Belarus - history and national identity

[Marcus Marulus]

BELARUS: IN SEARCH OF NATIONAL IDENTITY (1986-2000)

'In my view, the problem of saving the [Belarusian] nation is directly related to the degree of national self-awareness.'
Vasil Bykau. Belaruskaya Dumka 7 (1992), p. 43

Geopolitical background

The geographical location of Belarus severely affects its geopolitics. In the pre-1991 period, the occasionally used nickname of the Belarusian SSR as 'the Western Gate of the Soviet Union' aptly reflects the country's geostrategic significance. One fateful aftermath of this position was the physical destruction of Belarus in World War II, including a heavy demographic loss ('every fourth one'). As a consequence, the number of Russians in the republic rose by about one million between 1945 and 1985. This increase was even more significant among the intelligentsia as a result of the disproportionately high destruction of the native cadres in Stalinist purges.

Another feature of Belarusian society as it emerged from the Soviet era was its deep-rooted provincialism and difficulty to think of itself as an entity apart from Russia. A telling incident illustrating this occurred in 1992 during a visit of Polish journalists to Minsk. 'The guests from Warsaw,' reported a newspaper, 'were quite surprised to have learned from Mr. Butevich [Belarusian minister of information J.Z.] that the Polish ethnic minority is the largest in Belarus. When the minister was reminded that there are Russians, too [by far the largest minority J.Z.], he said: "Russians are not a minority!" At which the Poles were sincerely astonished.' (1)

Many Belarusians still cannot think of themselves as self-sustained nation, especially in terms of economic relations, which entails and enhances linguistic and cultural attachment to their eastern neighbor. A group of international analysts agrees that 'Belarus is, in a geopolitical sense, a crossroads state' and that Russia remains 'the single most important external factor in Belarus's evolution.' (2)

As to the intentions of Russia regarding Belarus, they can be seen in the recently adopted 'Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy,' where the issue of the national consciousness of Belarusians is also mentioned. The 'Theses' include the merger of the two countries' armies 'into a single system with a single command and control structure' and make the following projection: 'Since the processes of restoring national self-consciousness are being accelerated in Belarus, time is working in favor of the opponents of 'integration'. So, the unification process should be sped up.' (3)

There are indications that this process is being 'sped up.' During the last two years shifts at the top of the power in Minsk led to a dramatic increase in ethnic Russians occupying top positions in the Belarusian government where the country's prime minister, his deputies and heads of the power ministries, as well as a number of deputy ministers and the speaker of the lower chamber of parliament, are all Russian-born.

Gorbachevian opening

Mikhail Gorbachev's program of restructuring, announced in 1985, elicited unexpected fruit the following year in the heretofore-silent Minsk - a collective complaint to the top Soviet leader from twenty-eight intellectuals on behalf of their national culture. The move was rather unusual for Belarus, a country that had been known for its subservient Communist Party leadership and silent intelligentsia. In their letter to Gorbachev, the twenty-eight signatories entreated the recipient to help save the Belarusians from 'spiritual death.' The threat of demise was seen in the fact that the national language, which the petitioners saw as 'the soul of the nation,' and 'one of the foundations upon which the statehood of the Belarusian people rests,' had been 'squeezed out of almost all spheres of life.' The writers of the petition pointed out that the discrimination against the Belarusian culture gave rise to a 'noticeable growth of national awareness,' which, in turn, 'is provoking a hostile reaction from the bureaucracy.' To prevent a rise in tension, the authors suggested that the Belarusian language 'must be protected by legislation.' (4) Indeed, such protection was given by the republic's Supreme Council in 1990 (see below).

Political fallout of Kurapaty and Chernobyl

In the late 1980s, two major developments had a strong impact on the sense of identity of Belarusians -- the publication of an account of mass graves of victims of Stalinism in the forest of Kurapaty near Minsk and revelations about radiation fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster that severely affected Belarus.

Kurapaty immediately became a generic symbol of Stalinist repression of the nationally conscious Belarusian intelligentsia which took place in the ideological and ethnic cleansing of the 1930s. The name 'Kurapaty' became a powerful catalyst for national awareness and a patriotic political movement. To speed up investigation of the crime, a civic group, called the Martyrology of Belarus, was founded in October 1988. Its spokesman, the most prominent writer Vasil Bykau, said that the inquiry into 'our losses and our martyrs' 'would be laid as a cornerstone in the foundation of our national consciousness.' (5)

In February 1989, a Minsk rally of youth groups 40,000 strong displayed such slogans as 'Sovereignty for Belarus' and 'Official Status for the Belarusian Language.' The Communist Party bosses admitted that the previous policy of suppression of national culture led to 'an emotional "explosion" among the intelligentsia.' (6)

The Martyrology of Belarus became the base for the creation of the Belarusian Popular Front 'Renewal' (BPF) in June 1989. Chaired by Zianon Pazniak, the BPF played a singularly important role in securing for the Belarusian language the status of sole official language of the republic (for a brief period of 1990-95) and proclaiming Belarus's sovereignty (27 July 1990) and independence (25 August 1991).

Another important factor that impacted the rise of the issue of national self-assertiveness was the revelation, toward the end of 1989, that over seventy percent of the radiation from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster landed on Belarusian territory. A public outcry and pressure for investigation of the Chernobyl cover-up had significant political and psychological repercussions. The republic's leadership was accused of subservience to Moscow at the expense of national interests. 'The Chernobyl tragedy has demonstrated,' wrote one critic, 'that the Belarusian people needs indispensably to raise its self-awareness. If our leadership had high national self-awareness, this would not have happened.' (7)

'The national idea"

With the advent of sovereignty and independence, much discussion has been centered around the closely interrelated concepts of the Belarusian 'national idea,' 'national consciousness,' and 'national identity.' In August 1992, an international conference was held on the subject of the formation and development of national consciousness among the Belarusians. (8) Soon afterwards the Academy of Sciences took upon itself the task of providing a 'scientifically grounded Belarusian national idea.' The daily Zvyazda published a series of articles under the heading 'We need a vivifying idea that will save Belarus.' (9)

The key element in this quest for a new conceptual base of nationhood was to be sought, obviously, in the spheres of culture and history. The multiconfessional and multiethnic makeup of Belarusian society, located between East and West, was now presented in a new light. It was found to possess a distinct type of mentality characterized by tolerance, humanistic values, the absence of extremist views, and having peaceful intentions toward its neighbors. Claims were advanced that Belarusian culture was a 'synthesis' of Eastern and Western types, without dogmatic collectivized Byzantism, on the one hand, or Western individualism, on the other. (10) However, public awareness of these qualities was low. Researchers found that only five to six percent of the population 'possesses the necessary knowledge of the history of [our] national culture.' (11)

Apparently not much has occurred during the last seven years. A poll conducted in March 2000 among 1,608 residents of Belarus, a country with eighty-one percent Belarusians, revealed an amazing lack of national self-awareness. The respondents were asked to say who, according to them, Belarusians are 'a separate self-sustained ( samastoynaya ) Belarusian nation,' or 'a branch of the triune Russian nation,' or 'other.' Only 49.8 percent said Belarusians are a separate nation, while 42.6 percent chose the category 'the triune (i. e., Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian J.Z.) Russian nation.' Five-and-a-half percent said they did not know how to answer.

Interestingly enough, 75.9 percent of the same respondents named the Republic of Belarus, in response to whose citizens they felt to be 'in the first place.' Russia was named by only 2.2 percent, and the USSR by 12.4 percent. (12) This shows the importance of statehood in the formation of a sense of national identity.

Since Lukashenka's critics accuse him of destroying the Belarusian character of the state and selling statehood itself to Russia, what is the position of official ideologues on the issue of a 'national idea'? It must be said that they do not shy away from discussing and propagating such a concept. For example, the editor of the newly-launched presidential monthly Belaruskaya Dumka [Belarusian thought], Uladzimir Vyalichka, wrote in 1996: 'We need as fresh air a consolidating national idea. The formulation of the latter is an honorary common obligation of politicians and representatives of the social sciences.' (13) Two years later, the journal devoted an entire issue to this subject, announcing that 'The intellectual elite is busy looking for a universal national idea,' since 'attempts to organize one's life according to an alien pattern and image are not successful.' (14)

There are, of course, differences between government and independent intellectuals and politicians in their understanding of the meaning and practical applications of the 'national idea' concept. While independent writers advocate full sovereignty and independence for Belarus, on the government side there is plenty of double-talk, inherited from the Soviet era, which allows officials to speak of Belarus's 'independence' within a union with Russia. Nevertheless, there is also a general consensus that the concept of national idea should be developed, and some see it as being already in motion. Here is one explanation of this phenomenon and an optimistic projection: 'Having born later than other "national ideas," wrote one of them, 'and facing hardships in search of historical justification and acceptance for the future, "the Belarusian idea" nevertheless has been alive and gaining ground. And for the young people who are growing up in an independent state, the ideas of the Belarusian people and the Belarusian state will, obviously, become something so familiar and natural that they will never be lost.' (15)

Language. Culture. Religion.

Traditionally, to be Belarusian meant to be a Belarusian-speaker. In Belarus, as in Eastern Europe generally, the notion of nationality has been based on ethnicity. According to the outstanding Belarusologist, Academician Yaukhim Karski (1861-1931), author of the monumental three-volume monograph, Belorusy (1903-22), the Belarusian language was 'an inseparable indicator of the Belarusian nationality during its centuries-old history.' (16) Conversely, the use of the Russian or the Polish language among Belarusians generally has been an indicator of cultural and political allegiance to Russia or Poland. The conceptual fusion of language and nationality (citizenship), although challenged by some, is still brimming with political implications. 'If the entire official documentation in our country is conducted exclusively in the language of a neighboring state, i. e., in Russian,' says one critic of the present-day abandonment of Belarusian in official usage, 'then perhaps we the Belarusians are not any more citizens of Belarus, but of boundless Russia?' (17)

During the decade of the 1990s, the status of the Belarusian language went through a series of reversals. In January 1990, the Supreme Council of Belarus, in the wake of prolonged and heated public debates, adopted the 'Law about languages in the Belarusian SSR.' Belarusian was proclaimed to be the sole official language of the country. Minority languages were to be protected, and a period of up to ten years was given to make a transition from Russian to Belarusian. The preamble to the law declared: 'Language is not only a means of communication, but also the soul of a nation, the foundation and the most important part of its culture.' (18)

Implementation of the language law, however, was slow and difficult. Firstly, there was stubborn resistance by the bureaucracy to use Belarusian, even by those who knew it. Secondly, the language itself, in the mind of the population, was stigmatized as 'peasant' by years of disuse in the higher echelons. According to some polls, less than twenty-five percent of Belarusians knew their native tongue well and less than fifty percent were willing to promote the knowledge of it. (19) Nevertheless, efforts under the Kebich government (1990-94), with Speaker Stanislau Shushkevich using Belarusian in his parliamentary proceedings, led to some increase in the role of the national language in education and the media. It regained its position in the field of publishing, education and public usage reminding one of its status during the 1920s. However, after Alaksandr Lukashenka was elected president in the summer of 1994, a reversal took place, especially after the May 1995 referendum. One of the four questions asked was whether the voters would agree to give the Russian language 'official status equal to Belarusian.' In spite of ardent protests by some legislators and members of the intelligentsia, the answer was a firm 'yes,' explained by the following: a) decades of Russian being used as the official language; b) weak national self-awareness on the part of a majority of Belarusians; and c) intensive government propaganda, including the president himself, on behalf of the Russian language. Soon, further legal steps narrowed the use of Belarusian in public life. In 1998, the 'Law about languages' was amended in a peculiar way: the choice between Belarusian and Russian for official usage was left to individual bureaucrats with freedom to choose either one. Even more: the updated law, in saying that 'In the Republic of Belarus the languages in the sphere of culture are Belarusian and (or) Russian language,' made possible further elimination of Belarusian from public life. (20)

Currently, mass media, including TV and radio (the latter two totally owned and controlled by the state) use Russian overwhelmingly. In the capital of Minsk, there is not a single college or high school where classes are taught in the language of the titular nationality. Only in a few schools are there exclusively Belarusian-language classes. The number of books and periodicals in Belarusian has been diminishing from year to year. For example, in a three-year period of 1995-97 Belarusian-language publications dropped from 12.5 percent of the total to 5.5 percent. (21) Thus, linguistically, Belarus of 2000 has been pushed back almost to the mid-1980s, when the twenty-eight signatories of the petition to Gorbachev entreated him to save their nation from 'spiritual death.'

Opinions differ whether death will ensue. Professor David Marples, for example, having asked in his book on Belarus, 'Is it possible for the development of a national consciousness and culture to occur without the use of the native language?' answers: 'For Belarus, national development without the native language, especially under the shadow of a much larger Slavic neighbor with a lengthy historical tradition as an empire, was virtually impossible." (22)

The Belarusian language indeed has been losing ground in favor of Russian in the years since 1995. If the 1999 census is to be believed, Belarusian now is spoken at home by 36.7 percent of the population and Russian by 62.8 percent. But the question should be asked: Is Russian, spoken by Belarusians, unavoidably a carrier of Russian cultural and political identity? Apparently, not so, if one looks at Belarus's urban centers (where 69 percent of the population lives) and rural areas. For example, the predominantly Russian speaking capital of Minsk (population 1.7 million) has become a hotbed of political activism in defense of Belarus's sovereignty and independence. Meanwhile the Belarusian speaking villages have turned themselves into fortresses of conservatism and nostalgia for Soviet times and reintegration with Russia. There is a growing distinction between linguistic and political Russification. Russian in Belarus in many cases is as much a language of cultural renewal of the country and its independence as Belarusian. There may be, even if the comparison is distant, a similarity to English in Ireland or German in Austria. The Minsk researcher, Oleg Manayev, in his analysis of the republic's electorate provides a 'sociological photo' of a voter who is 'almost undoubtedly an opponent of Lukashenka': 'a young educated Minsker, actively engaged in entrepreneurship, who speaks Russian, supports Belarus's independence and is West-oriented. (23) Other examples of Russian being used to raise national self-awareness are bilingual independent newspapers ( Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Svaboda, Rabochy and others), where Russian-language commentaries expose the treasonous nature of the Lukashenka regime and advocate preservation of the republic's independence.

It is true that defenders of Belarus's nationhood insist that free development and wide public usage of the native language is a sine quo non condition for full-fledged national statehood. They are not only right in their insistence, but also stand on solid constitutional ground. The country's 1994 constitution, even as amended by Lukashenka in 1996, names two 'state languages' Belarusian and Russian, and in that order. As of now, only Belarusian is used on the republic's money and postage stamps. Also names in foreign passports are inscribed in the Belarusian variant only. On the official level, the ideal of a Belarusian speaking nation has not been abandoned. Alaksandr Sasnouski, minister of culture until November 2000, explaining the policy of his ministry, said: 'The Belarusian people bind up their future with national culture, which serves as a guarantor both of their sovereign existence and integration into a kind of bicultural community and, eventually, into world culture.' According to Sasnouski the desirable 'linguistic person' of tomorrow 'should speak,' among other languages, 'his native, national language; a language of interethnic, international relations (Russian, English) and the languages of Belarus's neighbors.' (24)

Belarus today contains many vestiges of the past Soviet era: the KGB; the statues of Lenin; the official holiday of the October Revolution; a disproportional number of Russian names of streets and collective farms; the (wordless) national anthem, etc. On the other hand, however, there is a slow institutionalization of nationhood. Thus, the former Supreme Council (Soviet) was renamed the National Assembly; the Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences; the Central Historical Archive, the National Historical Archive. Belarus today is a participant in the Olympic Games. The phrase "our country" (nasha kraina, in Belarusian; nasha strana, in Russian) which used to mean 'Soviet Union' before 1991, now means 'Belarus.' All this is accompanied by ongoing, albeit slow and unspectacular, cultural processes, with scores of small youth groups involved, that are contributing to the sense of national identity and patriotic impulses. The following is one of a number of new occurrences -- an interesting relationship between musical creations by young people and national identity: 'The program "I was born here," writes a musicologist, 'can do what either parliamentary commissions, or ideological organs were incapable of doing The two dozen songs, many of which have been known for a long while, in their new reading and new context contain not simply a strong artistic potential, but also that idea which is able to become "a unifying and directing" power [a reference to the past leading role of the Communist Party J.Z.].' (25>)


Religious revival in Belarus has also been a factor in the slow rise of national consciousness. A recent study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences has shown that forty-seven percent of the population are believers, while twenty percent are non-believers and thirty-three percent could not provide an answer as to their religious conviction. Among the believers, seventy-eight percent are Orthodox Christians, nine percent Catholics and the rest belong to various other denominations.(26)

Orthodox Christian believers are organized in the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), since 1989 an exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. The BOC is headed by an ethnic Russian, Metropolitan Filaret [Vakhromeyev], and has been a potent factor in the cultivation of the 'Russian spirit' of its flock. Lukashenka, who once called himself an 'Orthodox atheist,' told Patriarch Aleksey II of Moscow on a visit to Minsk that 'We are an Orthodox country and we will always be devoted to Orthodoxy.' (27)

During the 1989-94 period, in tune with general Belarusianization of cultural life, the Belarusian language and local traditions gained acceptance in some areas of religious activity of the BOC. The Feast of All-Belarusian Saints was established, translation of the Gospel into Belarusian begun, publication of Belarusian-language calendars and a periodical was launched, and Belarusian was allowed in certain religious services. But the idea of the autocephaly of the BOC, recently aired by some clergy and laymen, has a long way to go. As one of its protagonists put it, 'The path toward a Belarusian national [Orthodox Christian J.Z.] church goes through an INDEPENDENT NATIONAL BELARUSIAN STATE! (emphasis in the original J.Z.) Only then could one could speak also about autocephaly.' (28)

As to the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus, it is characterized, as a result of history, by a close pro-Polish orientation in its linguistic and cultural expression. The equation of Orthodoxy with Russianness and Catholicism with Polishness is still deeply ingrained in the popular mind. Nevertheless, in both of these confessions there are priests and lay people who appreciate the significance of the Belarusian language in religious life. Belarusian-language books and a periodical have been also published for Catholic believers.

Fully devoted to the cause of religious and national rebirth is the small Belarusian Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church, which uses Belarusian exclusively in its services and publications, but faces serious hurdles from both the leadership of the BOC and lay authorities, subservient to the official pro-Moscow policies.

Historical scholarship and education

The end of the Communist Party's control of ideology and the 1990 declaration of sovereignty loosened constraints on historical scholarship and opened new layers of the past and a wider freedom to interpret it. The new coat-of-arms and the national flag, adopted in 1991, harked back to the history of the medieval Duchy of Polatsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, where Belarusian culture flourished, as well as the 1918 Belarusian National ( Narodnaya ) Republic that preceded the establishment of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. The past, it seemed, would become prologue for a new future.

At the end of 1992, Prime Minister Vyachaslau Kebich laid out the views of his government on the role of national culture in the reconstruction of the nation's damaged spirit. In a speech that was advertised as a major address to the intelligentsia Kebich said: 'If we are a nation, we should by all means have our own national holy places. It is not easy for us to shape our national self-awareness with the national heritage we have received, not easy to reconvince our contemporaries and successors that we have a history of our statehood, that we are not some rootless Ivans. That is why any efforts, state and public initiatives, to revive our national history are so necessary and valuable.' (29)

Vasil Kushner, editor-in-chief of the newly launched quarterly, Belaruski histarychny chasopis [Belarusian historical journal], spelled out the approach to be taken: 'We openly and sincerely state that our policy and the main goal of the journal will be to contribute to the process of national rebirth and deepening the national consciousness of the Belarusian people This is the national policy, enshrined in a series of legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus.' (30)

The journal published an article, 'On the national conception of historical education in the Republic of Belarus,' where a new picture of the past was painted, starting with the ethnogenesis of the Belarusian people. The Belarusians were viewed no more as a branch of 'Old-Rus'ian nationality,' but as a Slavicized mixture of Slavic and Baltic tribes (a thesis forcefully advanced, among others, by the Russian Soviet historian Valentin Sedov). Teachers of history were advised to replace such appellations of pre-1917 Belarus as 'Western Rus',' 'West-Russian lands,' 'West-Russian population,' 'West-Russian culture' by the terms 'Belarus',' 'Belarusian people,' and 'Belarusian culture.' (31)

The 1994 constitution of the republic stated in its preamble (and repeated in the amended version of 1996) that the Belarusian people have a 'centuries-old history of development of Belarusian statehood.' Emotional historiography along these new historiographic lines, represented by such historians and fiction writers as Uladzimir Arlou, Kastus' Tarasau, Volha Ipatava, Leanid Dayneka and others, gained the support of publishers. To substantiate a new view of the past and assist in educational efforts, the publication of major tools was launched: a six-volume encyclopedia of the history of Belarus, an 18-volume universal Belarusian encyclopedia, single-volume encyclopedias of the Belarusian language, Belarusian thinkers, an illustrated chronology of the history of Belarus, and several others.

All these trends have been slowed down somewhat as a result of the 1995 referendum. Conservative historians and government watchdogs raised their voices against an 'extreme nationalistic' interpretation of the past. Soon, an 'adjustment' followed with replacements in institutes, universities, and editorial boards, including the encyclopedia of the history of Belarus and the universal Belarusian encyclopedia. In February 1999, Radio Liberty reported that Deputy Prime Minister Uladzimir Zamyatalin has ordered that 'seditious material' be eliminated from a textbook on Belarus's history in which the past was depicted from the 'positions of the nationally radical Belarusian opposition.' In particular, Zamyatalin denounced the textbook for mentioning repression of Belarusian national culture by Stalin's totalitarian regime in the 1930s. He labeled the book a 'falsification,' pointing to the 'lack of a single official view of the country's history in line with the demands of the president of the Republic of Belarus.' (32)

Apparently, not everyone fell in line following Zamyatalin's criticism. Here, for example, we have quite a different view on Stalin's repression: the newly published textbook for college students of law and history, approved by the Ministry of Education, speaks, albeit briefly, of 'mass repression,' 'Bolshevik terror' and the 'total Russification' of Belarus under Stalin. (33) It would appear that the confrontation between officialdom and nationally-minded elements of Belarusian society is being played out not only in the streets of Minsk, but also in the ministries and other official places. (34)

Civil society and civil liberties

In Belarus, the Soviet regime left in its wake an atomized society with a low political culture and an abysmal lack of interest in public and national life. Asked recently to pick the country's prime minister out of three names, fifty-eight percent of respondents said they did not know his name. In the eastern region of Mahilou eighty-one percent could not identify him. (35)

The past decade of independence has seen efforts to raise society's awareness of its power potential. Scores of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are trying to increase citizens' civic assertiveness, political activism and national consciousness. There are good reasons for this. One is that, in innumerable cases, authorities at higher and lower levels are guided in their decisions by secret instructions and sublegal acts often in contravention of constitutional principles. NGOs are counteracting such misuse of power, especially rampant in the field of culture and human and minorities' rights. The mobilization of society is steadily growing.

At the beginning of December 2000, a congress of Belarus's democratic NGOs took place in Minsk. Two hundred eighteen delegates decided to coordinate their activities, which include social, cultural and political goals. The country-wide Assembly of NGOs, aiming at the creation of 'a strong and influential third sector,' numbers 430 members. (36)

Activation of NGOs is hampered by a lack of financial support from the private sector. Upon coming to power with his idea of 'market socialism,' President Lukashenka reversed the process of privatization and imposed stringent regulations on any economic activity. As a result, private capital was drastically reduced and placed under strict state control.

Participation of young people in civil society activities reflects general population attitudes. According to some estimates only about five percent of the young people are engaged in public affairs. But most of those so engaged appreciate the values of democracy and national culture. And the capital of Minsk is not the only place where civil liberties are asserted. There are numerous regional clubs, bulletins, small circulation journals (many of them supported financially from the West) advancing the cause of national identity and the country's political independence. Street demonstrations and arrests that have taken place during the last two to three years show an increasing assertiveness of the young who have grown up under conditions of independence. The latest development in this area is the formation in the fall of 2000 of a new coalition of youth groups under the name 'Changes!'.

To counteract grass-root civic initiatives of young people the government has established a 'patriotic youth' union in 1997 pouring into it lavish state subsidies. This organization, however, is heavily bureaucratized and politically inert.

Civic disobedience in defense of national culture has been stimulated by the voluntary exile from their native country of a number of prominent figures who are now active abroad. They include writers Vasil Bykau, often characterized as 'the conscience of the nation,' Uladzimir Nyaklyayeu, president of Belarus's writers' union, politicians Zianon Pazniak, Syamyon Sharetski and Siarhyey Navumchyk, civic leader Hanna Surmach and others. They all are active abroad, each in his/her own field.

Another considerable influence on civil society activities in Belarus is the general support by Western states of an independent and democratic Belarus. Sharp criticism of Lukashenka's domestic and foreign policies by Western chancelleries, as well as in the Western press, has strong repercussions among the democratic opposition in Belarus.

Statehood as a source of national identity

Of all the elements that contribute to the formation of national identity, statehood is gaining predominant significance. 'Historical experience shows,' wrote one scholar in the pre-Lukashenka period, 'that neither union with Poland, nor being a part of Russia and then of the USSR allowed the Belarusian people to fully realize their creative potential. It is obvious that only within the framework of its own statehood will such a possibility will become a reality.' (37) Lukashenka himself vows to preserve his republic's sovereignty in a union with Russia, doubtful as that seems. In these circumstances, for many the search for national identity has become a quest for ways and means to reduce the antinomy between formal national statehood and its heavily Russified content. At a recent Belarusian-Polish round table on the idea of Belarusianness and Polishness, Belarusian discussants defined the essence of their national idea as a 'conception of a distinct national state of the Belarusian people' and stressed that the 'main strategic goal of national identity is the survival of the nation.' (38)

There is a view that the government, which has vested interests in independence, has no choice but to resort to the national awareness of the population as a sort of barrier against absorption of the country's sovereignty by Russia where the status and role of Belarusian bureaucrats, including that of Lukashenka, will be unavoidably reduced. 'Gradually,' writes one analyst about recent trends, 'the government's rhetoric began to emphasize the need to maintain Belarusian statehood and sovereignty no matter how advanced the integration process became.' (39) Some outside observers concur, including the editors of the most recent volume dealing with Belarus's foreign policy: 'Each day that passes strengthens the sense of national consciousness among Belarusians most rapidly among the young, the intellectuals, and those who hold the reins of power and see the advantages that independence has brought.' (40)

Conclusion

If saving the Belarusian nation depends on national self-awareness, as Vasil Bykau has postulated, there are indications that the effort to save it may succeed. The main hope for this to occur lies with the young generation of Belarusians and the preservation of Belarusian political statehood. The maintenance of the latter is not only in the interest of the Belarusians themselves, but also of their immediate neighbors and the democratic West as a whole. The world needs to see democratic states along the western fringes of Russia stabilized and strengthened. This would be the best way to reduce the threat of Russian imperialistic schemes which, as history has proven, never vanish and have the ability to reincarnate themselves. Contemporary Belarus is the best proof of this.
Since national identity has been gaining ground in Belarus, the only way for Russia to maintain its dominion over the 'western-gate' country is through suppression of that identity at the hands of an autocratic regime there. Strongman Alaksandr Lukashenka has been demonstrating this stratagem. Therefore, at this historical juncture, what the cause of democracy in Belarus and international security in Europe need most is continuous moral, political and financial support of the Belarusian democratic opposition and NGOs, which are a sure warrant for a peaceful Eastern Europe.

Notes

1. Znamya Yunosti. Minsk, 16 December 1992.
2. Sherman W. Garnett and Robert Legvold, eds. Belarus at the Crossroads (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), pp. 6, 7.
3. Stanislau Suskievic. 'Belarus: Self-identification and Statehood.' Belarusian Review, 2 (Summer 2000), p.10.
4. Letters to Gorbachev. New Documents from Soviet Byelorussia. 2nd ed. (London: The Association of Byelorussians in Great Britain, 1987), pp. 20-21.
5. Press-hrupa 'Navina pavedamlaye' (Minsk: Samizdat press release, n. d.), p. 2.
6. Selskaya gazeta. Minsk, 3 March 1989.
7. Sovetskaya Belorussiya. Minsk, 20 January 1990.
8. See the result of the deliberations in the 400-page volume Farmiravannye i razvitstsyo natsyyanalnay samasvyadomastsi belarusau. Minsk, 1992.
9. Zvyazda.. Minsk, 18 March 1993.
10. Uladzimir Konan, 'Arkhetypy belaruskaha mentalitetu: sproba rekanstruktsyi pavodle natsyyanalnay mifalohii i kazachnaha epasu' in: Farmiravannye i razvitstsyo natsyyanalnay samasvyadomastsi belarusau. (Minsk, 1992), p. 21.
11. Olga Gapanovich, 'Nam yavno nye khvatayet svezhego vozdukha kultury.' Belaruskaya Dumka. Minsk, 1993, no. 10, p. 13.
12. Andrey Vardamatski. 'Belarus i svyet.' Belaruskaya perspektyva. Minsk, October 2000, no.9, p. 7.
13. Belaruskaya Dumka.. Minsk, 1996, no. 1, p. 19.
14. Ibidem. 1998, no. 10 , p. 7.
15. Vyacheslav Nosevich, 'Belorusy: stanovleniye etnosa i "natsionalnaya ideya"' in: D. Ye. Furman, ed. Belorussiya i Rossiya: obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moskva: Izdatelstvo 'Prava cheloveka', 1998), p. 28.
16. Y. F. Karski. Etnograficheskaya karta belorusskogo plemeni (Petrograd, 1917), p. 1.
17. Anatol Astapenka. 'Rola i mestsa pravaslaunay tsarkvy u nyezalezhnay Belarusi' in: Ad 'tuteyshastsi' da natsyyanalnay dzyarzhaunastsi. [Warsaw], 1999), p. 67.
18. For details, see Jan Zaprudnik. Belarus. At a Crossroads in History (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 137-141.
19. Olga Gapanovich, 'Nam yavno nye khvatayet svezhego vozdukha kultury.' Belaruskaya Dumka.. Minsk, 1993, no. 10, p. 14.
20. Leanid Lych. 'Belaruskaya mova yak ab'yekt dzyarzhaunay dyskryminatsyi' in: Anyamyennye. Z khroniki znishchennya belaruskay movy (Vilnya: 'Gaudas,' 2000), p. 26.
21.Valantsin Hrytskevich. 'Linhvatsyd, albo Znishchennye movy' in:
Anyamyennye. Z khroniki znishchennya belaruskay movy (Vilnya: 'Gaudas,' 2000), p. 91.
22. David R. Marples. Belarus: a denationalized Nation (Australia - Canada, et al.: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1999), p.52.
23. Oleg Manayev. 'Elektorat Aleksandra Lukashenko' in: D. Ye. Furman. Belorussiya i Rossiya: obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moscow: Izdatelstvo 'Prava cheloveka,' 1998), p. 289.
24. Alaksandr Sasnouski. 'Nivelirouka kultur? Nye ikh samabytnasts'.' Belaruskaya Dumka. Minsk, 1997, no. 2, pp. 9 and 10.
25. Dmitri Podberezski. 'Eta pesnya khorosha nachinay snachala.' Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta , Minsk, 7 December 2000.
26. Belarustoday Online. Internet Journal, 13 November 2000.
27. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, vol. 2, no. 186, part II, 25 September 1998.
28. Anatol Astapenka. 'Rolya i myestsa pravaslaunay tsarkvy u nyezalezhnay Belarusi' in: Ad 'tuteyshastsi' da natsyyanalnay dzyarzhaunastsi. ([Warsaw], 1999), p. 67.
29. Zvyazda. Minsk, 23 December 1993.
30. Belaruski histarychny chasopis. Minsk, 1993, no. 1, p. 5.
31. Mikhas' Bich. 'Ab natsyyanalnay kantseptsyi historyi i histarychnay adukatsyi u Respublitsy Belarus.' Ibidem. 1993, no.1 p. 19.
32. RFE/RL Newsline. Vol. 3, no. 39, part II, 25 February 1999.
33. V. A. Krutalevich, I. A. Yukho. Historyya dzyarzhavy i prava Belarusi (1917-1945) (Minsk: 'Belaruskaya navuka,' 2000), pp. 193, 228, 229.
34. A detailed discussion of the role of historical scholarship and its relation to the process of nation building can be found in Rainer Lindner's thoroughly researched book, Historiker und Herrschaft. Nationsbildung und Geschichtspolitik in Weissrussland in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Muenchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999.
35. Andrey Vardamatski. 'Belarus i svyet.' Belaruskaya perspektyva.. Minsk, October 2000, no. 9, p. 7.
36. Belarusian Association of Resources Centers. BARC_List NEWS (barc@user.unibel.by), no.121, 4 December 2000. According to Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta (no. 883, 7 December 2000) 'about 500' NGOs belong to the assembly.
37. Vladimir Miskevich. 'Chas vybora.' Belaruskaya Dumka. Minsk, 1993, no. 8, p. 12.
38. Eduard Dubyanyetski. 'Idei belaruskastsi i polskastsi.' Kantakty i dyyalohi. Minsk, 2000, no. 10, p. 62.
39. Anatoly Rozanov. 'Belarus: Foreign Policy Priorities' in: Sherman W. Garnett and Robert Legvold, eds. Belarus at the Crossroads (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 33.
40. Ibidem , pp. 177-178.

__________________


Dr. Jan Zaprudnik is Vice President of the US-based Belarusian Institute of Arts and Sciences and the author of Belarus: At a Crossroads in History (1993) and Historical Dictionary of Belarus (1998). This article is based on the author's paper presented at the international seminar devoted to Belarus and held at Bath University, UK, in February 2000. The paper, along with other seminar material, will be published in the book entitled Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship, by Curzon Press, London, in January 2002.

This article appeared in
Belarusian ReviewVol. 13, Issue 2

---------------------------------------------

c 2001 Belarusian Review,
All rights reserved.
E-Mail: BelReview@aol.com

Jan Zaprudnik

[Whiteruthenian]

Some words on the history of the Belarusian national movement have to be said so that it became clearer why everything is how it is.

The process of creation of the nation from the ethnical group began here very late in comparison with other Slavs. Its starting point may be year 1891. It was the year when the small collection of poems “Dudka Biełaruskaja” by Francišak Bahuševič was published. (By the way, it couldn’t be published in the Russian Empire and was published in Austria-Hungary, in Krakow.) It wasn’t the first book published in the New Belarusian language, but it was especially important because it was the first time when (in the foreword) (something like) the national idea was articulated. The author pointed out that the situation when the Belarusians didn’t have books in Belarusian was abnormal. In the book the author mentioned documents (read by him) written centuries ago - the documents “in our pure language [obviously Old Belarusian] as if they have been written right now”, written by “great sirs”. He compared the situation to situations of other Slavic nations (Croats, Czechs, Bulgarians, Ukrainians) and said his book was an attempt to restore justice. Also the book reminded about the great past when “Lithuania and Belarus united in the single powerful state” (historical tradition), designated the borders of Belarus “Belarus is there where our language lives” and enumerated some most significant cities on the Belarusian ethnographical territory.

But the true rebirth began only in year 1905 when in the Russian Empire the laws concerning the ethnical minorities near its western border were liberalized. Unlike the Ukrainians (another Slavic people with similar fate) Belarusians didn’t have their Piedmont (Ukrainians had their Galicia (part of Austria-Hungary – freer for national development than Russia at that time)). But building of our national identity began and that work lasted more or less successfully to the First World War and during the war. After the October revolution this process was stopped and a new type of identity began to form – Soviet Belarusian identity. Its formation was so successful because ‘normal’ Belarusian identity simply wasn’t rooted deeply.

That’s what we have here, in my humble opinion – one ethnos but two identities. With two different views on the Belarusian history, with two separate pantheons of heroes, with different kind of languages (don’t you know about the two systems of orthography in the Belarusian language?), with two different national mythologies etc. etc.

That’s why Łukašenka is so popular. He is blood of our blood, flesh of our flesh – he is Soviet Belarusian, like most people in this country. But we can’t blame this situation on Łukašenka and people. It isn’t their fault.

One fateful aftermath of this position was the physical destruction of Belarus in World War II, including a heavy demographic loss ('every fourth one').

This may be an example of the Soviet mythology. Probably every Belarusian knows about “every fourth civilian killed” during the Second World War and believes that it’s true. The Soviet myth repeated thousand times became the truth in Belarusians’ minds.

As a consequence, the number of Russians in the republic rose by about one million between 1945 and 1985. This increase was even more significant among the intelligentsia as a result of the disproportionately high destruction of the native cadres in Stalinist purges.

By the way, researches show that up to 90% of executors were “imported” (weren’t from Belarus). It gives to these purges a genocide-like character.

Many Belarusians still cannot think of themselves as self-sustained nation, especially in terms of economic relations, which entails and enhances linguistic and cultural attachment to their eastern neighbor.

Probably most Belarusians already can ‘think of themselves as self-sustained nation in terms of economic relations’. After 17 years of independence this complex has been overcome. As for “linguistic and cultural attachment” – it is true.

During the last two years shifts at the top of the power in Minsk led to a dramatic increase in ethnic Russians occupying top positions in the Belarusian government where the country's prime minister, his deputies and heads of the power ministries, as well as a number of deputy ministers and the speaker of the lower chamber of parliament, are all Russian-born.

I don’t believe it was done on purpose. On the other hand I can remember that on the list of the people who tried to compete with our beloved father Łukašenka in presidential elections (I wonder how people can be so optimistic ) there were only people of Belarusian ethnicity. Everything is relative.

Kurapaty immediately became a generic symbol of Stalinist repression of the nationally conscious Belarusian intelligentsia which took place in the ideological and ethnic cleansing of the 1930s.

There were attempts to accuse Nazis of these executions (the victims were supposed to be Jews). What is the reason to defend in such a way Stalin’s executioners I have no idea.

Another important factor that impacted the rise of the issue of national self-assertiveness was the revelation, toward the end of 1989, that over seventy percent of the radiation from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster landed on Belarusian territory. A public outcry and pressure for investigation of the Chernobyl cover-up had significant political and psychological repercussions. The republic's leadership was accused of subservience to Moscow at the expense of national interests. 'The Chernobyl tragedy has demonstrated,' wrote one critic, 'that the Belarusian people needs indispensably to raise its self-awareness. If our leadership had high national self-awareness, this would not have happened.'

At the moment few people blame “judeo-bolshevik Moscow” for those seventy percent of the radiation.

The key element in this quest for a new conceptual base of nationhood was to be sought, obviously, in the spheres of culture and history. The multiconfessional and multiethnic makeup of Belarusian society, located between East and West, was now presented in a new light. It was found to possess a distinct type of mentality characterized by tolerance, humanistic values, the absence of extremist views, and having peaceful intentions toward its neighbors.

What?! Hell no, I won’t agree to eat this, thank you.

Researchers found that only five to six percent of the population 'possesses the necessary knowledge of the history of [our] national culture.'

Sounds like true. ½ of inhabitants of Minsk believe that Peter the Great was our ruler, and 2/3 believe that Ivan the Terrible was too. The ignorance is striking. I hope that among youths the figures aren’t so scary. For older people who were taught the history from Abecedarski’s “History of the Belarusian SSR” such ignorance is more forgivable.

A poll conducted in March 2000 among 1,608 residents of Belarus, a country with eighty-one percent Belarusians, revealed an amazing lack of national self-awareness. The respondents were asked to say who, according to them, Belarusians are 'a separate self-sustained (samastoynaya) Belarusian nation,' or 'a branch of the triune Russian nation,' or 'other.' Only 49.8 percent said Belarusians are a separate nation, while 42.6 percent chose the category 'the triune (i. e., Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian J.Z.) Russian nation.' Five-and-a-half percent said they did not know how to answer.

Plausible. Probably now more people will agree with the first option, though. But I would not agree that these figures mean that 42.6 percent of Belarusians in 2000 were ready to join Slavyanskiy Sobor Belaya Rus’ (an organization of Russian imperialists (by the way it was not re-registered in Belarus because it didn’t have enough members. )).

In Belarus, as in Eastern Europe generally, the notion of nationality has been based on ethnicity.

Yes, and it should be so for ever.

Secondly, the language itself, in the mind of the population, was stigmatized as 'peasant' by years of disuse in the higher echelons.

It is called “inferiority complex”. Yes, such thing exists.

In spite of ardent protests by some legislators and members of the intelligentsia, the answer was a firm 'yes,' explained by the following: a) decades of Russian being used as the official language; b) weak national self-awareness on the part of a majority of Belarusians; and c) intensive government propaganda, including the president himself, on behalf of the Russian language.

The attitude towards the Belarusian language usually depends on what the language for a person is, “means of communication” or “value”. Obviously for most Belarusians (Soviet Belarusians) the language is not a value so it does not need a special protection from the state.

Is Russian, spoken by Belarusians, unavoidably a carrier of Russian cultural and political identity?

I would agree that very often it is not. A person who speaks Belarusian not so well but is loyal to their folk is much better than a person who express their anti-Belarusian beliefs in Belarusian.

A recent study by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences has shown that forty-seven percent of the population are believers, while twenty percent are non-believers and thirty-three percent could not provide an answer as to their religious conviction. Among the believers, seventy-eight percent are Orthodox Christians, nine percent Catholics and the rest belong to various other denominations.

Interesting that proportion of curacies gives another image – 3 orthodox curacies : 2 protestant curacies : 1 catholic curacy. The cause of the difference is probably high percentage of not practicing Orthodox Christians and “Orthodox atheists”. It is the reason why the Belarusian Orthodox Church reacts so nervously to activities of the small Uniate church and its attempts to position itself as the national church. If the Uniate church manages to do it (and will be seen as the national church by most Belarusians) we may see sharp rise in conversions from “Orthodox atheism” to “Uniate atheism”.

But the idea of the autocephaly of the BOC, recently aired by some clergy and laymen, has a long way to go. As one of its protagonists put it, 'The path toward a Belarusian national [Orthodox Christian J.Z.] church goes through an INDEPENDENT NATIONAL BELARUSIAN STATE! (emphasis in the original J.Z.) Only then could one could speak also about autocephaly.'

I agree. First Belarus must become Belarusian in full sense of this word.
I heard that Metropolitan Filaret [Vakhromeyev] himself was going to proclaim autocephaly after the collapse of the USSR but our indecision and failures on the way to building the national state discouraged him. Metropolitan Filaret is more judicious than his chiefs in Moscow, it can be seen from his attitude to hierarchs of Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (in the USA) to Belarusianess etc.

As to the Roman Catholic Church in Belarus, it is characterized, as a result of history, by a close pro-Polish orientation in its linguistic and cultural expression. The equation of Orthodoxy with Russianness and Catholicism with Polishness is still deeply ingrained in the popular mind.
[…]
Fully devoted to the cause of religious and national rebirth is the small Belarusian Greek-Catholic (Uniate) Church … .

Yes, yes! Only the Uniate church will save us all!

The past decade of independence has seen efforts to raise society's awareness of its power potential. Scores of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are trying to increase citizens' civic assertiveness, political activism and national consciousness.

It is the most hateful thing our opposition does – it mixes up Belarusianess, democracy/liberalism and euro-enthusiasm and tells us to eat this dish. It uses white, red and white flag, for example, and discredits it – people associate the flag not with the nation but with the opposition (which is not popular at all).

There is a view that the government, which has vested interests in independence, has no choice but to resort to the national awareness of the population as a sort of barrier against absorption of the country's sovereignty by Russia where the status and role of Belarusian bureaucrats, including that of Lukashenka, will be unavoidably reduced. 'Gradually,' writes one analyst about recent trends, 'the government's rhetoric began to emphasize the need to maintain Belarusian statehood and sovereignty no matter how advanced the integration process became.'

It may be true. Today it seems, there are attempts of the authorities to work out something like Neo-Soviet Belarusian identity (to adapt the Soviet Belarusian identity of older generation to new conditions – to the independent Belarusian state (a union with Russia becomes less and less probable)). What this identity will be like and whether it will absorb some elements of “normal” Belarusian identity it is unclear yet. There are suppositions that among other elements, Łukašenka’s regime can most easily (without being unfaithful to itself) adapt the idea of preservation of the Belarusian language (for example) and some others. Well, let’s see.

'Each day that passes strengthens the sense of national consciousness among Belarusians most rapidly among the young, the intellectuals, and those who hold the reins of power and see the advantages that independence has brought.'

Indeed.

[svin]

What is the reason to defend in such a way Stalin’s executioners I have no idea.

Katyn is the similiar case. Blame everything on Nazis.

[Exeter]

Besides extremists, do any ordinary Belarusians perceive themselves as Russian?

[kyashan]

did the Belarusians already regarded themselves as a distinct ethnicity from Russians in the Zarist era?

[Marcus Marulus]

It is the most hateful thing our opposition does – it mixes up Belarusianess, democracy/liberalism and euro-enthusiasm and tells us to eat this dish.

Yes, it is awful indeed. So some people in Croatia as well tried, from the beginning of the nineties onward, to mix up the Croatian identity with democracy/liberalism, Westernism ( ), pro-capitalism, pro-EU and pro-NATO attitudes. There was much opposition to such attitudes in the nineties, but any significant opposition practically vanished in the period since 2000.

[svin]

Besides extremists, do any ordinary Belarusians perceive themselves as Russian?

Yes. But there are few.

[Whiteruthenian]

Besides extremists, do any ordinary Belarusians perceive themselves as Russian?

Yes. But there are few.

Yes. I wouldn’t be afraid to say that very few (if Exeter means Belarusians identifying themselves with the main ethnos of Russia).

did the Belarusians already regarded themselves as a distinct ethnicity from Russians in the Zarist era?

The impression that Belarusians appeared after splitting the Russian nation and identity, is not correct (formally speaking, Ruthenians and Muscovites distinguished themselves long before XX century).

It is not easy to answer your question. The Zarist era in Belarus lasted from the end of XVIII century to year 1917, and the identity of the native population changed a lot during that time. From the end of XVIII century to 1830s inhabitants of these land couldn’t feel especially close to the Russians. The elite was culturally polonized then and was predominantly Roman Catholic. The peasantry was predominantly Greek Catholic (Uniate). Up to 1830s the Russian Empire didn’t make serious attempts to russify these lands, the situation changed only after the uprising in year 1830. The Uniate church was abolished and became the part of the Russian Orthodox church (some Belarusians “escaped” to the Roman Catholicism although it was not allowed, but the main part became Orthodox). Before that time the Russian authorities distinguished Poles from Belarusians and Ukrainians not so well but after the uprising the theory about the triune Russian nation (which was supposed to include the Great Russians, White Russians and Little Russians) got a new impulse. As for the Catholic part of the Belarusians – they were put into the category “inovertsy” (persons of another faith) and often were simply regarded as Poles.

As I said the elite was culturally polonized at that time, but they had a regional identity - with the Great Duchy of Lithuania. That identification was so strong that survived the XIX century and existed at the beginning of XX century among pioneers of the Belarusian national movement as the intention to revive the Great Duchy (~ present Lithuania + present Belarus) in a new form. It is not unusual, because among those pioneers a large part were szlachta.

In my opinion in 1830-1917 we had this situation: the identity of White (Western) Russians steadily spreading among the Orthodox Belarusians, identification with Poles – among the Catholic Belarusians (doesn’t matter peasants or szlachta). Probably both the Catholic Belarusians and the Orthodox Belarusians distinguished themselves from “true” Poles and “true” Great Russians, but it was not what we call “a separate national identity”. The separate Belarusian national identity began to form and spread at the end of XIX century (and replace the two aforementioned identities), but, as I said, in 1917 it wasn’t rooted deeply yet in the Belarusian people, although the Belarusian national movement had some successes, no doubt. Otherwise we wouldn’t have had the declaration of independence of the Belarusian People’s Republic on 25 March 1918, the BSSR (as a part of the USSR), and independent Belarus now.