Russian-Estonian conflict & putinism

[Sohni]

For everyone who can read russian, here are some articles and a good collection of various links: index_protsitai

[Sohni]

Behind Putin's Estonia Complex

Nothing seems to make President Vladimir Putin angrier these days than Estonia. Once it was Chechnya that inspired blustery speeches and sent sparks flying at news conferences. Journalists who dared to question the war were met with bursts of hostility. One, a French reporter, was famously invited to Moscow to be circumcised.
Criticism of Kremlin policy in Chechnya still makes Putin steam, but Estonia is the new hot-button issue.

During a joint news conference with European Union leaders in Samara on Friday, Putin twice diverged from the question he was asked to return to the issue of Estonia. Both times he talked about the stabbing death of an ethnic Russian during rioting last month over Estonia's decision to move the Bronze Soldier war memorial out of central Tallinn.
Putin did not focus on the stabbing, which may well have been the work of other ethnic Russians. Instead, he complained that the protester had received no medical help and been allowed to bleed to death on the street. "This constitutes a willful crime, and we demand that the perpetrators be brought to justice," Putin said.
Two days earlier, he had criticized Russian human rights groups for not speaking out against Estonia. "I did not see any flurry of activity coming from rights groups when the remains of Soviet soldiers were being relocated in a neighboring country. Where are our human rights groups?" Putin asked.

Putin seems to have taken personally Estonia's decision to move the memorial to fallen Red Army soldiers. This may be because he sees it not only as an affront to his country but as an affront to the memory of his father. As Putin once told it, his father was betrayed by Estonians during the war.
Before he was first elected in 2000, Putin gave a series of interviews to three Russian journalists for a book called "First Person." In the first chapter, he talks about his father. During the war, he was in an NKVD sabotage battalion operating behind German lines and was sent as part of a group of 28 people to carry out an operation in Estonian territory. They succeeded in blowing up a supply train and were able to hide in the woods, but eventually they ran out of food and turned to the local population. Estonians brought them food but then gave them up to the Germans. Only four people in the group survived, including Putin's father, who hid in a bog, breathing through a reed, to escape detection by Nazi soldiers who were searching for them with dogs.
The story of his father continues with him joining the regular army in Leningrad. He was badly wounded, but saved by a fellow soldier and former neighbor who carried him across the frozen Neva River under enemy fire to a hospital. For Putin's father, the war was defined by moments of contemptible betrayal and unswerving loyalty.
Putin's feelings for Estonians were revealed two years ago at a news conference, again following a meeting with EU leaders. When an Estonian television correspondent asked him a question, he made fun of her by mocking her accent in Russian. Undeterred, she continued with another question, asking why it was so difficult for Russia to apologize for the occupation. If Russia were to apologize, she said, "We would be able to live together very easily."
Putin responded by launching into what in the end amounted to a convoluted defense of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the 1939 agreement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that divided up Eastern Europe and gave Estonia to Stalin.
Putin first said the Congress of People's Deputies had dealt with the pact in 1989 by saying it did not reflect the view of the Soviet people and was legally invalid. "What else can be said that would be more specific and clear?" he asked the Estonian journalist. "Or do you want us to do this every year? What else do you think has to be said? We consider this question closed. That's it. We will not return to this again. We said it once and that's enough."
He went on to explain that there had been no occupation of Estonia because Germany had given the territory back to the Soviet Union in 1939. "This means that if in 1939 the Baltic countries had joined the Soviet Union, then in 1945 the Soviet Union could not have occupied them, because they were already part of the Soviet Union," he said and then added this colorful note: "I may not have studied very well at university, because I drank a lot of beer in my free time, but even so I still remember something. Something remained in my head. We had good teachers."
One thing his Soviet teachers most likely did not tell him was that before the Estonians had betrayed his father's NKVD-led group, the NKVD had begun arresting the Estonian leadership and anyone else who opposed Soviet rule. Prominent Estonians were being executed or sent to labor camps.
For Putin, history is still the history taught in the Soviet Union. It is the history of the country where he grew up and of the man who survived the war to become his father.

Behind Putin\'s Estonia Complex

[Errigal]

I found the article quite interesting and learned new information. Thanks for posting it. My only complaint is the reporter chose to present Putin's hostile view of Estonia as a psychological "complex", or disorder. Ironically, a similar pseudo-psychiatry was used by the Soviets to imprison dissident from all over their empire, including Estonians of course. This was a mild version of the technique, but it still set off alarm bells with me.

[Sohni]

Сын фашистского карателя

Польский журнал «Ангора» № 31 (03.08.2003 г.) в разделе «Секреты истории» на стр. 11 опубликовал заметку Жозефа Занявского под названием «Участвовал ли отец президента России в подавлении Варшавского восстания?».

Приводим перевод этой заметки.
«Живущий в Великобритании Виктор Суворов (настоящее имя Богдан Резун), бывший резидент советской военной разведки ГРУ в Швейцарии, который в 1978 году перешёл на сторону британской разведки, за что заочно был приговорён к смертной казни (приговор не отменён после распада Советского Союза), автор «Аквариума» и других бестселлеров, в феврале прошлого года, собирая материал для книги о маршале Георгии Жукове, в секретных лондонских архивах 8-й британской армии случайно обнаружил очень интересную фотографию с надписями. На фотографии изображены шесть офицеров. Трое в мундирах казаков, двое в немецкой форме и один в мундире РОА.

Суворов поясняет, что офицеры в мундирах казаков - это россияне, служившие в казацких формированиях армии генерала Власова, перебежавшего к гитлеровцам. На фотографии указано, что она сделана в августе 1944 года, как раз во время подавления Варшавского восстания.

Из надписей ясно, что первый слева – это поручик Владимир Путин, а двое других в казачьих шапках – это майор Фролов и поручик Михалчевский.

Владимир Спиридонович Путин, отец нынешнего президента России Владимира Владимировича Путина, был офицером внутренних войск НКВД до 1941 года. В начале войны под Витебском сдался в плен немцам, а при создании генералом Андреем Власовым коллаборационистской армии, добровольно вступил в неё. В составе власовских формирований вместе с немцами принимал участие в карательных акциях против польского населения. В 1945 году В.С. Путин попал в плен к англичанам. Документы, свидетельствующие об этом, находятся в секретных английских архивах в Лондоне, где их и обнаружил Виктор Суворов.

В 1945 году В.С. Путин, вместе с остальными власовцами, был выдан англичанами Советскому Союзу. Его сын, нынешний президент России, пошёл по стопам отца. С 18 лет служил в КГБ (КГБ – наследник НКВД), где дослужился до высокого положения – до звания полковника.

Президент Владимир Владимирович Путин проводит в России пронемецкую политику в духе договора Риббентропа – Молотова от 1939 года.

Во время последнего визита в Польшу в 2002 году имел место дипломатический инцидент. Президент России отказался от совместного с представителями Сейма возложения венка к памятнику борцам польского сопротивления. И только после скандала в прессе, под конец визита, было произведено персональное возложение «охапки» цветов. И то без официальной церемонии…».

Редакция «Ангоры» предлагает также ознакомиться более подробно с материалами по данной тематике через Интернет и приводит адрес сайта, на котором имеется подробная информация по данному вопросу: Oficer Kozaków z Ostlegionów 1943 -1945

Ðåâîëþöèÿ.RU :: Ëåíòà íîâîñòåé, ñîáûòèÿ, ìíåíèÿ. Ñûí ôàøèñòñêîãî êàðàòåëÿ


ENGLISH:
Anorther version of Putin's father, according to which he surrendered to Germans and joined ROA (Russkaya Osvoboditel'naya Armiya - Russian Liberation Army), that fought on German side under leadership of General Vlassov:

[Kernunnos]

This photo is doctored, postwar issue.

The "german army officer " on the left wears a four pocket jacket without a bottlegreen collar.

It ever happened. It is apparently a model 40 soldier /NCO jacke, but officers used to modify soldiers jacket by adding bottlegreen collars and officer badges.

Anyway german officers are almost never seen in wartime pictures with such poor feldbluses.

The soldier bluses they converted for their uses were upgraded.

Also his schirmutze is devoid of the bottlegreen band, which was never taken off any schirmmutze model, and it is crushed in an uncommon way
(the young soldier in the background wears a non german strange visor cap too).

Litzen seems too big and cap also is not carrying the national eagle

the panzer officer is wearing an einehitsfeldmutze cap of the gray green variety, while his uniform is black: he should be wearing a black cap, of the type issued to panzer soldiers and officers, which was matching the tunic's and pants color.

Also ROA as far as I know never had panzer units, they fought as infantry.

[Kernunnos]

According to western sources, Putin\'s grandfather was one of Stalin\'s cooks. When Putin tried to join Kgb, he was given an half yes, since as usual they had to control his and his ancestor\'s past. Since he made a good career in Kgb, a very good one, what version will be true? ROA members were executed imemdiately after capture, they were tortured or ended up in gulags to die slowly. Who would believe that the son of a ROA member could be admitted into Kgb\'s service? I stick to the Stalin\'s cook nephew story, sorry.

[Errigal]

An American view of their relationship with the Baltic states.

America's Baltic Time Bomb

by Ted Galen Carpenter
Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of seven books and the editor of ten books on international affairs, including NATO Enters the 21st Century (Frank Cass Publishers).


The ongoing diplomatic food fight between Russia and Estonia over the latter's removal of a Soviet war memorial should be one of those things Americans can safely ignore. But because Washington successfully pressed its NATO allies into admitting Estonia and the other two Baltic republics into the alliance, the U.S. now has a treaty obligation to defend those tiny countries on Russia's border if Moscow ever resorts to force. It is an unwise, extremely dangerous commitment. As American trade with Asia increases by leaps and bounds, and China and India grow to great power, the Baltics are the last place the U.S. needs to assert itself.


Most American proponents of NATO's eastward enlargement act as though the alliance is now little more than a political honor society. Their logic is that, because the nations of Eastern Europe have become capitalist democracies, they deserve to be members of the West's most prominent club. And because NATO is now primarily a political body, so the argument goes, Russia has no reason to fear or oppose its expansion -- even to Russia's own border.


But as the Estonia episode should remind us, NATO is still a military alliance with serious obligations for the United States. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty proclaims that an attack on one member is an attack on all. That means the United States is obligated to defend every member -- no matter how small, how militarily and economically insignificant, or how strategically exposed that member might be.


And even worse, those obligations go on forever. Therein lies the danger. True, in the near term, there's little risk of a clash with Russia. Its military is in no condition to challenge the United States -- even in its own backyard. And although tensions between Washington and Moscow have risen in the past few years, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be more of a calculating opportunist than a reckless gambler.


But who knows what Putin's successor might be like? And who would dare predict the political environment in Russia a generation from now? All it would take to trigger a crisis is a Russian president who tires of the Baltic republics' continuing treatment of their Russian inhabitants as second class citizens and decides to rectify that situation by force if necessary.
For example, Moscow's anger might reach the boiling point if Estonia continues to insist on proficiency in the Estonian language for citizenship -- a requirement that disenfranchizes hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers. Or the Kremlin could tire of the pervasive discrimination against Estonian citizens of Russian descent in employment -- especially in government ministries. Although the Russian government would probably first use economic pressure to force a change in policy, nationalist emotions inside Russia could lead to an adoption of military measures.
Indeed, a crisis could result if a future Russian president concludes that NATO's mere presence in the Baltic region is an intolerable intrusion into Moscow's rightful sphere of influence. Russian concerns on that score have already been exacerbated by the efforts of the Baltic states to have NATO combat aircraft deployed in their territory. As Russia's economic and military recovery progresses, its determination to stand up to the United States and western allies is also likely to grow.


That is why permanent U.S. security obligations are so unwise. The commitments may make sense -- or at least seem innocuous -- under one set of conditions, but they can become disastrous liabilities when conditions change.


When permanent commitments are made to strategically and economically irrelevant clients, the folly is compounded. The security pledges to Estonia and the other Baltic republics are a prime example. If the U.S. commitment were ever challenged, Washington would face a choice between a bad outcome and a worse one. It could renege on its obligations, devastating American credibility and casting doubts on U.S. security commitments and statements elsewhere in the world. Or even worse, the U.S. could endeavor to carry out its pledge, which could easily lead to a clash with a nuclear power. America should never incur that degree of risk except in the defense of its most vital security interests. The security of three tiny nations on Russia's border doesn't even come close to meeting that test.

Washington should seriously consider the elimination of Article 5. If NATO is now meant to be primarily a political organization, as its supporters contend, there should be little objection to that reform. Conversely, if NATO supporters demand that Article 5 be maintained, then their assurances that the alliance is not directed against Russia are disingenuous, and we can expect serious tensions with that country in the future.


In any case, the U.S. should never have undertaken military commitments to the Baltic republics. These obligations are a dangerous liability, and the U.S. must extricate itself from them.


This article appeared in the South China Morning Post on May 24, 2007

source

[Susi]

Thanks Sohni. I'm writing an essay on Russia and its foreign relations so this is really useful.