticist' and Eurasianist thinking never ceased after 1917 but continued behind the scenes within the Soviet establishment. As a matter of fact, Dugin is here referring to the well-known general conflict between 'Westernisers' (zapadniki) and national patriots. In Soviet history, Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev were Eurasians or close to this Weltanschauung, whereas Trotsky and Khrushchev were typical 'Atlanticists'.
Dugin points out that Eurasianism was popular within the army in general and in the army's intelligence service GRU in particular. On the other hand, 'Atlanticist' thinking was to be found within the security forces like NKVD and KGB .
Significantly enough, in 1992 Dugin explained the unpopular war in Afghanistan as a plot engineered by the 'Atlanticist' KGB who wanted to compromise the `Eurasian' GRU and the army (ibid., 116 f).

The other main differences between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, as Dugin views them, are individualism vs collectivism, plutocracy vs ideocracy, democracy vs authoritarianism.

Dugin tries to combine a preservationist policy towards traditions with a selective modernisation of society without Westernisation. This `modernist' attitude he shares with numerous leaders of non-Western countries of the `Third World' . It should be remembered that Mussolini and Hitler favoured modernisation and industrialisation of their countries even if they rejected liberal democracy.
The Eurasians were defeated in August and December 1991. The fall of the Soviet ideocratic regime and the break-up of the Soviet empire signified the end of a bipolar world, Dugin concludes. In the new geopolitical situation, sea power, i.e. the maritime West (the `new Carthage'), was taking, over and establishing global hegemony. The view that the world was becoming multipolar was misleading as far as all the new expanding geopolitical centres, such as China, the Islamic world and the Pacific region, constituted only territorial versions of the Atlanticist system of values . In plain language, Dugin views the contemporary world as unipolar and dominated by the USA.

This is a Russian Eurasian's geopolitical assessment of the world of the 1990s, contrary to his own preferences. On the other hand, he previews that a new Eurasian Empire will emerge sooner or later as `a potential geopolitical inevitability'. Land power tendencies and continental impulses cannot be abolished unilaterally . The struggle between sea power and land power is irreconcilable and eternal. Dugin concludes that the post-cold war unipolar world is temporary.

In Dugin's view, Russia without being an empire is inconceivable. Russian nationalism is more related to space and soil than to ethnic Russianness. Russia can survive only as a multinational empire, not as an ethnic state. In this respect Dugin, a typical statist, disagrees with all the ethnocentric nationalistswho consider the fate of the Russian ethnos to be of primary importance and proclaim the idea of a Russian nation state (Etat-Nation). Some of the extreme ethnocentric nationalists advocate even the creation of a monoethnic state that would imply ethnic cleansings.

Yeltsin's Russian Federation resembles a national state, as about 80 per cent of the population are Russians. Here we, probably, see one important reason why most Russian nationalist ethnocentrist movements including the extreme right supported President Yeltsin's re-election in 1996. These national patriots are most worried about how to fight Russia's `inner enemies' - the aliens (inorodtsy) in general and the Jews in particular - who are considered guilty of all the country's shortcomings and tragedies. This train of thought leads directly to racism and anti-Semitism. In Dugin's view, the national state (bat-Nation) is a product of Western political thought that contradicts Russia's imperial traditions. That is why Dugin calls the post-Soviet Russian Federation a transitional formation in the ongoing global geopolitical process (ibid., 183). Russia is a broader concept and represents all the Russians living in the Eurasian space, i.e. in all the parts of the former Soviet empire.

In the constellation of liberal reformers versus conservative nationalists, Dugin calls the former `leftist', the latter `rightist'. As both the reformers and the conservatives are internally divided on the issue of Russia's, future, the Eurasian ideologist presents six different geopolitical projects, concerning the country's statehood.

Regionalism as a geopolitical concept is equivalent with the separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation (the RF). The idea of creating a Siberian republic is a good case in point. Yet, this project has never materialised, as has been the case with other analogous ideas. According to Dugin, some extreme liberals openly advocate the dissolution of the Russian Federation hoping that its geopolitical status could be reduced to that of Russia of the fourteenth century.

These `leftist' ideas are paralleled by the theory of a 'monoethnic Russian republic' founded on the principles of racial purity and ethnic isolationalism. This project has been proclaimed by some movements belonging to the extreme right including the ROD . In Dugin's view, the ethnocentric nationalists play into the hands of the West by exaggerating the danger of 'inner enemies' and preferring isolationism to empire building.

Russian centralism is equivalent with the idea of a national state (Nation) and represents statist thinking. It has materialised more or less in Yeltsin's Russian Federation that is interpreted differently by its `leftist to create a `common European house' (Obshcheevropeiskii dom) is a good case in point.

The views of the `rightist' neo-Eurasians are to be found in the political programmes and other pamphlets of the intransigent 'red-brown' opposition, i.e., the `national communists' (we would call them national Bolsheviks) and the `traditional imperialists' (traditsional-imperialisty). Zyuganov and his party belong to the former, Dugin and Prokhanov to the latter category. The dividing line between national bolshevism and `traditional imperialism', however, is blurred. The weekly Den' (Day) and its successor Zavtra (Tomorrow) have been the most popular mouthpieces of 'red-brown' neo-Eurasianism.
Proceeding from the idea of Russia's imperial mission in history, rightist neo-Eurasianism proclaimed the restoration of the dissolved empire as its primary task. Yet, this would not imply a new Soviet regime under the banners of Marxism-Leninism. Instead, there should emerge a totally new empire with a more flexible and pragmatic political system than the Bolshevik one. In the sphere of international politics, it should become an independent autarchic `continent' that requires some geopolitical arrangements.

Dugin has outlined a very ambitious geopolitical project for Russia's return to greatness. Its imperial rebirth is supposed to materialise through the emergence of a Eurasian empire constituting a broad anti-Western continental bloc of several 'sub-empires'. The new imperial Russia will serve as the centre of this bloc called `The Grossraum Confederation' (Konfederatsiia Bolshikh Prostranstv).

The aforementioned geopolitical bloc of different civilisations is based upon one sole uniting principle: the rejection of Atlanticism, of US hegemony in the world, as well as of the values of liberal market economy.
The Confederation of Grossraums eopolitical control--e er the whole Eurasian continent. In fact, Dugin is suggesting what probably many representatives of Russia's military-industrial complex are tacitly dreaming of. He himself, however, declares freely that Russia's geopolitical purpose is to oppose, and in the long run to defeat the Atlanticist powers spearheaded by the USA. This would become possible if the aforementioned Confederation came into being.

The question arises, how Dugin can imagine that Germany and Japan would side with Russia against the USA (and Great Britain). And why would the fundamentalist Iran suddenly take a liking to the Russians who have made war against Islamic Afghanistan and Chechnya? However that may be, Dugin finds psychological as well as geopolitical and civilisational reasons for establishing these strategic alliances. Psychologically, Dugin sees his chance in the fact that the USA, the sole economic and military super-power in the post-cold war world, is being more and more disliked by the rest. As there is no more any `Soviet threat', numerous non-communist states including allies refuse to cooperate with the United States on many important issues such as Cuba, Libya, Iran, nuclear proliferation etc.

At a 1997 Harvard conference, it was reported that the elites of countries comprising at least two-thirds of the world's people - Chinese, Russians, Indians, Arabs, Muslims and Africans - saw the United States as the single greatest external threat to their societies. Furthermore, the Japanese public in 1997 considered the USA as a threat to Japan second only to North Korea. Thus, Western unity begins to crack.

Yet, this growing international resentment with the USA policy is not enough. Dugin hopes that the USA's overwhelming military and economic superiority in the world will make most land-based regional major powers realise that they have to unite in defending their continentalist values against the encroachments of Atlanticism. To a certain extent, he has been right. The formation of the European Union, the fundamentalist Iran's strong religious influence in Central Asia, and Japan's protracted commercial war with the USA, are all signs of a growing antihegemonic opposition within the international community.
Dugin's geopolitical project envisages military-authoritarian empires to be established in Central Europe around Germany, in Central Asia around Iran and in the East Asian and Pacific region around Japan. This implies that Russia, the heartland for Eurasia, will establish three strategic axises in order to make the continental bloc or confederation work: the Western axis Moscow-Berlin, the southern axis Moscow-Teheran, and the eastern axis Moscow-Tokyo.

[source]

[Sinergia]

The Eurasian Idea

What is Eurasianism today? What forms the concept of Eurasia? -- Seven senses of word Eurasianism -- Evolution of notion of Eurasianism






Changes in the original meaning of Eurasianism

Different terms lose their original meaning though their daily use over the course of many years. Such fundamental notions as socialism, capitalism, democracy, fascism have changed profoundly. In fact, they have turned banal.

The terms "Eurasianism" and "Eurasia" also have some uncertainties because they are new, they belong to a new political language and intellectual context that is only being created today.

The Eurasian Idea mirrors a very active dynamical process. It's meaning has become clearer throughout history but needs to be further developed.

Eurasianism as a philosophical struggle


The Eurasian Idea represents a fundamental revision of the political, ideological, ethnic, and religious history of mankind, and it offers a new system of classification and categories that will overcome standard cliches. The Eurasian theory went through two stages - a formational period of classical Eurasianism at the beginning of the XX century by Russian emigrant intellectuals (Trubeckoy, Savickiy, Alekseev, Suvchinckiy, Iljin, Bromberg, Hara-Davan etc.) followed by the historical works of Leonid Gumilev and, finally, the constitution of neo-Eurasianism (second half of 1980's to the present).

Towards neo-Eurasianism

Classical Eurasian theory undoubtedly belongs to past and can be correctly classified within the framework of ideologies of the XX century. Classical Eurasianism might have passed, but neo-Eurasianism has given it a second birth, a new sense, scale, and meaning. When the Eurasian Idea arose from its ashes, it became less obvious, but has since revealed its hidden potential.

Through neo-Eurasianism, the entire Eurasian theory has received a new dimension. Today we cannot ignore the large historical period of neo-Eurasianism and must try to comprehend it in its modern context. Furthermore, we will describe the various aspects of this notion.

Eurasianism as a global trend



Globalization as the main body of modern history

In the broad sense, the Eurasian Idea and even Eurasia as concept do not strictly correspond to the geographical boundaries of the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian Idea is a global-scale strategy that acknowledges the objectivity of globalization and the termination of "nation-states" (Etats-Nations), but at the same time offers a different scenario of globalization, which entails no unipolar world or united global government. Instead, it offers several global zones (poles). The Eurasian Idea is an alternative or multipolar version of globalization, but globalization is the currently the major fundamental world process that is deciding the main vector of modern history.

Paradigm of globalization - paradigm of Atlantism

Today’s nation-state is being transformed into a global state; we are facing the constitution of planetary governmental systems within a single administrative-economic system. To believe that all nations, social classes, and economic models might suddenly begin to cooperate on the basis of this new planet-wide logic is wrong. Globalization is a one-dimensional, one-vector phenomenon that tries to universalize the Western (Anglo-Saxon, American) point of view of how to best manage human history. It is (very often connected with suppression and violence) the unification of different social-political, ethnic, religious, and national structures into one system. It is a Western European historical trend that has reached its peak through its domination of the United States of America.



Globalization is the imposing of the Atlantic paradigm. Globalization as Atlantism absolutely tries to avoid this definition. Proponents of globalization argue that when there will be no alternative to Atlantism and that it will stop being Atlantism. The American political philosopher F. Fukuyama writes about the "end of History," which actually means the end of geopolitical history and the conflict between Atlantism and Eurasianism. This means a new architecture of a world system with no opposition and with only one pole - the pole of Atlantism. We may also refer to this as the New World Order. The model of opposition between two poles (East-West, North-South) transforms to the center-outskirt model (center - West, "rich North," outskirt - South). This variant of world architecture is completely at odds with the concept of

Eurasianism.



Unipolar globalization has an alternative

Today the New World Order is nothing more than a project, plan, or trend. It is very serious, but it is not fatal. Adherents of globalization deny any alternative plan for future, but today we are experiencing a large-scale phenomenon - contra-globalism, and the Eurasian Idea coordinates all opponents of unipolar globalization in a constructive way. Moreover, it offers the competing idea of multipolar globalization (or alter-globalization).

Eurasianism as pluriversum

Eurasianism rejects the center-outskirt model of the world. Instead, the Eurasian Idea suggests that the planet consists of a constellation of autonomous living spaces partially open to each other. These areas are not national-states, but a coalition of states, reorganized into continental federations or "democratic empires" with a large degree of inner self-government. Each of these areas is multipolar, including a complicated system of ethnic, cultural, religious and administrative factors.

In this global sense, Eurasianism is open to everyone, regardless of one’s place of birth, residence, nationality or citizenship. Eurasianism provides an opportunity to choose a future different from the cliche of Atlantism and one value system for all of mankind. Eurasianism does not merely seek the past or to preserve the current status quo, but strives for the future,acknowledging that the world’s current structure needs radical change, that nation states and industrial society have exhausted all their resources. The Eurasian Idea does not see the creation of a world government on the basis of liberal-democratic values as the one and only path for mankind. In its most basic sense, Eurasianism in the XXI century is defined as the adherence to alter-globalization, synonymous with a multipolar world.

Atlantism is not universal

Eurasianism absolutely rejects the universalism of Atlantism and Americanism. The pattern of Western-Europe and America has many attractive features that can be adopted and praised, but, as a whole, it is merely a cultural system that has the right to exist in its own historical context along with other civilizations and cultural systems.
The Eurasian Idea protects not only anti-Atlantic value systems, but the diversity of value structures. It is a kind of "poliversum" that provides living space for everyone, including the USA and Atlantism, along with other civilizations, because Eurasianism also defends the civilizations of Africa, both American continents, and the Pacific area parallel to the Eurasian Motherland.

The Eurasian Idea promotes a global revolutionary idea

The Eurasian Idea on a global scale is a global revolutionary concept, called upon to be a new platform for mutual understanding and cooperation for a large conglomerate of different powers: states, nations, cultures, and religions that reject the Atlantic version of globalization.

If we analyze the declarations and statements of various politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals we will see that majority of them are adherents (sometimes unaware) of the Eurasian Idea.

If we will think about all of those who disagree with the "end of history" our spirits will be raised and the failure of the American concept of strategic security for the XXI century connected with constituting the unipolar world will be much more realistic.
Eurasianism is the sum of the natural, artificial, objective, and subjective obstacles on the path of unipolar globalization; it offers a constructive, positive opposition to globalism instead of simple negation.

These obstacles, however, remain uncoordinated in the meantime, and proponents of Atlantism are able to manage them easily. Yet, if these obstacles can somehow be integrated into a united force, they will be can be integrated into something united and the likelihood of victory will become much more serious.

Eurasianism as the Old World (continent)

The New World is a part of the Second Old World or a more specific and narrow sense of the word Eurasianism applicable to what we call the Old World. The Notion of the Old World (traditionally regarding Europe) can be considered in a much wider context. It is multi-civilizational super space, inhabited by nations, states, cultures, ethnicities, and religions connected to each other historically and geographically by dialectic destiny. The Old World is an organic product of human history.

The Old World is often opposed to the New World, the American continent, discovered by Europeans and transformed into a platform for an artificial civilization, where European projects of modernism were created. It was built based upon human-produced ideologies as a purified civilization of modernism.

The United States was the successful creation of the "perfect society," formed by intellectuals from England, Ireland, and France, while the countries of South and Central America remained colonies of the Old World. Germany and Eastern Europe were less influenced this idea of a “perfect society.»

In the terms of Oswald Spengler, dualism between the Old and New World can be brought to opposites: culture-civilization, organic-artificial, historical-technical.

The New World as Messiah

As a historical product of Western Europe during its evolution, the
New World very early on realized its "messiah" destiny, where the liberal-democratic ideals of the Enlightment were combined with the eschatological ideas of radical protestant sects. This was called the theory of Manifest Destiny, which became the new symbol of belief for generations of Americans. According to this theory, American civilization overtook all cultures and civilizations of the Old World and in its current universal form, it is obligatory for all nations of the planet.

With time, this theory directly confronted, not only the cultures of the East and Asia, but came into conflict with Europe, which seemed to the Americans to be archaic and full of prejudice and antiquated traditions.

In turn, the New World turned away from the heritage of the Old World. Directly following WWII, the New World became the indisputable leader in Europe itself with the "criteria of verity" of others. This inspired a corresponding wave of American dominance and at a parallel time the beginning of a movement that seeks geopolitical liberation from the brutal, transoceanic, strategic, economic, and political control of the "elder Brother.»

Integration of the Eurasian continent

In the XX century, Europe became aware of its common identity and step by step started to move towards the integration of all its nation into a common union, able to guarantee full sovereignty, security, and freedom to itself and all members.

The creation of the European Union became the most important event that helped Europe restore its status as a world power alongside the United States of America. This was the response of the Old World to the excessive challenge of the New World.

If we consider the alliance of the USA and Western Europe as the Atlantic vector of European development, European integration under the aegis of the continental countries (Germany, France) may be called European Eurasianism. This becomes more and more obvious if we take into consideration the theory of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals (S. de Goll) or even to Vladivostok. In other words, the integration of the Old World includes the vast territory of Russian Federation.

Thus, Eurasianism in this context may be defined as a project of the strategic, geopolitical, and economic integration of the north of Eurasian continent, considered the cradle of European history and the matrix of European nations.

Parallel with Turkey, Russia (alike ancestors of the Europeans) is historically connected with the Turkic, Mongolian, and Caucasus nations. Russia gives the integration of Europe an Eurasian dimension in both the symbolic and geographic senses (identification of Eurasianism with continentalism).

During last few centuries, the idea of European integration has been proposed by the revolutionary faction of European elites. In ancient times, similar attempts were made by Alexander the Great (integration of the Eurasian continent) and Genghis khan (founder of history’s largest empire).

Eurasia as three great living-spaces, integrated across the meridian

Three Eurasian belts (meridian zones)


The horizontal vector of integration is followed by a vertical vector.
Eurasian plans for the future presume the division of the planet into four vertical geographical belts (meridian zones) from North to South.
Both American continents will form one common space oriented on and controlled by the USA within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine.

This is the Atlantic meridian zone.

In addition to the above zone, three others are planned. They are the following:

· Euro-Africa, with the European Union as its center;
· Russian-Central Asian zone;
· Pacific zone


Within these zones, the regional division of labor and the creation of developmental areas and corridors of growth will take place.
Each of these belts (meridian zones) counterbalance each other and all of them together counterbalance the Atlantic meridian zone. In the future, these belts might be the foundation upon which to build a multipolar world: the number of poles will be more than two; however, the number will be much less than the number of current nation-states. The Eurasian model proposes that the number of poles must be four.

Great spaces

The Meridian zones in the Eurasian project consist of several "Great Spaces" or "democratic empires." Each possesses relative freedom and independence but is strategically integrated into a corresponding meridian zone.

The Great Spaces correspond to the boundaries of civilizations and include several nation-states or unions of states.


The European Union and Arab Great Space, which integrates North, Trans-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, form Euro-Africa.

The Russian-Central Asian zone is formed by three Great Spaces that sometimes overlap each other. The first is the Russian Federation along with several countries of the CIS - members of the Eurasian Union. Second is the Great Space of continental Islam (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). The Asian countries of the CIS intersect with this zone.

The third Great Space is Hindustan, which is a self-dependent civilization sector.

The Pacific meridian zone is determined by a condominium of two great spaces (China and Japan) and also includes Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Australia (some researchers connect it with the American meridian zone). This geopolitical region is very mosaic and can be differentiated by many criteria.

The American meridian zone consist of the American-Canadian, Central, and North American Great Spaces.

Importance of the fourth zone

The structure of the world based upon meridian zones is accepted by most American geopoliticians who seek the creation of a New World Order and unipolar globalization. However, a stumbling block is the existence of the Russian-Central Asian meridian space: the presence or absence of this belt radically changes the geopolitical picture of the world.

Atlantic futurologists divide the world into the three following zones:

· American pole, with the European Union as its close-range periphery (Euro-Africa as an exemption) and
· the Asian and Pacific regions as its long-range periphery.
· Russia and Central Asia are fractional, but without it as an independent meridian zone, our world is unipolar.


This last meridian zone counterbalances American pressure and provides the European and Pacific zones ability to act like self-dependent civilization poles.

Real multipolar balance, freedom, and the independence of meridian belts,Great Spaces, and nation-states depend upon the successful creation of a forth zone. Moreover, its is not enough to be one pole in a two-pole model of the world: the rapid progress of the United States of America can be counterbalanced only by the synergy of all three meridian zones.

The Eurasian project proposes this four-zone super-project on a geopolitical strategic level.

Eurasianism as Russian-Central Asian integration


Moscow-Teheran axis


Fourth meridian zone - Russian-Asian meridian integration. The central issue of this process is the implementation of a Moscow-Teheran axis. The whole process of integration depends on the successful establishment of a strategic middle and long-term partnership with Iran. Iranian and Russian economic, military, and political potential together will increase the process of the zone integration, making the zone irreversible and autonomous.


The Moscow-Teheran axis will be a basis for further integration. Both Moscow and Iran are self-sufficient powers, able to create their own organizational strategic model of the region.

Eurasian plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan

The integration vector with Iran is vitally important for Russia to gain access to warm-water ports as well as for the political-religious reorganization of Central Asia (Asian countries of CIS, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Close cooperation with Iran presumes the transformation of
the Afghani-Pakistani area into a free Islamic confederation, loyal both to Moscow and Iran. The reason this is necessary is that the independent states of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the continuing source of destabilization, threatening neighboring countries. The geopolitical struggle will provide the ability to implement a new Central-Asian federation and transform this complicated region into one of cooperation and prosperity area.

Moscow-Deli axis

Russian-Indian cooperation is the second most important meridian axis in the integration on the Eurasian continent and collective Eurasian security systems. Moscow will play an important role, decreasing the tensions between Deli and Islamabad (Kashmir). The Eurasian plan for India, sponsored by Moscow, is the creation of a federation that will mirror the diversity of Indian society with its numerous ethnic and religious minorities, including Sikhs and Muslims

Moscow-Ankara


The main regional partner in the integration process of Central Asia is Turkey. The Eurasian Idea is already becoming rather popular there today because of Western trends interlaced with Eastern. Turkey acknowledges its civilization differences with the European Union, its regional goals and interests, the threat of globalization, and further loss of sovereignty.
It is strategically imperative for Turkey to establish a strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and Iran. Turkey will be able to maintain its traditions only within the framework of a multipolar world. Certain factions of Turkish society understand this situation - from politicians and socialists to religious and military elites. Thus, the Moscow-Ankara axis can become geopolitical reality despite a long-term period of mutual estrangement.

Caucasus


The Caucasus is the most problematic region to Eurasian integration because its mosaic of cultures and ethnicities easily leads to tensions between nations. This is one of main weapons used by those who seek to stop integration processes across Eurasian continent. The Caucasus region is inhabited by nations belonging to different states and civilization areas. This region must be a polygon for testing different methods of cooperation between peoples, because what can succeed there
can succeed across the Eurasian continent. The Eurasian solution to this problem lies not in the creation of ethnic-based states or assigning one nation strictly to one state, but in the development of a flexible federation on the basis of ethnic and cultural differences within the common strategic context of the meridian zone.




The result of this plan is a system of a half-axis between Moscow and the Caucasian centers, (Moscow-Baku, Moscow-Erevan, Moscow-Tbilissi, Moscow-Mahachkala, Moscow-Grozny, etc.) and between the Caucasian centers and Russia's allies within the Eurasian project (Baku-Ankara, Erevan-Teheran etc.).

Eurasian plan for Central Asia

Central Asia must move towards integration into a united, strategic, and economic block with the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Union, the successor of the CIS. The main function of this specific area is the rapprochement of Russia with the countries of continental Islam (Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan).

From the very beginning, the Central-Asian sector must have various vectors of integration. One plan will make the Russian Federation the main partner (similarities of culture, economic and energetic interests, a common strategic security system). The alternate plan is to place the accent on ethnic and religious resemblance: Turkic, Iranian, and Islamic worlds.



Eurasian integration of post-soviet territories

Eurasian Union

A more specific meaning of Eurasianism, partially similar to the definitions of the Eurasian intellectuals of 20-30s of the XX century is connected with the process of the local integration of post-soviet territories.
Different forms of similar integration can be seen in history: from the Huns and other (Mongol, Turkic, and Indo-European) nomad empires to the empire of Genghis khan and his successors. More recent integration was led by the Russian Romanov Empire and, later, the USSR. Today, the Eurasian Union is continuing these traditions of integration through a unique ideological model that takes into consideration democratic procedures; respects the rights of nations; and pays attention to the cultural, lingual, and ethnic features of all union members.

Eurasianism is the philosophy of integration of the post-Soviet territory on a democratic, non-violent, and voluntary basis without the domination of any one religious or ethnic group.




Astana, Dushanbe, and Bishkek as the main force of integration

Different Asian republics of the CIS treat the process of post-soviet integration unequally. The most active adherent to integration is Kazakhstan. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev is a staunch supporter of the Eurasian Idea. Kyrgyz and Tajikistan similarly support the process of integration, though their support less tangible in comparison with Kazakhstan.

Tashkent and Ashabad

Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan oppose the integration process, trying to gain the maximum positive results from their recently achieved national sovereignty. However, very soon, due to the increasing rate of globalization, both states will face a dilemma: to lose sovereignty and melt into unified global world with its domination by American liberal values or to preserve cultural and religious identity in the context of the Eurasian Union. In our opinion, an unbiased comparison of these two options will lead to the second one, naturally sequential for both countries and their history.

Trans-Caucasian states

Armenia continues to gravitate towards the Eurasian Union and considers the Russian Federation an important supporter and conciliator that helps it to manage relations with its Muslim neighbors. It is notable that Teheran prefers to establish a partnership with ethnically close Armenian. This fact allows us to consider two half-axis - Moscow-Erevan and Erevan-Teheran -as positive prerequisites of integration.

Baku remains neutral, but this situation will drastically change with the continued movement of Ankara towards Eurasianism (it will immediately affect Azerbaijan). Analysis of the Azerbaijani cultural system shows that this state is closer to Russian Federation and post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia than to religious Iran and even moderate Turkey.

Georgia is the key problem of the region. The mosaic character of the Georgian state is the cause of serious problems during the construction of a new national state that is strongly rejected by its ethnic minorities: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Adjaria, etc. Furthermore, the Georgian state does not have any strong partners in the region and forced to seek a partnership with the USA and NATO to counterbalance Russian influence. Georgia is a major threat, able to sabotage the very process of Eurasian integration. The solution to this problem is found in the Orthodox culture of Georgia, with its Eurasian features and traditions.

Ukraine and Belarus - Slavic countries of the CIS

It is enough to gain the support of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to succeed in creation of the Eurasian Union. The Moscow-Astana-Kiev geopolitical triangle is a frame able to guarantee the stability of the Eurasian Union, which is why negotiations with Kiev are urgent like never before. Russia and Ukraine have very much in common: culture, language, religious, and ethnic similarities. These aspects need to be highlighted because from the beginning of Ukraine’s recent sovereignty Russophobia and disintegration have been promoted.

Many countries of the EU can positively influence the Ukrainian government, because they are interested in political harmony in Eastern Europe. The cooperation of Moscow and Kiev will demonstrate the pan-European attitudes of both Slavic countries.

The above-mentioned factors pertain to Belarus, where integration intentions are much more evident. However, the strategic and economic status of Belarus is less important to Moscow than those of Kiev and Astana. Moreover, the domination of a Moscow-Minsk axis will harm integration with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which is why integration with Belarus must proceed fluently without any sudden incidents - along with other vectors of the Eurasian integration process.

Eurasianism as Weltanschauung

The last definition of Eurasianism characterizes a specific

Weltanschauung: a political philosophy combining tradition, modernity, and even elements of postmodernism. This philosophy has as its priority traditional society; acknowledges the imperative of technical and social modernization (without separating from traditional culture); and strives for the adaptation of its ideological program to postindustrial, informational society, which is called postmodernism.

Postmodernism formally removes counter positions of tradition and modernism, disfranchising and making them equal. Eurasian postmodernism, on the contrary, promotes an alliance of tradition and modernism as a constructive, optimistic, energetic impulse towards creation and growth.
Eurasian philosophy does not deny the realities discovered by the Enlightment: religion, nation, empire, culture, etc. At the same time, the best achievements of modernism are used widely: technological and economic advances, social guarantees, freedom of labor. Extremes meet each other, melting into a unifying harmonic and original theory,
inspiring fresh thinking and new solutions for the eternal problems people have faced throughout history.

Eurasianism is an open philosophy

Eurasianism is an open, non-dogmatic philosophy that can be
enriched with new content: religion, sociological and ethnological discoveries, geopolitics, economics, national geography, culture, strategic and political research, etc. Moreover, Eurasian philosophy offers original solutions in specific cultural and lingual contexts: Russian Eurasianism will not be the same as French, German, or Iranian versions. However, the main framework of the philosophy will remain
invariable.

Principles of Eurasianism

The basic principles of Eurasianism are the following:

· differentialism, the pluralism of value systems versus the conventional obligatory domination of one ideology (American liberal-democracy first and foremost);
· tradition versus suppression of cultures, dogmas, and discoveries of traditional society ;
· rights of nations versus the "gold billions" and neocolonial hegemony of the "rich North";
· ethnicities as values and subjects of history versus the depersonalization of nations, imprisoned into artificial social constructions;
· social fairness and human solidarity versus exploitation and humiliation of man by man.

A. Dugin

[Menydh]

Dugin a nutcase with dangerous ideas.

[Arthur Gordon Pym]

Originally Posted by Mynydd

Dugin a nutcase with dangerous ideas.

So, as for Eurasianism, you basically agree with Svin, who holds a negative view of this movement.

I am myself very close to such opinion and I think that their ideas are highly, well, unrealistic, to put it in mildest terms.

[svin]

I didn't read the whole article, but Dugin is a nutcase, he is a close friend to another mad Eurasianist Geidar Dzhemal, a fanatical muslim who wants to convert Russians to Islam.

[Arthur Gordon Pym]

Originally Posted by svin

I didn't read the whole article, but Dugin is a nutcase, he is a close friend to another mad Eurasianist Geidar Dzhemal, a fanatical muslim who wants to convert Russians to Islam.

It was when reading the book "Against the modern world" (the book is crap anyway, I was disappointed by it, it doesn't contain much useful information) by Peter Sedgwick that I ran accross this Dzhemal Gaidar for the first time. I was very astonished by the fact that an allegedly Traditionalist movement like Dugin's has a fanatical Muslim as its memeber. I was even more astonished when I found out that Dugin and Gaidare were close associates.

[svin]

Well, the most famous French "traditionalist" René Guénon was converted muslim.