[Marcus Marulus]

A bit from the history of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations, with special emphasis on Kosovo.

RAD Background Report/91
(Albania)
2 June 1975

KOSOVO: AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

By Louis Zaaga

Summary: Yugoslavia and Albania are currently pursuing a policy
of rapprochement, A new feature is the emergence of Kosovo as
a key factor in relations between them. Tito's recent visit to
the province and a number of events connected with important
anniversaries both there and in Yugoslavia as a whole have
provided opportunities for declarations of good will and of
determination that the improvement in relations shall continue.

* * *

It has been clear for some time that Yugoslavia is anxious to "normalize"
its relations with Albania, and a crucial role in this process appears to have
been assigned to Kosovo, a virtually autonomous province that is formally part
of the Republic of Serbia and has a predominantly Albanian population.
The selection of Kosovo for this role is not without its irony. In the
past the province has been a major source of friction between Belgrade and
Tirana, and only in comparatively recent years has the neglect that made it
one of the least developed regions of Europe been replaced by concern for its
economic development and political status. These changes, coupled with
apprehensiveness felt in both Yugoslavia and Albania over possible Soviet moves in
the Balkans, have made the province an obvious choice as a catalyst for the
dissolution of past mistrust and the encouragement of rapprochement.

Tito's Visit: The Growing Importance of Kosovo

During the first week of April 1975, President Tito paid a two-day visit
to Kosovo, his fourth to date and his second in the past four years. This fact
alone is clear evidence of the Yugoslav central authorities' concern over the
province's knotty internal problems, such as an obstinately low economic growth
rate, and of their recognition of its growing political stature.

Shortly before going to Kosovo, Tito visited the Republic of Macedonia and
took the occasion to criticize Bulgaria's attempts to belittle Yugoslavia's
contribution to victory in World War II. His tone contrasted markedly with the
friendliness he displayed toward Albania during his stay in Kosovo and the
difference is a clear indication that perceptions of Soviet intentions in the

[page 2]

Balkans have tended to throw Yugoslavia and Albania together, while relations
between Belgrade and Sofia continue to be cool.

Tito's main speech in Kosovo was delivered at a gathering of the
province's activists [1] and he prefaced his comments on Yugoslav-Albanian
relations with a warning about Kosovo's vulnerability to attack by both internal
and external enemies; an unstable Kosovo could seriously prejudice the
internal cohesion of Yugoslavia, he said:

Yugoslavia is faced by enemies whose common goal is to destroy
the country and its people. Among them are people who have
chosen Kosovo as a focal point for their attempts to undermine
the whole country. I wish to add my voice to those who declare
that the problems of Kosovo are not confined to the province
and the Republic of Serbia but concern the entire country.

This sounded like an oblique reminder to the rest of Yugoslavia, and in
particular to the richer northern republics, that Kosovo's difficulties must
be taken more seriously, since they are a potential threat to the whole
country. It has become apparent in recent years that quite a number of people
have no wish to become involved in what they consider to be Kosovo's
insoluble problems -- in particular, they do not want to provide the investment
resources the province so badly needs. Tito's comments were probably intended
as a broad hint to such persons.

Certainly, his words evoked an immediate response: the Belgrade
parliament debated Kosovo's problems soon after the president's return, and the tone
of the discussion was more urgent than is customary when the province's affairs
are under review. One deputy said that the measures so far proposed would
"fail to make up for lost time"; another noted that Kosovo's per capita income
is only about 30 per cent of the national average; and a third complained that
in the past there had been much talk of "special" and "speedier" action but
that little had happened. Finally, a deputy from Slovenia said that his
republic intended to translate words into deeds -- a delegation from Slovenia
would visit Kosovo in the near future to discuss "concrete issues." [2]
Obviously, time is working against the province, and, although some cynics
believe that the wealthy northern republics are not averse to seeing Kosovo's
poverty act as a drain on the resources of the powerful Republic of Serbia, it
seem unlikely that the deputies were merely attempting to stall off action by
their statements of concern.

To return to Tito's speech: the Yugoslav leader devoted a large part of
what he said to relations between Belgrade and Tirana, and warned that Kosovo's
role as a bridge-builder cannot be taken for granted. While welcoming what had
been done, he said that "Yugoslavia's enemies are stubbornly drawing all sorts
of conclusions about Kosovo and our relations with Albania." Apart from any
enemies outside the country, Tito may have had in mind here certain elements
in Belgrade and in Serbia who possible view with skepticism and apprehension
the contacts between Pristina and Tirana. The improvement in Yugoslav-Albanian
relations, he said, was due to a common desire to maintain national independence,

-----------------------------

(1) Rilindja a daily published in Pristina, the capital of the province,
5 April 1975.

(2) Ibid., 16, 25, and 26 April 1975.

[page 3]

but he rebuked Tirana mildly for its failure to stop even "those few attacks"
that have been made on Yugoslavia in recent times.

In general, however, his tone was conciliatory: "let us not be too
sensitive," he said, and went on to urge the Kosovo leadership to make a "further
contribution" toward the improvement of relations with Albania. Tito stressed
that "what unites the two countries is more important than what divides them"
-- a significant comment at a time when both are showing signs of uneasiness
about the threat (real or imagined) from the northeast.

Tito ended by stating that the improvement of Yugoslav-Albanian relations
must be considered a key factor in the peace of the Balkans:

If the two countries were to start quarreling with each other,
many others would try to get into the act. But our common
interests are so great (and I am sure the Albanian leaders
realize this) that I believe the relationship will develop to
our mutual benefit.

By extending the olive branch in this way, Tito was reciprocating a
gesture made in 1974, when Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu made self-interested but
obviously sincere overtures to Belgrade and expressed their wish for "full
solidarity" in the event of external aggression. [3] The Yugoslav president
underlined his good will by devoting part of his brief sojourn to a visit to
a war memorial in honor of Yugoslavs and Albanians who lost their lives during
World War II. Such a gesture will not be overlooked by the Albanian leadership.

Tito's personal concern for Kosovo's welfare and status, to which his
visits and regular contacts with the province's leaders in Belgrade bear
witness, has probably played a decisive role in its rise to autonomy. The local
leaders in Pristina have made it abundantly clear that in their view the
majority of the citizens acknowledge the Yugoslav president's personal involvement
and appreciate his backing. For example, Rilindja [4] recently carried an
interview with the chairman of the Kosovo Provincial Presidium, Xhevat Nimani,
whose title summed up its contents: "Everything Accomplished in Kosovo Has
Been Achieved by Tito's New Yugoslavia"; Bahri Oruci, the head of the Kosovo
trade unions, declared that "all our victories are linked with the name of
Tito" [5]; and the president of the Provincial Assembly, Iliaz Kurtesi,
??aimed that "all the progress made in the material and social development of
Kosovo is the work of Comrade Tito and the League of Communist of Yugoslavia."[6]
Such an attitude goes a long way to explain Tito's reliance on the predominantly
Albanian leadership of Pristina, with a young intellectual named Mahmut Bakalli
at its head, and his willingness to let them run the complex affairs of the
province fairly independently -- provided, of course, that Belgrade's
requirements are met.

-----------------------------

(3) See Louis Zanga, "The Albanian Leadership at the Crossroads?" Research
Report No. 2132, Radio Free Europe Research, 6 November 1974.

(4) 8 May 1975.

(5) Rilindja, 19 April 1975.

(6) Ibid., 20 April 1975.

[page 4]

Bakall's Speech

While introducing Tito, Bakalli took the occasion to deliver a lengthy
report on the general situation in Kosovo, including an evaluation of its
relations with Albania. [7] Rarely has a Kosovar official spoken so openly about
this question, and it was clear from what he said that Yugoslav-Albanian
affairs were to take a high place on the agenda for Tito's visit. Bakalli affirmed
that the role and responsibility assigned to the province by the new
Constitution enabled it to play a more active part in Yugoslavia's foreign affairs,
especially in seeking friendly contacts with other countries. This
co-operation is likely to grow, he said, and a large number of specialists are being
trained for the work. He told Tito:

Starting from our known principles and positions, and encouraged
by your personal understanding of our interest in and special
efforts to co-operate with foreign countries, we can claim that
in recent years there has been a normalization of relations
between Yugoslavia and Albania, brought about by the continued
successful development of contacts between them. The process
has been primarily motivated by each country's long-term
interests and desire to defend its independence.

Lake the Yugoslav president himself, Bakalli used the "independence"
argument to justify a political accommodation with Tirana, arid his moderation of
tone here contrasted sharply with his bluntness in dealing with the province's
internal problems: "We may face major sociopolitical clashes now or in the
future because of the failure to develop Kosovo more rapidly."

In dealing with Pristina's direct contacts with Tirana, Bakalli said that
this policy was necessitated by the special position of the province vis-a-vis
Albania -- notably in the field of cultural and scientific co-operation. These
contacts had enabled Kosovo to help familiarize Albania with "the successes of
socialist construction" in Yugoslavia, and to "create and build up trust"
between the two countries. He then took the unusual step of divulging certain
"irregularities" that had marred the early stages of Kosovar-Albanian
collaboration. He may have done this in order to mollify those Yugoslavs (mainly
Serbs) who look askance at what is going on in Kosovo. He admitted that there
had been some "confusion, disorganization, and haste" in the early days, which
had been brought under control by the party. In the future, he said, the party
will be on its guard against "potentially subversive ideological, political,
nationalist, and other similar tendencies" in the field of relations with
Albania. Presumably the early stages of rapprochement induced a certain
euphoria, to the chagrin of the non-Albanian ethnic element in Kosovo, and
Bakalli was apparently claiming success for the local leadership in damping
down this reaction and implying that it therefore deserves Belgrade's
continued trust and support.

Looking to the future, Bakalli said that, while cultural co-operation
with Albania will continue, the main emphasis will be on economic
collaboration. Surprisingly enough, Albania's trade with Kosovo has failed to reflect
the upward trend experienced in its commerce with Yugoslavia as a whole, an
anomaly partly explicable by the province's low level of industrialization.
This situation should change for the better in the near future, and Bakalli

-----------------------------

(7) Ibid., 4 April 1975.

[page 5]

emphasized that Kosovo's collaboration with Albania must develop in parallel
with that of the rest of Yugoslavia; it follows, he said, that the various
republics must become more deeply involved if Albanian-Kosovar co-operation
is to flourish. What he meant, plainly, was that only an economically
thriving Kosovo can achieve such co-operation, and that the republics must
contribute to the province's economic growth.

The local leaders' emphasis on Tito's personal contribution to Kosovo's
emergence from its former lowly state has already been noted They are equally
eager to stress his involvement in the Albanian-Kosovar relationship. Kurtesi,
for instance, during a meeting with the editors of Rilindja, [8] spoke of the
"extraordinary and many-sided significance" of the president's visit to Kosovo.
He added that "the climate today is such that steps will be taken soon to
improve relations still further,"

Dolanc Recognizes Albania's Wartime Role

Stane Dolanc, LGY CC Presidium member and secretary of the Executive
Committee, made some frinedly references to Albania's contribution to the defeat
of Nazi Germany in a recent interview with the Yugoslav press, [9] What he
said has no direct connection with Albanian-Kosovar relations, but is
important within the general context of Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement. He stated
that the Albanian people, "led by its communist party," had resisted the
Italian invasion from its inception (i.e., from 7 April 1939), and went on:

Between 1941 and 1945, the Albanian people joined en masse in
the armed struggle for national liberation. The partisan units
and battalions formed in 1942 merged into the Albanian National
Liberation Army, which in November 1944 numbered 70,000 men and
women. This army fought a series of battles that resulted in
heavy human and material losses; in the course of them, 40,000
Albanians fell or were wounded.

Dolanc also mentioned, that Albanians fought with the Yugoslav National
Liberation Army.

Yugoslavia thus became the only East European country to mention, apropos
the 30th anniversary of V-E day, Albania's contribution to victory, and this
at a time when Belgrade was showing considerable annoyance at Soviet attempts
to belittle the Yugoslavs' own wartime efforts. The Albanians had already
defended their contribution in typically outspoken style; an editorial in
Zeri i Popullit [10] rejected attempts by "revisionist generals" to
"absolutize" the Soviet role in the defeat of the Nazis, and said that there were
those in the Balkan Peninsula "who did not wait until the fall of 1944 to
rise against fascism." The Soviet Army was well aware that "in the mountains
of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece . . . thousands upon thousands of people
were giving their lives to make it easier for them [the Soviet Army] to
repulse the Nazi attack." Yugoslav and Albanian reactions to the anniversary,
and in particular to its treatment by the USSR, highlight the similarity of
their concern over current Soviet-inspired pressures in the Balkans.

-----------------------------

(8) Ibid., 24 April 1975.

(9) Ibid., 4 May 1975.

(10) 20 April 1975.

[page 6]

Dolanc's gesture is of some significance for the future of relations
between Belgrade, Pristina, and Tirana. He was the second highest official to
accompany Tito on his visit to Kosovo in April, which suggests that he takes
a personal interest in the province's affairs, including its direct links with
Albania, and that, if the speculations that he is to be Tito's heir prove
well-founded, he will preserve the continuity of current policy in this sphere in
the post-Tito era.

Yugoslav-Albanian Solidarity in Face of External Threats

Much has been written about the long and bitter feud between Belgrade and
Tirana, but little has been said about the ties that have bound them together
when confronted with a common threat -- notably during the 1939-1945 war.
Recently, however, the two countries have soft-pedaled their differences and
made much of what they have in common. Is this merely a reaction to the 30th
anniversary celebrations, with their evocation of "battles long ago," or is it
a response to a present threat which both Yugoslavia and Albania believe to be
real and menacing? The latter seems the more likely hypothesis and, since the
polemics during the anniversary commemoration were directed mainly against
Moscow -- bluntly (as usual) by Tirana and rather more subtly by Belgrade --
it is clear that any potential challenge to their independence is believed by
both countries to emanate from the Soviet Union. Hence the revival of memories
of their joint response to the threat posed by one superpower 30 years ago at
a time when they believe themselves endangered by another; and hence too the
new, unexpected significance of Kosovo in the changing pattern of Balkan policy.
In recent months the anniversary of the end of the war in Europe has
provided a suitable occasion for tributes to the solidarity between the two
countries in face of external danger. Earlier this year the Tirana party daily
carried an article on Albania's contribution to the fighting inside Yugoslavia
in the closing stages of the war; it was entitled "A Fine Gesture of
Proletarian Internationalism," [11] and stated that 15,000 Albanians had joined
their "brethren" in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia in a number of battles
against the retreating enemy. Certainly, the Albanian media have in the past
made much of this contribution to the common cause, but the present publicity
is directed at a different target -- it emphasizes Albania's earlier solidarity
with Yugoslavia rather than the national glory of its own past.

Yugoslavia has acknowledged its neighbor's help in the last days of the
war, and Tito himself spoke of it during a recent television interview:

I would also like to recall the part played by a number of units
of the Albanian National Liberation Army in the struggle on our
own territory. By mutual agreement they joined our forces in
opposing the Germans, the Ballists, and the Chetniks in Western
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and on toward Bosnia. After the
battles -- again in accordance with previous agreements -- they
returned to Albania. [12]

Expressions of solidarity have been backed up by deeds, symbolic but
important. In March of this year agreement was reached on the return of the remains

-----------------------------

(11) Zeri i Popullit, 15 February 1975.

(12) Rilindja, 9 May 1975.

[page 7]

of Albanians who fell in these battles to their native land; the transfer is
to be completed by October 31. During the signing of the protocol in Belgrade,
the Yugoslav delegate, Nevenka Novakovic, drew attention to its significance;
the agreement, she said, coincided with the 30th anniversary of the victory
over fascism, "in which the peoples of Yugoslavia and Albania played an
important role." [13]

Commemoration of Popovic1s Death

Another anniversary with overtones of Yugoslav-Albanian solidarity was
celebrated during March in Kosovo -- the 30th anniversary of the death of
Miladin Popovic, [14] secretary of the Kosovo-Metohija provincial committee
of what was then the Yugoslav Communist Party.

Popovic, born in Kosovo but of Montenegrin stock, was fluent in the
Albanian language -- an important accomplishment for non-Albanian officials in
Kosovo -- and was acclaimed as a supporter of the rights of Albanian nationals
in the province. He was chosen personally by Tito to help found the Albanian
Communist Party and the subsequent Albanian National Liberation Movement. [15]
The YCP also sent Dusan Mugosa and Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo to help in this
work, but Popovic, unlike them, was and still is popular with the Albanians,
and is said to have developed a close friendship with Hoxha. The line that
Tirana draws between Popovic and these other two figures from the past was
clearly demonstrated in a recent article by Stefanaq Polio, a member of the
Albanian Academy of Sciences, which appeared in a journal intended for foreign
readers. [16] He said:

The importance and role of Albanian-Yugoslav collaboration in
the struggle against the common enemy, the fascist invader, is
well known, as is the view taken by Albanian historians of the
work of the representative sent by the Yugoslav Communist Party,
Miladin Popovic. But the memoirs of Vukmanovic-Tempo and
Mugosa dealing with events in Albania are riddled with the idea
-- as false as it is vain -- that every good and valuable
achievement, every important military or political success during the
War of National Liberation, was the result of their invervention.

It is not surprising to learn that neither Vukmanovic-Tempo nor Mugosa was
present at the Pristina meeting in honor of Pppovic's memory.

-----------------------------

(13) Ibid., 4 March 1975.

(14) His assassination remains shrouded in mystery. Bakalli said during the
commemorative meeting that "the arm of the enemy and of
counterrevolution" had stretched forth and encompassed his death, but the Albanian
version is that he was killed in a plot "planned by the Yugoslav secret
service" (Historia e Partise se Punes te Shqiperise ["History of the
Albanian Workers' Party], Tirana: Nairn Frashreri Publishing House,
1968, p. 177).

(15) According to Bakalli, Tito dispatched his emissaries to Albania at the
request of the Comintern. Popovic was arrested in Albania in July 1941,
but was freed by the Albanian Communists soon afterward.

(16) Albania Today No. l/75.

[page 8]

Bakalli's long speech on that occasion read like a revised version of the
history of Yugoslav-Albanian collaboration during a critical phase of the two
countries' histories, [17] and the slant he gave his remarks may have been
designed to foster good relations between Kosovo and Albania. His most
striking point, however, was the suggestion that the proper lesson to draw from
Popovic's "internationalist contribution" of 30 years ago is that wartine
cooperation set an example for the present day. Popovic, he said, had devoted
most of his life to building confidence and respect "on an internationalist
basis" between the peoples and the Communists of the two nations. Firm
foundations for collaboration were laid during the War of National Liberation, during
the two countries' socialist revolutions, and in the struggle against the
common enemy, and Popovic had made an "extraordinarily powerful contribution" to
the joint struggle. Bakalli went on:

Long-term possibilities of fuller co-operation undoubtedly exist
between the two countries, which will deepen the trust and
good-neighborly relations that obtain between them. Our position is
the result of the principles on which our foreign policy is based
-- principles of nonalignment, resistance to imperialism and
hegemony, a refusal to yield to bloc policies, and a readiness
to engage in co-operation with nonaligned, independent, and
developing countries. The foundation and guiding star of
good-neighborly collaboration between Yugoslavia and Albania must be those
positive and shining moments in the past which help to remove
everything that creates division and lack of confidence. The
shared struggle against a common enemy and our shared losses are
the charter for further and deeper co-operation. The
revolutionary personality and work of Miladin Popovic are the best
symbol of good-neighborly collaboration, of trust and unity between
the nationalities of Yugoslavia and the peoples of Albania.

Conclusion

Recent events in Yugoslavia and its protestations of solidarity with
Albania provide ample evidence of the seriousness of Belgrade's intention to
pursue a pro-Albanian policy, and Kosovo has obviously been assigned an
important role in its implementation. The Albanians have been characteristically
more cautious in their approach to the improvement of relations with their
neighbor, but their leaders have made it clear on several occasions that
today, more than at any time since the end of the war, it is imperative for the
two countries to march in step. As already noted, this was demonstrated by
Hoxha�s self-interested but sincere overtures in his October 1974 speech,
which was probably the catalyst of the gestures of friendship reviewed in
this paper.

The new feature of the situation is the emergence of Kosovo as a common
denominator of relations between the two countries, with a role to play out
of proportion to the province1s size. This is a new and important development
in the Balkans, and it has probably been precipitated largely by a perception
of Soviet-inspired pressures on a traditionally restless part of the European
continent.

- end -

-----------------------------

(17) Rilind.ja, 14 March 1975.

[source]