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		<description><![CDATA[Stirpes, Identity &amp; Tradition in a Free Europe of Sovereign Nations]]></description>
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			<title><![CDATA[Excerpts from José Ortega y Gasset's "Unity and Diversity of Europe"]]></title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/74-excerpts-jose-ortega-y-gassets-unity-diversity-europe.html</link>
			<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jul 2008 02:37:59 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[Unity and Diversity of Europe  

[...]
 A good part of the disorder of the present is due to the disproportion between the perfection of our ideas on physical phenomena and the scandalous backwardness of the "moral sciences." Most of our statesmen, professors, distinguished physicists, and novelists have opinions on these subjects worthy of a small-town barber. Is it not then quite natural that it should be the small-town barber who sets the tone of the time?  But to return to our subject: I wanted to suggest that for a long time the peoples of Europe have actually made up a society, a collectivity, taking these words in the same sense as when applied to the nations separately. This society has all the attributes of any: there are European manners, European customs, European public opinion, European law, and European public power. But all these social phenomena appear in a form appropriate to the stage of evolution reached by European society as a whole, which is obviously less advanced than that of its component parts, the nations.

For example, that form of social pressure which is public power functions in all societies, including primitive ones where there exists no special organ to handle it. If one wants to give the name of "state" to that differentiated organ charged with the exercise of public power, one may say that in certain societies there is no state, but not that there is no public power. Where there exists public opinion, how could there not be public power, if the latter is simply collective violence let loose by opinion? Now it would be hard to deny that for centuries, and with ever-greater intensity, there has been a European public opinion and even a technique of influence over it.

I therefore suggest that the reader spare the malice of a smile when I predict - somewhat boldly, in view of present appearances - a possible, a probable unification of the states of Europe. I do not deny that the United States of Europe is one of the poorest fantasies that has ever existed and I take no responsibility for what others have handed out under these verbal signs. But I do maintain that it is highly improbable that a society, a collectivity as ripe as that now formed by the peoples of Europe, should not move towards the creation of a state apparatus for the exercise of the European public power which already exists. It is not, then, a weakness for fantasy nor a leaning towards "idealism," which I despise and have fought all my life, that has brought me to this conclusion. It is historic realism that has made it clear to me that the unity of Europe as society is not an "ideal" but a very ancient daily fact, and having seen this fact one cannot but confront the probability of a general European state. As for the occasion that will suddenly bring the process to a close, it might be almost anything: a Chinaman's pigtail appearing behind the Urals or a shock from the great Islamic magma.

The shape of this supernational state will, of course, be very different from those to which we are accustomed, just as the national state differed from the city-state of ancient times. All that I have attempted in these pages is to free the mind of the reader so that it may keep faith with the subtle conception of society and state proposed by the European tradition.
[...]
We should be falling back into the limitation of the ancients were we to perceive public power only where it has assumed the well-known and, so to speak, fixed masks of state, that is, in the particular nations of Europe. In my opinion it is quite untrue that the decisive public power at work in any one of them consists exclusively of its inner or national public power. It must be realized once and for all that for centuries-and consciously during the last four-the peoples of Europe have lived under a public power so purely dynamic that it can be characterized only by names drawn from mechanical science: "European balance," or "balance of power."

This is the real government of Europe, ruling in its flight through history the swarm of peoples, industrious and belligerent as bees, that rose out of the ruins of the ancient world. The unity of Europe is not a fantasy, but reality itself; what is fantastic is the belief in France, Germany, Italy, or Spain as substantive and independent units. It is understandable, however, that everyone should not clearly perceive the reality of Europe, for Europe is not a "thing" but a balance. Already in the eighteenth century the historian Robertson called the balance of Europe "the great secret of modern politics." It is indeed a great and paradoxical secret! For the balance of power depends at bottom on the existence of a plurality. If the plurality is lost, the dynamic unity fades away. Europe may well be called a swarm: many bees and a single flight.

This unitary character of the magnificent European plurality is what I should call the good kind of homogeneity, fruitful and desirable, the quality that inspired Montesquieu's remark that "Europe is only a nation made up of several"  and moved Balzac, more romantically, to speak of "the great continental family whose efforts reach toward I know not what mystery of civilization." 

This abundance of European modes, surging constantly out of their deep-rooted unity and returning again to preserve it, is the greatest treasure of the West. The dull-witted can never grasp a concept so acrobatic, in which one jumps endlessly back and forth between the affirmation of plurality and the recognition of unity. They are sluggish spirits, born to live beneath the perpetual tyrannies of the Orient.

[...]
But of greater interest to us in Mill is his anxiety over the pernicious kind of homogeneity that he saw growing throughout the West. It was this that moved him to seek refuge in a great thought expressed by Humboldt in his youth, that if mankind is to be enriched, to consolidate and perfect itself, [B]there must exist a "variety of situations."  Within each nation and in the aggregate of nations there must be a diversity of circumstances, so that when one possibility fails others remain open. It is sheer madness to stake all Europe on one card, on a single type of man, on one identical "situation." Europe's secret talent up to the present day has been to avoid this, and it is the consciousness of this secret that has shaped the speech, sometimes stammering to be sure, of the perpetual liberalism of Europe. This consciousness includes a recognition of the plurality of Europe as a positive value in its own right, not evil but good. I have gone to some length to clarify this point so as to avoid any misunderstanding of the idea of a European supernation set forth in this book.[/B]
[...]
Total politicalism, the absorption of everything and of the entire man by politics, is one and the same phenomenon as the revolt of the masses. The mass in revolt has lost all capacity for knowledge or devotion. It can contain nothing but politics, a raving, frenetic, exorbitant politics that claims to replace all knowledge, religion, wisdom-everything, in short, really qualified to occupy the center of the human mind. Politics drains men of solitude and intimacy, and preaching total politicalism is therefore one of the techniques of socialization.

When someone asks us where we stand politically, or anticipating, with the usual impertinence of the time, ascribes us to one party or another, instead of answering we should cross-examine the inquirer: what does he think of man and nature and history? what is his understanding of society, the individual, collectivity, the state, custom, law? Politics hurries to put out the light so that all these cats will be gray. 

[...]
Revolutions, so incontinent in their hypocritically generous haste to proclaim the rights of man, have always violated, trampled on, and broken man's most fundamental right, so fundamental that it may stand as the definition of his being: the right to continuity. 
[...]
Man's real treasure is the treasure of his mistakes, piled up stone by stone through thousands of years. It is because of this that Nietzsche defined man as the being "with the longest memory." [B]Breaking the continuity with the past, wanting to begin again, is a lowering of man and a plagiarism of the orangutan.[/B] It was a Frenchman, Dupont-White, who around 1860 had the courage to exclaim: "Continuity is one of the rights of man; it is a homage of everything that distinguishes him from the beast."]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>Unity and Diversity of Europe  <br />
<br />
[...]<br />
 A good part of the disorder of the present is due to the disproportion between the perfection of our ideas on physical phenomena and the scandalous backwardness of the &quot;moral sciences.&quot; Most of our statesmen, professors, distinguished physicists, and novelists have opinions on these subjects worthy of a small-town barber. Is it not then quite natural that it should be the small-town barber who sets the tone of the time?  But to return to our subject: I wanted to suggest that for a long time the peoples of Europe have actually made up a society, a collectivity, taking these words in the same sense as when applied to the nations separately. This society has all the attributes of any: there are European manners, European customs, European public opinion, European law, and European public power. But all these social phenomena appear in a form appropriate to the stage of evolution reached by European society as a whole, which is obviously less advanced than that of its component parts, the nations.<br />
<br />
For example, that form of social pressure which is public power functions in all societies, including primitive ones where there exists no special organ to handle it. If one wants to give the name of &quot;state&quot; to that differentiated organ charged with the exercise of public power, one may say that in certain societies there is no state, but not that there is no public power. Where there exists public opinion, how could there not be public power, if the latter is simply collective violence let loose by opinion? Now it would be hard to deny that for centuries, and with ever-greater intensity, there has been a European public opinion and even a technique of influence over it.<br />
<br />
I therefore suggest that the reader spare the malice of a smile when I predict - somewhat boldly, in view of present appearances - a possible, a probable unification of the states of Europe. I do not deny that the United States of Europe is one of the poorest fantasies that has ever existed and I take no responsibility for what others have handed out under these verbal signs. But I do maintain that it is highly improbable that a society, a collectivity as ripe as that now formed by the peoples of Europe, should not move towards the creation of a state apparatus for the exercise of the European public power which already exists. It is not, then, a weakness for fantasy nor a leaning towards &quot;idealism,&quot; which I despise and have fought all my life, that has brought me to this conclusion. It is historic realism that has made it clear to me that the unity of Europe as society is not an &quot;ideal&quot; but a very ancient daily fact, and having seen this fact one cannot but confront the probability of a general European state. As for the occasion that will suddenly bring the process to a close, it might be almost anything: a Chinaman's pigtail appearing behind the Urals or a shock from the great Islamic magma.<br />
<br />
The shape of this supernational state will, of course, be very different from those to which we are accustomed, just as the national state differed from the city-state of ancient times. All that I have attempted in these pages is to free the mind of the reader so that it may keep faith with the subtle conception of society and state proposed by the European tradition.<br />
[...]<br />
We should be falling back into the limitation of the ancients were we to perceive public power only where it has assumed the well-known and, so to speak, fixed masks of state, that is, in the particular nations of Europe. In my opinion it is quite untrue that the decisive public power at work in any one of them consists exclusively of its inner or national public power. It must be realized once and for all that for centuries-and consciously during the last four-the peoples of Europe have lived under a public power so purely dynamic that it can be characterized only by names drawn from mechanical science: &quot;European balance,&quot; or &quot;balance of power.&quot;<br />
<br />
This is the real government of Europe, ruling in its flight through history the swarm of peoples, industrious and belligerent as bees, that rose out of the ruins of the ancient world. The unity of Europe is not a fantasy, but reality itself; what is fantastic is the belief in France, Germany, Italy, or Spain as substantive and independent units. It is understandable, however, that everyone should not clearly perceive the reality of Europe, for Europe is not a &quot;thing&quot; but a balance. Already in the eighteenth century the historian Robertson called the balance of Europe &quot;the great secret of modern politics.&quot; It is indeed a great and paradoxical secret! For the balance of power depends at bottom on the existence of a plurality. If the plurality is lost, the dynamic unity fades away. Europe may well be called a swarm: many bees and a single flight.<br />
<br />
This unitary character of the magnificent European plurality is what I should call the good kind of homogeneity, fruitful and desirable, the quality that inspired Montesquieu's remark that &quot;Europe is only a nation made up of several&quot;  and moved Balzac, more romantically, to speak of &quot;the great continental family whose efforts reach toward I know not what mystery of civilization.&quot; <br />
<br />
This abundance of European modes, surging constantly out of their deep-rooted unity and returning again to preserve it, is the greatest treasure of the West. The dull-witted can never grasp a concept so acrobatic, in which one jumps endlessly back and forth between the affirmation of plurality and the recognition of unity. They are sluggish spirits, born to live beneath the perpetual tyrannies of the Orient.<br />
<br />
[...]<br />
But of greater interest to us in Mill is his anxiety over the pernicious kind of homogeneity that he saw growing throughout the West. It was this that moved him to seek refuge in a great thought expressed by Humboldt in his youth, that if mankind is to be enriched, to consolidate and perfect itself, [B]there must exist a &quot;variety of situations.&quot;  Within each nation and in the aggregate of nations there must be a diversity of circumstances, so that when one possibility fails others remain open. It is sheer madness to stake all Europe on one card, on a single type of man, on one identical &quot;situation.&quot; Europe's secret talent up to the present day has been to avoid this, and it is the consciousness of this secret that has shaped the speech, sometimes stammering to be sure, of the perpetual liberalism of Europe. This consciousness includes a recognition of the plurality of Europe as a positive value in its own right, not evil but good. I have gone to some length to clarify this point so as to avoid any misunderstanding of the idea of a European supernation set forth in this book.[/B]<br />
[...]<br />
Total politicalism, the absorption of everything and of the entire man by politics, is one and the same phenomenon as the revolt of the masses. The mass in revolt has lost all capacity for knowledge or devotion. It can contain nothing but politics, a raving, frenetic, exorbitant politics that claims to replace all knowledge, religion, wisdom-everything, in short, really qualified to occupy the center of the human mind. Politics drains men of solitude and intimacy, and preaching total politicalism is therefore one of the techniques of socialization.<br />
<br />
When someone asks us where we stand politically, or anticipating, with the usual impertinence of the time, ascribes us to one party or another, instead of answering we should cross-examine the inquirer: what does he think of man and nature and history? what is his understanding of society, the individual, collectivity, the state, custom, law? Politics hurries to put out the light so that all these cats will be gray. <br />
<br />
[...]<br />
Revolutions, so incontinent in their hypocritically generous haste to proclaim the rights of man, have always violated, trampled on, and broken man's most fundamental right, so fundamental that it may stand as the definition of his being: the right to continuity. <br />
[...]<br />
Man's real treasure is the treasure of his mistakes, piled up stone by stone through thousands of years. It is because of this that Nietzsche defined man as the being &quot;with the longest memory.&quot; [B]Breaking the continuity with the past, wanting to begin again, is a lowering of man and a plagiarism of the orangutan.[/B] It was a Frenchman, Dupont-White, who around 1860 had the courage to exclaim: &quot;Continuity is one of the rights of man; it is a homage of everything that distinguishes him from the beast.&quot;</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/74-excerpts-jose-ortega-y-gassets-unity-diversity-europe.html</guid>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[A Footnote on the "Mr.Loeb" in José Ortega y Gasset's "History as a System"]]></title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/70-footnote-mr-loeb-jose-ortega-y-gassets-history-system.html</link>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 May 2008 23:28:45 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[B][SIZE=2]From José Ortega y Gasset's "History as a System":[/SIZE][/B]

[quote][SIZE=2]
....
What has collapsed in it is the rhetoric, the trimmings of childish presumption, of irrational and arbitrary additions it gave rise to, what, many years ago, I styled "the terrorism of the laboratory." This is why ever since I began to write I have combated what I called scientific [I]Utopianism. [/I]Open, for example, [I]El terra de nuestro tiempo [/I]at the chapter entitled "The historic sense of Einstein's theory," written about 1921. There the following passage will be found:[/SIZE]
  
[SIZE=2][quote]It is incomprehensible that science, whose only pleasure lies in attaining to a true image of things, should nourish itself on illusions. I recall a detail whose influence on my thought was decisive. [B]Many years ago I was reading a lecture of the physiologist Loeb[/B] on tropism [a biological phenomenon indicating growth or turning movement of an organism in response to an environmental stimulus]. The tropism is a concept which has been invoked to describe and throw light on the law governing the elemental movements of the infusoria [microscopic sea organisms]. The concept serves, indifferently well and with corrections and additions, to help us understand some of these phenomena. [B]But at the close of this lecture Loeb adds: "The day will come when what we now call moral acts in man will be explained simply as tropisms." Such temerity perturbed me exceedingly, for it opened my eyes to many other judgments of modern science that are guilty, if less ostentatiously, of the same error[/B]. So then, I thought, a concept like the tropism, which is scarce capable of plumbing the secret of phenomena so simple as the antics of the infusoria, may at some vague future date suffice to explain phenomena as mysterious and complex as man's ethical acts! What sense is there here? Science has to solve its problems in the present, not transport us to the Greek kalends [a date which never comes]. If its present methods are insufficient to master now the enigmas of the universe, discretion would suggest that they be replaced by other and more effective ones. But the science [I]a [/I][I]la mode is [/I]full of problems which are left intact because they are incompatible with its methods. As if it was the former that were under obligation to subordinate themselves to the latter, and not the other way round! Science is full of anachronisms, of Greek kalends.
[/quote][/SIZE]
[SIZE=2]...[/SIZE]
[SIZE=2]From this idea of the Greek kalends all my philosophic thought has emanated. There in germ is my whole conception of life as the basic reality and of knowledge as an internal - and not an independent or Utopian function of life. Just as Einstein was then telling us that in physics it is necessary to elaborate concepts such as will make absolute motion impossible (absolute motion is immeasurable and before what cannot be measured physics is impotent), I considered it essential to elaborate a philosophy that should take its point of departure, its formal principle, from the exclusion of the Greek kalends. Because life is the opposite of these kalends. Life is haste and has urgent need to know what it is up against, and it is out of this urgency that truth must derive its method. [B]The idea of progress, placing truth in a vague tomorrow, has proved a dulling opiate to humanity.[/B] Truth is what is true now and not what remains to be discovered in an undetermined future. [B]Mr. Loeb - and his whole generation is with him - gives up his claim to a present truth of morality on the strength of the future attaining to a physics of morality:[/B] a curious way of existing at the expense of posterity while leaving one's own life shorn of foundations, of roots, of any profound implications in the scheme of things. The viciousness of this attitude is so radical that it appears already in the "provisional morality" of Descartes. And so it happens that the first blow directed against the superficial framework of our civilization, our economics, our morals, our politics, finds man possessed of no truths of his own, of no clear, firm position on anything of importance.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=2]
[/SIZE]
  [SIZE=2]The only thing he believed in was physical science, and when this received the urgent call to propound its truth on the most human problems, it did not know what to say. And suddenly Western man has received the impression of losing his footing, of finding himself without support, and has known a panic terror and believed himself to be sinking, making shipwreck in the void.[/SIZE]
  
  [SIZE=2]And yet, a measure of serenity is all that is needed for our feet once more to experience the delicious sensation of touching hard, solid mother earth, an element capable of sustaining man. As always, it is essential and sufficient-instead of giving way to panic and losing one's head, to convert into a source of support the very factor that had engendered the impression of an abyss. [B]Physical science can throw no clear light on the human element. Very well. This means simply that we must shake ourselves free, radically free, from the physical, the natural, approach to the human element.[/B] Let us instead accept this in all its spontaneity, just as we see it and come upon it. In other words, the collapse of physical reason leaves the way clear for vital, historical reason.[/SIZE]
....[/quote]Here is an excerpt from [I]Jews and the American Soul[/I], by Andrew R. Heinze.

Chapter 8 "The Spectre of the Mob" pg.176-180
[quote][FONT=Garamond]

....[/FONT]

  In light of the resistance that Watson's perspective would encounter from the Jewish thinkers who shared his interest in popularizing psychology, it is perhaps ironic that behaviorism was inspired by a Jewish scientist. [B]The ideal of social engineering by a corps of experts in human psychology - an ideal with chilling as well as liberating possibilities - originated with one of Watson's teachers, Jacques Loeb.[/B] When Watson depicted the human being as "nothing but an organic machine" whose behavior could be predicted and controlled by scientific experts, he echoed Loeb. [B]In his single-minded materialism, his belief that physiology explained all of life's processes, he followed Loeb's philosophy of science."[/B]
   
  Jacques Loeb (1859-1924) came from the German Rhineland. Originally named Isaak, he changed his name to Jacques as a young man, reflecting his father's Francophilia and his own desire to be a cosmopolitan who transcended the German nationalism of his day.  ....

His medical thesis, published in 1884, attacked the idea that there was a "metaphysiology" of the brain and insisted, instead, that every mental function could be explained in simple biological terms. ....

[B]He sought a general theory to explain the biological purposiveness of the animal mind."[/B]
   ....
  Loeb had initially studied philosophy at the University  of Berlin but quickly became disgusted at what he considered the inability of philosophers to penetrate to the fundamental problem of free will. Were people free to choose their actions? Mindful of that old philosophical concern, he turned to biology, believing that a close study of the mechanisms of animal behavior would yield answers that the "wordmongering" of philosophy would not. [B]Biology, Loeb concluded, proves that free will is an illusion because human beings, like other animals, respond almost mechanically to a world of physical forces, of which their own reflexes constituted an important part. Loeb did not find this worldview depressing. On the contrary, he realized that the lawfulness of animal behavior made it possible to reshape the quality of human life.[/B] 
... [B]
He forged the ideal of the scientist as an engineer rather than a mere observer of life processes. Fittingly, one of his students, Gregory Pincus, developed the birth control pill that freed women from one of biology's most stringent demands."[/B]
   
  The philosophy of science and life with which Loeb's name was most associated, the "mechanistic conception of life," was a direct response to theories of biological evolution that he considered dangerously metaphysical and potentially chauvinist. Loeb likened human reflexes and responses to the tropisms of plants. [B]His theory that humans, like other animals and like plants, are designed to respond to stimuli in predetermined ways "puts an end to the metaphysical ideas that all matter, and hence the whole animal world, possesses consciousness."[/B] 
...
   
  [B]Loeb's worries were not abstract; he remained keenly aware of the efforts of Christian colleagues to reconcile science with Christianity.[/B] 
...
 [B]As a German Jew Loeb especially fretted about the way German thinkers assumed the evolutionary superiority of European civilization. 
[/B]...
   
As a pioneer of biological engineering, Loeb saw science not as an activity whereby people discovered fixed properties of evolution but, instead, as a means of altering evolution, of changing the conditions of life itself. [B]His science steered entirely away from concerns about the "heritage" of human beings; those concerns, he knew, produced pernicious myths about race. The real excitement and the real challenge of biology, Loeb argued, lay in the possibility of restructuring life processes. That was the path to a rational and just world."[/B]
   
  As a Jewish atheist with socialist political views, Loeb retained an idealistic belief in principles of justice but did not believe that humans necessarily evolved toward a more humane social existence. 
...
 [B]Progress, then, was not inherent in human evolution. It was something that scientists might produce by bending the laws of human nature.[/B]
  [/quote]  [SIZE=2]
[/SIZE]
  [SIZE=2]
[/SIZE]
  [SIZE=2]

[/SIZE]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[B][SIZE=2]From José Ortega y Gasset's &quot;History as a System&quot;:[/SIZE][/B]<br />
<br />
[quote][SIZE=2]<br />
....<br />
What has collapsed in it is the rhetoric, the trimmings of childish presumption, of irrational and arbitrary additions it gave rise to, what, many years ago, I styled &quot;the terrorism of the laboratory.&quot; This is why ever since I began to write I have combated what I called scientific [I]Utopianism. [/I]Open, for example, [I]El terra de nuestro tiempo [/I]at the chapter entitled &quot;The historic sense of Einstein's theory,&quot; written about 1921. There the following passage will be found:[/SIZE]<br />
  <br />
[SIZE=2][quote]It is incomprehensible that science, whose only pleasure lies in attaining to a true image of things, should nourish itself on illusions. I recall a detail whose influence on my thought was decisive. [B]Many years ago I was reading a lecture of the physiologist Loeb[/B] on tropism [a biological phenomenon indicating growth or turning movement of an organism in response to an environmental stimulus]. The tropism is a concept which has been invoked to describe and throw light on the law governing the elemental movements of the infusoria [microscopic sea organisms]. The concept serves, indifferently well and with corrections and additions, to help us understand some of these phenomena. [B]But at the close of this lecture Loeb adds: &quot;The day will come when what we now call moral acts in man will be explained simply as tropisms.&quot; Such temerity perturbed me exceedingly, for it opened my eyes to many other judgments of modern science that are guilty, if less ostentatiously, of the same error[/B]. So then, I thought, a concept like the tropism, which is scarce capable of plumbing the secret of phenomena so simple as the antics of the infusoria, may at some vague future date suffice to explain phenomena as mysterious and complex as man's ethical acts! What sense is there here? Science has to solve its problems in the present, not transport us to the Greek kalends [a date which never comes]. If its present methods are insufficient to master now the enigmas of the universe, discretion would suggest that they be replaced by other and more effective ones. But the science [I]a [/I][I]la mode is [/I]full of problems which are left intact because they are incompatible with its methods. As if it was the former that were under obligation to subordinate themselves to the latter, and not the other way round! Science is full of anachronisms, of Greek kalends.<br />
[/quote][/SIZE]<br />
[SIZE=2]...[/SIZE]<br />
[SIZE=2]From this idea of the Greek kalends all my philosophic thought has emanated. There in germ is my whole conception of life as the basic reality and of knowledge as an internal - and not an independent or Utopian function of life. Just as Einstein was then telling us that in physics it is necessary to elaborate concepts such as will make absolute motion impossible (absolute motion is immeasurable and before what cannot be measured physics is impotent), I considered it essential to elaborate a philosophy that should take its point of departure, its formal principle, from the exclusion of the Greek kalends. Because life is the opposite of these kalends. Life is haste and has urgent need to know what it is up against, and it is out of this urgency that truth must derive its method. [B]The idea of progress, placing truth in a vague tomorrow, has proved a dulling opiate to humanity.[/B] Truth is what is true now and not what remains to be discovered in an undetermined future. [B]Mr. Loeb - and his whole generation is with him - gives up his claim to a present truth of morality on the strength of the future attaining to a physics of morality:[/B] a curious way of existing at the expense of posterity while leaving one's own life shorn of foundations, of roots, of any profound implications in the scheme of things. The viciousness of this attitude is so radical that it appears already in the &quot;provisional morality&quot; of Descartes. And so it happens that the first blow directed against the superficial framework of our civilization, our economics, our morals, our politics, finds man possessed of no truths of his own, of no clear, firm position on anything of importance.[/SIZE]<br />
[SIZE=2]<br />
[/SIZE]<br />
  [SIZE=2]The only thing he believed in was physical science, and when this received the urgent call to propound its truth on the most human problems, it did not know what to say. And suddenly Western man has received the impression of losing his footing, of finding himself without support, and has known a panic terror and believed himself to be sinking, making shipwreck in the void.[/SIZE]<br />
  <br />
  [SIZE=2]And yet, a measure of serenity is all that is needed for our feet once more to experience the delicious sensation of touching hard, solid mother earth, an element capable of sustaining man. As always, it is essential and sufficient-instead of giving way to panic and losing one's head, to convert into a source of support the very factor that had engendered the impression of an abyss. [B]Physical science can throw no clear light on the human element. Very well. This means simply that we must shake ourselves free, radically free, from the physical, the natural, approach to the human element.[/B] Let us instead accept this in all its spontaneity, just as we see it and come upon it. In other words, the collapse of physical reason leaves the way clear for vital, historical reason.[/SIZE]<br />
....[/quote]Here is an excerpt from [I]Jews and the American Soul[/I], by Andrew R. Heinze.<br />
<br />
Chapter 8 &quot;The Spectre of the Mob&quot; pg.176-180<br />
[quote][FONT=Garamond]<br />
<br />
....[/FONT]<br />
<br />
  In light of the resistance that Watson's perspective would encounter from the Jewish thinkers who shared his interest in popularizing psychology, it is perhaps ironic that behaviorism was inspired by a Jewish scientist. [B]The ideal of social engineering by a corps of experts in human psychology - an ideal with chilling as well as liberating possibilities - originated with one of Watson's teachers, Jacques Loeb.[/B] When Watson depicted the human being as &quot;nothing but an organic machine&quot; whose behavior could be predicted and controlled by scientific experts, he echoed Loeb. [B]In his single-minded materialism, his belief that physiology explained all of life's processes, he followed Loeb's philosophy of science.&quot;[/B]<br />
   <br />
  Jacques Loeb (1859-1924) came from the German Rhineland. Originally named Isaak, he changed his name to Jacques as a young man, reflecting his father's Francophilia and his own desire to be a cosmopolitan who transcended the German nationalism of his day.  ....<br />
<br />
His medical thesis, published in 1884, attacked the idea that there was a &quot;metaphysiology&quot; of the brain and insisted, instead, that every mental function could be explained in simple biological terms. ....<br />
<br />
[B]He sought a general theory to explain the biological purposiveness of the animal mind.&quot;[/B]<br />
   ....<br />
  Loeb had initially studied philosophy at the University  of Berlin but quickly became disgusted at what he considered the inability of philosophers to penetrate to the fundamental problem of free will. Were people free to choose their actions? Mindful of that old philosophical concern, he turned to biology, believing that a close study of the mechanisms of animal behavior would yield answers that the &quot;wordmongering&quot; of philosophy would not. [B]Biology, Loeb concluded, proves that free will is an illusion because human beings, like other animals, respond almost mechanically to a world of physical forces, of which their own reflexes constituted an important part. Loeb did not find this worldview depressing. On the contrary, he realized that the lawfulness of animal behavior made it possible to reshape the quality of human life.[/B] <br />
... [B]<br />
He forged the ideal of the scientist as an engineer rather than a mere observer of life processes. Fittingly, one of his students, Gregory Pincus, developed the birth control pill that freed women from one of biology's most stringent demands.&quot;[/B]<br />
   <br />
  The philosophy of science and life with which Loeb's name was most associated, the &quot;mechanistic conception of life,&quot; was a direct response to theories of biological evolution that he considered dangerously metaphysical and potentially chauvinist. Loeb likened human reflexes and responses to the tropisms of plants. [B]His theory that humans, like other animals and like plants, are designed to respond to stimuli in predetermined ways &quot;puts an end to the metaphysical ideas that all matter, and hence the whole animal world, possesses consciousness.&quot;[/B] <br />
...<br />
   <br />
  [B]Loeb's worries were not abstract; he remained keenly aware of the efforts of Christian colleagues to reconcile science with Christianity.[/B] <br />
...<br />
 [B]As a German Jew Loeb especially fretted about the way German thinkers assumed the evolutionary superiority of European civilization. <br />
[/B]...<br />
   <br />
As a pioneer of biological engineering, Loeb saw science not as an activity whereby people discovered fixed properties of evolution but, instead, as a means of altering evolution, of changing the conditions of life itself. [B]His science steered entirely away from concerns about the &quot;heritage&quot; of human beings; those concerns, he knew, produced pernicious myths about race. The real excitement and the real challenge of biology, Loeb argued, lay in the possibility of restructuring life processes. That was the path to a rational and just world.&quot;[/B]<br />
   <br />
  As a Jewish atheist with socialist political views, Loeb retained an idealistic belief in principles of justice but did not believe that humans necessarily evolved toward a more humane social existence. <br />
...<br />
 [B]Progress, then, was not inherent in human evolution. It was something that scientists might produce by bending the laws of human nature.[/B]<br />
  [/quote]  [SIZE=2]<br />
[/SIZE]<br />
  [SIZE=2]<br />
[/SIZE]<br />
  [SIZE=2]<br />
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[/SIZE]</div>

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			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
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			<title><![CDATA[From José Ortega y Gasset's  “Man The Technician” concerning the English Gentleman]]></title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/69-jose-ortega-y-gassets-man-technician-concerning-english-gentleman.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2008 18:55:01 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[(First published in English in 1940)

[...]

But enough of digressions. We were bent on contrasting the two situations of man that ensue from his aspiration to be a gentleman or a [I]bodhisattva. [/I]The difference is radical. It will become quite clear when we point out some characteristics of the gentleman. Concerning the gentleman we must first state that he is not the same as an aristocrat. No doubt, English aristocrats were the first to invent this mode of being, but they were actuated by those tendencies which have always distinguished the English noblemen from all other types of noblemen. While the others were hermetic as a class and likewise hermetic regarding the type of occupations they deigned to devote themselves to - war, politics, diplomacy, sport, agriculture on a large scale - since the sixteenth century the English aristocrat held his own in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions. As history from that time on has mainly consisted in activities of this sort he has been the only aristocrat to survive in full social efficiency. This made it possible for England to create in the beginning of the nineteenth century a prototype of existence which was to become exemplary throughout the world. Members of the middle class and the working class can, to a certain degree, be gentlemen. Nay more, whatever happens in a future which, alas, may be imminent there will remain as one of the miracles of history the fact that today even the humblest English workman is in his sphere a gentleman. Gentlemanliness does not imply nobility. The continental aristocrat of the last four centuries is, primarily, an heir-a man who has large means of living at his command without having had to earn them. The gentleman as such is not an heir. On the contrary, the supposition is that a man has to earn his living and to have an occupation, preferably a practical one-the gentleman is no intellectual-and it is precisely in his profession that he has to behave as a gentleman. Antipodes of the gentleman are the [I]gentilhomme [/I]of Versailles and the Prussian [I]Junker[/I].
  [CENTER][CENTER][FONT=&quot;]
VII THE GENTLEMAN TYPE-ITS TECHNICAL
REQUIREMENTS-THE GENTLEMAN
AND THE [/FONT][I][FONT=&quot;]HIDALGO

[/FONT][/I][/CENTER]
[/CENTER]
    But what does it mean to be a gentleman? Let us take a short cut and, exaggerating things, put it this way: a gentleman is a man who displays throughout his life, i. e., in every situation however serious or unpleasant, a type of behavior which customarily remains restricted to those brief moments when the pressures and responsibilities of life are shuffled off and man indulges in the diversion of a game. This again shows strikingly to what degree the human program of life can be extra-natural. For games and their rules are sheer invention in comparison with life as it comes from nature's own hands. The gentleman ideal inverts the terms within human life itself, proposing that a man should behave in his enforced existence of struggle with his environment as though he moved in the unreal and purely imaginative orbit of his games and sports.

  When people are in the mood to play we may assume that they feel comparatively safe regarding the elemental needs of life. Games are a luxury not to be indulged in before the lower zones of existence are well taken care of, and an abundance of means guarantees a life within an ample margin of serene tranquillity, unharassed by the stress and strain of penury which converts everything into a frightening problem. In this state of mind man delights in his own magnanimity and gratifies himself with playing fair. He will defend his cause but without ceasing to respect the other fellow's rights. He will not cheat, for cheating means to give up the attitude of play: it is "not cricket." The game, it is true, is an effort, but an effort which is at rest in itself, free from the uneasiness that hovers about every kind of compulsory work because such work must be accomplished at all costs.
   
  This explains the manners of the gentleman, his sense of justice, his veracity, his perfect self-control based on previous control of his surroundings, his clear awareness of his personal claims on others and theirs on him, viz., his duties. He would not think of using trickery. What is done must be done well, and that is all there is to it. English industrial products are known to be good and solid both in raw material and in workmanship. They are not made to be sold at any price. They are the opposite of trash. The English manufacturer has never condescended to conform to the taste and caprices of his customer as has the German. On the contrary, he calmly expects his customer to conform to his products. He does but little advertising which is always deceit, rhetoric, foul play. And the same in politics. No phrases, no farces, no demagogic inveiglement, no intolerance, but few laws; for the law, once it is written, turns into a reign of pure words which, since words cannot be fulfilled to the letter, necessarily results in falsification of the law and governmental dishonesty. A nation of gentlemen needs no constitution. Therefore England has fared very well without it. And so forth.
   
  The gentleman, in contrast to the [I]bodhisattva, [/I]wants to live intensely in this world and to be as much of an individual as he possibly can, centred in himself and filled with a sense of independence of everything else. In Paradise, where existence itself is a delightful game, the gentleman would be incongruous, the gentleman's concern being precisely to remain a good sport in the thick of rude reality. The principal element, the atmosphere, as it were, of the gentlemanly existence is a basic feeling of leisure derived from an ample control over the world. In stifling surroundings one cannot hope to breed gentlemen. This type of man, bent on converting existence into a game and a sport, is therefore very far from being an illusionist. He acts as he does just because he knows life to be hard, serious, and difficult. And just because he knows this he is anxious to secure control over circumstance-matter and man. That is how the British grew to be great engineers and great politicians.
   
  The desire of the gentleman to be an individual and to give to his mundane destiny the grace of a game made it necessary for him to live remote from people and things, even physically, and to ennoble the humblest functions of his body by attending to them with elaborate care. The details of personal cleanliness, the ceremony of dressing for dinner, the daily bath-after Roman times there were hardly any private baths in the Western world-are punctiliously observed. I apologize for mentioning that England gave us the w.c. A dyed-in-the-wool intellectual would never have thought of inventing it, for he despises his body. But the gentleman, as we have said, is no intellectual; and so he is concerned about decorum: clean body, clean soul.
   
  All this, of course, is based on wealth. The gentleman ideal both presupposed and produced large fortunes. Its virtues cannot unfold without an ample margin of economic power. As a matter of fact, the gentleman type reached its perfection only in the middle of the last century when England had become fabulously rich. The English worker can, in his way, be a gentleman because he earns more than the average member of the middle class in other countries.
   
  It would be of no small interest if someone with a good mind and a long intimate knowledge of the English situation were to study the present state of the system of vital norms which we have called the gentleman ideal. During the last twenty years economic circumstances in England have changed. She is much less rich than in the beginning of this century. Can one be poor and still be English? Can the characteristic English virtues survive in an atmosphere of scarcity?
   
  Be that as it may, it is not unfitting to think of an exemplary type of life that preserves the best qualities of the gentleman and yet is compatible with the impoverishment that inexorably threatens our planet. If we try to visualize this new figure, there will inevitably rise before our mind's eye as a term of comparison another human profile evolved in history, which in some of its features bears close resemblance to the portrait of the gentleman while differing from it in one respect: it thrives on the soil of poverty. I mean the Spanish [I]hidalgo[/I]. In contrast to the gentleman the [I]hidalgo[/I] does not work. He reduces his material necessities to a minimum and consequently has no use for technology. He lives in poverty, it is true, like those plants of the desert which have learned to grow without moisture. But it is also beyond question that he knows how to lend dignity to his wretched conditions. Dignity makes him the equal of his more fortunate brother, the gentleman.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>(First published in English in 1940)<br />
<br />
[...]<br />
<br />
But enough of digressions. We were bent on contrasting the two situations of man that ensue from his aspiration to be a gentleman or a [I]bodhisattva. [/I]The difference is radical. It will become quite clear when we point out some characteristics of the gentleman. Concerning the gentleman we must first state that he is not the same as an aristocrat. No doubt, English aristocrats were the first to invent this mode of being, but they were actuated by those tendencies which have always distinguished the English noblemen from all other types of noblemen. While the others were hermetic as a class and likewise hermetic regarding the type of occupations they deigned to devote themselves to - war, politics, diplomacy, sport, agriculture on a large scale - since the sixteenth century the English aristocrat held his own in commerce, industry, and the liberal professions. As history from that time on has mainly consisted in activities of this sort he has been the only aristocrat to survive in full social efficiency. This made it possible for England to create in the beginning of the nineteenth century a prototype of existence which was to become exemplary throughout the world. Members of the middle class and the working class can, to a certain degree, be gentlemen. Nay more, whatever happens in a future which, alas, may be imminent there will remain as one of the miracles of history the fact that today even the humblest English workman is in his sphere a gentleman. Gentlemanliness does not imply nobility. The continental aristocrat of the last four centuries is, primarily, an heir-a man who has large means of living at his command without having had to earn them. The gentleman as such is not an heir. On the contrary, the supposition is that a man has to earn his living and to have an occupation, preferably a practical one-the gentleman is no intellectual-and it is precisely in his profession that he has to behave as a gentleman. Antipodes of the gentleman are the [I]gentilhomme [/I]of Versailles and the Prussian [I]Junker[/I].<br />
  [CENTER][CENTER][FONT=&amp;quot;]<br />
VII THE GENTLEMAN TYPE-ITS TECHNICAL<br />
REQUIREMENTS-THE GENTLEMAN<br />
AND THE [/FONT][I][FONT=&amp;quot;]HIDALGO<br />
<br />
[/FONT][/I][/CENTER]<br />
[/CENTER]<br />
    But what does it mean to be a gentleman? Let us take a short cut and, exaggerating things, put it this way: a gentleman is a man who displays throughout his life, i. e., in every situation however serious or unpleasant, a type of behavior which customarily remains restricted to those brief moments when the pressures and responsibilities of life are shuffled off and man indulges in the diversion of a game. This again shows strikingly to what degree the human program of life can be extra-natural. For games and their rules are sheer invention in comparison with life as it comes from nature's own hands. The gentleman ideal inverts the terms within human life itself, proposing that a man should behave in his enforced existence of struggle with his environment as though he moved in the unreal and purely imaginative orbit of his games and sports.<br />
<br />
  When people are in the mood to play we may assume that they feel comparatively safe regarding the elemental needs of life. Games are a luxury not to be indulged in before the lower zones of existence are well taken care of, and an abundance of means guarantees a life within an ample margin of serene tranquillity, unharassed by the stress and strain of penury which converts everything into a frightening problem. In this state of mind man delights in his own magnanimity and gratifies himself with playing fair. He will defend his cause but without ceasing to respect the other fellow's rights. He will not cheat, for cheating means to give up the attitude of play: it is &quot;not cricket.&quot; The game, it is true, is an effort, but an effort which is at rest in itself, free from the uneasiness that hovers about every kind of compulsory work because such work must be accomplished at all costs.<br />
   <br />
  This explains the manners of the gentleman, his sense of justice, his veracity, his perfect self-control based on previous control of his surroundings, his clear awareness of his personal claims on others and theirs on him, viz., his duties. He would not think of using trickery. What is done must be done well, and that is all there is to it. English industrial products are known to be good and solid both in raw material and in workmanship. They are not made to be sold at any price. They are the opposite of trash. The English manufacturer has never condescended to conform to the taste and caprices of his customer as has the German. On the contrary, he calmly expects his customer to conform to his products. He does but little advertising which is always deceit, rhetoric, foul play. And the same in politics. No phrases, no farces, no demagogic inveiglement, no intolerance, but few laws; for the law, once it is written, turns into a reign of pure words which, since words cannot be fulfilled to the letter, necessarily results in falsification of the law and governmental dishonesty. A nation of gentlemen needs no constitution. Therefore England has fared very well without it. And so forth.<br />
   <br />
  The gentleman, in contrast to the [I]bodhisattva, [/I]wants to live intensely in this world and to be as much of an individual as he possibly can, centred in himself and filled with a sense of independence of everything else. In Paradise, where existence itself is a delightful game, the gentleman would be incongruous, the gentleman's concern being precisely to remain a good sport in the thick of rude reality. The principal element, the atmosphere, as it were, of the gentlemanly existence is a basic feeling of leisure derived from an ample control over the world. In stifling surroundings one cannot hope to breed gentlemen. This type of man, bent on converting existence into a game and a sport, is therefore very far from being an illusionist. He acts as he does just because he knows life to be hard, serious, and difficult. And just because he knows this he is anxious to secure control over circumstance-matter and man. That is how the British grew to be great engineers and great politicians.<br />
   <br />
  The desire of the gentleman to be an individual and to give to his mundane destiny the grace of a game made it necessary for him to live remote from people and things, even physically, and to ennoble the humblest functions of his body by attending to them with elaborate care. The details of personal cleanliness, the ceremony of dressing for dinner, the daily bath-after Roman times there were hardly any private baths in the Western world-are punctiliously observed. I apologize for mentioning that England gave us the w.c. A dyed-in-the-wool intellectual would never have thought of inventing it, for he despises his body. But the gentleman, as we have said, is no intellectual; and so he is concerned about decorum: clean body, clean soul.<br />
   <br />
  All this, of course, is based on wealth. The gentleman ideal both presupposed and produced large fortunes. Its virtues cannot unfold without an ample margin of economic power. As a matter of fact, the gentleman type reached its perfection only in the middle of the last century when England had become fabulously rich. The English worker can, in his way, be a gentleman because he earns more than the average member of the middle class in other countries.<br />
   <br />
  It would be of no small interest if someone with a good mind and a long intimate knowledge of the English situation were to study the present state of the system of vital norms which we have called the gentleman ideal. During the last twenty years economic circumstances in England have changed. She is much less rich than in the beginning of this century. Can one be poor and still be English? Can the characteristic English virtues survive in an atmosphere of scarcity?<br />
   <br />
  Be that as it may, it is not unfitting to think of an exemplary type of life that preserves the best qualities of the gentleman and yet is compatible with the impoverishment that inexorably threatens our planet. If we try to visualize this new figure, there will inevitably rise before our mind's eye as a term of comparison another human profile evolved in history, which in some of its features bears close resemblance to the portrait of the gentleman while differing from it in one respect: it thrives on the soil of poverty. I mean the Spanish [I]hidalgo[/I]. In contrast to the gentleman the [I]hidalgo[/I] does not work. He reduces his material necessities to a minimum and consequently has no use for technology. He lives in poverty, it is true, like those plants of the desert which have learned to grow without moisture. But it is also beyond question that he knows how to lend dignity to his wretched conditions. Dignity makes him the equal of his more fortunate brother, the gentleman.</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
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			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 1 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/16-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-1-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:52:54 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[B][I]Pg 23[/I][/B]

[B]   INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TO THE  THIRD  EDITION[/B]
  
 WHEN this book was first published fifteen years ago, the things it had to say were new to the English public. The Jewish question had never been properly discussed or understood. For most people it did not exist.
  
This was less true of the English-speaking world as a whole. In the United States, and particularly in the town of New York, the Jewish question was ever present and at times acute; but it had not reached either in scope or intensity the position it has achieved to-day. Being on a new subject and one, in England at least, so unfamiliar, it is remarkable that a new edition was called for in half a dozen years. The time lag between the day when matters of high public importance are first heard and the general discussion of them, even on a small scale, is set going, is usually a good deal longer than that; especially where, as in this case, the Press is concerned (through its dependence on Commercial advertisement) to say as little about it as possible.
  
Now that a third edition is called for, nine years later, we are in a different world so far as the Jewish question is concerned. Three things of first-class magnitude have changed everything and have aroused universal interest on the subject here discussed. That interest may increase until it breeds something much graver than mere debate.
  [B][I]
   Pg 24[/I][/B]
   
These three things which have of late accentuated the Jewish question are, first, the advance of the European Revolution by the recent great and definite stage it has taken since it was launched with the enormous massacres in Russia twenty years ago. The Revolution has obtained power in Spain, holds nearly half that country and is there fighting desperately to extend its power. As continental writers have recently put it, “The conflagration has now caught on at both ends of Europe.” Moscow is in power at Valencia, at Barcelona and (though precariously) at Madrid.
  
The second thing is the violent reaction against the European Revolution of the government of Berlin, with the consequent exile and persecution of Jews throughout the German Reich. It is now over four years since this completely new departure in European politics began and there has been time to appreciate the first of its effects.
  
 The third thing is the maturing  of the Zionist experiment in Palestine.
  
This last is not of sudden or recent appearance like the first two. The Zionist experiment has been passing through gradual growth for many years. It has been present in the minds of men ever since the Great War, and the idea behind it has been present for a life-time. What is of actual and immediate importance therein is not the idea, still less the name, but the high stage of development which it has reached. For twenty years, ever since the Balfour Declaration) was first made, the policy of the Zionists has been in action. For fifteen or sixteen years it has consolidated and taken root. But it was not until the new Prussian policy, attacking the Jewish race as a whole, was launched that Zionism entered what may be called “the acute phase,” and it was not till the Arab revolt of 1935-6 that the West in general and England in particular began to understand how serious the business was.

  
[B]    Pg 25[/B]
   
 These three things taken together open a new chapter in the discussion of that great problem with which the future will be necessarily occupied: [I]the problem of settling the Jewish  question in justice and peace.[/I]
  
If that problem is not so solved the fault will be ours, it will not be that of the Jews. That it can be solved and permanently solved in only one fashion, is the thesis of this book. That there is a new development through the three things here set down, is now so clear to everybody that we can grasp the practical points of future policy more firmly and in more detail.
  
The cry “I told you so” is futile, but the drawing of lessons from experience is the very opposite of futility, it is the most valuable form of constructive political thought. If you warn a man who cannot read, that a board marked “danger” on a frozen pond means thin ice, and that its neighbourhood should be avoided, then, if the poor fellow falls through, to say “I told you so” when he is dragged out dripping to the bank, leads nowhere, except to his exasperation and to the satisfaction of one’s own vanity. But if, after the event, you can convince him by this experience that these six odd marks which he did not understand and neglected — D, A, N, G, E, R — means “look out! Thin Ice!” then you have done something constructive. If ever the cry, “I told you so” was well founded, it was so founded in the case of this book, but the book will do no good unless its argument is understood.
  
[I][B]    Pg 26[/B][/I]
   
 The peculiar and universal danger of Communism working from Moscow, its character and its intensity, has been lit up under the fierce glare of the fires consuming shrines and churches throughout Spain. It has been emphasized by the murder of religion in as much of that unhappy country as was seized by the revolutionaries.
  
Jews as such are not Communists, but the modern Communist movement was inspired and is directed by Jews. That is why the term “Jewish Communism” is heard everywhere in conversation, though not in the Press; the Revolution now advancing in Europe is a part of the Jewish problem.
  
My original statement that it would prove impossible to prolong the silly pretence that no Jewish question exists, and that ignoring it would lead to an explosion at some point, has been amply illustrated in the case of Germany.
  
The judgement that the Zionist experiment must at last prove unstable and would clamour for readjustment has become equally plain.
  
In each of these typical fields a new departure has begun and a new stage of development has been reached in a struggle which will soon preoccupy the whole world. No limit has as yet been set to the progress made by the Revolution, by the German persecution of the Jews, or by the reaction against Zionism; each of the three curves is still rising, but we are already now, in 1937, at a point on each of the three curves where their formulae call be set, down and their probable future course plotted out: the immediate past has, by this time, afforded enough evidence for such conclusions.
  
[B]    Pg 27[/B]
   
 I therefore take each of these three main forms of what is at root the same problem and examine, them separately in their order:
  
 First, the nature and progress  of the Revolution at work throughout our culture and inspired by Jewish  Communism.
  
 Next, the active opposition to  Jewish power, the “counter-offencive” as they call it, which has been launched  by Berlin.
  
 Lastly,  the business of Palestine.
  
The nature of the conflict in Spain and how and why it is a branch of that general revolutionary movement called Jewish Communism must first be appreciated.
  
 The original revolution in  Moscow set out to destroy Capitalism.
  
The reasons which made that task appeal to the Jewish temperament in general and to the Russian Jews in particular have been set out in this book and need no repetition. The reasons that made Spain their next field of action, after their attempt to work through Central Europe had broken down, do need explanation because they are thoroughly misunderstood. Spain is a long way from Russia; the Spanish temperament in all its forms differs more from the Russian temperament than any other in Christendom. The Spaniard — Castilian, Andalusian, Galician, even Catalonian — is intensely personal. The theory or philosophy of Communism could never be accepted by the mass of the Spanish people as it might be by the mass of the Russian people. The positive side of Jewish Communism as expressed by Mordecai himself (Marx) and by all the other exponents of it, Jew and Gentile, is their insistence on the control of the means of production, distribution and exchange, by officials of the community — which turn out in practise to be in large proportion Jewish. The exploitation of the poor by the rich is thus destroyed and on the supposition that the officials of the community will be full of justice and charity every one of the community will receive his due share of the produce proceeding from the State machine.

 [B][I]
  Pg 28[/I][/B]
   
 Everyone will also be a slave of the State; but as the proletarian worker under Capitalism is almost a slave already, he gains by the change. His life under Communism is even more controlled by the will of other men than under Capitalism, but he is free from the anxiety of unemployment and (in theory at least) entitled to the full results of his labour.
  
With that positive side of Communism, I say, the Spaniard had no sympathy whatever. You can find a few real communists up and down Spain, but they are for the most part intellectuals of the common middle-class type which you may find everywhere: academic theorizers at the best and adventurers at the worst. The new Communism, however, proceeding from Moscow had another side, quite different from the positive one. This other side may by courtesy be called the negative side, for it did not directly point towards the establishment of Communism. But it certainly had highly positive characteristics of its own.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[B][I]Pg 23[/I][/B]<br />
<br />
[B]   INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TO THE  THIRD  EDITION[/B]<br />
  <br />
 WHEN this book was first published fifteen years ago, the things it had to say were new to the English public. The Jewish question had never been properly discussed or understood. For most people it did not exist.<br />
  <br />
This was less true of the English-speaking world as a whole. In the United States, and particularly in the town of New York, the Jewish question was ever present and at times acute; but it had not reached either in scope or intensity the position it has achieved to-day. Being on a new subject and one, in England at least, so unfamiliar, it is remarkable that a new edition was called for in half a dozen years. The time lag between the day when matters of high public importance are first heard and the general discussion of them, even on a small scale, is set going, is usually a good deal longer than that; especially where, as in this case, the Press is concerned (through its dependence on Commercial advertisement) to say as little about it as possible.<br />
  <br />
Now that a third edition is called for, nine years later, we are in a different world so far as the Jewish question is concerned. Three things of first-class magnitude have changed everything and have aroused universal interest on the subject here discussed. That interest may increase until it breeds something much graver than mere debate.<br />
  [B][I]<br />
   Pg 24[/I][/B]<br />
   <br />
These three things which have of late accentuated the Jewish question are, first, the advance of the European Revolution by the recent great and definite stage it has taken since it was launched with the enormous massacres in Russia twenty years ago. The Revolution has obtained power in Spain, holds nearly half that country and is there fighting desperately to extend its power. As continental writers have recently put it, “The conflagration has now caught on at both ends of Europe.” Moscow is in power at Valencia, at Barcelona and (though precariously) at Madrid.<br />
  <br />
The second thing is the violent reaction against the European Revolution of the government of Berlin, with the consequent exile and persecution of Jews throughout the German Reich. It is now over four years since this completely new departure in European politics began and there has been time to appreciate the first of its effects.<br />
  <br />
 The third thing is the maturing  of the Zionist experiment in Palestine.<br />
  <br />
This last is not of sudden or recent appearance like the first two. The Zionist experiment has been passing through gradual growth for many years. It has been present in the minds of men ever since the Great War, and the idea behind it has been present for a life-time. What is of actual and immediate importance therein is not the idea, still less the name, but the high stage of development which it has reached. For twenty years, ever since the Balfour Declaration) was first made, the policy of the Zionists has been in action. For fifteen or sixteen years it has consolidated and taken root. But it was not until the new Prussian policy, attacking the Jewish race as a whole, was launched that Zionism entered what may be called “the acute phase,” and it was not till the Arab revolt of 1935-6 that the West in general and England in particular began to understand how serious the business was.<br />
<br />
  <br />
[B]    Pg 25[/B]<br />
   <br />
 These three things taken together open a new chapter in the discussion of that great problem with which the future will be necessarily occupied: [I]the problem of settling the Jewish  question in justice and peace.[/I]<br />
  <br />
If that problem is not so solved the fault will be ours, it will not be that of the Jews. That it can be solved and permanently solved in only one fashion, is the thesis of this book. That there is a new development through the three things here set down, is now so clear to everybody that we can grasp the practical points of future policy more firmly and in more detail.<br />
  <br />
The cry “I told you so” is futile, but the drawing of lessons from experience is the very opposite of futility, it is the most valuable form of constructive political thought. If you warn a man who cannot read, that a board marked “danger” on a frozen pond means thin ice, and that its neighbourhood should be avoided, then, if the poor fellow falls through, to say “I told you so” when he is dragged out dripping to the bank, leads nowhere, except to his exasperation and to the satisfaction of one’s own vanity. But if, after the event, you can convince him by this experience that these six odd marks which he did not understand and neglected — D, A, N, G, E, R — means “look out! Thin Ice!” then you have done something constructive. If ever the cry, “I told you so” was well founded, it was so founded in the case of this book, but the book will do no good unless its argument is understood.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 26[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 The peculiar and universal danger of Communism working from Moscow, its character and its intensity, has been lit up under the fierce glare of the fires consuming shrines and churches throughout Spain. It has been emphasized by the murder of religion in as much of that unhappy country as was seized by the revolutionaries.<br />
  <br />
Jews as such are not Communists, but the modern Communist movement was inspired and is directed by Jews. That is why the term “Jewish Communism” is heard everywhere in conversation, though not in the Press; the Revolution now advancing in Europe is a part of the Jewish problem.<br />
  <br />
My original statement that it would prove impossible to prolong the silly pretence that no Jewish question exists, and that ignoring it would lead to an explosion at some point, has been amply illustrated in the case of Germany.<br />
  <br />
The judgement that the Zionist experiment must at last prove unstable and would clamour for readjustment has become equally plain.<br />
  <br />
In each of these typical fields a new departure has begun and a new stage of development has been reached in a struggle which will soon preoccupy the whole world. No limit has as yet been set to the progress made by the Revolution, by the German persecution of the Jews, or by the reaction against Zionism; each of the three curves is still rising, but we are already now, in 1937, at a point on each of the three curves where their formulae call be set, down and their probable future course plotted out: the immediate past has, by this time, afforded enough evidence for such conclusions.<br />
  <br />
[B]    Pg 27[/B]<br />
   <br />
 I therefore take each of these three main forms of what is at root the same problem and examine, them separately in their order:<br />
  <br />
 First, the nature and progress  of the Revolution at work throughout our culture and inspired by Jewish  Communism.<br />
  <br />
 Next, the active opposition to  Jewish power, the “counter-offencive” as they call it, which has been launched  by Berlin.<br />
  <br />
 Lastly,  the business of Palestine.<br />
  <br />
The nature of the conflict in Spain and how and why it is a branch of that general revolutionary movement called Jewish Communism must first be appreciated.<br />
  <br />
 The original revolution in  Moscow set out to destroy Capitalism.<br />
  <br />
The reasons which made that task appeal to the Jewish temperament in general and to the Russian Jews in particular have been set out in this book and need no repetition. The reasons that made Spain their next field of action, after their attempt to work through Central Europe had broken down, do need explanation because they are thoroughly misunderstood. Spain is a long way from Russia; the Spanish temperament in all its forms differs more from the Russian temperament than any other in Christendom. The Spaniard — Castilian, Andalusian, Galician, even Catalonian — is intensely personal. The theory or philosophy of Communism could never be accepted by the mass of the Spanish people as it might be by the mass of the Russian people. The positive side of Jewish Communism as expressed by Mordecai himself (Marx) and by all the other exponents of it, Jew and Gentile, is their insistence on the control of the means of production, distribution and exchange, by officials of the community — which turn out in practise to be in large proportion Jewish. The exploitation of the poor by the rich is thus destroyed and on the supposition that the officials of the community will be full of justice and charity every one of the community will receive his due share of the produce proceeding from the State machine.<br />
<br />
 [B][I]<br />
  Pg 28[/I][/B]<br />
   <br />
 Everyone will also be a slave of the State; but as the proletarian worker under Capitalism is almost a slave already, he gains by the change. His life under Communism is even more controlled by the will of other men than under Capitalism, but he is free from the anxiety of unemployment and (in theory at least) entitled to the full results of his labour.<br />
  <br />
With that positive side of Communism, I say, the Spaniard had no sympathy whatever. You can find a few real communists up and down Spain, but they are for the most part intellectuals of the common middle-class type which you may find everywhere: academic theorizers at the best and adventurers at the worst. The new Communism, however, proceeding from Moscow had another side, quite different from the positive one. This other side may by courtesy be called the negative side, for it did not directly point towards the establishment of Communism. But it certainly had highly positive characteristics of its own.</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/16-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-1-6.html</guid>
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		<item>
			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 2 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/15-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-2-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:52:12 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[I][B]Pg 29[/B][/I]
   
 It insisted on “liquidating” those who had inherited or acquired the habit of control under the old Christian society: not only those who were themselves in possession of machinery and lands and reserves of necessaries — not only capitalists, that is — but all educated men who, though themselves — proletarian and possessed of nothing, sympathized with the traditions of Christian society; for these traditions include the right to property and the independence of the family. It was necessary to “liquidate” these people, and further to “liquidate” more particularly and more thoroughly those who passed on the tradition of the Christian religion. The simplest form of “liquidation” was murder, and under the inspiration of Communism we saw murder on a scale hitherto unknown even during the invasions of the pagan Mongols. Priests by tens of thousands, the owners of wealth in every kind, the adherents to old traditions in every form, were massacred wherever the new fury could strike. 
  
Moreover, Communism declared itself not only atheist but materialist in its atheism. It declared quite accurately and logically that its prime enemy was the Christian religion.
  
[I][B]    Pg 30[/B][/I]
   
 Now Spain was a country in which the exploitation of the poor by the rich, such as takes place under Capitalism, was more intensely resented by the victims of that system than anywhere else in Europe. The mass of Spain is agricultural, and much of the agricultural population had either security of tenure or actual possession of land sufficient to establish a just and contented society. But there were great patches which were exceptional. In the South, that is in Andalusia, the medieval arrangements of village life from which all the better traditions of Christendom descend were not present. The land reconquered from the Moors at the end of the Christian advance against them during the last century of the Middle Ages was confiscated to the Crowns of the conquerors, as was the universal custom with land redeemed from Pagan or Mahommedan invaders; but it was not redistributed to the peasantry. It was given in huge estates to great nobles and other favourites. The actual tillers of the soil remained amongst the poorest in Europe. In Andalusia therefore there was a widespread feeling of popular enmity against the wealthier classes. But that had little to do with the opportunity which other parts of Spanish society offered to revolutionary propaganda. The core of that opportunity was the intense feeling of the Spanish proletariat in the large towns, especially where these towns had been industrialized. Nowhere was it felt more violently than in Barcelona. Anyone who has mixed with the people of that port, and has seen the workers in its factories during the last thirty years, can testify to the intensity of the rising popular anger against industrial conditions. Those who were ready to go to all lengths in order to end those conditions by violence were a minority, and not a large minority, but they were exceedingly courageous, thoroughly determined, and inspired by the fullest hate. They were naturally to be found mainly among the younger men of the industrial proletariat, but they had sympathizers outside that class.

 
[B][I]   Pg 31[/I][/B]
   
 Meanwhile, there was a hatred of the Church as, violent as, or more violent than, the hatred of the rich and of the system whereby the rich were supported. This hatred of the Church was not due, as foreigners have ignorantly and even stupidly supposed, to the wealth of the Church: the Spanish parish clergy were among the poorest in Europe, and anyone who will go carefully over the list of those known to have been murdered will satisfy himself that envy of wealth had nothing to do with the crimes. Half the priests of Spain have been savagely put to death by the revolutionaries, and very few of them could have known from one day to another where to find &#8356;10. Humble village priests, sprung from the people, indistinguishable in manners and speech from the peasants around them and less endowed with goods than any other class in the country, were the specially chosen victims.
  
Here again it was a minority, as might be expected, that committed such shocking crimes. The bulk of the population, even in great towns, were churchgoing Catholics. This was manifest in Barcelona, though Barcelona was the very focus of the revolution. But the Church was associated in the minds of the revolutionaries with the best of all the traditions they were determined to destroy.
  
[I][B]    Pg 32[/B][/I]
   
 At this point let it be carefully noted and fixed in the reader’s mind that the Spanish conflict is essentially a religious war. It does not call itself such. The superficial foreign observer, especially if he be from a country where Catholicism is virtually unknown to the mass of men, may well think the other elements in the struggle to be of greater importance, and particularly the struggle between Capital and Labour. But in all its manifestations of active hatred, especially its organizing of murder, Communism in Spain since the outbreak of the revolution has been specially and particularly anti-Christian.
  
In that part of Spanish territory still in the hands of the revolutionaries it has been impossible to practise religion, or to teach religion to the young. What is more, implements and symbols of religion were systematically destroyed wholesale because the Revolutionaries judged, quite rightly, that symbols are a support to Religion. They are also proofs of its presence. In a great many cases the possession of a crucifix or a rosary was a death-warrant.
  
When the organized reaction against this outburst of anarchy and murder arose under the conduct of General Franco, it seemed at first as though Madrid wherein the gold of the country was amassed — particularly in the Bank of Spain — would be seized by the insurgents. Madrid was saved from capture by something which thenceforward dominated the situation — foreign intervention. The Communist Government of Russia began to pour in munitions of war through the eastern ports which were under the control of revolutionary bodies, principally composed of young men and most of them Anarchists. With the Anarchists, Moscow Communism was not in great sympathy. They would be a disturbing factor. But anything was thought by Moscow worthy of support which helped to destroy Christian Spain.
  
[I][B]    Pg 33[/B][/I]
   
 The young revolutionaries, both the comparatively small body within Madrid itself and the much larger bodies from the eastern seaboard, were enrolled as militia, so were the men let loose from the gaols, and almost anyone who cared to join for such pay as the revolutionary government could offer.
  
The courage of these irregular troops was very fine but their lack of discipline was hopeless, and the insurgent aircraft could drive the militiamen out of their badly made trenches almost at will. The advance on Madrid from the South was so rapid that the centre of the town would certainly have been reached in the first continuous movement had it not been necessary to rescue the Army cadets who were holding out against the revolutionaries at Toledo, in the military school of that town, which was also the old castle, the Alcazar. This deflection from Franco’s main purpose gave the revolutionary government time to bring up tanks — not of the first quality, but sufficient for the purpose and provided by Moscow. The advance was checked and the penetration of the town of Madrid never got beyond the outskirts.
  
Thence onwards masses of munitionment and men began to reach the revolutionary side in all manner of ways. The revolutionaries having seized the gold of the country — about 130 millions (probably more counting private sources) — they spent it wholesale, buying up out-of-works in the Southern French towns and elsewhere. They also bought up at a very high price, for it was risky work, pilots and machines for air fighting. Meanwhile, the French Government was secretly conniving at the passage of French aeroplanes over the Pyrenees.
  
[I][B]    Pg 34[/B][/I]
   
 Franco and his insurgents were also receiving reinforcements; not of course on the same scale as their opponents, and this for two reasons. First, because it was more difficult to reach them with the French Government hostile to the insurgent cause and with only one port at their disposal, that of Cadiz; secondly, because they had been better equipped at the beginning of their movement than had the ramshackle and ill-organized revolutionary herd calling itself “the Government forces” (often known in this country as “constitutional “— the most comic epithet which under the circumstances could have been applied).
  
Soon a certain number of German experts, especially expert organizers of flying work and a certain number of German pilots and machines, and another contingent of Italian engineers and machines appeared on the insurgent side. The numbers thus contributed have never been accurately ascertained. They were probably more than 8,000 men and less than 10,000, so far as ground work was concerned: they were all volunteers, but their volunteering was winked at by the authorities of the countries from which they came. On the revolutionary side far larger numbers of hired mercenaries but also young foreign revolutionaries, filled with a genuine enthusiasm for the Anarchist or Communist cause, as the case might be, came flooding into Eastern Spain, organized their International Brigade, and soon became the best disciplined and (for a long time) the only serious fighting force which Franco had to meet.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[I][B]Pg 29[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 It insisted on “liquidating” those who had inherited or acquired the habit of control under the old Christian society: not only those who were themselves in possession of machinery and lands and reserves of necessaries — not only capitalists, that is — but all educated men who, though themselves — proletarian and possessed of nothing, sympathized with the traditions of Christian society; for these traditions include the right to property and the independence of the family. It was necessary to “liquidate” these people, and further to “liquidate” more particularly and more thoroughly those who passed on the tradition of the Christian religion. The simplest form of “liquidation” was murder, and under the inspiration of Communism we saw murder on a scale hitherto unknown even during the invasions of the pagan Mongols. Priests by tens of thousands, the owners of wealth in every kind, the adherents to old traditions in every form, were massacred wherever the new fury could strike. <br />
  <br />
Moreover, Communism declared itself not only atheist but materialist in its atheism. It declared quite accurately and logically that its prime enemy was the Christian religion.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 30[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Now Spain was a country in which the exploitation of the poor by the rich, such as takes place under Capitalism, was more intensely resented by the victims of that system than anywhere else in Europe. The mass of Spain is agricultural, and much of the agricultural population had either security of tenure or actual possession of land sufficient to establish a just and contented society. But there were great patches which were exceptional. In the South, that is in Andalusia, the medieval arrangements of village life from which all the better traditions of Christendom descend were not present. The land reconquered from the Moors at the end of the Christian advance against them during the last century of the Middle Ages was confiscated to the Crowns of the conquerors, as was the universal custom with land redeemed from Pagan or Mahommedan invaders; but it was not redistributed to the peasantry. It was given in huge estates to great nobles and other favourites. The actual tillers of the soil remained amongst the poorest in Europe. In Andalusia therefore there was a widespread feeling of popular enmity against the wealthier classes. But that had little to do with the opportunity which other parts of Spanish society offered to revolutionary propaganda. The core of that opportunity was the intense feeling of the Spanish proletariat in the large towns, especially where these towns had been industrialized. Nowhere was it felt more violently than in Barcelona. Anyone who has mixed with the people of that port, and has seen the workers in its factories during the last thirty years, can testify to the intensity of the rising popular anger against industrial conditions. Those who were ready to go to all lengths in order to end those conditions by violence were a minority, and not a large minority, but they were exceedingly courageous, thoroughly determined, and inspired by the fullest hate. They were naturally to be found mainly among the younger men of the industrial proletariat, but they had sympathizers outside that class.<br />
<br />
 <br />
[B][I]   Pg 31[/I][/B]<br />
   <br />
 Meanwhile, there was a hatred of the Church as, violent as, or more violent than, the hatred of the rich and of the system whereby the rich were supported. This hatred of the Church was not due, as foreigners have ignorantly and even stupidly supposed, to the wealth of the Church: the Spanish parish clergy were among the poorest in Europe, and anyone who will go carefully over the list of those known to have been murdered will satisfy himself that envy of wealth had nothing to do with the crimes. Half the priests of Spain have been savagely put to death by the revolutionaries, and very few of them could have known from one day to another where to find &#8356;10. Humble village priests, sprung from the people, indistinguishable in manners and speech from the peasants around them and less endowed with goods than any other class in the country, were the specially chosen victims.<br />
  <br />
Here again it was a minority, as might be expected, that committed such shocking crimes. The bulk of the population, even in great towns, were churchgoing Catholics. This was manifest in Barcelona, though Barcelona was the very focus of the revolution. But the Church was associated in the minds of the revolutionaries with the best of all the traditions they were determined to destroy.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 32[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 At this point let it be carefully noted and fixed in the reader’s mind that the Spanish conflict is essentially a religious war. It does not call itself such. The superficial foreign observer, especially if he be from a country where Catholicism is virtually unknown to the mass of men, may well think the other elements in the struggle to be of greater importance, and particularly the struggle between Capital and Labour. But in all its manifestations of active hatred, especially its organizing of murder, Communism in Spain since the outbreak of the revolution has been specially and particularly anti-Christian.<br />
  <br />
In that part of Spanish territory still in the hands of the revolutionaries it has been impossible to practise religion, or to teach religion to the young. What is more, implements and symbols of religion were systematically destroyed wholesale because the Revolutionaries judged, quite rightly, that symbols are a support to Religion. They are also proofs of its presence. In a great many cases the possession of a crucifix or a rosary was a death-warrant.<br />
  <br />
When the organized reaction against this outburst of anarchy and murder arose under the conduct of General Franco, it seemed at first as though Madrid wherein the gold of the country was amassed — particularly in the Bank of Spain — would be seized by the insurgents. Madrid was saved from capture by something which thenceforward dominated the situation — foreign intervention. The Communist Government of Russia began to pour in munitions of war through the eastern ports which were under the control of revolutionary bodies, principally composed of young men and most of them Anarchists. With the Anarchists, Moscow Communism was not in great sympathy. They would be a disturbing factor. But anything was thought by Moscow worthy of support which helped to destroy Christian Spain.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 33[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 The young revolutionaries, both the comparatively small body within Madrid itself and the much larger bodies from the eastern seaboard, were enrolled as militia, so were the men let loose from the gaols, and almost anyone who cared to join for such pay as the revolutionary government could offer.<br />
  <br />
The courage of these irregular troops was very fine but their lack of discipline was hopeless, and the insurgent aircraft could drive the militiamen out of their badly made trenches almost at will. The advance on Madrid from the South was so rapid that the centre of the town would certainly have been reached in the first continuous movement had it not been necessary to rescue the Army cadets who were holding out against the revolutionaries at Toledo, in the military school of that town, which was also the old castle, the Alcazar. This deflection from Franco’s main purpose gave the revolutionary government time to bring up tanks — not of the first quality, but sufficient for the purpose and provided by Moscow. The advance was checked and the penetration of the town of Madrid never got beyond the outskirts.<br />
  <br />
Thence onwards masses of munitionment and men began to reach the revolutionary side in all manner of ways. The revolutionaries having seized the gold of the country — about 130 millions (probably more counting private sources) — they spent it wholesale, buying up out-of-works in the Southern French towns and elsewhere. They also bought up at a very high price, for it was risky work, pilots and machines for air fighting. Meanwhile, the French Government was secretly conniving at the passage of French aeroplanes over the Pyrenees.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 34[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Franco and his insurgents were also receiving reinforcements; not of course on the same scale as their opponents, and this for two reasons. First, because it was more difficult to reach them with the French Government hostile to the insurgent cause and with only one port at their disposal, that of Cadiz; secondly, because they had been better equipped at the beginning of their movement than had the ramshackle and ill-organized revolutionary herd calling itself “the Government forces” (often known in this country as “constitutional “— the most comic epithet which under the circumstances could have been applied).<br />
  <br />
Soon a certain number of German experts, especially expert organizers of flying work and a certain number of German pilots and machines, and another contingent of Italian engineers and machines appeared on the insurgent side. The numbers thus contributed have never been accurately ascertained. They were probably more than 8,000 men and less than 10,000, so far as ground work was concerned: they were all volunteers, but their volunteering was winked at by the authorities of the countries from which they came. On the revolutionary side far larger numbers of hired mercenaries but also young foreign revolutionaries, filled with a genuine enthusiasm for the Anarchist or Communist cause, as the case might be, came flooding into Eastern Spain, organized their International Brigade, and soon became the best disciplined and (for a long time) the only serious fighting force which Franco had to meet.</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/15-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-2-6.html</guid>
		</item>
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			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 3 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/11-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-3-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:36:53 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[I][B]Pg 35[/B][/I]
   
 Transformed thus during the  last few months, this condition of affairs has, to use a metaphor taken from the  Great War, “crystallized”. Reinforcements in men and material continue to reach  both sides, but the revolutionary side is more constantly supplied than the  other. On the other hand, that half of the Spanish navy which joined the  revolutionaries became incompetent through the murder of its officers, and the  other half which joined the nationalists or insurgent anti-revolutionaries could  have some effect, though not a very great one, in checking the support of the  Reds from outside.
  
 We are now, after the first  completed year of the war, in the following situation. The port of Bilbao and  its iron supplies (which had been seized by the revolutionaries, aided by a  minority of the Basques) has been captured after prolonged efforts by Franco and  through it he can receive supplies.  Malaga also has been restored to normal  government and the revolutionaries who had seized the town have been driven  out.  For some months the Great Powers have played insincerely at confining the  conflict to Spain and at preventing foreign intervention.  But their motives are  all at cross purposes and therefore no serious plan has been carried out. The  obvious policy for England is to keep Spain as weak as possible and to prevent  the highly centralized and disciplined new Italian Power from establishing  itself further in the Western Mediterranean.  England is therefore interested in  two main points of policy — preventing the outbreak of a European war which  would be fatal to her, and keeping Spain weak and divided as long as possible.   For Spain to be reunited under a strong government such as Franco proposes,  would be a grave menace to English power in the Mediterranean.  For Italian  influence to dominate in Spain, and particularly in the Balearics, would be even  worse for this country.
  
[I][B]    Pg 36[/B][/I]
   
 The Government at Berlin is  sincerely occupied with fighting a European revolution. It has no local purpose  to serve but it sympathizes with the anti-revolutionary Italian Government in  all its aims.
  
 The Portuguese coast, which is  of the highest value for supplies to Franco, is under the efficient  administration of a strong, centralized government after the Italian model,  presided over by a character worthy of his task, utterly indifferent to private  gain or any personal advantage but dominatingly anti-revolutionary.
  
 The French situation is  divided, and the division is almost as comic in its irony as the results may be  tragic in their effect. The major part of the professional politicians (who are  the curse of modern France and have brought her to her present weakness) are on  the revolutionary side, and it is they who, so far as they can and dare, supply  the new aircraft which is the chief weapon of the Reds. The motive of these  politicians in this, as in everything they do, is personal. The support of the  small Communist minority in France (one-sixth of the voting is nominally  Communist and perhaps one-twelfth sincerely so) is necessary to keep the  politicians in the saddle. The intensely anti-Catholic organization of the  Radical party and the less violent but better disciplined Socialist party are on  the same side as the Communists. These between them constitute that “popular  front” in France which was organized from Moscow some months ago.
  
[I][B]    Pg 37[/B][/I]
   
 This meaningless and silly  phrase “popular front “ has caught on with the wire-pullers of political  committees, but corresponds in no way to the nation. The French nation as a  whole is determined above all things to prevent the war spreading. On the other  hand, it is suspicious of any increase of German power and has an hereditary  reaction against despotic government. It is to be remarked that the directing  part of the French army is preoccupied with the importance of preventing any  increase in German power. Thus there is in France a double confused current of  opinion, of which the revolutionary side in Spain can take advantage. On the  other hand the French politicians cannot go beyond a certain point.* in their  secret support of the Spanish Reds, because they know that an outbreak of war in  which France was involved would be an end not only of their lucrative careers  but of their lives. (The French Government in its present deplorable phase has  been well described as “Politicians on the make, restrained by their terror of  the people.”)
  
 A very important feature in any  estimate of what the eventual fate of the Spanish conflict may be is the  condition of propaganda on the two sides.
  
[I][B]    Pg 38[/B][/I]
   
 On Franco’s side there is  virtually none. Franco’s side is national and the Spanish national temper does  not lend itself to this form of commercialized falsehood. Such facts as have  been put forth in foreign magazines, and occasionally in the foreign daily  press, to support Franco’s cause and that of the traditionally Christian Spain  which he is defending have been from non-Spaniards, of whom I think the most  effective has been Mr. Douglas Jerrold. On the other side propaganda may be  described as the main weapon. It is used with all the well-known tricks of that  trade, and used, as the Americans say, “to capacity.” Franco had with him in his  first efforts a considerable contingent of Moroccan troops — just as we  attempted to use Indian troops during the Great War and the French actually did  use African troops, Mahommedan and negro. The presence of these non-European  elements on the insurgent side has been advertised by the Reds for all it is  worth. Great bodies of opinion in England and America still think of the Spanish  war as being a crushing of free men by an armed despot who uses black savages  for his main instrument. In the same way the reinforcement of Franco’s side by a  small number of foreigners was shouted all day long through a hundred organs,  while the much larger reinforcements of the revolutionaries was left  unmentioned. Now and then we get a test case, as in the murder of Miss Boland, a  Catholic Irish lady, by the Reds just as they were leaving Bilbao. This lady was  born a British subject and remained one by international law. She was possessed  of a British passport. Yet the incident passed almost unnoticed — especially in  England.
  
 In so far as propaganda can win  a war the Reds hold all the trumps.
 

[I][B]    Pg 39[/B][/I]
   
 This is only natural,  considering the motive power behind the revolutionaries which works everywhere  by the suppression of truth on the one side and propagation of falsehood on the  other.  During a long visit to the United States in this summer of 1937 I found  the effects of the propaganda everywhere formidable and in many places supreme.  The presence of Moses Rosenberg, the Russian Jew, as chief organizer of the Reds  (he absurdly calls himself “Marcel” Rosenberg), I found had not been heard of in  New York and none of the main newspapers would mention it. Happily propaganda  pushed beyond a certain point defeats its own object, and the Moscow Communists  here, as in every case public and private, underestimate the intelligence of  what the Germans call “ Aryans “ and what you and I know as “you and me.” If you  lie too prodigiously you arouse suspicion, and it looks as though that had  already begun in the case of those who direct the exceedingly un-Spanish Red  propaganda from Spain.
  
 What the upshot of this  critical struggle in the Spanish field may be certainly no one can tell at the  moment in which these words are written (August 1937), but as certainly anyone  may confidently affirm that on that upshot will depend, more than upon anything  else, the future of Communism in Western Europe.
 Next  let me take the proscription of Jews in Germany.
  
 The Nazi policy at Berlin in so  far as it affects the Jewish question has one main interest apart from its  merely dramatic interest of surprise or sensation. That interest is this: what  effect will it have upon a solution of the Jewish question? Is it an advance  towards a just solution of that question or not?]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[I][B]Pg 35[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Transformed thus during the  last few months, this condition of affairs has, to use a metaphor taken from the  Great War, “crystallized”. Reinforcements in men and material continue to reach  both sides, but the revolutionary side is more constantly supplied than the  other. On the other hand, that half of the Spanish navy which joined the  revolutionaries became incompetent through the murder of its officers, and the  other half which joined the nationalists or insurgent anti-revolutionaries could  have some effect, though not a very great one, in checking the support of the  Reds from outside.<br />
  <br />
 We are now, after the first  completed year of the war, in the following situation. The port of Bilbao and  its iron supplies (which had been seized by the revolutionaries, aided by a  minority of the Basques) has been captured after prolonged efforts by Franco and  through it he can receive supplies.  Malaga also has been restored to normal  government and the revolutionaries who had seized the town have been driven  out.  For some months the Great Powers have played insincerely at confining the  conflict to Spain and at preventing foreign intervention.  But their motives are  all at cross purposes and therefore no serious plan has been carried out. The  obvious policy for England is to keep Spain as weak as possible and to prevent  the highly centralized and disciplined new Italian Power from establishing  itself further in the Western Mediterranean.  England is therefore interested in  two main points of policy — preventing the outbreak of a European war which  would be fatal to her, and keeping Spain weak and divided as long as possible.   For Spain to be reunited under a strong government such as Franco proposes,  would be a grave menace to English power in the Mediterranean.  For Italian  influence to dominate in Spain, and particularly in the Balearics, would be even  worse for this country.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 36[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 The Government at Berlin is  sincerely occupied with fighting a European revolution. It has no local purpose  to serve but it sympathizes with the anti-revolutionary Italian Government in  all its aims.<br />
  <br />
 The Portuguese coast, which is  of the highest value for supplies to Franco, is under the efficient  administration of a strong, centralized government after the Italian model,  presided over by a character worthy of his task, utterly indifferent to private  gain or any personal advantage but dominatingly anti-revolutionary.<br />
  <br />
 The French situation is  divided, and the division is almost as comic in its irony as the results may be  tragic in their effect. The major part of the professional politicians (who are  the curse of modern France and have brought her to her present weakness) are on  the revolutionary side, and it is they who, so far as they can and dare, supply  the new aircraft which is the chief weapon of the Reds. The motive of these  politicians in this, as in everything they do, is personal. The support of the  small Communist minority in France (one-sixth of the voting is nominally  Communist and perhaps one-twelfth sincerely so) is necessary to keep the  politicians in the saddle. The intensely anti-Catholic organization of the  Radical party and the less violent but better disciplined Socialist party are on  the same side as the Communists. These between them constitute that “popular  front” in France which was organized from Moscow some months ago.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 37[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 This meaningless and silly  phrase “popular front “ has caught on with the wire-pullers of political  committees, but corresponds in no way to the nation. The French nation as a  whole is determined above all things to prevent the war spreading. On the other  hand, it is suspicious of any increase of German power and has an hereditary  reaction against despotic government. It is to be remarked that the directing  part of the French army is preoccupied with the importance of preventing any  increase in German power. Thus there is in France a double confused current of  opinion, of which the revolutionary side in Spain can take advantage. On the  other hand the French politicians cannot go beyond a certain point.* in their  secret support of the Spanish Reds, because they know that an outbreak of war in  which France was involved would be an end not only of their lucrative careers  but of their lives. (The French Government in its present deplorable phase has  been well described as “Politicians on the make, restrained by their terror of  the people.”)<br />
  <br />
 A very important feature in any  estimate of what the eventual fate of the Spanish conflict may be is the  condition of propaganda on the two sides.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 38[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 On Franco’s side there is  virtually none. Franco’s side is national and the Spanish national temper does  not lend itself to this form of commercialized falsehood. Such facts as have  been put forth in foreign magazines, and occasionally in the foreign daily  press, to support Franco’s cause and that of the traditionally Christian Spain  which he is defending have been from non-Spaniards, of whom I think the most  effective has been Mr. Douglas Jerrold. On the other side propaganda may be  described as the main weapon. It is used with all the well-known tricks of that  trade, and used, as the Americans say, “to capacity.” Franco had with him in his  first efforts a considerable contingent of Moroccan troops — just as we  attempted to use Indian troops during the Great War and the French actually did  use African troops, Mahommedan and negro. The presence of these non-European  elements on the insurgent side has been advertised by the Reds for all it is  worth. Great bodies of opinion in England and America still think of the Spanish  war as being a crushing of free men by an armed despot who uses black savages  for his main instrument. In the same way the reinforcement of Franco’s side by a  small number of foreigners was shouted all day long through a hundred organs,  while the much larger reinforcements of the revolutionaries was left  unmentioned. Now and then we get a test case, as in the murder of Miss Boland, a  Catholic Irish lady, by the Reds just as they were leaving Bilbao. This lady was  born a British subject and remained one by international law. She was possessed  of a British passport. Yet the incident passed almost unnoticed — especially in  England.<br />
  <br />
 In so far as propaganda can win  a war the Reds hold all the trumps.<br />
 <br />
<br />
[I][B]    Pg 39[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 This is only natural,  considering the motive power behind the revolutionaries which works everywhere  by the suppression of truth on the one side and propagation of falsehood on the  other.  During a long visit to the United States in this summer of 1937 I found  the effects of the propaganda everywhere formidable and in many places supreme.  The presence of Moses Rosenberg, the Russian Jew, as chief organizer of the Reds  (he absurdly calls himself “Marcel” Rosenberg), I found had not been heard of in  New York and none of the main newspapers would mention it. Happily propaganda  pushed beyond a certain point defeats its own object, and the Moscow Communists  here, as in every case public and private, underestimate the intelligence of  what the Germans call “ Aryans “ and what you and I know as “you and me.” If you  lie too prodigiously you arouse suspicion, and it looks as though that had  already begun in the case of those who direct the exceedingly un-Spanish Red  propaganda from Spain.<br />
  <br />
 What the upshot of this  critical struggle in the Spanish field may be certainly no one can tell at the  moment in which these words are written (August 1937), but as certainly anyone  may confidently affirm that on that upshot will depend, more than upon anything  else, the future of Communism in Western Europe.<br />
 Next  let me take the proscription of Jews in Germany.<br />
  <br />
 The Nazi policy at Berlin in so  far as it affects the Jewish question has one main interest apart from its  merely dramatic interest of surprise or sensation. That interest is this: what  effect will it have upon a solution of the Jewish question? Is it an advance  towards a just solution of that question or not?</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/11-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-3-6.html</guid>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 4 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/12-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-4-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:36:07 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[I][B]Pg 40[/B][/I]
   
 I do not mean “ Is the Nazi  action towards the Jews a just solution or not?” for it is not a solution at  all. I mean rather “Will the effects proceeding from this sudden piece of  radical reform make towards a final equitable result?”
  
 There is no doubt that the Nazi  attack was sincere. There is no doubt that in the eyes of its authors it was  provoked by a situation which they thought intolerable.
  
 But can  it be fruitful?
  
 Let us begin by remarking that  this shock has cleared the air. That is the effect of most shocks. They get rid  of humbug.  It is perhaps their chief advantage, and often their only one.  “The  Germans,” you will have heard it said, “have belled the cat. No one now is  afraid to discuss the Jewish question as they used to be. That is all to the  good.”  Yes, it is all to the good that free discussion should arise on a matter  which had been under such an irrational taboo. It is indeed true that since the  violent attack on the Jewish race by the Prussian Government through wholesale  spoliation, the destruction of their professional careers in Germany, the  extraordinary restrictions upon intercourse and, most extravagant of all, the  declaration of Jewish blood up to and including the last generation but one—all  these things have cleared the air. So for that matter would an attack by a  Jewish State against a Christian or Mahommedan minority clear the air.  Anything  at once sudden, startling and violent, clears the air. But beyond that the Nazi  policy has done very little. Those who support it in its own country talk  extravagantly about it. They say, “ We have conquered the Jews and therefore we  have won the Great War.” These are the actual words they use. I am not  exaggerating. They seem to think they have done something which is for all time  and which will have the most prodigious results.
  
[I][B]    Pg 41[/B][/I]
   
 Now there are two criticisms to  be made of this attitude. The first is that the attack made upon the Jews in  Germany is neither thorough nor final. The second is that you will not achieve a  victory until you have some moral consecration for it. A murder may have some  lasting political result if you can ensure the continuance of its effect by the  continued prosperity of the murderer. But injustice of this kind cannot solve  any problem, and there is grave and glaring injustice in the Nazi policy against  the Jews, for these two simple reasons, as familiar to Greek philosophy as to  the Christian conscience ; first, that justice concerns the individual soul, not  a type or race. Secondly, that you cannot justly destroy a bilateral agreement  by a unilateral declaration.
  
 Let us look at the agreement,  open or implied, between our civilization and the Jews everywhere, but  particularly in the Prussianized German Reich, for it was there that this  agreement had the fullest effect and that Jews most benefited by it. We  Europeans had said to the Jews, “ You are citizens like ourselves. You have made  your arrangements for living under our code of laws, and that code guarantees  you your possessions and your contracts.” It is not immoral to declare a new  policy and to say, “ We will in future regard Jews as citizens of a different  class from those around them, their hosts ; they are in fact different and we  propose in future to” recognize that fact instead of carrying on with the  fiction —for it is no better — that there is no difference between us.” But when  things of that kind are done, justice demands that the effect shall be gradual,  and that the loser by any new regulation shall be compensated. We may make a law  tomorrow to say that a foreigner shall not own English land in freehold: if we  apply that law retrospectively without compensation, and deprive the foreigner  of land which he has bought at his own sacrifice, we have committed theft.
  
[I][B]    Pg 42[/B][/I]
   
 Now that has gone on all over  the field of Judao-German relations, and because these actions are grossly  unjust, therefore immoral, they must inevitably carry with them retribution.
  
 A citizen acts under a certain  code of law. He exercises his civil rights and proposes to bring up his son in  the profession of, say, medicine. He stints himself perhaps in his daily life in  order to provide the money for the young man’s training. The lad is trained;  passes examinations, walks the hospitals, obtains a good degree, and launches  out into his profession. After some years of practice he is successful, marries  on the strength of it, and is established. Then out of the blue, you say to  him,  “Because you are a Jew, you shall no longer be allowed to carry on your  profession.” You ruin him by breaking a clear contract. You do so with no moral  excuse.
  
  
[I][B]    Pg 43[/B][/I]
   
 It is exactly the same with any  other of the professions, membership of which has suddenly been forbidden to  Jews in the Reich. It is no answer to say that the proportion of Jews in these  professions was excessive ; it is no answer to say the Jew was a new arrival.   “You made a contract with him, and you have broken it”. There is no reply to  that indictment. The main rules of justice are clear enough, and they have here  been violated.
  
 Most of my readers I fear will  not accept the proposition that a violation of morals on a large scale carries  with it retribution on a similar scale. They are short-sighted if they think  thus, but daily experience,  carrying no further than daily experience, is  certainly on their side.  Every day we see violations of justice going on around  us which are followed by no evil consequence to the evil-doer. On the contrary,  we see given him more wealth, or leisure, or fame, or standing, or some other  good than he had before.  Men are thereby tempted to deny the ultimate justice  of God in temporal affairs.  But what no one can deny is the missing of a mark.  If your policy is unjust, it may or may not be followed by retribution, that is  debatable; but if your policy is aimed at securing a certain result and it  manifestly does not secure it, then the failure of your policy is not  debatable.  Now the Nazi attack upon such of the Jewish race as are subject to  Berlin is, as I have said, not thorough, not final, but incomplete, and I think  soon to prove abortive.
  
 I say this apart from the fact  that Israel is eternal, and Nazidom most certainly not eternal. The policy has  missed its mark, on lower grounds : it has missed its mark, because it has not  dared to be thorough and has not had the competence to be well thought out.
  
[I][B]    Pg 44[/B][/I]
   
 Take  two points, one by one, and see how the policy fails.
  
 You can prevent marriage  between a declared Jew, or a person of declared Jewish blood, and a person of  other blood, or of supposedly other blood, but you cannot prevent affairs  between the two, and you cannot even be certain in this particular case that the  person of supposedly Jewish blood is really Jewish, or that the supposedly  non-Jewish person has no Jewish blood in him which may reappear in another  generation. The attempted prohibition is mechanical and that alone is sufficient  to make it futile as applied to human affairs, for human affairs are essentially  organic and non-mechanical, and, apart from that, it relies upon necessarily  insufficient evidence. It may be said that a certain rough knowledge of the  situation is sufficient, and if the mixture of races cannot be entirely  prevented it may be largely checked, but it can be checked much less largely  than the promoters of this policy seem to think.
  
 Or, again, take the provision  affecting the professions. You do not make it affect — probably you cannot make  it affect — money dealing; and yet that profession of money dealing is the most  important profession in the modern world. The official attack upon the Jews in  the Reich has nowhere been more lopsided and glaringly ineffective than in its  dealing with the big financial houses. The Nazis allow the influence of those  houses to go on; they probably could not help allowing it; but in allowing it  they give away the whole of their position. It was the same with the  multiple-shops and other big businesses which were in Jewish hands. The Nazis  had not the will or the power to suppress them.
  
[I][B]    Pg 45[/B][/I]
   
 But perhaps the worst weakness  of the whole attack upon the Jews in Germany is that it has no philosophy behind  it, or at least no philosophy of general application and of ascertainable  principle. Because an eccentric Frenchman of the name of Gobineau affirmed that  the principal virtues derive from a certain stock which he called Germanic (and  which, by the way, he found especially pure in the Spanish peasantry!),  you  cannot — even if this eccentric Frenchman were divinely inspired — make certain  that the people living in Germany who did not happen to be Jews are of this  peculiar and god-like sort.  It is tomfoolery to pretend it.  It is racial  vanity gone mad. Now illusion in any form can be a restricted evil if it is not  acted upon with logical thoroughness, but once you act on an illusion logically  you pass the practical line between sanity and madness. If you cherish an  illusion that you are the Emperor of China, and neither act upon that illusion  nor draw rational deductions from it (such as that your wife is the Empress of  China), there is no great harm done. Your excellent wife can be merciful to your  foible, and yet when she is out of your presence cease to play the part of the  Empress. But were you to act upon the illusion, condemn people to death on the  strength of it and try to execute them, your illusion will go off the rails.  Extravagance pushed beyond a certain point is unworkable, because  it is  mad.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[I][B]Pg 40[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 I do not mean “ Is the Nazi  action towards the Jews a just solution or not?” for it is not a solution at  all. I mean rather “Will the effects proceeding from this sudden piece of  radical reform make towards a final equitable result?”<br />
  <br />
 There is no doubt that the Nazi  attack was sincere. There is no doubt that in the eyes of its authors it was  provoked by a situation which they thought intolerable.<br />
  <br />
 But can  it be fruitful?<br />
  <br />
 Let us begin by remarking that  this shock has cleared the air. That is the effect of most shocks. They get rid  of humbug.  It is perhaps their chief advantage, and often their only one.  “The  Germans,” you will have heard it said, “have belled the cat. No one now is  afraid to discuss the Jewish question as they used to be. That is all to the  good.”  Yes, it is all to the good that free discussion should arise on a matter  which had been under such an irrational taboo. It is indeed true that since the  violent attack on the Jewish race by the Prussian Government through wholesale  spoliation, the destruction of their professional careers in Germany, the  extraordinary restrictions upon intercourse and, most extravagant of all, the  declaration of Jewish blood up to and including the last generation but one—all  these things have cleared the air. So for that matter would an attack by a  Jewish State against a Christian or Mahommedan minority clear the air.  Anything  at once sudden, startling and violent, clears the air. But beyond that the Nazi  policy has done very little. Those who support it in its own country talk  extravagantly about it. They say, “ We have conquered the Jews and therefore we  have won the Great War.” These are the actual words they use. I am not  exaggerating. They seem to think they have done something which is for all time  and which will have the most prodigious results.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 41[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Now there are two criticisms to  be made of this attitude. The first is that the attack made upon the Jews in  Germany is neither thorough nor final. The second is that you will not achieve a  victory until you have some moral consecration for it. A murder may have some  lasting political result if you can ensure the continuance of its effect by the  continued prosperity of the murderer. But injustice of this kind cannot solve  any problem, and there is grave and glaring injustice in the Nazi policy against  the Jews, for these two simple reasons, as familiar to Greek philosophy as to  the Christian conscience ; first, that justice concerns the individual soul, not  a type or race. Secondly, that you cannot justly destroy a bilateral agreement  by a unilateral declaration.<br />
  <br />
 Let us look at the agreement,  open or implied, between our civilization and the Jews everywhere, but  particularly in the Prussianized German Reich, for it was there that this  agreement had the fullest effect and that Jews most benefited by it. We  Europeans had said to the Jews, “ You are citizens like ourselves. You have made  your arrangements for living under our code of laws, and that code guarantees  you your possessions and your contracts.” It is not immoral to declare a new  policy and to say, “ We will in future regard Jews as citizens of a different  class from those around them, their hosts ; they are in fact different and we  propose in future to” recognize that fact instead of carrying on with the  fiction —for it is no better — that there is no difference between us.” But when  things of that kind are done, justice demands that the effect shall be gradual,  and that the loser by any new regulation shall be compensated. We may make a law  tomorrow to say that a foreigner shall not own English land in freehold: if we  apply that law retrospectively without compensation, and deprive the foreigner  of land which he has bought at his own sacrifice, we have committed theft.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 42[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Now that has gone on all over  the field of Judao-German relations, and because these actions are grossly  unjust, therefore immoral, they must inevitably carry with them retribution.<br />
  <br />
 A citizen acts under a certain  code of law. He exercises his civil rights and proposes to bring up his son in  the profession of, say, medicine. He stints himself perhaps in his daily life in  order to provide the money for the young man’s training. The lad is trained;  passes examinations, walks the hospitals, obtains a good degree, and launches  out into his profession. After some years of practice he is successful, marries  on the strength of it, and is established. Then out of the blue, you say to  him,  “Because you are a Jew, you shall no longer be allowed to carry on your  profession.” You ruin him by breaking a clear contract. You do so with no moral  excuse.<br />
  <br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 43[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 It is exactly the same with any  other of the professions, membership of which has suddenly been forbidden to  Jews in the Reich. It is no answer to say that the proportion of Jews in these  professions was excessive ; it is no answer to say the Jew was a new arrival.   “You made a contract with him, and you have broken it”. There is no reply to  that indictment. The main rules of justice are clear enough, and they have here  been violated.<br />
  <br />
 Most of my readers I fear will  not accept the proposition that a violation of morals on a large scale carries  with it retribution on a similar scale. They are short-sighted if they think  thus, but daily experience,  carrying no further than daily experience, is  certainly on their side.  Every day we see violations of justice going on around  us which are followed by no evil consequence to the evil-doer. On the contrary,  we see given him more wealth, or leisure, or fame, or standing, or some other  good than he had before.  Men are thereby tempted to deny the ultimate justice  of God in temporal affairs.  But what no one can deny is the missing of a mark.  If your policy is unjust, it may or may not be followed by retribution, that is  debatable; but if your policy is aimed at securing a certain result and it  manifestly does not secure it, then the failure of your policy is not  debatable.  Now the Nazi attack upon such of the Jewish race as are subject to  Berlin is, as I have said, not thorough, not final, but incomplete, and I think  soon to prove abortive.<br />
  <br />
 I say this apart from the fact  that Israel is eternal, and Nazidom most certainly not eternal. The policy has  missed its mark, on lower grounds : it has missed its mark, because it has not  dared to be thorough and has not had the competence to be well thought out.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 44[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Take  two points, one by one, and see how the policy fails.<br />
  <br />
 You can prevent marriage  between a declared Jew, or a person of declared Jewish blood, and a person of  other blood, or of supposedly other blood, but you cannot prevent affairs  between the two, and you cannot even be certain in this particular case that the  person of supposedly Jewish blood is really Jewish, or that the supposedly  non-Jewish person has no Jewish blood in him which may reappear in another  generation. The attempted prohibition is mechanical and that alone is sufficient  to make it futile as applied to human affairs, for human affairs are essentially  organic and non-mechanical, and, apart from that, it relies upon necessarily  insufficient evidence. It may be said that a certain rough knowledge of the  situation is sufficient, and if the mixture of races cannot be entirely  prevented it may be largely checked, but it can be checked much less largely  than the promoters of this policy seem to think.<br />
  <br />
 Or, again, take the provision  affecting the professions. You do not make it affect — probably you cannot make  it affect — money dealing; and yet that profession of money dealing is the most  important profession in the modern world. The official attack upon the Jews in  the Reich has nowhere been more lopsided and glaringly ineffective than in its  dealing with the big financial houses. The Nazis allow the influence of those  houses to go on; they probably could not help allowing it; but in allowing it  they give away the whole of their position. It was the same with the  multiple-shops and other big businesses which were in Jewish hands. The Nazis  had not the will or the power to suppress them.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 45[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 But perhaps the worst weakness  of the whole attack upon the Jews in Germany is that it has no philosophy behind  it, or at least no philosophy of general application and of ascertainable  principle. Because an eccentric Frenchman of the name of Gobineau affirmed that  the principal virtues derive from a certain stock which he called Germanic (and  which, by the way, he found especially pure in the Spanish peasantry!),  you  cannot — even if this eccentric Frenchman were divinely inspired — make certain  that the people living in Germany who did not happen to be Jews are of this  peculiar and god-like sort.  It is tomfoolery to pretend it.  It is racial  vanity gone mad. Now illusion in any form can be a restricted evil if it is not  acted upon with logical thoroughness, but once you act on an illusion logically  you pass the practical line between sanity and madness. If you cherish an  illusion that you are the Emperor of China, and neither act upon that illusion  nor draw rational deductions from it (such as that your wife is the Empress of  China), there is no great harm done. Your excellent wife can be merciful to your  foible, and yet when she is out of your presence cease to play the part of the  Empress. But were you to act upon the illusion, condemn people to death on the  strength of it and try to execute them, your illusion will go off the rails.  Extravagance pushed beyond a certain point is unworkable, because  it is  mad.</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/12-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-4-6.html</guid>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 5 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/13-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-5-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:35:25 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[I][B]Pg 46[/B][/I]
   
 Perhaps the two most practical  considerations in connection with this department of our subject are: (1) How  long the, present German drive against the Jews can last, and (2) How widespread  and profound will be the inevitable reactions against it outside Germany.
  
 If you adopt an irrational  attitude you are challenging the human race. You are at the best making yourself  ridiculous and at the worst making yourself impossible.  Further you are buying  &#8356;1 for 30s. You are deliberately creating  difficulties for yourself which you might have avoided and which far outweigh  the advantages you hope to obtain. Let any man look at his own life, if it has  been at all full, and ask himself what would have happened if he had gone out of  his way to make every Jew of his private acquaintance an enemy. The ultimate  suffering which he would have incurred is the image of what a race or a nation  may suffer if it acts on similar irrational lines.  I shall be saying in another  connection that the taking up of the Jewish cause in Zionism against the whole  world of Islam was in our own case a gratuitous piece of folly, but it is a  folly more capable of remedy and presumably of restoration than the folly on the  other extreme of challenging such a permanent factor in the general construction  of our civilization as is formed by the Jews.
  
 It is not as though the Jews in  Germany had acted as enemies of the German people. Jewish Communism was hostile  to the German race and to the somewhat exasperated nationalism of the Reich,  because Jewish Communism is opposed to all national patriotisms except that of  its authors. But Jewish Communism is not identical with the Jewish race, still  less with the individuals of that race. Berlin, by acting as she has done in  this matter, has not made itself a rallying-point for all those who would  restrict Jewish power, still less has it made itself a rallying-point for all  those who would state the truth on the Jewish problem and discuss it reasonably.  Berlin has not made itself a rallying-point even for anti-Communism, as it might  well have done had it lucidly distinguished between the Jewish element in  Communism and the Jewish race as a whole.
  
[I][B]    Pg 47[/B][/I]
   
 We look round and see that no  one has copied the example of Berlin. Italy, which inaugurated the modern system  of absolute government, has not done so.  It has wisely used Jews of high talent  to help it in the reconstruction of Italian affairs, and if it be said that this  is because Italy was not provoked as Germany was by any great number of Jews on  her territory, then what about Poland? Poland has a far larger proportion of  Jews than the Reich.  She has recently and with difficulty risen from the dead.   She suffered horribly from the War — far more than the German Reich suffered.   She might be excused indeed for losing her head over a problem which has gravely  affected all nations, and particularly our own. Instead of that, she has gone to  meet the Jews half-way and it has been greatly to her advantage.
  
 Now let us turn to the third  point, the present stage (and crisis) of Zionism. It is as important in its way  as the other two, but it can be more briefly dealt with. It is the one most  directly Jewish, though certainly not the most important. What stage has been  reached in this matter and what may be the possible development ?
  
[I][B]    Pg 48[/B][/I]
   
 The new factor in the affair  since the last edition of this book in 1928, is the Arab insurrection of  1935-6.
  
 The word “insurrection” sounds  altogether too grand for the business.  It was no more than the action of a few  snipers, petty raids on Jewish plantations and a regretable but not very large  number of Jewish deaths; also, naturally, as the Arabs took the initiative, a  certain number of Arab deaths. The thing as a whole was on quite a small  scale.
  
 The population was disarmed, as  it is our necessary policy to disarm all populations subject to our rule, as the  Irish were disarmed until the other day, and as millions of discontented  subjects are disarmed all over the globe, whether under English, French,  Italian, Russian or any other masters.
  
 Why then was that insurrection,  a thing on so very small a scale and so soon over, all important? Why did it  mark a new departure? Because it illustrated the weakness of our whole position  in Syria to-day, and particularly the threat which it involves. Most of what can  be said on this subject has already been said in the pages of this book. All  that can be added to it here is the important fact that our original policy, or  rather lack of policy, has been followed up and we are now compelled to come to  some decision after having characteristically postponed that decision as long as  we could.  So to act is the fruit of that spirit which is called by various  phases and names: “compromise,” “common sense,” “we are not logical people,”  “muddling through” and all the rest of the suicidal litany. There was a time  when we could afford to talk rubbish, just as a rich young man in a secure home  can afford to play the fool. That time has gone.
  
[I][B]    Pg 49[/B][/I]
   
 What Balfour had in mind when  he offered Palestine to the Jews as part of the spoils in the course of the  Great War, we all know. The man was an intense patriot, he understood the power  of Jewish finance with which we were allied.  He knew something, though not very  much (and that in a confused way) of the then interwoven strands of Jewish  racial feeling and German racial feeling. He was determined to put the former at  the service of Great Britain, to which he was so passionately attached, and with  which the Jews had worked for more than two hundred years.  He of course did not  understand, any more than the rest of the governing class to which he belonged,  what was meant by the problem.  If he blundered, one can at least say this: that  the blunders of the governing class in this and other matters, are nothing to  what they would have been if they had been made by those classes in England,  which are so easily governed. Luckily these did not (as yet) interfere with  foreign policy.*
  
[I]  *There are signs that this happy  indifference of the English people to the measures of those who rule them is  growing insecure. It was the fruit of  long peace. The Great War and especially  the tardy appearance of conscription changed all. Great sections of the people  will now express themselves actively on some point in foreign policy where,  before the war, they would have regarded themselves (rightly) as incompetent.  They are so determined to avoid a new call to arms that they will actually  interpose to enforce what they have been persuaded will ensure their repose.  Great masses, beyond those of the suburbs, recently clamoured against and  reversed our considered policy on Abyssinia, with the result that we have for  the moment or forever lost the Bab-el-Mandeb, the gate of the Red Sea, and  therefore the shorter road to India, which in future an enemy may control or a  friend who will demand his price.[/I]
  
  
[I][B]    Pg 50[/B][/I]
   
 Anyhow, to Arthur Balfour, when  he made this offer to the Jews, the whole thing seemed quite suitable. The Jews  would be very glad to get Palestine, and there was nothing to stop them. The  Arabs did not count. As for the old Christian feeling about the place it was a  silly superstition which had no strength save with certain backward and poorer  elements of continental Europe, and possibly (by the way), with the Irish —  another reason for despising it. That a Jew governing Golgotha might be a source  of serious irritation to important opponents could never have crossed his  mind.
  
 To-day, after these very few  years, even the most obtuse of his compeers understands that Jews holding  Nazareth might prove a very serious irritant indeed in quite serious centres  which are still, after a fashion, Christian. (I can imagine a pilgrimage to the  shrine of the Annunciation losing its temper after the pilgrims had interviewed  a local Jewish authority for permission to do so:  strange, but true.) Until the  Germans, or rather the peculiar government of Berlin, launched its attack  against the Jewish nationals of the Reich, there was no very strong drive among  non-Jews in Europe for continued Jewish immigration into Palestine save in  Poland. The Polish government of course was all in favour, because the more they  could “run off” or  “tap” the Jewish trouble in their own country and divert it  into another, the better for them, seeing the enormous Jewish population with  which Poland is burdened.]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[I][B]Pg 46[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Perhaps the two most practical  considerations in connection with this department of our subject are: (1) How  long the, present German drive against the Jews can last, and (2) How widespread  and profound will be the inevitable reactions against it outside Germany.<br />
  <br />
 If you adopt an irrational  attitude you are challenging the human race. You are at the best making yourself  ridiculous and at the worst making yourself impossible.  Further you are buying  &#8356;1 for 30s. You are deliberately creating  difficulties for yourself which you might have avoided and which far outweigh  the advantages you hope to obtain. Let any man look at his own life, if it has  been at all full, and ask himself what would have happened if he had gone out of  his way to make every Jew of his private acquaintance an enemy. The ultimate  suffering which he would have incurred is the image of what a race or a nation  may suffer if it acts on similar irrational lines.  I shall be saying in another  connection that the taking up of the Jewish cause in Zionism against the whole  world of Islam was in our own case a gratuitous piece of folly, but it is a  folly more capable of remedy and presumably of restoration than the folly on the  other extreme of challenging such a permanent factor in the general construction  of our civilization as is formed by the Jews.<br />
  <br />
 It is not as though the Jews in  Germany had acted as enemies of the German people. Jewish Communism was hostile  to the German race and to the somewhat exasperated nationalism of the Reich,  because Jewish Communism is opposed to all national patriotisms except that of  its authors. But Jewish Communism is not identical with the Jewish race, still  less with the individuals of that race. Berlin, by acting as she has done in  this matter, has not made itself a rallying-point for all those who would  restrict Jewish power, still less has it made itself a rallying-point for all  those who would state the truth on the Jewish problem and discuss it reasonably.  Berlin has not made itself a rallying-point even for anti-Communism, as it might  well have done had it lucidly distinguished between the Jewish element in  Communism and the Jewish race as a whole.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 47[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 We look round and see that no  one has copied the example of Berlin. Italy, which inaugurated the modern system  of absolute government, has not done so.  It has wisely used Jews of high talent  to help it in the reconstruction of Italian affairs, and if it be said that this  is because Italy was not provoked as Germany was by any great number of Jews on  her territory, then what about Poland? Poland has a far larger proportion of  Jews than the Reich.  She has recently and with difficulty risen from the dead.   She suffered horribly from the War — far more than the German Reich suffered.   She might be excused indeed for losing her head over a problem which has gravely  affected all nations, and particularly our own. Instead of that, she has gone to  meet the Jews half-way and it has been greatly to her advantage.<br />
  <br />
 Now let us turn to the third  point, the present stage (and crisis) of Zionism. It is as important in its way  as the other two, but it can be more briefly dealt with. It is the one most  directly Jewish, though certainly not the most important. What stage has been  reached in this matter and what may be the possible development ?<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 48[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 The new factor in the affair  since the last edition of this book in 1928, is the Arab insurrection of  1935-6.<br />
  <br />
 The word “insurrection” sounds  altogether too grand for the business.  It was no more than the action of a few  snipers, petty raids on Jewish plantations and a regretable but not very large  number of Jewish deaths; also, naturally, as the Arabs took the initiative, a  certain number of Arab deaths. The thing as a whole was on quite a small  scale.<br />
  <br />
 The population was disarmed, as  it is our necessary policy to disarm all populations subject to our rule, as the  Irish were disarmed until the other day, and as millions of discontented  subjects are disarmed all over the globe, whether under English, French,  Italian, Russian or any other masters.<br />
  <br />
 Why then was that insurrection,  a thing on so very small a scale and so soon over, all important? Why did it  mark a new departure? Because it illustrated the weakness of our whole position  in Syria to-day, and particularly the threat which it involves. Most of what can  be said on this subject has already been said in the pages of this book. All  that can be added to it here is the important fact that our original policy, or  rather lack of policy, has been followed up and we are now compelled to come to  some decision after having characteristically postponed that decision as long as  we could.  So to act is the fruit of that spirit which is called by various  phases and names: “compromise,” “common sense,” “we are not logical people,”  “muddling through” and all the rest of the suicidal litany. There was a time  when we could afford to talk rubbish, just as a rich young man in a secure home  can afford to play the fool. That time has gone.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 49[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 What Balfour had in mind when  he offered Palestine to the Jews as part of the spoils in the course of the  Great War, we all know. The man was an intense patriot, he understood the power  of Jewish finance with which we were allied.  He knew something, though not very  much (and that in a confused way) of the then interwoven strands of Jewish  racial feeling and German racial feeling. He was determined to put the former at  the service of Great Britain, to which he was so passionately attached, and with  which the Jews had worked for more than two hundred years.  He of course did not  understand, any more than the rest of the governing class to which he belonged,  what was meant by the problem.  If he blundered, one can at least say this: that  the blunders of the governing class in this and other matters, are nothing to  what they would have been if they had been made by those classes in England,  which are so easily governed. Luckily these did not (as yet) interfere with  foreign policy.*<br />
  <br />
[I]  *There are signs that this happy  indifference of the English people to the measures of those who rule them is  growing insecure. It was the fruit of  long peace. The Great War and especially  the tardy appearance of conscription changed all. Great sections of the people  will now express themselves actively on some point in foreign policy where,  before the war, they would have regarded themselves (rightly) as incompetent.  They are so determined to avoid a new call to arms that they will actually  interpose to enforce what they have been persuaded will ensure their repose.  Great masses, beyond those of the suburbs, recently clamoured against and  reversed our considered policy on Abyssinia, with the result that we have for  the moment or forever lost the Bab-el-Mandeb, the gate of the Red Sea, and  therefore the shorter road to India, which in future an enemy may control or a  friend who will demand his price.[/I]<br />
  <br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 50[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Anyhow, to Arthur Balfour, when  he made this offer to the Jews, the whole thing seemed quite suitable. The Jews  would be very glad to get Palestine, and there was nothing to stop them. The  Arabs did not count. As for the old Christian feeling about the place it was a  silly superstition which had no strength save with certain backward and poorer  elements of continental Europe, and possibly (by the way), with the Irish —  another reason for despising it. That a Jew governing Golgotha might be a source  of serious irritation to important opponents could never have crossed his  mind.<br />
  <br />
 To-day, after these very few  years, even the most obtuse of his compeers understands that Jews holding  Nazareth might prove a very serious irritant indeed in quite serious centres  which are still, after a fashion, Christian. (I can imagine a pilgrimage to the  shrine of the Annunciation losing its temper after the pilgrims had interviewed  a local Jewish authority for permission to do so:  strange, but true.) Until the  Germans, or rather the peculiar government of Berlin, launched its attack  against the Jewish nationals of the Reich, there was no very strong drive among  non-Jews in Europe for continued Jewish immigration into Palestine save in  Poland. The Polish government of course was all in favour, because the more they  could “run off” or  “tap” the Jewish trouble in their own country and divert it  into another, the better for them, seeing the enormous Jewish population with  which Poland is burdened.</div>

]]></content:encoded>
			<dc:creator>Errigal</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/13-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-5-6.html</guid>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Introductory Chapter to The Jews (1937) by Hilaire Belloc, part 6 of 6</title>
			<link>http://forum.stirpes.net/blogs/errigal/14-introductory-chapter-jews-1937-hilaire-belloc-part-6-6.html</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 23:34:54 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[[I][B]Pg 51[/B][/I]
   
 By the way, it is curious that  those people who are always telling us that a Jewish minority is a source of  wealth and power, do not apply that dictum to Poland.  It is stranger still that  those who tell us that justice to Jews is always rewarded at once by Heaven,  never emphasize the special care the Poles have taken to give their Jewish  subjects privilege.
  
 When the government at Berlin  began, in violent, dramatic fashion, its attack on the Jewish people, everyone  who differed from the government of Berlin (and that, they will be sorry to  hear, covers the vast majority of what they themselves call “Aryans”), became  much more inclined than they had been before, to defend the Jewish thesis. “We  used to think,” they said, “that the Jews had no great grievance, for, though it  is true they have no country of their own, yet they were not badly treated by  their hosts, but, if anything, a little too well treated— especially in Germany.  But now we see how unjustly Jews are made to suffer.”
  
 For there had come that  startling thing — it was a thunderbolt — the moral declaration of war by the  triumphant Nazis upon the Jews who had the misfortune to be the subjects of  Berlin. After that the old argument broke down. The opponent to Zionism could no  longer say, “What do Jews need with a national home?”  Every German Jew could  answer, and every honest man as well: “We now quite understand the need for some  place where Jews may be guaranteed to live at peace without encroaching ‘upon  their neighbours.”
  
[I][B]    Pg 52[/B][/I]
   
 But in that last phrase comes  the whole crux of the affair: — “without encroaching upon their neighbours.” It  is true that the Jewish immigration into Palestine bought at very high prices  the land on which it settled ; it is further true that it developed the value of  that land immensely, not merely by the pressure of millions of money, but by the  exercise of organizing power and of industry. It is true, as the Zionist  complains, that he took nothing from Palestine, but hugely added to what he had  found there.
  
 Unfortunately the point is not  an economical one, but a spiritual one.  Islam hates and despises the Jew, and  what we were doing in Palestine was to thrust an increasing body of Jews under  the protection of British power, into the flesh of Islam. It was a challenge to  that feeling which Islam has for the Holy Places.  It was a challenge to that  feeling within the very territory which was historically the heart of Islam, for  though Islam came from the sands to the South,  it was first planted in Syria;  and Damascus is the heart of its legend, tradition and home.
  
 Now, at that word “ Damascus “  it is well that we should pause. No English journal to my knowledge, and  certainly no English politician, has told people what Damascus means. Damascus  is Syria and Syria is Damascus.  Pompey knew that, and all the successful  masters of Antioch even, before him. You cannot rule Syria against the will of  Damascus ; you can always rule Syria with the support of Damascus.  Had the  Crusaders seized Damascus and held it with a sufficient garrison, Europe would  have been in the midst of Islam long since, and Islam would have withered. The  retirement (the inevitable retirement) of the combined French and German forces  from before Damascus in 1148 was the doom of the Crusades and the source of  Saladin’s triumph : Islam ousting the West.
  
[I][B]    Pg 53[/B][/I]
   
 Now, England does not hold  Damascus, and does not seem likely to hold it. Nor is it to be presumed that the  French will be there much longer. Yet unless you hold Damascus how can you  permanently support an alien hated and despised Jewish colony in a corner of  Syria?  Can anything in the near future render the possession of the Palestinian  sea-board by the Jews a thing of such value to England that she would be willing  to risk all the Orient for that one anomalous position — which is not even a  possession?
  
 Attempts have indeed been made  to prove in some tortuous fashion that the holding of the coast between Acre and  Telaviv was the holding of a “key” to India.  It is lamentable nonsense.   Palestine has no strategical value to us whatsoever.  It has an indefensible  land frontier which is geographically and strategically a part of Syria in  general. Haifa as a British port has an obvious and very great strategical  value, or rather will have such when it has been fortified, but then so will  have any other point on the coast where in future a modern harbour may be  formed. Tripoli and Beyrouth are obvious examples.  Even if Palestine were held,  or part of Palestine were held, as a British colony with inhabitants among them  from this country, it would be a weakness — a debit, not an asset.  Palestine  held, not for ourselves but for somebody else who is no strength to us and owes  us no allegiance, is not only a debit but a constant peril.  To this it will be  answered “The thing has been done. It cannot be undone.  What then should we  advise?”
  
[I][B]    Pg 54[/B][/I]
   
 If we cut our losses by  abandoning the Jews to their fate, they will certainly be destroyed by the  surrounding power of Islam. Perhaps the only solution for the moment is the  present state of things, arranged as best it can be arranged to our future  advantage. Perhaps we can carry on for some few years at least, even for many  years, gratuitously defending an alien immigrant population against the millions  of Mohammedans, though obviously we could never do so on condition of preventing  any further extension of Jewish power in those parts.
  
 The compromise suggested by the  British government in this summer of 1937, can have no finality about it. But  there is a certain precarious equilibrium for the moment in the existing  presence of a large protected Jewish minority on Syrian soil. We can count for  the moment on the support of the Arab state immediately to the east, across the  Jordan, because its ruler hopes that the present arrangement will increase his  wealth and power and the number of his subjects. We are for the moment not  threatened by any other European power.  The French so long as they remain in  chaos may be neglected, the Italians are not established within close striking  distance.  But the thing remains unsettled and a full immediate solution of the  problem remains impossible.
  
[I][B]    Pg 55[/B][/I]
   
 The truth is, as everybody  knows, that we promised the Arabs their country if they would help us against  the Turks. We then broke our promise.  As a rule, to break your promise is an  advantage in this world; in this case it seems to have turned out the other way,  and all we can do is to shoulder the consequences of the error or falsehood or  betrayal, whichever you like to call it, and carry on from day to day and from  hand to mouth.
  
 Those who made the promise now  assure up, a score of years later, that they made a “mental reservation”  excluding Palestine, but the interval between the act and its explanation is  singularly broad, and “mental reservations” are suspect especially when the  other party never heard of them.
 
 [FONT=Georgia]*         *        *        *        *[/FONT]
 
 Such, as it seems to me, is the  standing of the triple problem in its Revolutionary, German and Zionist aspects  at the moment of writing.
 

 [B]H. BELLOC.[/B]

 [B]KING’S LAND,[/B]

 August, 1937]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div>[I][B]Pg 51[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 By the way, it is curious that  those people who are always telling us that a Jewish minority is a source of  wealth and power, do not apply that dictum to Poland.  It is stranger still that  those who tell us that justice to Jews is always rewarded at once by Heaven,  never emphasize the special care the Poles have taken to give their Jewish  subjects privilege.<br />
  <br />
 When the government at Berlin  began, in violent, dramatic fashion, its attack on the Jewish people, everyone  who differed from the government of Berlin (and that, they will be sorry to  hear, covers the vast majority of what they themselves call “Aryans”), became  much more inclined than they had been before, to defend the Jewish thesis. “We  used to think,” they said, “that the Jews had no great grievance, for, though it  is true they have no country of their own, yet they were not badly treated by  their hosts, but, if anything, a little too well treated— especially in Germany.  But now we see how unjustly Jews are made to suffer.”<br />
  <br />
 For there had come that  startling thing — it was a thunderbolt — the moral declaration of war by the  triumphant Nazis upon the Jews who had the misfortune to be the subjects of  Berlin. After that the old argument broke down. The opponent to Zionism could no  longer say, “What do Jews need with a national home?”  Every German Jew could  answer, and every honest man as well: “We now quite understand the need for some  place where Jews may be guaranteed to live at peace without encroaching ‘upon  their neighbours.”<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 52[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 But in that last phrase comes  the whole crux of the affair: — “without encroaching upon their neighbours.” It  is true that the Jewish immigration into Palestine bought at very high prices  the land on which it settled ; it is further true that it developed the value of  that land immensely, not merely by the pressure of millions of money, but by the  exercise of organizing power and of industry. It is true, as the Zionist  complains, that he took nothing from Palestine, but hugely added to what he had  found there.<br />
  <br />
 Unfortunately the point is not  an economical one, but a spiritual one.  Islam hates and despises the Jew, and  what we were doing in Palestine was to thrust an increasing body of Jews under  the protection of British power, into the flesh of Islam. It was a challenge to  that feeling which Islam has for the Holy Places.  It was a challenge to that  feeling within the very territory which was historically the heart of Islam, for  though Islam came from the sands to the South,  it was first planted in Syria;  and Damascus is the heart of its legend, tradition and home.<br />
  <br />
 Now, at that word “ Damascus “  it is well that we should pause. No English journal to my knowledge, and  certainly no English politician, has told people what Damascus means. Damascus  is Syria and Syria is Damascus.  Pompey knew that, and all the successful  masters of Antioch even, before him. You cannot rule Syria against the will of  Damascus ; you can always rule Syria with the support of Damascus.  Had the  Crusaders seized Damascus and held it with a sufficient garrison, Europe would  have been in the midst of Islam long since, and Islam would have withered. The  retirement (the inevitable retirement) of the combined French and German forces  from before Damascus in 1148 was the doom of the Crusades and the source of  Saladin’s triumph : Islam ousting the West.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 53[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 Now, England does not hold  Damascus, and does not seem likely to hold it. Nor is it to be presumed that the  French will be there much longer. Yet unless you hold Damascus how can you  permanently support an alien hated and despised Jewish colony in a corner of  Syria?  Can anything in the near future render the possession of the Palestinian  sea-board by the Jews a thing of such value to England that she would be willing  to risk all the Orient for that one anomalous position — which is not even a  possession?<br />
  <br />
 Attempts have indeed been made  to prove in some tortuous fashion that the holding of the coast between Acre and  Telaviv was the holding of a “key” to India.  It is lamentable nonsense.   Palestine has no strategical value to us whatsoever.  It has an indefensible  land frontier which is geographically and strategically a part of Syria in  general. Haifa as a British port has an obvious and very great strategical  value, or rather will have such when it has been fortified, but then so will  have any other point on the coast where in future a modern harbour may be  formed. Tripoli and Beyrouth are obvious examples.  Even if Palestine were held,  or part of Palestine were held, as a British colony with inhabitants among them  from this country, it would be a weakness — a debit, not an asset.  Palestine  held, not for ourselves but for somebody else who is no strength to us and owes  us no allegiance, is not only a debit but a constant peril.  To this it will be  answered “The thing has been done. It cannot be undone.  What then should we  advise?”<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 54[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 If we cut our losses by  abandoning the Jews to their fate, they will certainly be destroyed by the  surrounding power of Islam. Perhaps the only solution for the moment is the  present state of things, arranged as best it can be arranged to our future  advantage. Perhaps we can carry on for some few years at least, even for many  years, gratuitously defending an alien immigrant population against the millions  of Mohammedans, though obviously we could never do so on condition of preventing  any further extension of Jewish power in those parts.<br />
  <br />
 The compromise suggested by the  British government in this summer of 1937, can have no finality about it. But  there is a certain precarious equilibrium for the moment in the existing  presence of a large protected Jewish minority on Syrian soil. We can count for  the moment on the support of the Arab state immediately to the east, across the  Jordan, because its ruler hopes that the present arrangement will increase his  wealth and power and the number of his subjects. We are for the moment not  threatened by any other European power.  The French so long as they remain in  chaos may be neglected, the Italians are not established within close striking  distance.  But the thing remains unsettled and a full immediate solution of the  problem remains impossible.<br />
  <br />
[I][B]    Pg 55[/B][/I]<br />
   <br />
 The truth is, as everybody  knows, that we promised the Arabs their country if they would help us against  the Turks. We then broke our promise.  As a rule, to break your promise is an  advantage in this world; in this case it seems to have turned out the other way,  and all we can do is to shoulder the consequences of the error or falsehood or  betrayal, whichever you like to call it, and carry on from day to day and from  hand to mouth.<br />
  <br />
 Those who made the promise now  assure up, a score of years later, that they made a “mental reservation”  excluding Palestine, but the interval between the act and its explanation is  singularly broad, and “mental reservations” are suspect especially when the  other party never heard of them.<br />
 <br />
 [FONT=Georgia]*         *        *        *        *[/FONT]<br />
 <br />
 Such, as it seems to me, is the  standing of the triple problem in its Revolutionary, German and Zionist aspects  at the moment of writing.<br />
 <br />
<br />
 [B]H. BELLOC.[/B]<br />
<br />
 [B]KING’S LAND,[/B]<br />
<br />
 August, 1937</div>

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