The Battle Of Marathon

[Ferran]

The Battle Of Marathon

September 490 BC

by Major General Dimitris Gedeon, HEAR

Note: The term "Greek" and "Greece" are generally used when quoting other sources. In my own text I use, when appropriate, the terms "Hellas" for Greece and "Hellenes" for Greeks.

The period of the Greek history Between 492 - 479 BC is known as «The Persian Wars». It was a period of contest between the city-states of Greece and the mighty Persian Empire. The cause of the Persian Wars was the expansion policy of the Persians. It was impossible for them to expand their empire eastwards (to India), or beyond Egypt (due to the Libyan Desert) or towards the inhospitable land of the Scythes (northwards), so their only choice was to advance westwards, to the European Continent. Greece was the primary barrier they had to breech in order to achieve their objective and Athens the most decisive opponent in Greece.

The Persians needed only a pretext and Athens obligingly provided this in 500 BC when the Greek cities of Ionia in Asia Minor, forming part of the Persian Empire, revolted against the Persian rule. Athens sent twenty ships to their assistance and the small city of Eretrtia in the island of Euboea five. The rebels had some initial success and burned Sardes, the capital of the Persian satrap of Ionia but they were soon defeated by the Persians. The Persian king, Darius, upon learning that some obscure city-states from mainland Greece had sent help to the rebels, asked to be informed "what short of thing was the city of 'Athens'"! When he was briefed about those insolent Athenians, became so angry that he fired an arrow skywards and vowed to punish them. His anger was such that every night at dinner, he had a servant repeat to him "Lord, don't forget the Athenians!"

In that way the Athenians gave the Great King the pretext he needed to invade Greece and clear the road to Europe. To invade Greece Darius had two routes: one by sea and one by land, each one with advantages and disadvantages. He chose the sea route but it proved disastrous. His first expedition in 492 BC failed because a storm, sent by the Gods from Olympus, destroyed his fleet. Two years later he launched his second attempt, again by sea but with a more southern route. This expedition resulted in the battle of Marathon.

After the failure of the expedition of 492 BC King Darius ordered new preparations and according to the customs of that time he sent heralds to the Greek cities and asked "earth and water" as a token of submission. Many cities complied but many did not, Athens and Sparta first and foremost among them. The Athenians considered the demand such a mortal insult that they threw the heralds, headfirst, from Acropolis and even condemned to death the unfortunate interpreter because by translating the Persian demand had reviled the Greek language. The Spartans promptly threw the heralds into the nearest well where they could find "earth and water" in great abundance! After that the war became inevitable. In the Spring of 490 BC the Persian army and fleet were ready. Their leaders were Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, a nephew of the King. Their mission was to oblige all the other Greeks who had refused to give "earth and water" to become vassals to the Great King, but also to shack Eretria and Athens and «bring before him all their inhabitants as slaves.»

The Persian fleet conveying a force of infantry and cavalry sailed across the Aegean Sea in late August or early September 490 BC. Most of the islands along their route submitted. The siege of Eretria lasted for six days until some of its citizens helped the Persians to enter the walls. The city was sacked and its inhabitants who survived the massacre that followed were taken prisoners. From Eretria the Persian fleet crossed to Marathon bay and landed there. The site of their landing was 35 klms northeast of Athens. The strength of the Persian army must have been around 48.000 men although their numbers vary according to the different historians who have described the battle. Why did they choose Marathon? There is a story behind this decision. The Athenians at that time had just expelled Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, their last tyrant. Hippias, who together with his remaining followers in Athens dreamed of coming again to power, was with the Persian Army as an adviser. It was he who said to Datis and Artafernis to land at Marathon. They could calculate, he argued, on drawing the Athenians away of Athens, facilitating thus the seizure of power there by his followers. It seemed also that Hippias had in his mind the battle between his father's , Pisistratus, army and the army of their political opponents in that same plain forty seven years earlier. Pisistratus had won the day and restored himself in the tyrannical power.

To quote Liddel Hart, if this was the intention of the landing at Marathon, then it succeeded, for the Athenians finally decided to rush to the Marathon plain to challenge the enemy. Bat Was that decision the right one? It seems that Hippias had not known well his compatriots. The Athenians would have gone there anyway. As soon as they were informed of the Persian landing they sent a runner to Sparta to ask for help and at the same time they considered the following three possible courses of action against the threat.

• To fight the Persians at Marathon (the most daring of the three)
• To wait the Persians at the Pallini pass (15 klms east of Athens)
• To face the Persians walled in the City (the worst of the three)

The first solution prevailed due to the insistence of Miltiades, one of the ten Athenian generals. Miltiades persuaded the Athenians when he told them that their appearance in Marathon would have surprised greatly the Persians.
It seems that the lookout organization of the Athenians was very efficient and spotted immediately the landing of the enemy. One must have in mind that at that time the Athenian army could go to Marathon in 8 hours through the Pallini pass.

The Athenian runner arrived at Sparta 48 hours after he had been dispatched. The Spartans were willing to help but not to break their established law which prohibited them to leave Sparta before the moon had reached the full. So they waited for the full moon and then sent a force to help the Athenians. That force arrived after the battle of Marathon had been fought. But the Athenians had a most welcome surprise when they arrived at Marathon: a force of 1.000 Plataeans joined them there to fight with the Athenians against the common enemy. Athens would never forget that brave act of the Plataeans.

Here it is necessary to discuss the subject of the organization, command, doctrine and way of fighting of the Athenian and the Persian Armies.

The Persian Army consisted of infantry and excellent cavalry. Their doctrine was of defensive nature due to their main weapon which was the bow. The usual tactics was to wait the enemy to come close and then to "bury" him under a barrage of arrows. In 480 BC king Xerxes was dead serious when he said to King Leonidas in Thermopile that the Persian arrows would hide the sun (only to receive the Spartan reply "That is good, because we shall fight in the shade!!"). The weapons and armament of the Persian infantry made it unsuitable for close combat particularly with the heavily armed Greek Hoplites. Regarding their deployment, the Persians put in the middle of their battle formation their best troops, the Persians and the Sacae, while in the wings they deployed the soldiers provided by their vassals states. The cavalry was deployed in the flanks so that they could cover them and turn the enemy's as the case might be.

The Greek army's doctrine on the other hand was of offensive nature. Their main weapon, the long, heavy spear, their heavy armament (helmet, shield, breastplate, greaves) and their battle formation, the phalanx, favored close combat. The phalanx was deployed uniformly with a depth of eight spears. At that time the Athenian army had neither cavalry nor bows. The Athenians were divided into ten "tribes" (phylae). Each tribe had to mobilize 1.000 hoplites (soldiers) and to appoint a general as their leader. Thus the Athenian army comprised 10.000 hoplites and 10 generals. To that strength one must add a number of slaves and light infantry armed with small spears. When the army was assembled for war, each day one of the ten generals in turn was appointed as the head of the whole army for that day. Because they voted for any decision made, there was another general, appointed by the city, with the title of "polemarch" (literally "War ruler") who also had the right to vote. Thus there was no case of parity in the vote, the number of voters being eleven.

Regarding the spirit of the Athenians, who had a newly founded democratic state, I had better let Herodotus, the contemporary historian, the Father of History, to say the tale: "Liberty and Equality of civic rights are brave spirit stirring things, and they who, while under the yoke of a despot, had been no better men of war than any of their neighbors, as soon as they were free, became the foremost men of all. For each felt that in fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for himself and whatever he took in hand he was willing to do the work thoroughly."

Miltiades, one of the ten generals, belonged to one of the noblest families of Athens. He was a wealthy man. About twenty eight years before Marathon Miltiades had gone to Thrace, as ruler of the Peninsula (to day Dardanels) and lived there up to 494 BC. When the Persian Empire expanded to that territory, Miltiades submitted to the Great King Darius and watch closely the Persian Army in its expedition against Scythia. Thus he had had a good idea of their tactics. During his staying in the Peninsula, Miltiades conquered and placed under the authority of Athens the islands of Lemnos and Imbros and therefore he stood high in public opinion. So when the invasion of the Persians became known he was elected as one of the ten generals of the Athenian army. The names of five generals are known. Among them were two generals who played a vital role in the last invasion of the Persians after ten years: Aristides and Themistocles. The name of the Polemarch is also known: Callimachus.

The plain of Marathon has the form of a crescent with a length of about ten klms and a maximum width of three in the center. It narrows towards its two ends where at that time existed marshes, flooded during the period the battle took place and therefore unsuitable for cavalry operations. The Persians had run their ships ashore and they had camped in even, unbroken ground. They were greatly surprised when the saw the Athenian army arriving at Marathon and encamping at the valley of Avlona (see map). The position was unattackable. The Persian camp was in full view in the distance. To the Athenians became clear that the enemy did not intend to make an overland advance to Athens since he had left unoccupied the two passes leading to Athens. So the fear of trickery became a decisive factor for the conduct of a battle. In the war council that was held, there was a parity of votes: five generals, with Miltiades first and foremost, were in favor of immediate attack while the other five voted for attack after the arrival of the Spartans. Then Miltiades turned to Callimachus the man whose vote would be decisive and said, in the words of Herodotus: "With you it rests Callimachus either to lead Athens to slavery or, by securing her freedom to leave behind to all future generations a memory far beyond even those who made Athens a democracy. For never since the time the Athenians became a people were they in so great a danger than now...." After that address Callimachus voted for immediate battle.

For eight days the two armies stood confronting each other. In the ninth day the Persians started embarking and it became apparent that a covering force would secure the Athenian army at Marathon while the rest of the army would sail to Athens to seize the defenseless city. The situation demanded immediate action and Miltiades, whose turn to be commander in chief had come that day, ordered the army of the 10.000 Athenians and the 1.000 Plataeans to deploy for battle.

Miltiades faced two difficult problems and to solve them applied new tactics, totally deviating from the commonplace tactics the Greeks had applied so far:

• Taking into account the fact that the deployment of the Persian army was 30 men deep, (as described by Xenophon in his work Cyropaedia) the 48.000 thousand men would have formed a front-line of 1.600 meters. To equal that front-line, Miltiades had to array his army in a thin line. If the 10.000 Athenians formed a line 8 men deep their front would be only 1.250 meters wide, and thus the flanks would be dangerously exposed. But Miltiades knew from previous experience the way the Persians deployed their army: in the canter their best troops (Persians and Sacae) while in the flanks their vassals' forces (whose motivation usually was just "fight or else...." since no national cause inspired them). He also noticed that the Persian cavalry had already embarked, thus offering to him two advantages: first they posed no threat to his flanks and second they did not cover the Persian flanks. This led him to apply totally new tactics, which was to be repeated by Hannibal in the battle of Canea 3 centuries later and by the Germans in the battle of Tannenberg 24 centuries later. He deliberately weakened his own center forming a line of two Phylae in a depth of only four men (i.e. since each one of the Phylae had 1.000 men the front in the center was 500 meters wide). In each of the two flanks he deployed four more Phylae in the usual depth of 8 men, thus forming a front of 500 meters wide in each flank. (Thus the total front had a width of 500+500+500 = 1.500 meters). Finally to the left of the left flank of the Athenians he deployed the army of the Plateans with a depth of 8 men, and thus the front has a total width of 1625 meters. Callimachus took the honorary position in the right flank. The two Phylae of the center were led by two men who ten years later would become famous: the one was Aristides (the Just) who led the Athenian army in the battle of Plateae in 479 BC and the other Themistocles, the victor of Salamis in 480 BC.
• The Persian army would try to exterminate the Athenian army with arrows. The range of the bows was about 150-200 meters. Therefore this critical distance before the heavily armed hoplites could engage the Persians in close combat had to be covered in the shortest possible time, and this could only be done at the double. To that end he applied the technic of the "assault at the double". As soon as the phalanx of his hoplites would be within the range of the Persian arrows, they would run so that they could cross the killing ground in the shortest possible time and fall on the enemy with the greatest possible momentum.

So in the morning of the 17th of September 490 BC, with perfect timing, Miltiades gave the order and the 11.000 Athenians and Plataeans formed their ranks and marched against the enemy, while the hills of Marathon must have resounded by the hymn that the great tragic poet Aeschylus, who fought in all the battles of the Persian Wars, brought to our days through his famous tragedy "Persians": "On, sons of the Hellenes! Fight for the freedom of your country! Fight for the freedom of your children and of your wives, for the gods of your fathers and for the sepulchers of your ancestors! All are now staked upon the strife!"

Herodotus tells us that "When the Persians saw the Athenians coming down on them without cavalry or archers and scanty in numbers, they thought them as an army of madmen running towards their certain destruction." Soon they arrayed their troops to face the "madmen". Nearing the "killing ground" the Athenians launched the assault at the double. The engagement developed exactly as planned. In the center the Phylae of Aristides and Themistocles fought bravely but the numbers of the Persians obliged them to cave in towards the inner country where the ground gave them the possibility to regroup and renew the fighting. In the flanks the Athenians and Plataeans had routed the opposing forces. Then Miltiades gave the order: they had to forget the fleeing enemy and turn against the backs of the Persians of the victorious, so far, center. And so they did. The Persians surrounded by their opponents, their short lances and swards and their wicker shields no match for the Hellenic spears, had no chance. Hard they fought but finally the previously invincible Persians turned their backs and fled while the Athenians followed them to the ships. There took place the hardest battle and there the Athenians suffered the heaviest casualties. There fell Cynaegyrus, the brother of Aeschylus, the noble and brave war ruler Callimachus and many other Athenians. By hard fighting the Persians succeeded to save all their ships except seven that were captured. The casualties of the Hellenes amounted to 192 Athenians and un unrecorded number of Plataeans and slaves, as it is implied by the fact that the Athenians to honor their dead buried them in three tombs (mounts). In one of the tombs were buried the Athenian citizens, in the second the Plataeans and in the third the slaves. The tomb of the Athenians still exists in the plain of Marathon and it is the starting point of the Marathon race. It is believed that the tomb of the Plataeans is found at the foot of Penteli mountain. The tomb of the slaves has not yet been discovered. Among the dead slaves was a little boy killed by a Persian arrow while giving water to the fighters during the battle. The Persians lost 6400 men but in these casualties we must include a large number of prisoners. For Herodotus tells us that when Miltiades perceived that the Persian fleet could sail and attack the undefended city of Athens, he left the Phylae of Aristides and Themistocles, who had been tried hardly in the center of the line, to keep the spoils and the prisoners. Then he with the rest of the army hastened to Athens. It is also known that when the battle was nearing its end, someone at the summit of Penteli mountain lift high a shield and sent an optical message. It is assumed that this was a signal to the Persians by one of the followers of Hippias, that the City was undefended, or, more possible, to the Athenians by some special observer who from Penteli could easily see the Persian fleet sailing towards the shores of Athens.

The Persian leaders had indeed sailed to Athens and arrived at the bay of Faliron. There another surprise awaited them: in the distant hills the saw the shields of the Athenians glistening in the sun. So they set about their fleet and left for Persia. That same evening the Spartans arrived. They asked permission to inspect the battlefield and when they were granted permission they expressed their admiration for the feat of the Athenians.
Thus ended the first great engagement between Greece and Persia but it did not end the contest. Ten years later a vast Persian Army, under king Xerxes himself, would invade Greece only to be defeated in Salamis and Plataea.
Was the battle of Marathon a "decisive" battle? Two distinguished historians, Fuller in his "Military History of the Western World" and Creasy in his "Fifteen Decisive Battles" have different opinions. According to Fuller "Marathon was a remarkable battle both from the point of view of Persian Strategy which was admirable, and of Grecian tactics, which were no less so. .... For the first time in their history the Greeks had beaten the Persians on their own element, the land, and Marathon endowed the victors with a faith in their destiny which was to endure for three centuries during which western culture was born. Marathon was the birth cry of Europe."
Greasy comes closer to the Greek opinion that the battle of Marathon was decisive for the world history. According to him: "The day of Marathon broke for ever the spell of the Persian invincibility which has paralyzed men's minds. It generated among the Greeks the spirit which beat back Xerxes and afterwards led on Xenophon, Agesilaus and Alexander in terrible retaliation through their Asiatic campaigns. It secured for mankind the intellectual treasure of Athens, the growth of free institutions, the liberal enlightenment of the western world and the gradual ascendancy for many ages of the great principles of European civilization."

What is the most important from the Greek point of view is epitomized in the Epigram that was written over the tomb of the Athenians: "The Athenians, as defenders of the Hellenes, in Marathon destroyed the might of the golden-dressed Medes". The Athenians were the first to realized that UNITY of all the Greek City-states was needed to counter the Persian threat.

What are the conclusions we can draw from the battle of Marathon, the battle in which courage won over numbers and close combat won over shooting arrows?

The most important conclusion is that the battle was a triumph of the morale forces over the numbers. The Athenian citizen at Marathon, knew what he was fighting for: he was defending his land, his family, his home. On the other hand the Asian and African troops, except the Persians, did not know what they were fighting for and many of them had merely to chose who would kill them: the Athenians or the Persians!

Regarding the principles of war we can see that Miltiades applied, for the first time in recorded history, and without having graduated any Military Academy, the following:

• Offensive: He seized the initiative and ordered the attack against the Persians, with inferior numerically forces at the right moment.
• Economy of force and mass: He deployed his line of battle in such a way as to hit the weakest section of the Persian line with his strongest. In other words he applied strong combat power at the decisive place and time. In that respect he did what few generals have done: he broke a «taboo», that is he changed the long applied tactics, risking an anathema against him in case of failure.
• Unity of command. Herodotus tells us that the Athenian generals offered their turn of command to Miltiades, but he attacked the day of his turn of command. Thus he secured that all Phylae were under one responsible commander.
• Surprise: First he persuaded the Athenians to go to Marathon and then at the decisive moment he attacked the enemy, applying the new tactics, in such a way that the Persians considered the Athenians «madmen».
• Maneuver. In the battle of Marathon, Miltiades applied the maneuver of double envelopment. It does not matter that the front was not very extended. That was the way battles were fought those days. It matters that this magnificent maneuver, so often repeated by other great generals later, was conceived and directed successfully for the first time by Miltiades who had not had any previous knowledge or example.

Finally, I consider proper to offer the opinion on Miltiades by one distinguished historian, Hans Delbr(ck, who in his classic work «History of the Art of War, Warfare in Antiquity» writes:

«The figure of Miltiades as a field commander stands giant-like in the early annals of world military history. The most complete and rarest form of leadership that the art of work has evoked up to the present day, the defensive-offensive combination, is found here, in the simple lines of work of art of the first great military event. What perspicacity in his choice of the battlefield, what self-control in awaiting the enemy attack, what authority over the masses, over a proud, democratic citizens' levy, to be able to hold them fast in the chosen position and then to lead them forward to the attack at the double at the decisive moment! Everything was geared to this moment -not a minute too early, for the Athenians would have reached the enemy breathless and disordered; not a minute too late, for then too many of the enemy arrows would already have struck and the large number of falling and hesitating men would have slowed up and finally broken the power of the assault, which had to fall on the enemy line like an avalanche if it was to give victory. We shall have further occasion to discuss many a similar situation, but never a greater one.»

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GREEK WORKS

'Histories' Book 5, by Herodotus, Military Publication 1970

History of The Greek Nation, by K. Paparigopoulos, Athens 1930

Miltiades in the Battle of Marathon, by Maj. General M. Soulis, Military Review February 1972

Selected Battles, by HAGS, Army History Directorate, 1995

The Battle of Marathon, a Comparison with the Battle of Marne, by Arthour Boussier, Greek translation in the Military Review of March 1933

FOREIGN WORKS

A Military History of the Western World, by J. F. C. Fuller, Fank & Wagnalis 1954
Hellenic History, by G. W. Botsford and C. A. Robinson Jr., MACMILLAN COMPANY NEW YORK 1956

History of the Art of War, Warfare in Antiquity, by Hans Delbr(ck, Bison Books 1990

Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, by sir E. S. Creasy, The Military Service Publishing, 1955

The maps are from sir Creasy's book

Curriculum Vitae

Name: Dimitris Gedeon
Rank: Major General Hellenic Army
Present assignment: Deputy Director of the Army History Directorate of the Hellenic Army General Staff
Born: 1939
Birthplace: Athens, Greece
Service in the Army: 40 years
Branch: Infantry
Education: Military Academy class 1960
War College
National Defense School
Languages: English, French (fair)
Other assignments:

• Commander of all Infantry units up to Battalion level
• Staff Officer of the Hellenic MILREP in NATO
• Director of Special Missions Branch of the Greek War College
• Professor of Military History in the Military Academy

Written works: Over one hundred articles on battles, biographies, and general interest in Military and Civilian magazines. Translation of about one hundred books form English into Greek.
Family status: Married to Jenny. Two children, daughter Melina, 20, son John, 18.



Source: http://www.army.gr/n/e/archive/events/marathon.html