[Menydh]

Notes

1. I define an ethnic group -like Eriksen (1993: 10-12)- as a group of people, who firmly believe that they are ethnically and/or culturally distinct from the rest of the population. An ethnic group is primarily an "emic group of ascription;" in other words, how its members perceive themselves and their differences from other groups is more important than any definition or categorization done by outsiders. It is, therefore, futile to search for an objective and general definition, based on specific criteria like language, history, skin color etc., even though such criteria, to a lesser or greater degree, are included in the self-definition of ethnocultural groups.
2. An ethnic minority, then, is an ethnic group, that is numerically smaller and/or politically less powerful than the dominant group in a country's population. The term minority, of course, is a "relative and relational" concept (Eriksen, 1993: 121): It is meaningful, only in relation to the 'majority,' and it is not a permanent characterization for any ethnocultural group: Demographical changes, border changes, mass migrations, and radical social changes leading to redefinition of social boundaries can make a minority majority, and vice versa.
   
3. I therefore disagree with Walker Connor, who defines nation-state as a "territorial-political unit [...] whose borders coincide or nearly coincide with the territorial distribution of a national group" (Connor, 1978: 382). The term nation-state in this essay is defined as a territorial-political unit under the (official) control of a national/ethnic group (Staatsvolk) which is usually the majority of the population. I should emphasize 'official control,' because constitutionally and according to the International Law, nation-states and their territories are considered to belong to, or to be identified by, the Staatsvolk. That is why they are, as a rule, named after the dominant or majority group; thus, Germany is the land of the Germans, France, the land of the French, Turkey, the land of the Turks, etc. Ethnic or national homogeneity, as I try to explain in this article, is not a requirement for a state to be called a nation-state. Rather, it is a goal to be achieved by the state and/or a claim that would induce the population to collectively imagine itself as homogenous.
4. Even though there are some very well-researched, very elaborate case studies involving irredentism (see, for example: Jacob, 1981 and Kolsto et al., 1993), one can find very few books or articles that examine irredentism as a general, global phenomenon.
5. Landau (1995) also examines, as a special type of irredentism, the 'pan-' ideologies and movements (e.g. Pan-Turkism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, and pan-Arabism -- see also Mixed Nationalisms in the text) that generally aim at promoting the solidarity or union of ethnic groups physically in different states, but connected with each other by a common or similar language, race or tradition or by some other tie, such as geographic proximity.
   
   
6. Through a research on secessionism, Heraclides (1990) reached parallel and corroborating conclusions: He found out that neighboring states find it difficult to avoid becoming involved in nearby conflicts, and that states which are adjacent to the secessionist region of a neighboring state are likely to support the secessionists, thus contributing to the violence.
   
   
7. That minority, incidentally, being concentrated in 'its' territory, may even be the numerical majority in that area (Carment & James, 1995).
8. Robert K. Merton defines self-fulfilling prophesy as "[a process through which] public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments" (Merton, 1948: 195).
   
   
9. An irredentism aiming at liberating a minority obviously cannot develop if the minority members do not feel somewhat discontented with the policies of the nation-state under whose jurisdiction they live. Thus, it usually is the (discriminatory) policies of the nation-state that trigger the conflict. Irredentism emerges as a reaction to those policies (Jacob, 1981).
10. McIntosh et al. (1995) have found out in their research conducted in Romania and Bulgaria, that the threat factor associated both with the ethnic minority (Hungarians in Romania, Turks in Bulgaria) and a neighboring state that is feared to have irredentist goals (Hungary vis-a-vis Romania and Turkey vis-a-vis Bulgaria) is the main predictor of intolerance toward the minorities, and the primary excuse for oppressive policies.
11. In the meantime, the irredentist state, through "international networks of communication, including the mass media" is usually engaged in a widespread 'expression of passionate interest' toward the minority (Gurr, 1992: 4).
    
    
12. I would argue that the conflict in Kosovo is a typical example of this process of self-fulfilling prophecy (see, for instance, Denitch, 1994: 117-126).
    
    
13. Consider, for instance the conflicts in Krajina (in Croatia), Bosnia, Kosovo, Transdnistria, or Kashmir. All of them are, at least partially, irredentist.
14. This type of irredentism is usually justified/rationalized through historical arguments: "That territory used to be part of our homeland, but was unjustly taken from us" (Mayall, 1990: 57).
15. On the other hand, the desire to redeem a minority without redeeming a territory usually results in mass migrations (like the migration of Russian and Ethiopian Jews to Israel) which is a phenomenon quite different from irredentism, at least as it is defined and delineated in this essay.
16. Nevertheless, in some cases, ethnic minorities might not benefit from that compromise at all. On the contrary, they might be totally obliterated through mass transfers of populations. For example, the bloodiest and most violent phase of the irredentist conflict between Greece and Turkey ended with a compulsory transfer of populations: 1.3 million Greeks and Christians had to leave Turkey and migrate to Greece and about 500,000 Turks and Muslims left Greece and migrated to Turkey, This marked the end of the Greek presence in Asia Minor and of the Turkish presence in Greece (except Western Thrace) (Chazan, 1991b; see also: Kitsikis, 1988).
    
    
17. For a comparison and contrast between utopias and ideologies, see Mannheim (1936).
    
    
18. Even authoritarian regimes become vulnerable after such a failure. There are many examples of dictatorships that could not survive after failing to achieve an irredentist goal: Two recent examples of authoritarian regime collapse after a failure of an irredentist attempt are the Greek junta after having failed to annex Cyprus in 1974, and the Argentine junta, after the Falklands debacle in 1982.
    
    
19. These leaders are generally aware and worried that even if irredentist goals are achieved and their group joins the 'mother country,' their influence will decline, for their authority will become subordinate to the national leadership (Horowitz, 1992).
    
    
20. One could argue that if it were not for the influence and pressure of the US, an agreement like the one that was reached in Dayton could not have been achieved, and the Bosnian conflict, a conflict of multiple irredentisms, could not have entered the phase of settlement.
    
    
21. As Jacob (1981) indicates, to speak of the resolution of an ethnic conflict is very difficult, for such conflicts tend to have a recurring character. Even after a mutually satisfactory agreement is reached, ethnic conflicts may continue in a latent form; and when circumstances change, they may resurface again.