[Menydh]

Ottoman Authors on the Lepanto Defeat

Writing history was considered an official pursuit in the Ottoman world and Ottoman historians – “chroniclers” is perhaps a better word – were exclusively state officials who climbed up the social ladder thanks to their connections (intisab) in the Palace milieu. In their writings, Ottoman chroniclers tended to devote more space to individuals and institutions than to the ideas and developments of their times. Where their narration of events is concerned, they adopted a descriptive method and usually shied away from passing judgments on the consequences of events. In their pursuits they were often impeded by a series of concerns which included primarily the risk of being reported to the Sultan or a high-ranking official. Thus they left aside their own reactions to a particular event, and the views of the other parties, who might have been directly involved with this event, remain largely unaddressed. Occasionally the views of the sultans and high-ranking bureaucrats, particularly viziers connected to the causes and effects of events are quoted but usually in a politically correct fashion. Thus, by and large, Ottoman chroniclers, by the nature of their trade, upheld the state and appraised past and present rulers, since criticism of the latter meant exile, if not decapitation.

The dead does not speak; therefore putting the blame on the dead was always an easy way out for Ottoman chroniclers. That is what the early Ottoman narrators of the Lepanto defeat did in their accounts for the most part. They put the whole blame of the defeat on the shoulders of the grand admiral who was killed in action, together with his sons. The only Ottoman commander who managed to escape the battle scene was Uluç Ali Paşa, who was appraised unanimously by all Ottoman authors. This might have been owing to the fact that the Ottoman sultan Selim II promoted him to the rank of grand admiral after the defeat and he proved his skills in the battle field in several campaigns that were organized and won during his tenure. Thus Ottoman authors made a teleological assessment of his performance in the Lepanto Battle and avoided from casting any doubt on the decision of the sultan to promote him to the rank of grand admiral.

Several Ottoman chroniclers, whose writings were surveyed for this paper, seem to have reproduced the narrative of the event from one another. A major difference is observed in the numerical information they give about the size of the Ottoman and Holy League fleet. The size of the Ottoman fleet is given as 170 by Katip Çelebi, 250 by Solakzade, 184 by Selaniki and 300 by Peçevi. The last number is consistent with the number provided by European sources. Although Ottoman chroniclers differ greatly about the number of Ottoman vessels, they all stress the fact that the Ottoman fleet replaced all its losses and sailed out on time the following spring with a fleet that the enemy were unwilling to confront. Here the only different view comes from Peçevi, who maintains that the Ottoman fleet was unwilling to confront the enemy on account of what had happened the previous year.

The chroniclers surveyed for this paper all produced their writings at a time when the Ottoman intelligentsia began to adopt a more critical tone over the current state of affairs. Sometimes motivated by their personal concerns, the Ottoman chroniclers also tried to diagnose the sources of “decline” that, they thought, plagued the empire. Here they focused on the changes in the institutions and practices rather than on the dynamics of the events covered in their narratives. Thus, where the Lepanto defeat was concerned, Katip Çelebi wrote about the failure to fulfill certain conditions before launching a comprehensive expedition. In his view, as it will be shown in the following pages, the Ottoman military leadership failed to prepare properly for such warfare. He also alludes to the composition of oarsmen employed on Ottoman ships, arguing that the number of Muslim oarsmen on a ship should exceed the number of Christians and other non-Muslims in order to maintain discipline and order. Almost all the authors under review emphasize the importance of commanding skills that were required to lead an army to victory. They all seem to agree that none of the commanders, with the exception of Uluç Ali Paşa, possessed those skills. Thus all the chroniclers believe that the grand admiral of the Ottoman navy, Müezzinzade Ali Paşa, was certainly not qualified for this position since he was of janissary background and had no knowledge of maritime affairs, let alone naval warfare. This view should be interpreted as an indirect criticism of the Ottoman sultan who appointed to him to this post but no Ottoman chronicler dared to say a word on the “decision” of the sultan. Certain Ottoman chroniclers used Lepanto as a metaphor to criticize the fiscal policies of the governments of their times. Peçevi, for example, who wrote his history during the early seventeenth century when the Ottoman government was implementing a harsh policy of taxation on subject populations, underscored that the Ottoman Sultan Selim II and his grand vizier Sokullu managed the reconstruction of the entire Ottoman fleet, indeed a gigantic task, without imposing any urgent taxes on the populations. The slight differences in the representation of the Lepanto incident by Ottoman chroniclers, which will be laid out in the following pages, should be considered against the background of those concerns, since those concerns are embedded in the dynamics of power according to which the sixteenth-century Ottoman state and society were structured and operated.

The most detailed narrative of the Lepanto incident is found in Katip Çelebi (1609-1658) who completed his work in 1655.²⁹ Katip Çelebi, a geographer and cartographer, is one of the Ottoman writers who used a special term to designate the battle of Lepanto. He opted for the term «the expedition of the defeated fleet» to label the Lepanto defeat. Most of the information found in his narrative on the preparations prior to the campaign and the situation of the navy were derived from earlier chronicles such as those of Peçevi and Selaniki. Unlike Peçevi, Katip Çelebi does not provide any detail concerning the departure of the fleet from Istanbul. He begins his narrative with the naval activities of two commanders, Pertev Paşa and Müezzinzade Ali Paşa, who joined their forces during the siege of Cyprus and moved to Rhodes, and then attacked Crete. When they were plundering those islands, the fleet of Uluç Ali Paşa joined them with twenty ships under his command. Together they attacked the island of Cefalonia and seized three Venetian fortresses; at the time of which they were still uninformed about the activities of the enemy fleet. Since it was winter time, most of the timariot cavalry on Ottoman ships asked for permission to return home, which they were granted. Some oarsmen and warriors on ships also took advantage of the opportunity to leave their ships when the fleet anchored at the port of Lepanto. There the news arrived about the coming of the enemy fleet – the author curses the enemy fleet – to confront the imperial fleet. Unlike the other Ottoman writers, Katip Çelebi provides detailed information about the composition of the allied fleet, that is, the types and conditions of ships, the number of soldiers aboard, the contribution of each participating party, the names of commanders etc. Katip Çelebi is more realistic and neutral in his representation of the discussions between various Ottoman commanders: where Uluç Paşa’s resistance to the proposal of confronting the allied Christian fleet close to the coast is concerned, the author makes it clear that Uluç Paşa’s objection emanated from his knowledge of the conditions of the ships in the Ottoman fleet. In his view the ships were worn out owing to the six-month campaign that they have been involved in. However, the rhetoric eventually prevailed and the Ottoman fleet engaged the allied Christian fleet in the name of the Sultan and Islam.

Katip Çelebi is one of those rare Ottoman chroniclers who deviate from the traditional narrative and draws lessons from each event. In his view, the defeat at Lepanto showed that the situation of the enemy had not been inspected carefully by frontier commanders. «For future campaigns, the commanders must consider the possibi- lity of peace first even if the power of the enemy is considered sufficient to overcome. If they choose to war, they must consider their decision in detail and base it on the relevant rules and regulations. Those frontier commanders should not attack first but should stay put and promptly use their soldiers. If the defeat is inevitable, survival should be considered as an indication of skill», alluding to the action of Uluç Ali Paşa in the final phase of the Lepanto Battle. He thinks, it is better to lose all the soldiers than losing one commander: «Where sea wars are concerned, they are not like land wars. The commanders should examine maritime laws to the purpose of which they should read books of law and orders».

The second Ottoman chronicler who was surveyed for this paper is Peçevi (1574-1650).³⁰ Early in his career Peçevi was in charge of conducting a census in Lepanto, A˘griboz and Karlı I·li and was familiar with the writings of Ottoman writers such as Celalzade Nişancı Mustafa, Ramazanzade Ali and Katip Mehmed Efendi. He provides a detailed account of the campaign. He gives the number of ships in the Ottoman fleet as well above 300, twenty of which were under the command of Uluç Ali Paşa. With the participation of the ships owned by the Ottoman statesmen (ümera) and the small ships of the levends, the total number of vessels amounted to 400. Having just returned to the Imperial Arsenal from the Cyprus Campaign, the Ottoman fleet was repaired and fitted out with a view to being sent against the enemy fleet which was feared to attack the Ottoman forces on Cyprus, still continuing the siege of the fortress of Magosa (Famagosta). But the number of oarsmen and warriors on the ships was not high due to the fact that the fleet had sailed earlier than the regular season. They sailed to Cyprus, where they recruited further men and obtained provisions. Then the Ottoman sailors attacked and spoiled the island of Cefalonia and several other neighboring islands. Then they anchored in the harbor of Lepanto where they learned that the fleet of the infidels had set out to confront them. The discussion amongst the commanders focused on the issue of man power. Pertev Paşa, the commander of the land forces, argued that the number of oarsmen and warriors was not sufficient to confront the enemy forces and the timariot cavalry in the neighboring districts created different pretexts and got permission to leave their posts. Since the fleet was short of men and provisions it stayed put in the harbor and waited for the enemy fleet to attack. The grand admiral, Müzzinzade Ali Paşa, with his head at stake, invoked the fervor of Islam and the honor of the sultan, to convince the other commanders to proceed with the attack. Despite the objection of the most experienced person, Uluç Ali Paşa, the final decision rested with the Grand Admiral, who underscored the fact that the order to attack had come from Istanbul and he feared not of losing his office but his head. Then the discussion shifted to the issue of positioning during which the commanders once again differed in their views. While Uluç Ali Paşa insisted that the fleet should confront the enemy in open sea, the Grand Admiral preferred to position the fleet close to the shore. Once again the opinion of the Grand Admiral prevailed, sealing the fate of the Ottoman fleet. The allied Christian fleet attacked the Ottoman fleet from the sea side and sent to the bottom of the sea the ship of the Grand Admiral which they had spotted owing to its three distinguishing lights. The Grand Admiral was killed and his sons captured. The oarsmen and warriors on Ottoman ships quickly evacuated their ships and fled, proving the hindsight of Uluç Ali Paşa, who had argued all along that being close to the shore would encourage the soldiers to disembark their ships in the first instance. Pertev Paşa also fled the battle scene to take refugee in the mountains. Uluç Ali Paşa took advantage of the wind and, after some fighting with the enemy ships, managed to sail away from the harbor of Lepanto. Upon his return to Istanbul, he was promoted to the rank of Grand Admiral, the word “Sword” being added to his name to signify the bravery that he had shown in the battle.

In Peçevi’s view, the seas of the Islamic states if not those of the whole world had not seen such an unblessed war since the invention of ship by the Prophet Noah. Some 190 pieces of oar-ships with all their oarsmen and warriors numbering 20,000 were lost; though the loss was worth the cause. The reaction of the Ottomans to the disastrous defeat was the construction of a new fleet within the space of 5-6 months, the cost of which was paid from the treasury without imposing any urgent taxes (akçe-i imdadiye) on the subject populations and without asking private individuals to provide ships. Before concluding his narrative of Lepanto, Peçevi makes a particular reference to the reactions of the “infidel” to the rebuilding of the fleet in such a short time. He says «they did not believe that we would be able to construct those ships let alone finding the necessary manpower to operate them. When they saw such a perfect navy, they said this is such a nation that lost so many ships at once and managed to construct the same number of ships in six months». Before he jumps to the narration of other events, he talks about the limited confrontation of the Muslims (he never uses the word «Ottomans») and the infidel (he never uses the word Christian) once again off the coast of Coron in 1572, when the Muslims decided not to pursue the engagement further due to the fear of the last year’s defeat and the infidel sailing away with the pride of last year’s victory.

The Third Ottoman chronicler whose narrative of the defeat at Lepanto is examined is Solakzade (d. 1657)³¹ who wrote his history between 1058 (1648) and 1099 (1687) which covers the period from the emergence of the Ottoman state to the end of Murad II’s reign. His coverage of Lepanto is quite concise and dry. He provides no details concerning the battle. The only interesting aspect of his account is the title of the section: «The defeat of the fleet with the order of God». The story is as follows: a fleet of 250 galleys was sent against the enemy territories to obtain spoils. Since the Grand Admiral was uninformed of the science of sea and Pertev Paşa, the commander of the land forces, lacked experience in warfare and open confrontation, the soldiers of Islam succumbed to the three hundred galleys of the Venetians which they faced somewhere across the fortress of Morea. Most of the galleys were sunk to the bottom of the sea. Only Kılıç Ali Paşa managed to flee the battle scene and return to the World of Islam with thirty-forty galleys. The naval campaign was renowned as the defeated fleet (Sıngun Donanması) amongst the people. Solakzade continues to narrate the ensuing developments. «Although in order to take revenge from the enemy of religion, with the initiative of the Grand Vizier Sokullu Paşa and the supervision of Kılıç Ali Paşa, the same year mountainous efforts were put into the construction of 250 pieces of galleys. The newly constructed fleet was then sent to the open sea to show its strength to the enemy of the religion. But they failed to materialize the oat of revenge and only inspected the maritime districts and made sure that no damage was inflicted by the enemy upon the lands of Islam. But then with the mediation of France, the Venetians approached us with a peace proposal which their ambassadors submitted to us. Their peace proposal was accepted and documents were signed to this effect. The Venetians prayed for friendship but this does not mean that they would honor their word and never attack the ships owned by the Muslims.

The forth Ottoman chronicler is Selaniki who starts his seventeenth-century account of the campaign with a brief description of the alliance between the Spaniards and the Venetians.³² He says «they signed a pact of alliance with an oath on their false religion to take revenge of the defeat at Cyprus and began to collect men and money in order to form a strong fleet against the fleet of the Muslims. They also declared that “somnolence is not allowed”». The Sultan, hullidet hilafetuhu, issued a decree to the Serdar (Ahmet Paşa) and the Grand Admiral (Ali Paşa) for the capture of the Zaklise and Çuka islands, authorizing them to allow the soldiers of Islam to take spoils from these places. Having located the place of the fleet of the miserable infidels, you must confront it. As instructed the soldiers of Islam fully spoiled those islands and then proceeded to situate themselves across Venice. Uninformed of the preparations on the part of the Holy League, the oarsmen and warriors on Ottoman ships seem to have disembarked. However, many of the warriors failed to return to their ships which created a major shortage of man power. Accordingly the janissaries and tımariot cavalry on these islands were summoned to embark on the ships. A further order was issued to bring soldiers and azaps (auxiliary footmen) from the fortresses in the neighboring districts by all possible means. Uluç Ali Paşa made a final attempt to convince the commanders to confront the enemy in open sea but to no avail. The Grand Admiral, ignoring the calls about the absence of enough marines, attacked the enemy fleet. Seeing that his ship was destroyed by the Christians and he was shot by an enemy gun, many soldiers on Ottoman ships deserted their positions and fled. Uluç Ali Paşa victoriously sailed away from the battle scene while the other commander, Pertev Paşa received the curses of people and returned home. With this occasion, destruction and defeat showed their face to the people of Islam.

In none of the accounts referred to above are the consequences of the Battle of Lepanto assessed. The sources of the defeat are put down to the incidental factors such as the unusually early departure of the fleet from Istanbul in the spring, the exhaustion of the crews as a result of a long period of operations on the sea, the desertion of the timariot cavalry, the shortage of man power etc. They unanimously attribute the defeat to commanders in charge of the navy. Between the lines criticism of the appointment procedures of the high ranking military officials is found. None of the sources give any credit to the opponent. They neither talk about the efficiency of the commanding lines nor mention the superior capacity of the ships in the allied fleet. Almost all see the confrontation as one between Muslims and Christians.