[Prussian]

The Process of Unification

For reasons of economy the annual recruitment for the army had not been increased, despite the fact that the population of Prussia had doubled since 1815. So in practice no universal military service existed and some 24,000 draft-age youth escaped military service each year. There was some traditional antimilitarist sentiment among Prussian liberals, that accounts for this, but the equally traditional economy-mindedness of laissez faire liberalism also played a role.

Perhaps, this antimilitarist sentiment was not as powerful as some have alleged, since the crux of the problem turned cut to be a political issue. In short, William I did not trust the Landwehr (Prussian army).

I. The Landwehr Problem

William wanted a tightly-knit officer corps, which he considered to be the best protection against the popular wish of his people for freedom and self-government. William wanted to keep recruits for a period of three years, instead of the normal two, in order to give him time to develop loyalty to the crown among the soldiers. The opposition, on the other band, thought of the Landwehr as an expression of a more popular and liberal regime.

The Army Bill, introduced in the Prussian Landtag (diet) on February 10, 1860, sought an increase of 39 infantry divisions and 10 cavalry regiments. This, in fact, would have made military service compulsory. Parity between the new recruits (the line) and the Landwehr was thus abandoned. Latter the Landwehr would have come under the command of line officers. The Landwehr would thus have been separated from the field army. The military establishment did accept the increase in army size, but they also retained the Landwehr as such and the traditional two-year service period.

The government of Prussia then did something that could hardly have been done anywhere else. It used the 9 million thaler grant to proceed on the reform without having explicit authorization from the Landtag. This lead to a deadlock between government and diet. A new diet in 1861 refused to pass the reform bill or to increase the size of the general budget. The so-called "new era" in Prussia then came to an end with the resignation of the liberal Auerswald Ministry.

Another diet in 1862 was elected with an even greater block of representatives from the Progressive Party, now powerful enough to attempt major constitutional reform by using the Landwehr issue. The new Landtag wanted to reduce the power of the upper house of the diet, since it was the lever of government manipulation. An impasse had been reached and the king was desperate.

II. The Arrival of Bismarck

At this point Bismarck was brought into the picture. He was what the Germans call a Herrennatur (dominant personality). As an old-fashioned landed aristocrat, Bismarck had absolutely no sympathy for urban, bourgeois life. From the start he believe that force against Austria was necessary to push her out of the scene and then unify Germany without Austria. As a matter of tactic, he believed that one had to bring any situation to such a point that improvement became an absolute necessity. He also believed, and this is important, that foreign policy always determined domestic policy. The Germans call this das Primat der Aussenpolitik (the primacy of foreign policy).

On September 30, 1862 Bismarck made his famous iron and blood speech before the budget commission, where the army bill was bottled up. He said, in effect, that no amount of debating and negotiating is ever going to unify Germany; if she is s going to be unified it will have to be done by military force. He then practiced what he preached by withdrawing the budget proposal and ordering the government bureaucracy to collect taxes without Diet authorization. No minister before him had had the courage to do such a thing. To rationalize his actions he developed the new "theory of the gap" (Lücke): there was no provision in the constitution that tells us which of the three institutions (upper house, lower house, crown) must yield when no agreement exists among them. Since the state must continue to live, the government simply has to collect taxes and spend them.

Simultaneously, Bismarck launched a loud campaign against the liberal opposition in the Diet and the press. Public sentiment at this point was largely lined up against the government. Even Crown Prince Frederick disassociated himself pointedly from the repressive measures Bismarck pushed. It was Ferdinand Lasalle, the father of German socialism, who showed how the Prussian situation (unlike the English) made it possible for the people to continue paying taxes without parliamentary authorization. Respect for monarchical authority and a deeply ingrained sense of obedience to superiors did the trick for Bismarck. He knew his fellow countrymen well. Then foreign wars and nationalist issues interfered to overshadow the progress of German liberalism.

III. The Wars of Unification

Bismarck had to fight three wars to unify Germany. The 1864 Danish War helped Bismarck consolidate his internal position in Prussia. The War of 1866 ousted Austria from leadership in Germany for good. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 brought the South under the aegis of the Prussian eagle. That was the unification process in a nutshell. Now let us look at it in some detail.

A. The Danish War: 1864-1865

Liberal sentiment in Germany had always been stirred by a desire to separate Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. The liberals called for a repudiation of international agreements by Prussia (such as the 1852 Protocol which put the Danish issue on ice) , while Bismarck declared in the Diet that he would not be a party to a breach of international obligations. So Bismarck made an agreement with Austria, the avowed enemy of German unity, to proceed within the context of the 1852 Protocol"

The two powers then sent an ultimatum to Denmark on January 16, 1864 demanding a withdrawal of the constitution of Nov. 18 (which incorporated Schleswig in Denmark) within 48 hours or face military action. Denmark, counting on the support of the European Powers, rejected the ultimatum" France hesitated to join England, which refused to act alone. So the powers did nothing. An attempt at mediation also failed. Denmark was therefore reduced to submission by Prussian and Austrian military force.

In the Treaty of Gastein (Aug. 1865) Prussia and Austria decided how to dispose of the acquired duchies. The two powers decided to rule the two duchies jointly, with Austria administering Holstein and Prussia administering Schleswig. Prussia was given certain military roads through Holstein and command of Kiel, which was to be a port of the German Confederation. Both duchies were compelled to join the Zollverein, which was of course to Prussia's benefit since she controlled the customs union for all practical purposes.

But that was not all; Prussia also annexed Lauenburg, although she paid a price of 2.5 million thaler for it. The German claimant to the throne of the two duchies, Augustenberg, was completely ignored. All this seemed fair enough, although Prussia obviously got the better end of the stick. But Bismarck had no intention of leaving things as they were. It is surprising that the statesmen of Austria did not see this.

B. The Prusso-Austrian War: 1866

Bismarck believed that trouble and eventual war with Austria would be inevitable. His entire policy from 1863 to 1866 was predicated on war with Austria. He had made sure that Russia would not intervene when he Russia would not intervene when he sympathized with Russia in crushing the Polish revolution of 1863. Napoleon III was maneuvered into a favorable position by all kinds of vague promises for territorial aggrandizement in 1865. An alliance with Italy was made in April, 1866, through Napoleon's assistance, which stipulated that Italy would come to the aid of Prussia if a war with Austria broke out in three months. Bismarck also tried to get Bavarian support but failed.

It is interesting that not a single German state was with Prussia when the war actually came. The liberal and progressive majority in the Prussian diet was somewhat mollified after the Banish wag, but still actively opposed to the government. Bismarck then adopted some Caesarism from Napoleon III and Disreali.

He presented a plan to the Confederate Diet in April, 1866, which called for the acceptance of the 1849 electoral laws, including universal equal and secret ballot. It was a tactical move to embarrass Austria since he knew Austria would oppose the planned reform. He really believed that universal suffrage would work to his advantage, hoping that the clergy and the landowners would be able to win the peasants to the conservative side. The growth of the worker movement would also help since Lasalle was the chief enemy of the liberals, whose main support came from the upper bourgeoisie. In fact Bismarck and Lasalle had several important talks which increased Bismarck's confidence that his gambit would work.

Bismarck then moved towards the showdown by accusing Austria of arming and troop movements in Bohemia. He called it "seditious agitation" and further accused Austria of supporting the unlucky Augustenburg. Strangely enough when the Prussian king put pressure on Vienna, Austria seemed willing to disarm, but false rumors that Italy was arming scared Austria and moved her in the opposite direction. So Austria mobilized first and at the same time brought the various minor problems which had developed over Schleswig-Holstein before the Federal Diet in order to gain the support of the other German states. Bismarck immediately cried that this was a breach of the Gastein Convention. When Austria shortly thereafter convoked the Holstein diet, Prussian troops marched into Holstein. Austria called on the armies of the Confederation to act against what it called illegal actions of Prussia in Holstein.

Meanwhile Bismarck presented a new plan for the reorganization of the Confederation. This was laid on the table about the same time that Bavaria proposed to choose a commander for the Confederate armies and to mobilized the forces of the smaller states. When the Bavarian proposal won by a vote of 9 to 6 the Prussian delegate declared the Confederation dissolved and the existence of a state of war.

It was a quick war--three weeks in duration. Sadowa or Königgratz in Bohemia was the crucial battle which turned into an easy victory for Prussia, thanks to excellent organization and the famous new needle gun. The king, who had been hesitant before now wanted to invade Austria, but Bismarck, the ever-calculating diplomat, demurred. He knew the value of restraint. He was not interested in crushing Austria but in removing her from German politics. Baden and Württemberg were treated most leniently. Bavaria was forced to sign a secret treaty to aid Prussia in any future war with France.

The North German Confederation was formed by the annexation of various smaller states and the unavoidable adhesion of some larger states north of the Main river. The whole business was considered to be a revolution by most contemporary observers. What the liberals bad dreamed of for five decades, Bismarck achieved in three short weeks. Austria was permanently eliminated from German affairs.

Only some South German Catholic leaders and the socialists remained critical of Bismarck. Success had turned most of his former enemies into friends and admirers. The new Prussian diet elected on the day of the Battle of Königgratz showed a decided shift to the Right. William claimed that the victory was due to his army reforms.

An Indemnity Bill passed the new diet 230 to 75, with the Poles, Catholics and Progressives voting against. This strange little maneuver legalized the budgets of 1862 to 1864, allocated 154,000,000 thalers for 1866 and confirmed the government promise to produce periodic expenditures and receipts for money spent. A further vote of confidence on the conduct of foreign affairs also passed 230 to 83. The memory of Bismarck's triumph was a powerful factor in sapping the strength and vitality of German parliamentary life for years to come.

C. The Franco-Prussian War: 1870-1871

But Germany was not yet fully unified. The South remained outside the fold and here is where France and Napoleon III came into the picture. Napoleon was vulnerable. He was forced to modify the traditional Richelieuan policy toward Germany because of his nationalities doctrine. But Napoleon's policy was still somewhat equivocal on German unification, as if he could not decide which was more important his belief in national self-determination or to keep France stronger than the new Germany would be. Bismarck however helped him to decide when he outmaneuvered Napoleon on the Luxembourg and Belgian issue. These disappointments plus the failure of the Mexican venture made Napoleon determined to have some kind of diplomatic triumph.

French policy on the whole was jittery and erratic, reflecting Napoleon"s uncertain position at home. French public opinion was not very militant. Ollivier and Gramont, the chief political leaders, preferred peace, but certain "statesmen" in France made mistakes. There were premature threats of war, there were impudent demands made on the Germans (particularly on July 12, 1870) and there was serious misinterpretation of French public opinion. Nevertheless, he who thinks war is necessary is responsible for it and Bismarck thought it was necessary to bring the South of Germany into the union.

Now, strange as it may seem, the Franco-Prussian War actually began in Spain. Queen Isabella was dethroned by a military coup in 1868. The Spanish parliament then began to look for candidates to replace her. Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen became one of the candidates. Bismarck was the prince's chief promoter, since he believed it would bring on the war he had failed to trigger over the Luxembourg affair of 1867. The news of Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish crown hit France like a bombshell on July 2. Gramont, the foreign minister made vague threats in the French Corp Legislatif: "We should know how to do our duty."

On July 9 the French ambassador Benedetti interviewed King William who was taking the bath at Bad Ems in Southwest Germany. The King apparently was persuaded by Benedetti to force Leopold to retract his candidacy. So on duly 12 Leopold retracts, being a good and obedient member of the Hohenzollern family. Now the matter should have rested there. But the French began to blunder and Bismarck's ingenuity fanned the embers of bad feeling into the flame of war.

Gramont was not satisfied with Benedetti's accomplishment. So Bennedetti was sent to see the king again and demand an unequivocal promise never to allow Leopold to renew his candidacy. Gramont was out for a big diplomatic triumph and so he played a game of tremendous risk, underestimating Bismarck's cleverness. Benedetti tried to see the king again, but the latter refused to grant him an audience. However, on duly 13 the king was taking a stroll through the park when Benedetti suddenly materialized from among the trees to accuse the king and make his demand for a definite promise. The king politely refused to make such a promise. A report of the affair was sent to Bismarck in Berlin by an official with the Kings's authority.

When Bismarck read this famous Ems Telegram he immediately saw his opportunity. By clever abridgement of the Ems dispatch Bismarck achieved a terse and sharply worded text which made it look like outright provocation on the part of France. He had it published in the newspapers, saying that it would have the effect of a red cloth upon the Gallic bull. That is exactly the effect it had since the French considered the doctored telegram a provocation. On duly 19 France declared war on the North German Confederation.

Only Bavaria hesitated for a moment in joining Bismarck:s war. Russia promised neutrality. England became neutral when Bismarck published Benedetti's plan for the annexation of Belgium which had been worked out with Bismarck.s benign approval right after the Battle of Königsgratz. The war did not last long. The fortress of Sedan fell on September 2, 1870 and the Emperor Napoleon walked across the German lines with his hands high in the air. Now a revolution broke out in Paris and Paris did not surrender until January 28, 1871. The Peace of Frankfurt was concluded on May 10.

France had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion francs. East Lorraine had to be surrendered to Germany although Bismarck showed no great enthusiasm for taking them until certain industrialists pointed out their economic and hence military value. Northern France was occupied until 1873, when the indemnity was completely paid.

On January 18, 1871 William was crowned as the Emperor of Germany in the French Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The Germans know how to add insult to injury and thus lay the groundwork for future wars. Victor Hugo made a profound prophesy at this time that France would retake Alsace and Lorraine and even the Rhineland and make Germany a republic.

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Documents of German Unification, 1848-1871

Johann Gustav Droysen: Speech to the Frankfurt Assembly, 1848

We cannot conceal the fact that the whole German question is a simple alternative between Prussia and Austria. In these states German life has its positive and negative poles--in the former, all the interests which are national and reformative, in the latter, all that are dynastic and destructive. The German question is not a constitutional question, but a question of power; and the Prussian monarchy is now wholly German, while that of Austria cannot be. . . .We need a powerful ruling house. Austria's power meant lack of power for us, whereas Prussia desired German unity in order to supply the deficiencies of her own power. Already Prussia is Germany in embryo. She will "merge" with Germany. . .


Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia: Proclamation of 1849

I am not able to return a favorable reply to the offer of a crown on the part of the German National Assembly [meeting in Frankfurt], because the Assembly has not the right, without the consent of the German governments, to bestow the crown which they tendered me, and moreover because they offered the crown upon condition that I would accept a constitution which could not be reconciled with the rights of the German states.


Otto von Bismarck: Letter to Minister von Manteuffel, 1856

Because of the policy of Vienna [the Congress of Vienna, 1815], Germany is clearly too small for us both [Prussia and Austria]; as long as an honorable arrangement concerning the influence of each in Germany cannot be concluded and carried out, we will both plough the same disputed acre, and Austria will remain the only state to whom we can permanently lose or from whom we can permanently gain. . . .I wish only to express my conviction that, in the not too distant future, we shall have to fight for our existence against Austria and that it is not within our power to avoid that, since the course of events in Germany has no other solution.


Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke: 1866

The war of 1866 [between Prussia and Austria] was entered on not because the existence of Prussia was threatened, nor was it caused by public opinion and the voice of the people; it was a struggle, long foreseen and calmly prepared for, recognized as a necessity by the Cabinet, not for territorial aggrandizement, for an extension of our domain, or for material advantage, but for an ideal end--the establishment of power. Not a foot of land was exacted from Austria, but she had to renounce all part in the hegemony of Germany. . . Austria had exhausted her strength in conquests south of the Alps, and left the western German provinces unprotected, instead of following the road pointed out by the Danube. Its center of gravity lay out of Germany; Prussia's lay within it. Prussia felt itself called upon and strong enough to assume the leadership of the German races.


Otto von Bismarck: 1866

We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia. . . .The acquisition of provinces like Austria Silesia and portions of Bohemia could not strengthen the Prussian state; it would not lead to an amalgamation of German Austria with Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed from Berlin as a mere dependency. . . .Austria's conflict and rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her; our task was the establishment or foundation of German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia.


The Imperial Proclamation, January 18, 1871

Whereas the German princes and the free cities have unanimously called upon us to renew and to assume, with the restoration of the German Empire, the German imperial office, which has been empty for more than sixty years; and Whereas adequate arrangements have been provided for this in the constitution of the German Confederation;

We, Wilhelm, by the grace of God King of Prussia, do herewith declare that we have considered it a duty to our common fatherland to answer the summons of the united German princes and cities and to accept the German imperial title. In consequence, we and our successors on the throne of Prussia will henceforth bear the imperial title in all our relations and in all the business of the German Empire, and we hope to God that the German nation will be granted the ability to fashion a propitious future for the fatherland under the symbol of its ancient glory. We assume the imperial title, conscious of the duty of protecting, with German loyalty, the rights of the Empire and of its members, of keeping the peace, and of protecting the independence of Germany, which depends in its turn upon the united strength of the people. We assume the title in the hope that the German people will be granted the ability to enjoy the reward of its ardent and self-sacrificing wars in lasting peace, within boundaries which afford the fatherland a security against renewed French aggression which has been lost for centuries. And may God grant that We and our successors on the imperial throne may at all times increase the wealth of the German Empire, not by military conquests, but by the blessings and the gifts of peace, in the realm of national prosperity, liberty, and morality. Wilhelm I, Kaiser und König.

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